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
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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

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MODERN THOUGHT.

BY REV. RANSOM BETHUNE WELCH, D.D., LL.D., PROFESSOR IN UNION
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IN the strife of theories, both science and faith should be saved from confusion. Carefully, at least, if not repeatedly, should we take our bearings, that we may the better detect the drift of modern thought, and distinguish the course of false thinking from that of the true.

At the outset, it is obvious to remark, but it is important to remember, that thought has its laws as fixed as those of material nature — perhaps comprehending the laws of nature and confirming the laws of faith.

The primary law of thought is the recognition of existence; the existence of the thinker, and then of the act of thinking as involving content. This is illustrated by the proposition *cogito*, expressing the simplest judgment. Whatever may be thought of Descartes' familiar enthymeme, *cogito ergo sum*, to which we do not refer, the proposition *cogito* (I think), illustrates this primary law which thought implicitly follows in the simplest judgment, *I am* thinking. In the simplest and earliest thought, then, there is by inevitable law the consciousness of existence and action — of the thinker thinking.

But more than this, there cannot be thought without content, and the primary law involves this, that in every

thought there shall be the thinker, the thinking, and the theme; the agent and the content, the subject and the object, to both of which the thinking relates. This primary law is so comprehensive that if the mere phenomenon seem to furnish the content, the law is not satisfied. It claims more than this, viz. some substance underlying the phenomenon, as well as some person originating the act of thinking. So scrupulous is this fundamental law of thought, in each direction requiring reality, implying that there cannot be an appearing or manifesting without some *thing* which furnishes the appearance or manifestation. Even Herbert Spencer admits, asserts, this to the confusion of Comte and Mill and Lewes and all mere phenomenologists. There must be a seeing self or mind as well as an object seen. For example, a sensation or impression cannot be, unless there be something to produce the sensation or impression; and more, something to cognize the impression or sensation. Without a mind to receive, there could be no appearing in the universe, no manifestation. So that at the outset, we find a certain modern system, in both directions violating this primary law, and therefore doomed to self-renunciation or to self-destruction.

Let valiant knight-errants of science who would fiercely slay theologians and metaphysicians, on the right hand and on the left, sheathe their swords. Their own safety and the higher interest of science will be promoted by peace rather than by Quixotic warfare. Mr. Spencer's advice to scientists is timely and significant: "He who contemplates the universe from the scientific point of view, must learn to see . . . that religion must be treated, as a subject of science, with no more prejudice than any other reality."¹

Even Mr. Mill admits that "there are laws of thought and of feeling which rest on experimental evidence which are a clue to the interpretation of ourselves and others. Such laws, so far forth, make psychology a positive science, as certain as chemistry."² According to the involuntary confession of

¹ First Principles, p. 21.

² See his Inaugural Address at the University of St. Andrew.

the "straitest of the sect" of inductionists, then, we shall, as we advance, meet with other laws of thought.

Knowledge begins in consciousness. Without consciousness knowledge were impossible. Whether or not suggested by Socrates, at least since the time of Descartes this principle has been admitted. In regard to knowledge, then, the subjective factor is primary and chief, and is to be studied first and chiefly, if we would ascertain what can be known and how it can be known. What then is the scope of our knowledge? Evidently, the scope of our consciousness. Whatever may be presented to consciousness may become matter of knowledge.

We have already seen that the primary law of thought is that there must be both content of thought, and agent—something which thinks and something about which it thinks. Now what and whence and how is the content furnished? Whether these essential questions can be answered *a priori* we do not stop to inquire. We, at least, will make the approach to the answer *a posteriori*, and by the process of observation, which the most fastidious Comtean must approve, detect the law which regulates thinking in relation both to the agent and to the content.

Starting with simple apprehension, we pass, by a process of the judgment, from premise to premise, and thus to conclusion. This, which is completed reasoning, may be in the line of analysis or synthesis, from the general to the particular, or from the particular to the general, and so be legitimate reasoning, either deductive or inductive. These laws developed into a science constitute logic. To ascertain these logical laws, and properly to apply them, is the appropriate work of thinkers in any and in every age. To invent a new, another logic, and call it a science, is quite incompetent for any thought in any age. The simple apprehension of terms—the first elements of knowledge—belongs to the mind alone; but it is dependent upon the presentation. The senses are to do at least a part of this important service; and the apprehension, without which the presentation can be of no avail,

the mental apprehension, must be intuitive. The senses, in this presentation, must be supervised by some higher faculty which must evermore verify for the sense, so as to correct for the mind the faulty presentation of a sense, and confirm the true — as in the opposite cases of healthy condition and of nervous derangement, or when the medium for the action of sense is at fault, as in beholding a distant star whose light has been millions of years coming through space, coming to report to us the position of the star in the heavens, — not its present position, but the position it held ten thousand centuries ago.

Sense is not only unable to verify for itself, its report may be actually false ; e.g. sight reports as the present place of Sirius that which it occupied five millions (?) of years ago, and from which place during this immense period it has been steadily hastening away. Ratiocination, having from the higher laws of astronomy deduced the distance, orbit, and motion of this planet, and the velocity of light, corrects and adjusts the report of sense and tells us the real position which the planet now occupies. Our eyes hail the morning and report the sunrise. But eight minutes have actually elapsed since the sun rose above our horizon ; and, again, ratiocination must correct and adjust the report of sense and verify for the mind the knowledge thus imperfectly presented. Sense says the sun rises, the sun sets, daily performing its revolution round the earth. But this report of sense must be corrected by some higher mental faculty before it is accepted by precise science and properly announced as the diurnal revolution of the earth upon its axis. The sailing ship is not where the sense reports it, nor is the floating cloud, nor the flying bird. Our friend receding or advancing is not where we see him, nor is our foe. The lightning flash deceives the eye ; the thunder's roar deceives the ear. Did the soldier or the sailor trust to sight or sound, disaster would prevail on land and sea ; defeat would take the place of victory.

Instead, then, of sense being competent to verify to the mind all our knowledge, it cannot always verify even for

itself. Its very reports cannot be relied upon. In the instances just cited — and these are but samples of unnumbered instances — we must needs call in our reasoning faculty, the understanding, to rectify and adjust and verify for sense. Reason supervises both, and as between the two decides that the conclusion attested by the higher faculty is to be accepted as valid. And, whatever the pretension of some “advanced thinker” or scientific *coterie*, the world confirms the decision as rational. And now if this be clear and trustworthy, that while sense (sight, hearing, etc.) reports mere phenomena, mere qualities and attributes, but not any subject to which the attributes belong, not any substance in which qualities inhere, nor any cause which produces the phenomena, the reasoning faculty — the understanding — has the competency and the right to supply this deficiency — to correct again and adjust this report of sense, and affirm to the mind with an authority which gives higher knowledge than mere sense can give — knowledge of attributes and subject, of qualities and substance, effect and cause; i.e. that thinking is done by a thinker; that extension belongs to a body; that effect is related to its cause. Here, again, reason supervises the work of both, and as between the two decides that the conclusion attested by the higher faculty is to be accepted as valid. And, whatever the pretension of some “advanced thinker” or scientific *coterie*, the world confirms the decision as rational.

While, then, we admit and affirm what every experiential or sense-philosopher will assert, that the senses present to the mind elements of knowledge; we deny what some of these philosophers assert, that the senses alone can give, and can verify our knowledge.

In tracing the laws of thought we are now prepared to take another step forward.

The reasoning faculty, the understanding, may also present to the mind elements of knowledge deduced from observation and experience. For example, by the argument from progressive approach, the law of motion, or the law of attraction,

may be thus presented : that a body cannot stop or put itself in motion, and that all bodies gravitate toward each other. No sense has discovered these conclusions or can verify them. Nevertheless they are laid down as established principles in science. These are among a thousand illustrations which might be given. This second mode of presentation as supervised by the reason is pronounced rational. The elements of knowledge as thus presented and thus supervised are accepted by the mind as verified knowledge. This, we see at once, is a larger field of knowledge than the former while it is certainly none the less trustworthy, perhaps less liable to suspicion and vacillation.

But, does not reason, also, present elements of knowledge for the intuitive apprehension of the mind—as intuitive as in the case of sense presentation? An effect, which the sight presents for intuitive beholding by the mind, is no less directly presented by the reason as necessarily produced by a cause, and this whether it be the first or the last effect ever presented by the sense.

The wind blows, as the sense affirms to the mind; but sense cannot go beyond the effect. Reason, however, as quickly affirms that this effect must have a cause; and the mind as intuitively sees the latter truth through reason as the former truth through sense, and holds the latter truth, to say the least, as certainly and as firmly as the former. Again, the sense cannot see or feel or taste or smell space, yet it affirms extension—material extension, as of some body great or small—which the mind intuitively perceives through the sense. But reason as quickly affirms space in which such body may be extended—a space in which all bodies may be extended—even universal limitless space, which no sense can verify, but which the mind sees as intuitively through the reason as it saw through the sense a body extended. Indeed, the latter may have been a fancy, the fancy of a disordered sense; the former is a fact beyond all possible doubt or uncertainty. Events illustrate the same truth. The event is reported to the mind, reported by the sense, for intuitive

perceiving; but no sense can affirm the time in which the event occurred. Time transcends the cognizance of any sense. Neither sight nor touch nor taste can detect it. But reason as quickly, as certainly, affirms a time for the occurrence of this event,—time for the occurrence of every event,—time universal, limitless; and the mind as intuitively beholds this through the reason as the other through the sense. Indeed the sense may be at fault in respect to the specific event; but the reason is at no fault in regard to time. The mind holds the latter knowledge at least as certain as the former. If it be said that the sense verifies for itself in regard to the things of sense and the mind accepts this intuitively (a statement which we might question, but which we do not now stop to challenge); may we not say with higher certainty that the reason verifies for itself in regard to the things of reason, a verification which the mind accepts as the clearest intuition and as of supreme authority? We may apply the same principle to quality and substance, phenomena and subject, effect and cause, axiom and corollary.

The inevitable conclusion, then, is that sense is not the only agency which presents to the mind elements of knowledge. Reason is a surer, if not a more fertile, source of knowledge. Again, sense is not the only means of verification. Reason is as prompt to verify, and no less competent. Sense, perchance, may verify for the things of sense. It may compare sensation with sensation, as touch with sight, or sight with sound; but, at best, how do these gross sensations differ, while, often, they cannot avail to help each other, as in the instance of sight and smell, or taste and touch—in the universe of color, or in the vast realm of astronomy. So the verification of sense is ever exposed to error and attended with more or less of mental misgiving, until a higher faculty has been called in to decide the case. Indeed, the very ground for any confidence in induction and generalization, viz. the uniformity of the course of nature, is a ground which no sense can furnish and no sense can verify. Withdraw this ground and all the superstructure of induction becomes insubstantial and “like the baseless fabric of a vision.”

On the other hand, reason verifies for the things of reason with an authority which does not require the attestation of a lower faculty to confirm ; nor does it allow the intermeddling of subordinates. Reason may, does, accept the sympathetic attestation of conscience, and the responsive assurance of faith, and the concurrent testimonials of analogy and order and design from ten thousand thousand voices which fill the universe. Now thinkers, ancient or modern, who, in obedience to mental laws, have employed these modes of presenting knowledge to the mind, and these modes of verification, and these processes of thought, inductive or deductive, analytic or synthetic, are justified in their work. No arbitrary method in the interests of a particular theory or school can be foisted into scientific service to displace or exclude the method which the common consciousness approves, and which the ages of serious and sincere thinking have employed and established. Such a change, if violently precipitated, would be not a revolution, but a rebellion, against the laws of mind — a rebellion to be suppressed by the united force of loyal thought. We would be, we are, no less alert to note the testimony of sense and to encourage scientific observation and experiment than are the positivists. We use the results differently, perhaps, while we claim a criterion at once higher and surer. Within the scope of our theory we embrace all the positive knowledge, all the positive science, which they can get ; and by our theory we are authorized to get more.

The advances of modern science in every direction are to be hailed with sincere gratification by every true thinker. Its real successes cannot be appropriated and monopolized by any clique or class or country ; they belong alike to the world. Everywhere they help the better to interpret the laws which pervade material nature, and to satisfy the philosophic longing of the human soul to know things in their causes, contributing to extend and unify that knowledge in the realm of thought and the realm of force, everywhere revealing more fully the reign of law and the prevalence of order. As true science is evermore consistent with itself

(since it is the knowledge of a higher and all-surrounding harmony), its present successes do not annul those of the past, nor demand that we relinquish what has been gained in order to receive what is being secured. Its real office is not to destroy, but to conserve; reverently to guard, reverently to gain. Entertaining evermore this twofold purpose, and cherishing this genuine spirit of science, he is the best modern thinker who is grateful for the past and hopeful for the future, with mind alert, actively awaiting every presentation of knowledge by the lower intuitions of sense, by the higher intuitions of reason, and by the logical deductions from both. It is evident from this threefold presentation of knowledge that science is by no means restricted to the narrow circle of sense. To change the figure, the great superstructure of knowledge which the individual and the universal mind are uniting to rear is based not upon sense alone, but upon the triple foundation of sense, understanding, and reason; reason being the corner-stone.

In the process of knowledge, especially in the scientific process, ratiocination, or understanding, supports sense, gives it significance, and makes it serviceable to science by arranging in order the incoherent reports of each sense and of all the senses, reducing them to results, connecting them to conclusions. With sense alone there could be no science. However strong were the sight, though it could penetrate like the glance of the eagle, undazzled by the noontide blaze of the sun; however acute were the hearing, though it could detect the harmony of the spheres, as in concentric circles they glide through outlying realms of space; though touch and taste and smell were intensified a thousand and a thousandfold; yet, with mere sense and without understanding there would be, there could be, no classification, no judgments, no generalizations, no advance toward science. Reason, in the meantime, supervises the whole process that it be rational, not fanciful; that science itself be not the slave of tyranny nor the dupe of superstition; and that sense become not false through fear, nor imbecile through inaction, nor

blunted by age, nor drowned in dissipation and maddened with delirium. If reason be enthroned in the soul, its light and guidance penetrate the understanding and pervade the sense; both become rational; and man is exalted to his proper place, a different and a higher sphere than that of the animal, and in the right of his own excellence holds dominion. But, if reason be dethroned, human knowledge can be no longer verified; sense and understanding both wander, lost, without the light and without a guide; and man is inferior to the meanest brute. In the exercise of these threefold powers, man is conscious of their possession. He needs no argument to make that possession more apparent, while no argument can lessen his assurance. But more than this, he clearly sees the propriety of this threefold possession. He needs the senses to commune with the outer world, to know its varied phenomena, and to satisfy his physical wants. He needs the understanding to prepare him for scientific knowledge and intellectual advancement. He needs reason to satisfy the demands of conscience and the longings of faith; and, as he holds himself and others morally responsible, to fit him for moral responsibility. This is the more apparent, since, by universal consent, when reason fails man ceases to be held responsible. He may be confined, commiserated, or cast out; but he is not held responsible.

There need, then, be no conflict between true science and true religion. The conflict has been between scientists and religionists. The best thinkers have often been the most devout. Trite as the saying has become, it is no less true, and Baconians at least should not object to its repetition, "Depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds back to religion." Science and religion heartily bid each other good-speed. Religion has served science, and certainly science, especially modern science, with and without intent, is doing much-needed and lasting service to religion in the increasing demonstration it affords of order, "Heaven's first law," and in the steady advance toward higher and still higher unification of knowledge, unmistakably indicating what reli-

gion has uniformly maintained: that there is a uni-verse, giving new and still newer significance to that term held in common both by science and religion — the universe.

It is, then, the more remarkable with what refinement of self-conceit a certain set of thinkers now-a-days monopolize the merit of modern thought, and gratuitously assume that all other thinking in these times is archaic and obsolete; who talk boastingly of philosophical radicalism that shall reverse the world's estimate of more than twenty centuries, proclaim a new definition of truth, ostracize the old leaders, repudiate and banish the established method of thought, and reconstruct the whole empire of knowledge;¹ who ostentatiously parade a "New Philosophy"; and consistently with such pretension sneer at conservative thought as superstitious veneration for the past, arrogating to themselves the purpose and the spirit of progress; who would confine science to the field of experience — the field of sense — and then patronize this bantling as the sum of all knowledge and as their own private possession. Lest their bantling be not sufficiently dwarfed, they talk evermore of material science, as if science were only material.² Sometimes, in more liberal mood, they mention both mind and matter, but both attenuated to the slightest phenomenal consistency (Mill); while, in severer moods, they declare feeling and even thought to be material secretions of the brain, as the liver secretes bile (Vogt, etc.).

From such premises, self-styled modern thought would proceed to divorce science and Christianity as incompatible, framing its bill of indictment, and trumping up its testimony in irrelevant and inconsequential conflicts between science and religion. With inflamed zeal it would banish theology as a hoary intruder upon the domain of scientific thought, slay theologians as enemies of scientific progress, and brand metaphysics as an outlaw doomed to fetters and perpetual imprisonment. Having thus cleared the field, it would consummate the new regime by enthroning "The New Philosophy."

¹ See Comte, and Lewes, and positivists everywhere.

² See Büchner, Moleschott, Maudsley, and Virchow, etc.

The effrontery of such pretension becomes more manifest when we remember that the greatest philosophers of modern times, like Newton and Bacon and Locke and Leibnitz and Descartes and Kepler and Galileo, have been sincere Christians, and that the greatest thinkers of all times have been most earnest believers in the supernatural; and still more manifest, when we remember that the greatest theologians, like Augustine and Calvin and Edwards and Bishop Butler and Chalmers, have been valiant champions of progress; while Christianity has been the very parent of modern civilization, more industrious in its promotion than any other agent, and more successful than all other agencies, and most industrious and most successful when most thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Christ, the Master; seeking to-day with sublime zeal and courage and self-denial to extend Christian civilization and Christian progress over all the earth; desiring at once to plant the school and the church everywhere, at home and abroad; and still more remarkable, when we remember that Christianity, not satisfied with even the present degree of progress, points to the better time coming, when the knowledge of the Lord shall fill the whole earth; bids us, as sons of God, "Be strong and of good courage," "laying aside the first principles of the doctrine of Christ, go on unto perfection," when, as full inheritors of the truth of God, men shall "grow up into the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ," speaking to us evermore of the supreme value of the soul, and stimulating us and the world evermore with the significant words of Jesus: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"

On the other hand, self-styled modern thought, with shameful contradiction of its pretensions to progress, goes back to heathen scepticism for its philosophy, revives the defunct notions of Democritus and Leucippus, exalts nature above God, and matter above mind, asserts the descent of man from the monkey; and, as if not satisfied with such debasement, declares that the monkey was once a slimy ascidian, and that the ascidian — the low, but living ascidian — had a

spontaneous generation, taking its life from that which was positively and utterly lifeless; so that the human soul and body equally are material and alike subject to death and decay; while "modern thought" completes the vicious circle of contradictions by declaring that the future shall be not a progress, but a regress along the receding curve in the cycle of *evolution* and *revolution*. Such is the pretension and such is the mockery of self-styled modern thought. If this be "advanced thinking," what, we ask, is the direction? What a system, we submit, is this to be proud of! How well it is authorized to despise Christ and Christians, theology and theologians, civilization such as Christianity has produced and perfected, progress such as Christianity promises — il-limitable in the opening field of the future, in a purer moral life and a better moral atmosphere and "a better country, even an heavenly," saying to each and to all evermore: "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect"!

These general criticisms are more than verified by a reference to specific results reached by modern thought in regard to science, philosophy, morals, and religion. This reference must, of course, be restricted by the limits of a review Article; and it need be the less extended by reason of the notoriety industriously given to their conclusions by these new schoolmen.

In science, which is their especial boast, they tell us that we can know nothing but phenomena, their antecedents and sequents. Indeed, this is all we can know of the laws of nature. In fact, this is the law of nature, according to their formal definition — the invariable succession and resemblance of phenomena (Comte and Lewes and Mill). After all the vaunted talk of laws, their sum is this, and nothing more.

According to "modern thought," so extremely tenuous and insubstantial a thing is law. And yet we are told by these "advanced thinkers" not only to study the laws of nature, but to study *only* the laws of nature, since this is all we can know. At the same time, we are oracularly informed that we ourselves are only a series of feelings and sensations,

and that material nature — the universe of worlds — is but the possibility of sensations (See Mr. Mill).

But if "modern thought" makes the realm of knowledge thus phenomenal and fleeting, still more unstable does it make science itself. Even so simple a fact as that $2 + 2 = 4$ they tell us is not fixed, but that at some other time or place $2 + 2$ may make 5, that two lines which are parallel may meet somewhere and at some time, and that effects may happen without any cause. Like the old sceptics, they cannot affirm; they cannot deny. In this uncertainty of knowledge, which is more tantalizing than ignorance, "modern thought" is driven like a shuttle, between phantasms without and phantasms within, weaving its own winding-sheet of nescience; so that even Mr. Mill, coolest and steadiest of modern thinkers, as he looks in one direction resolves all knowledge into outward experience, and as he looks in another direction resolves it all into self-knowledge, and then, as he pauses to look at his theory, denies the knowledge of self and the knowledge of things. Driven by his theory of nescience, he concludes, with the notorious sophists of twenty centuries ago, that nothing is truly known; and now, driven by the necessity of thought, or, as he styles it, "irresistible association," he refers every sensation to mind and matter — the subject and object; affirming, "I cannot be conscious of the sensation, without being conscious of it as related to these two things."¹

In his posthumous essay on "Nature," he says: "The nature of a thing means its entire capacity of exhibiting phenomena. Nature means the sum of all phenomena, together with the causes which produce them." Thus, in common with all phenomenologists, he fully recognizes both the principle and the terminology of causation. Yet, driven by his theory, in common with all phenomenologists, he repudiates the principle, and emasculates the term "cause" of its meaning: "I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon."² His logic should have saved him from contra-

¹ Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 214, 215. ² Logic, i. p. 358.

dictions. It should at least have prevented his false play between the general and the special use of such a term as "cause," and from the convenient fallacy of shifting premises. The teacher of logic should not allow his own practice to illustrate the *ignoratio elenchi*. More than this, if he disregards the claim of consistency, he should respect the claim of honesty; and, in a question so manifestly essential, be careful neither to deceive himself nor to mislead others.

Herbert Spencer, driven by the necessity of thought, asserts that "there cannot be appearing without an underlying reality or ground of the appearance, that is unthinkable"¹; — striving thus to give validity to science; and now, driven by his theory of nescience, asserts that the ultimate ground is unknowable, and thus concludes, with the sophists, that nothing is truly known. His whole scientific superstructure, which seemed so fair and firm, only deceives us by concealing from our view the fathomless abyss of nescience; and as we enter it, seeking scientific repose and security, the false foundation suddenly sinks, precipitating us and all into the frightful vortex of the unknown.

Lewes, who, with his modern definition of truth as the order of ideas corresponding to the order of phenomena,² asserts that we know only phenomena, and should therefore study their laws, and would make science at least legitimate, informs us that law is only invariable succession, having no vital connection nor real power. When asked whether there is an external world or an internal conscious being, he replies that we know only phenomena — that whether there is really anything within or anything without, we know not. Driven by his theory of verification, Lewes would make science legitimate. Driven by his theory of nescience, he would make the internal and the external world merely phenomenal, and science itself — however legitimate by hypothesis — invalid in fact; concluding, with the sophists, that nothing is truly known, and even pausing to applaud the sophists in their remarkable conclusion.

¹ First Principles.

² History of Philosophy, i. p. 31.

A single quotation from Mr. Bain must conclude our illustration of science as presented by these "advanced thinkers." As if to outdo the old sophists in this direction, and thus establish some apparent claim to originality for "modern thought," Mr. Bain asserts: "Both as to the reality of matter and as to the reality of spirit, I am incapable of direct knowledge, therefore make no distinction between the knowable and the unknowable."¹ Such is the scope, and such the security of science, according to self-styled "modern thought." What can science such as this avail, even if perfected? Is this the boasted progress of our century? Stripped of its disguises, such thought is not even modern. It is not only ancient, but antiquated.

We are forcibly reminded of Tyndall's truthful confession: "The logical feebleness of science is not sufficiently understood"; and the more forcibly, when we compare the assertions and admissions of the automatic system so pompously presented by modern materialists, like Maudsley: "The formation of an idea is an organic process. Exquisitely delicate is the mental development which takes place in the minute cells of the cortical layers; yet the mysteries of their secret operations cannot be unravelled. Physiology hitherto has been unable to construct a mental science"²; and Carl Vogt: "Thought stands in the same relation to the brain as bile to the liver"; and Moleschott: "Thought is a motion of matter"; and the irrepressible Büchner: "Mental activity is a function of the cerebral substance"; in contrast with Tyndall's acknowledgment that "the molecular groupings and molecular motion of the materialists explain nothing. The problem of the connection of soul and body is as insoluble in its modern form as it was in the pre-scientific ages."

Mr. Huxley, who significantly points to materialism as threatening the extinction of spirit, and sneeringly refers to the public solicitude in regard to the question as no more dignified or reasonable than the vulgar lamentation at the death of Pan, feels compelled to vindicate his own reputation,

¹ The Senses and the Intellect.

² Physiology and Pathology of Mind.

by saying: "I am no materialist. On the contrary, I believe materialism to involve grave philosophical error."

"Modern thought," in its phase of materialism, makes mind, like heat, a mode of motion, and thought the result of molecular changes; and in the phase of nescience, finally reduces science to the knowledge not of things, but of relations, and these not even the relations of things, but the relations of fleeting appearances, — of mere phenomena, — scientifically and seriously this, and nothing more.

But if "modern thought" is so faulty and false toward true science, it is, as we should expect, fatal to true philosophy — philosophy as knowledge of things in their causes. Indeed, Comte magisterially ruled out philosophy from his system, as irrelevant to knowledge and impossible. Lewes, in his elegiac history of its repeated, but fruitless struggles, reports philosophy a failure — the study of causes vain and illusory.

Mill, who "positively" condescends to examine the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, repudiates all consciousness of being, or knowledge of causes, and, with endless iteration, repeats: "All our knowledge is only of phenomena; of things and causes we can know nothing."

Mr. Spencer, not content with mere phenomena, seeks forever for something real; but, having extinguished from his system the light of reason, in his blindness postulates despairingly in the unknown what he longs to find, but forever fails, and leaves philosophy confounded in the limitless chaos of the unknowable. If positive science is merely of the phenomenal, not of the real, positive philosophy, at the most, can be no more than this — the science ultimately of the unknown and unknowable. Thus does the nescience of "modern thought" summon the scientific crusade against theology and metaphysics and philosophy, against the *being* of God and of mind and of matter. In this war of extermination it would at last slay knowledge itself. The great defect in the experiential philosophy is the chasm between mind and matter. Whatever the persistency of the analysis, mind remains conscious, matter remains unconscious.

It is especially noticeable to what contradictions these philosophical repudiators are driven. Now, in their theory, they repudiate *a priori* principles and processes. And now, driven by the necessity of thought, Spencer rests on a "fundamental verity," and postulates a force unknowable, as persistent, and as a ground of all phenomena. Mill, driven by "irresistible association," refers all phenomena to matter and mind — to the "me" and the "not-me" — the subject and the object. And Lewes is driven to admit that "the fundamental ideas of modern science are as transcendental as any of the axioms in ancient philosophy."¹ These principles, this science — their science of the phenomenal — will not, cannot give. No generalization of phenomena can give the knowledge of being, especially to those who scientifically deny the possibility of all knowledge of things as existing; no generalization of effects can give the knowledge of cause, especially to those who scientifically deny all possible knowledge of things and causes, and who thus ignore and rule out philosophy as illicit and illusory.

How do these "advanced thinkers" treat morality?

Mr. Buckle says: "Every new fact is the necessary product of antecedent facts, and both providence and free-will are a delusion. Physical laws take the place of personal agency. Historic actors, therefore, are automatons." In this personal statement Mr. Buckle indicates the general drift of "modern thought" in regard to morals.

Mr. Mill, in reviewing Comte's theory approvingly, says: "The transition is steadily proceeding from the theological mode of thought to the positive, which is destined finally to prevail by the universal recognition that all phenomena, without exception, are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, either natural or supernatural, interfere." Mill would subject even the Creator and Governor to necessity, and restrict him to arbitrary arrangements, permitting no belief even to recognize his existence, unless he obey fixed laws, which are never to be modified or counteracted by the

¹ Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 66.

personal preference of the Creator.¹ Thus does "modern thought" repudiate responsibility, and reject moral freedom, and inculcate the pernicious theory of automatic action on earth and in heaven.

Mr. Mill introduces his view of punishment by this startling preamble: "Though a man cannot help acting as he does, his character being what it is," and much more to the same effect. "His own good, either physical or moral, is no warrant for compelling him" to do otherwise. "The most we should think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself."²

And yet, whether influenced by force of thought or by force of feeling we need not conjecture, Mr. Mill, with strange forgetfulness, falls into this gross inconsistency: He has made up his mind, if the First Cause be an *immoral* God, he will defy him to do his worst, and will not worship him.³

But we reply, how can the First Cause, according to Mr. Mill's theory, possibly be immoral or moral? As a necessary and necessitated cause he can have no moral character; or, if you please, he must be un-moral (i.e. not moral). But suppose Mr. Mill will not worship such a God? The carping philosopher must obey, as the effect (according to his system of necessity) must obey its cause. What if the defiant philosopher *must*, even if he will not, worship the tyrant? Such talk, from a philosophic necessitarian is mere bravado. In spite of his theory excluding all possible morality, Mr. Mill freely employed the terms "morality" and "morals," "moral results" and "moral causes"; admitted the prevalent conviction of choice or moral freedom both before and after voluntary action; and asserted that this conviction could only be acquired by experience. The admission proves too much for the necessitarian — proves the undoing of his theory. The conviction is acquired. The freedom has been exercised. Moral freedom is vindicated

¹ Mill's *Philosophy of Comte*, p. 16.

² See Mill's *Essay on Liberty*; although this is rather a vindication of necessity or denial of any possible morality or accountability.

³ See Mill's *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 103.

by experience, as well as by universal conviction. Therefore Mr. Mill is held to the logical consequence of moral responsibility and moral government. Hence we argue to the moral character and moral government of God.

Comte, at first, excluded religion from his system, or referred to it not as moral or spiritual, but merely as intellectual—the product of the understanding striving to explain the phenomena of nature, rather than of reason and conscience recognizing moral obligation and seeking communion with a living, personal God. The two conceptions differ utterly in regard to the source, the character, and the sphere of religion. Both cannot be true. One must be right to the exclusion of the other. According to Comte's conception, natural history, as intellectual—the product of the understanding and seeking to explain the phenomena of nature—would be the height of religion; though it involved not the least moral choice, nor the slightest moral feeling, nor any recognition of God.

But at length intense reaction completely reversed the religious attitude of Comte, and from his earlier exclusion of religion he proceeded to elaborate the "religion of humanity," which the *Catéchisme Positiviste*, since 1852, has made more familiar to the public, perhaps more repugnant.

In his review of Comte's system, Mr. Mill expressly declares: "Comte's religion is without a God";¹ and, lest the reviewer be suspected of condemning it as such, he remarks approvingly: "We venture to think that a religion may exist without belief in a God," and be at once "instructive and profitable." Mr. Mill will, indeed, allow one to believe or disbelieve in a God, and yet have religion. Nothing could more clearly indicate his complete indifference to religion, and the utter emptiness of his religious conception. And yet for this careless permission to believe in a God he is severely criticised and condemned by Littré, a disciple and successor of Comte. The religious theory of Mr. Spencer is at least as liberal as that of Mr. Mill. From his system

¹ p. 120.

he rules out the possible recognition of a personal God, and allows nothing but an utterly inscrutable power, while he makes this startling statement: "The atheistic, the pantheistic, and the theistic hypotheses contain the same element — an absolute mystery."¹ Thus modern positivism presents a religion without a God, but proposes "a new Supreme Being," the "Grand Etre," that is, Collective Humanity — "a God not yet formed," but "to be forming of new component parts"; "the dead to occupy the first place, then those who are yet to be born." Madame Clotilde de Vaux — like Comte himself released by divorce from the marriage bond — becomes his "angelic interlocutrix" in elaborating the new religion. With the establishment of this religion the Christian calendar is to be superseded by a scientific calendar. The temples are to be turned toward Paris — the Mecca of "modern thought." Jehovah is to give place to a new goddess, the goddess of Collective Humanity. Thrice daily shall men pray everywhere to deified woman. Worship, dogmas, discipline, architecture, altars, priesthood, symbolism, gestures, sacraments, — all the details are minutely given in the ritual of positive religion, even to directions for closing and opening the eyes, in this worship of woman. Madame Clotilde — or whatever woman — is to be exalted over him whose name is above every name; and "soon the knee of man will never bend, except to woman." The deification of mortals according to Comte, or the worship of the unknowable according to Spencer, or blank materialism excluding all worship and all religion, is offered to us by modern thought to supersede the Christian religion and the worship of the ever-living and true God.

Mr. Spencer feels the need of conciliation, not of conflict, between science and religion, and points to a common ground, which both may harmoniously occupy. Comte, the Corypheus of positivism, whom Lewes devoutly hails as a scientific apostle, and proclaims as a leader not only for himself, but for such impatient followers as Mill and Huxley and Spencer —

¹ First Principles, p. 36.

Comte, suffering the horrors of divorce between science and religion, penitently besought a reconciliation, and strove to effect a union between his emasculated system and a religion if not wholly earth-born, at least not divine. Even Strauss, after forty years of Titanic struggle to scale the heavens and dethrone the old faith, repented of his folly, and turned beseechingly toward a new faith, to which he sought to win his vacillating disciples. Mill, left alone with his philosophy, became a devotee at the grave of departed love. The school of nescients worship an unknown God; while the more advanced of the advanced thinkers, who have pushed their analysis to its scientific limit, and have found the primal being—the source of all phenomena—return with synthetic fervor, crying “Aha! we have found a God!” and reverently place a fetich upon the altar of science; and, with worship “for the most part of the silent sort,” bow the knee to force,—blind, unconscious, unintelligent, unknowable force. Mr. Spencer, we repeat, feels the need of conciliation, not conflict, between science and religion, as did Bacon and Locke, and Newton and Descartes, and Galileo and Copernicus, and Tully and Plato and Socrates, and, as we believe, most men who have been capable of profound thought, earnestly feel. How can this be made not only possible, but permanent?

✧ We have already described the threefold presentation of knowledge to the mind by the sense, by the understanding, by the reason. Now science, however restricted, need not, cannot, legitimately conflict with religion. If science be theoretically confined within the narrow limit of sense, as it is by many, it cannot oppose, it can at most only stand self-silenced in the presence of religion. Its strongest assertion can only be, it does not know. Its comprehensive objection must be its own ignorance. In the pathway of religion experiential science has come thus far; because of self-imposed limits it can go no farther. By no means, however, can it legitimately forbid religion to advance.

If science be enlarged to the field of the understanding, as

is its right and its duty, logical deductions from ten thousand thousand indications confirm the claim of religion, and follow far in the pathway of her advance; and if pausing at any time, it is not with disbelief, but with prompt admission that the course, however long, is right, and with an earnest good-speed to religion along the brightening way it would fain accompany her.

But if science advance to the province of the reason, which is its chief right and duty, it beholds not only things seen and temporal through the intuitions of sense, but the things unseen and eternal through the intuitions of reason. Reason looks out upon space, and reports it limitless; upon time, and reports it endless; surveys the realm of phenomena, and reports of every effect,—as does the sense, so far as it can feel or hear or see,—reports that every effect has a cause, and more, that every effect must have a cause; and applies this rule with unqualified assurance to every positive effect in space, and to every positive effect in time; and as certainly that every effect must have an adequate cause, e.g. that while the weight of fifty pounds requires a power sufficient to raise it, a weight of one hundred pounds requires twice that power to raise it; and that variation of cause is required for variation of effect, not only in degree, but also in kind. Moral effects require moral causes; for there can be no morality without mental choice, and no responsibility without rational freedom. By the same intuition of reason, it is a positive knowledge that an intelligent effect must have an intelligent cause. Every design put forth into effect must have a designer. The author of all things must be adequate to what is. Who shall dare deny that these intuitions of reason, reported to the human mind and carefully arrayed in classified knowledge—who shall deny that this is science? Shall he, especially, who in the same breath asserts that intuitions of sense reported to the mind and then classified constitute science?

Intuitively to the individual mind, and with supreme authority, reason presents this as most rational. Not only has

the common consciousness of the world confirmed this affirmation of reason, but natural religion rests in confidence upon this rational support. In this higher and surer realm of science, religion may best expatiate and feel most at home. With no fanatical frenzy and no superstitious devotion, but in the calm and cheerful light of rational beholding, religion and reason have thus accompanied each other sympathetically and harmoniously. On the way have the physical senses failed? Has the eye grown dim? the ear dull and heavy? Religion has pressed forward; for she walks not by physical sight. Have tongues ceased? Has the understanding completed its deductions from what has been seen and heard and felt of sensible things, and paused in its prophecies? Religion has pressed forward; for something there is in the human soul that has never failed it—the presence and the support of reason.

But is there no end? no beginning? Are reason and religion doomed forever to tread the unsatisfying pathway of development, never to find what is, only to meet what is becoming—the phenomenal, the transitory? Is there no comprehension to the field of rational science? While the field of sense is comprehended, and the field of the understanding is comprehended, is there no comprehension to the field of rational science? Reason itself comprehends this field by a right as complete, at least, as does the sense and the understanding each comprehend its field. And reason evermore affirms not only that phenomena come and go in endless succession and variety, but that something is—eternal. Though phenomena pass by and vanish, this remaineth; although all else should wax old and be changed, yet this shall remain the same, and never fail. This ultimate ground not only has Spencer reached in the pathway of rational science, which he would harmonize with religion; but the same ultimate ground Paul has reached in the pathway of religion, which he promptly harmonizes with reason. So far forth, there has been no conflict between science and religion.

Religion would find in this eternal source of all things adequate cause for every effect, in one word, eternal power and Godhead, in which it may confide, on which it may rely, with which it may commune. Does reason reject as irrational the declaration of an old and familiar, but by no means dishonored writer, whom we have just mentioned, who, in a remarkable letter to the Romans, says: "The invisible things of *him* from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made"; and in another letter, no less remarkable, addressed to the Hebrews, says: "*Thou* remainest, and *thou* art forever the same."

If an issue is raised, it is at this point: Shall mind be secondary and subordinate to matter? This is the real issue. One or the other is original and dominant. We shall be pardoned for adverting to it, for it is the real issue presented and pressed by "modern thought." Mr. Spencer postulates an ultimate force, persistent, unconscious, unintelligent, physical force. This, then, he assumes is original and dominant—the source of all that is. Mind, therefore, according to Spencer, is secondary and subordinate to matter.

Tyndall looks "across the boundary of experimental evidence," beyond which, according to the experimental system of "modern thought," he has no right to look, "and discerns in matter the promise and the potency of every form and quality of life." Mind, then, according to Tyndall, is secondary and subordinate to matter. And yet Tyndall is compelled to say that all true men of science "will frankly admit their inability to point to any satisfactory, experimental proof that life can be developed save from demonstrable antecedent life."

Avowed materialists, with whom Spencer and Tyndall are unwilling to be classed,—avowed materialists assume that matter is primary and all-prevalent. Hence mind, if there is any, is secondary and subordinate to matter; in its final analysis, is indeed material.

Now, we do not for a moment stop to speak of blank materialism, which precludes the existence of mind by reducing it and all things to matter, and thus contradicts our

fundamental belief, the universal distinctions of language, and the common consciousness of mankind. To avowed materialists, who assume that mind itself is material, this issue must be utterly irrelevant and impossible. The issue with them is upon entirely another ground. Science itself is impossible, where mind is ruled out as material; for matter can know nothing, *a fortiori* it cannot construct science.

But to advance to the narrowest field of science, — that of sense, the experiential, — we affirm that those who confine themselves within this narrow field are by self-limitation excluded from this discussion. The problem does not, at least, lie within that field. The issue is not a phenomenon, for the eye or ear or touch to decide. If there is no science but this possible, as some scientists pretend, then the problem is ruled out forever, and the issue must be pronounced nugatory. But the issue does not await the permission of positivism. It spurns such scientific impertinence. Ruled out forever as nugatory and impossible, it returns with ten thousand thousand voices to assert its real presence, and confront and contradict the partial ruling. If this restricted tribunal is incompetent to do it justice and secure its rights, it is but a confession of the incompetency of positivism. There is an appeal to a court of larger jurisdiction and higher competency. We make no special plea against the modern school of science. We point to the confession as conclusive proof of weakness. Within its own field it is doing industrious and legitimate service to religion and progress. But it is not comprehensive, therefore it must not be exclusive. It may be positive in regard to its knowledge; it should be positive, also, in regard to its ignorance. On other and essential grounds we have already shown its fatal defect. Its confession here confirms our criticism. The issue is not only between religion and partial science, but also between partial science and true philosophy.

We repeat, the real issue remains. It will not down at the bidding of positive science. It has the life of humanity, and the vigor of faith reappearing in every form of religion

since the world began. Shall mind be secondary and subordinate to matter? Or is mind itself superior and primary — the source of all that is, and the sovereign? We say to positivism, as we say to every sense-theory, it is incompetent to assert; it is incompetent to deny. All it can say is, that there are antecedents and sequents, phenomena succeeding phenomena; but it cannot affirm, it certainly cannot deny, that there is anything abiding. Hence we dismiss objections from any such quarter as unauthorized and groundless. But there is a larger field of science — the field of the understanding, where true logic has its legitimate sphere, and conclusions may be valid, e.g. that there cannot be phenomena without something to appear, nor effects without something to produce them. And so Mr. Tyndall admits that all phenomena have a causative source in the potency of matter; although he does not tell us what matter is, nor whence or what is its potency. Till these questions be answered, he has thrown but a dim and unsatisfactory light upon the problem. Yet Tyndall disclaims atheism — a disclaimer certainly significant in regard to the real question at issue.

Mr. Spencer, with greater boldness, tells us that force is the ground of all phenomena, and that force is unknowable. This is the farthest analysis of "modern thought."

And this is proposed as the common ground of reconciliation between science and religion. Is science, whose very office is to know, — is science satisfied with this proposed reconciliation, in the unknowable? Can it consent to a postulate which is suicidal — an ultimate which would swallow up every scientific labor and success in fathomless nescience?

Can religion accept this theory as sufficient to satisfy the longing of the human soul — a longing not only to rely upon, but to trust in and commune with, the Eternal Being, — not only to fear, but to worship and love, the Eternal? In this final question, important above all others, does ratiocination repudiate or confirm faith? Does reason still accompany and support religion? Can science give us any knowledge of force which will help decide the case? In our own consciousness does

force appear as the offspring of mind, the result of will-power, and not *vice versa*? Is not Mr. Spencer's notion of force derived from mind? "Force, as known to us, is an affection of consciousness."¹ "The force by which we ourselves produce changes serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general, and is the final disclosure of analysis."² Is, then, his final analysis final, when he postulates force as ultimate? Or does it look directly beyond, to the will-power or personality which exerts that force? Is not his final analysis, then, really an indication and admission of a *personal* First Cause as Author of force, and thus Creator of the universe? Religion does not discard the reconciliation proposed by Mr. Spencer, because it is too scientific, but because it is too little scientific. Religion admits the right of science to go thus far, whether Mr. Spencer's system would authorize it to do so or not. But religion denies the right to go thus far, and then stop at this point.

Faith raises the same question in behalf of religion which reason asks in behalf of science: Why stop with force as the ground of all phenomena, when force itself is phenomenal as meeting and resisting the senses, e.g. in hearing, touch, etc.? Why stop with force, when force itself, according to our consciousness, testifies of will as its source? Why call it unknown, when in the same breath it is declared known, as having persistence and power and causality, etc. — attributes which belong to personality? Why call it unintelligent, when confessedly its doings are the most intelligent (according to "modern thought") in the universe; comprehending, indeed, by the theory, all the intelligence in the universe? Why call it unconscious, when it manifests not only the highest intelligence, but the highest wisdom in the adaptation of means to ends, in relating causes to effects, in harmonizing forces and phenomena throughout the universe? so that science itself asserts the universal order; and science and religion agree in tracing all phenomena and all effects to one ultimate cause. Why call this ultimate and eternal cause force,

¹ First Principles, p. 58.

² Ibid. p. 235.

—blind, unconscious, unintelligent force,—and thus exclude God from the universe, and deny his existence, when “modern thought” itself involuntarily admits that such effects as have been produced demand the highest type of causation?¹ Why call it unknown, when in the same breath it is declared persistent, and so known as enduring? when it is declared “the ultimate of ultimates,” and so known as the ground of all appearances, “the cause of all phenomena,” the ultimate or first cause? If science can know so much about this “unknowable” as to clothe it with attributes of personality, why not frankly admit, as some of the most candid and able scientific thinkers affirm, and as faith will admit and our consciousness asserts, that force is the product of will-power, and so the primal or ultimate force is the product of an eternal, almighty, intelligent, and wise will—the infinite and holy will of a personal God?

This may be common ground for science and religion. Thus is the First Cause not only ultimate, but adequate to the production of mental, as well as material, phenomena—adequate, which according to Mr. Spencer’s theory it confessedly is not. Thus all things centre harmoniously in God. Mind as a free, personal activity is his offspring; and force, though unseen, is his material creation—the product of his will—the ground of all material phenomena. So that, in the higher light of rational science, as well as in the clear vision of faith, God appears as the Author of all things, and reason confirms the affirmation of faith, that “The worlds were framed by the word of God; so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear.”

Thus both by the authority of reason and of faith is the universe wrested from the false and fearful dominion of fate, and the capricious and still more fearful dominion of chance. Moral government is restored to the world. Not only power, but wisdom and goodness belong unto God. Henceforth, forever, science, as well as religion, may rest by faith in God. He is our dwelling-place in all generations; the universe is

¹ See Tyndall’s Address.

secure under his almighty and everlasting and holy government. Neither necessity nor chance shall wreck or crush it. The field of science securely opens into the alluring and widening future. Newton was, indeed, as a child gathering pebbles on the shore of the boundless ocean of knowledge. Bacon was but the trumpeter to sound the inspiring call in the triumphant march of thought; while faith surveys the expanding fields of science and the bright and interminable field of religion, and with rapture recalls the promise of God: "All are yours."

Here we find the clue to a true theory of evolution, which runs throughout all material nature, and inductively and securely leads us back to force, and up to God as the Creator of force and the Author of nature — an evolution originated by a divine mind, controlled by divine power, guided by divine wisdom, and consummated by divine benevolence.

On the other hand, this clue saves us from wandering in the endless mazes of the false theory of evolution presented by "modern thought," based upon the false theory of force as ultimate. Besides this fundamental defect, this theory of evolution declares force to be absolute, yet becoming conditioned; to be homogeneous, yet becoming heterogeneous — the one evolving into the many, not only, and the multifarious, but into the contradictory and superior, in endless succession. How, we ask, can evolution start with the homogeneous, — force, and force only, — without spontaneity or will? How, then, can the homogeneous become unstable and heterogeneous, and force become forces? It is impossible, according to the system; and evolution cannot begin. It is only by an illicit process that Spencer's system can change the homogeneous into the heterogeneous — by surreptitiously introducing motion. If force is first, and at first is all, how is it that it evolves so as to produce consciousness and self-consciousness; so as to produce knowledge, — knowledge of itself, and knowledge of all things, amounting even to omniscience?

By Spencer's "positive" legerdemain not only does his

unknown and unknowable make itself familiar to mortals in these new and curious forms, as blind force playing fantastic tricks that rival the capricious antics of the Grecian Pan; but more than this, the unknown and the unknowable, grown familiar in the skilful hands of Mr. Spencer, outrivals Pan, who indeed became all things, but by hypothesis was himself all things. Mr. Spencer's blind force evolves into more than it was, and what it was not. This ultimate force, in itself unconscious, makes itself conscious by whirling; in itself unintelligent, makes itself intelligent by whirling and whirling; without wisdom or purpose in itself, it makes itself the centre of all wisdom and the perfection of all purpose by *fortuitous* whirling and whirling; in itself merely physical, at a single bound it leaps into the metaphysical. Material, blind, and unseeing, at a bound it evolves into the mental; at another bound, it evolves into the rational; by continued evolution the blind, unconscious, physical force evolves into mind,—rational, moral, spiritual,—until, in a maze of wonder, the multitude cry out: "It is a God"; and the high-priests of positivism, with reverential recognition, standing aloof from the wondering crowd, bow down, "for the most part in worship of the silent sort." Such is the wonder-working of "modern thought." In phenomenal theorizing, verily, nothing serves so well as a skilful prestidigitator.

If force be declared ultimate,—force persistent, unconscious, unintelligent,—then matter must be primary and superior, and evolution must be unoriginated and uncontrolled by a divine mind, subject to blind fate or capricious chance. Either horn of the dilemma would prove fatal. With chance supreme, science were impossible; with fate supreme, moral freedom and moral government were impossible.

If mind is declared ultimate,—mind infinite, eternal,—then mind is primary and superior; then evolution is originated and controlled by divine wisdom and power, and nature's laws are at the same time efficient and uniform; efficient, because sustained by divine authority; and, although variable according to the divine behest, yet uniform because of the divine faithfulness, which "is unto all generations."

ARTICLE II.

CHERUBIM.

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AMONG the Articles of minor importance which are found in our Dictionaries of the Bible, and which have the quality of unsatisfactory treatment, perhaps none are more conspicuous for this quality than those headed by the word "Cherubim." The quality of treatment results in large measure necessarily from the nature of the subject treated. The symbolism of the Hebrews, like that of all other nations, is obscure in itself, while the evidence necessary to clear up this inherent obscurity is at the best only scantily to be obtained. There are also not wanting readers who will readily believe that those writers, who by long study acquire most profundity in the interpretation of symbolism, are sometimes, for that very reason, less apt to seize the correct interpretation. The questions of the cherubim are more or less questions of symbolism. They are therefore, as a matter of course, somewhat difficult questions.

But the difficulty has, as it seems to us, often been unnecessarily increased by the failure to observe a very plain and important distinction between the earlier Mosaic cherubim and the "living creatures" of prophetic vision. Such a distinction is warranted by the evidence of the text and by the nature of the case. It should be clearly made and faithfully maintained. The nature of the case warrants the distinction. We should not expect that the work which followed a fixed pattern, and was wrought in enduring metal, or as tapestry, would correspond to the ideal productions, which can shift with every new phase of the vision, and which by their nature, both in regard to construction and function, invite constant change. Nor does the text of passages, which furnish

to the critical student his evidence as to the facts, fail to corroborate the impression derived from a consideration of the nature of the case. How clearly indicated in the text is this distinction between the earlier cherubim of the artisan's handiwork and the later cherubim of the prophet's vision, our following examination will, we hope, make apparent.

It would be the usual way of procedure in such inquiries as the present, and at the same time a pleasant and safe way, could we begin by ascertaining the derivation of that word (כְּרֻב), the subsequent contents of which it is our purpose to examine. But unfortunately this word has thus far resisted all the power of that great solvent, modern philology. The older writers, among whom may be mentioned Origen and Jerome, were all satisfied with a derivation of the word which have it the meaning "abundance of knowledge," so that even Aquinas could write, "the name seraphim is given from their fervor, as belonging to love; but the name cherubim is given from their knowledge." The modern writers are satisfied each one with his own derivation, but with that of no one else. It is likely that most of those who make domestic and amatory use of the word "cherub" little suspect what trouble its dignified but obscure original has given to scores of philologists and commentators. Investigation, however, reveals this consoling fact, that no theory of its symbolism can well be adopted which will not find support in some one at least of the many meanings which have been discovered for the word. One learned German whose theory of the thing itself would seem to demand a meaning hitherto unventured for the word, has called it a *crux interpretum*, and summarily dismissed the investigation. We may well follow the example which Bähr set us in his *Symbolik*.

But if we may not know what the word "cherub" originally meant, is it possible for us to discover what the thing cherub was? On this point our knowledge can be at the most only partial, and in some specialities only such knowledge as consists in an acquaintance with conflicting opinions, amongst the claims of which it is difficult or impossible to

make a satisfactory choice. We shall surely, however, escape much confusion and error if we keep constantly in mind the two following considerations.

And first of the two stands the consideration to which we have already directed attention. We are sharply to distinguish between the "living creatures" of Ezekiel's vision and the cherubim which overshadowed the ark, adorned the curtains, and clung upon the walls of the tabernacle and temple. The latter were fashioned in enduring metal or wrought as tapestry by those who were acquainted with Egypt's temples and palaces. The former passed, repeatedly shifting and fleeting, before one who was surrounded with Assyrian symbolism. The latter, in so far as they are ideal forms realized in wood, gold, and tapestry work, are historical, objective. The former, though they have some points of union with the latter, and thus in some of their elements of composition share in the real, still, as a whole are unhistorical, subjective, and never actualized in any known image or painting. As the former pass before the prophet in his inspired vision, they change and unfold new elements. They serve his purpose, and then vanish, except so far as they obtain for themselves a fixed form in the record of the vision. But they cannot be used, even to prove the conventional form of the cherubim in Ezekiel's time, on the supposition that any such conventional form was in existence — a supposition which may seem warranted from the fact that the prophet attributes to his "living creatures" the "face of a cherub." Much less can they be used to settle questions arising in the discussion of the Mosaic cherubim. To treat these strange, changeable creatures of the prophet's vision as though they were historical realities, and, having determined their supposed form and meaning, force them back through many centuries to obscure an account which though meagre is otherwise tolerably plain, is the usual method of investigation.

The reasons for giving such prominence to the distinction between the "living creatures" of Ezekiel and the cherubim of the tabernacle and temple will show themselves more

fully in the progress of the discussion. It is enough, at present, to say that the intent of the description of the cherubim in the two cases is entirely different, and that the things described, in their nearest approaches to similarity, are quite unlike,—certainly in form, and probably also in original and significance.

The second consideration which will assist in avoiding error and confusion is common to all questions of criticism. As we pass from what is plainer to what is more obscure, we are not to let our dubious attempts at a solution of that which is by its nature obscure throw a shadow back over the conclusions which taken by themselves seem trustworthy. Why the cherubim of the artisan's handiwork and the cherubim of the prophet's fantasy should *not* differ in original, in form, and in significance, we are not prepared to say. That the two *did* differ in all three particulars, the evidence clearly shows. To treat the two under one heading is somewhat like writing two Articles under one title.

Bearing these considerations in mind, we have to answer three questions of main importance: What was the form of the cherubim? What was their significance? And whence was their origin?

I. To the question, What was the form of the cherubim? Meyer replies, we may make our "answer by asking the counter question, How does a thing look that has no fixed form?"¹ To this reply Bähr² agrees. According to the latter author, the cherubic figure might have one, two, or four faces, two or four feet, one or two pair of wings, and might have the bovine or leonine type as its base. Beginning with the cherubim of Ezekiel's vision, he proves their changefulness of form, and, arguing from these short-lived, ideal existences to the forms which stood in real image-work for centuries, asserts the same characteristic of the Mosaic cherubim. These are, in brief, Bähr's reasons: The cherubim in tapestry-work could not have been conceived like those on the ark, because the latter were statues, the former rather

¹ Bibeldent, 179.

² Symbolik. I. 312.

paintings. This would be a more decisive reason, if the forms of the cherubim over the ark had been as complex as the forms of those seen in the prophet's vision; but having only one face, as Bähr himself admits, it is hard to see why there must have been any more difference between the inwrought and upright cherubim than must be in the case of any other form, represented now in statue, now in painting. But Bähr farther asserts, that if at any time the cherubim had taken on a fixed form, they would have become objects of idolatrous worship. Yet not only did similar forms, but the same forms, raise aloft and spread abroad their wings in the tabernacle and in the temple for centuries, without becoming idols.

But "it lay in their nature to have no fixed form, and therefore no fixed representation of form." This is the cherubic nature only according to Bähr's theory; and to what lengths his theory carries him remains to be more clearly seen in the subsequent part of our discussion. These reasons seem to us unsupported and little satisfactory.

1. The truth with regard to the form of the Mosaic cherubim — and only with regard to it need changes of form puzzle us — is, we think, that it was a fixed form, and remained the same in all representations throughout history. We are not, however, on this account, to attempt to fix the details of the form any further than we have evidence.

Their general aspect and proportions were probably human, — "*Specie maximam partem humana*," as says Gesenius in his *Thesaurus*. To this view, however, there is no direct testimony, so far as the Mosaic cherubim are concerned. The cherubim of Solomon's temple, standing ten cubits high upon their feet, stretched out their wings so that they reached the same distance from tip to tip, which equality of proportion is that of the perfect human form. Of the cherubim standing upon the mercy-seat, which was two and a half cubits in length, and raised by the ark to the height of a cubit and a half (Ex. xxv. 17; xxxvii. 6), it may be said that the two with their pedestal are in best proportions if they are admitted to have

had those of the human form. These hints are, it is true, slender evidence, yet are all the evidence we have, unless we admit the statement of Ezekiel (i. 10) to stand in proof as to the form of the cherubim in Moses' time.¹

The historic cherubim, except possibly those on the walls and doors of Solomon's temple, had only one face. For of those upon the "mercy-seat," or, more properly, "cover" of the ark (כַּפֹּרֶת, see Gesenius in his Thesaurus), it is said: "Their faces shall look toward one another, toward the mercy-seat shall the faces of the cherubim be" (Ex. xxv. 18sq.; xxxvii. 9). Of those in Solomon's temple, we are told (2 Chron. iii. 13) that "their faces were inward" (in Hebrew, לַפְּנִיָּה), or toward the house.

Spencer and others have argued, from Ezek. i. 10 compared with x. 14, that the distinctive face of the cherubim of Moses, as well as of Ezekiel, was that of the ox; but the conclusion is unwarranted.

The cherubim are always represented with wings, when any explanation accompanies the mention of them. Those in the tabernacle stretched their wings toward each other "on high," "covering" (or, as the Septuagint translates the passage, *συσκιάζοντες ἐπὶ*) the lid of the ark. The huge forms of the temple were ten cubits high, and "stretched forth" (1 Kings vi. 27), or "spread out" (1 Chron. xxviii. 18) their wings, and with their faces in one direction so covered (Sept., *περικάλυπτον ἐπὶ*) the ark.

The cherubim in the temple had feet (2 Chron. iii. 13) upon which they stood; but of those in the tabernacle nothing in this regard is said.

Gesenius thinks² that they had hands as well, and cites Gen. iii. 24 in proof, as though these guardians of abandoned Eden held their weapon; but this seems to be decidedly more of inference than the text will support, especially since the sword is represented by the Hebrew as turning of itself.

The cherubim of Solomon's temple were, as their great size made necessary, constructed of olive-trees overlaid with

¹ See Keil and Delitzsch, Pent. ii. p. 170.

² See Thesaurus, in loco.

gold, and are called "image-work" (כְּסֵפֶה, 2 Chron. iii. 10, *opus statuarium*, Vulgate, and so Gesenius; ἔργον ἐκ ξύλων, Septuagint). According to Gesenius and De Wette, those of the tabernacle were formed in like manner; but this conclusion is by no means universally received. The Hebrew word used to describe the construction of the cherubim of the tabernacle is נֶפֶשׁ (Ex. xxv. 18), which is rendered by some, as in our version, *beaten*, or "solid work"; but by others, among whom is Gesenius, *opus tornatum*, or "turned work"; by the Seventy, χρυσοτορεντά, "worked in relief," or "chased work"; and by Bähr, *opus ductile*, with which the Vulgate agrees. Meyer and others assert that they were of one piece with the "mercy-seat; but Bähr, with more of probability, contends that they were only indissolubly joined to it. "Of the mercy-seat," our version reads, "shall ye make the cherubims."

In the tabernacle these same forms were wrought upon the curtains (Ex. xxvi. 1; xxxvi. 8), and upon the vail before the oracle (Ex. xxvi. 31; xxxvi. 35); while in the temple they were found upon the walls of the holy place (1 Kings vi. 29). Upon the doors of the oracle and of the temple they are carved with palm-trees and open flowers. They appear, also, upon the borders to the bases of the sacred lavers, and on the plates of the ledges—mingled, in the former case, with lions and oxen, and in the latter, with lions and palm-trees. Thus mingled, the cherubim of the temple, unlike those of the tabernacle, bear witness to the influence of foreign workmen. Hiram, as a Tyrian sculptor, "did not scruple," says Stanley, "to introduce bulls in the greater laver, and bulls and lions and cherubs in the lesser, probably as the emblems of the two chief tribes." It is often assumed, because the cherubim upon the walls of Ezekiel's ideal temple have two faces, one "of a man" and the other of a "young lion," that those upon the walls of Solomon's temple were also double-faced. But at this point we are again warned not to force details of the temple seen in vision upon the temple built in stone, wood, and gold. If the

cherubim of the historic temple had had two faces, it is not likely that the historians would have failed to mention such an anomaly in their form. Besides, we should not expect two-faced cherubim, with one face "the face of a lion," mingled with lions upon the sacred lavers. In the cherubim of Ezekiel's temple, where they are represented as paintings upon a flat surface, only two faces of the four could, as a matter of course, well appear; but the other two are, according to Hengstenberg, Lightfoot, and others, to be considered as existing, though not in sight. The faces which are described as in sight are the two most important among the faces of the cherubim of prophetic vision.

It appears, then, to be tolerably clear that the form of the Mosaic historic cherubim, the component parts of which can be only partially described, was in its totality one and definite, and that this form was retained without considerable change throughout Jewish history. Herder has even understated the truth, when he says that the forms wrought in the tapestry and upon the walls, both of the tabernacle and temple, were probably the same as those which rose over the mercy-seat above the ark.

We shall soon, after making the attempt, discover that it is impossible to reconcile the forms of Ezekiel's vision with those which have been thus far described, and which were the tangible results of the workman's hand. The two have few points in common. Nor is it necessary to attempt the reconciliation. The "living creatures" of Ezekiel never had any existence outside of the prophetic vision, changed the ideal form of that ideal existence like the shifting costume of the theatre, and passed away with the fading of the vision. We have no need, then, to hold the opinion that the form of the cherubim varied in various times. The form of the cherubim, so far as the figures wrought in metal and tapestry are concerned, seems to have remained the same. The only variation which appears is between the cherubim of the artisan and the cherubim of the seer, and also among the several forms of this latter sort of cherubim. Nor need we

be forced by this gratuitous attempt to reconcile things normally different into the opinion — which has already been mentioned, and is credited by Meyer, Bähr, and others — that the cherubim never had any fixed, conventional form. If its delineation varied even in unimportant details, we have no evidence for the assertion that it did thus vary. It does not follow, however, from what has just been said, that we are to go to the other extreme of fixing for ourselves those details upon the nature of which we have no evidence. “The complete delineation of the Mosaic cherubim,” says Winer, “is forever to be renounced.”

When Solomon’s temple was finished, assembled Israel, chiefs of fathers and people, looked on while the priests “brought up the ark of the Lord,” and brought it in “unto his place” under the wings of the gigantic cherubim. Whether the smaller figures, which had crouched over the ark in the tabernacle, remained upon it in the temple of Solomon, we are not told. But they probably had already disappeared, no mention being made of the more important cherubim, while a minute account of what was done with the staves is given; and all the sacred relics having gone from the inside of the sacred chest. It is also to be noted that two pair of cherubim over the ark would seem incongruous.

2. The form of the cherubim of vision differs almost completely from that of the Mosaic cherubim, and changes its own details according to the demands of the prophet’s imagination.

From the time that the gigantic cherubim received the long wandering ark to a resting-place beneath their outspread wings, no further historical mention is made of them. If the eighteenth Psalm is, as Ewald supposes, Davidic, and the eightieth belongs to the exile, then only in the prayer of Hezekiah (2 Kings xix. 15) and in Ps. xcix. 1 (written perhaps in the time of Chaldean oppression) is even incidental and figurative mention made of the cherubim, until the prophecy of Ezekiel introduces to us, under the same name, a very different thing.

The recognition of the essential difference in form, significance, and origin, between the Mosaic cherubim and the cherubim of the vision will alone prevent confusion. This difference we find more clearly set forth in Ewald's note on Ezekiel and in Winer's *Realwörterbuch* than elsewhere; from the latter of which we quote the statement: "We cannot understand how the mere fantasy of this prophet, if only he held fast in general to the original type of the Mosaic cherubim, should not have been freely handled in the carrying out of its forms." How fast the prophet did hold to this type, and how much freedom there was in details of form, a comparison of the two representations will show us. We cannot expect the same simplicity and consistency in the delineation of the forms of vision as of historic reality, and as a matter of fact we do not find them.

The "living creatures" of Ezekiel's vision are thus described: "They had the likeness [probably the upright posture (?)] of a man"; "Every one had four faces and every one had four wings"; "Their feet were straight feet" (translated in the Septuagint, *καὶ τὰ σκέλη αὐτῶν ὀρθά*; the Hebrew word *יָשָׁר* meaning, in this place, straight, as opposed to curved); "and the soles of their feet like the soles of a calf's foot," which the Seventy render, *καὶ πτερωτοὶ οἱ πόδες αὐτῶν*. They "sparkled like the color of burnished brass." "And they had the hands of a man under their wings on their four sides"; of which wings we read that "two of every one joined to another, and two covered their bodies." "And they four had the face of a man and the face of a lion on the right side, and they four had the face of an ox on the left side; they four also had the face of an eagle." "Wheels" full of eyes, a "firmament," a "throne," "the likeness of a man above upon it," accompany these strange creatures, and almost make an integral part of them. Surely it would need a cunning workman in metal and tapestry to delineate these forms, were their complexity the only difficulty which he had to overcome." They are, however, not only complex, but also changeful.

In that wonderful tenth chapter, these beings, which had before been called "living creatures," are again described, with some changed and some entirely new details, and are thereupon called "cherubims." At the fourteenth verse of this chapter, the four faces are again enumerated; but now "the first face was the face of a cherub," and the face of "an ox on the left side" had disappeared. This fourteenth verse is, however, omitted in the Septuagint as edited by Tischendorf, though it is not without manuscript authority. What is meant by "the face of a cherub," in this connection, it is not easy to determine. The opinion of Spencer and others, that this interchange proves the face of an ox to have been the distinctive cherubic face, is now generally abandoned.¹ May not the expression be held to show that there was a distinctive historic "face of a cherub," and thus disclose touches of the real in this imaginative compound? At any rate, this phrase and the one which attributes to these living creatures the likeness of man are the most certain elements of the old Mosaic cherubim considered as contributing anything besides a name to this new compound. The latter phrase is, however, restricted by Ewald to the common intelligence of man and these cherubim. In this tenth chapter, where the word "cherubim" occurs twenty-one of the something like eighty-five times in all, we are also told that their whole body and their backs and their hands and their wings, as well as the wheels, were full of eyes round about. Well may Gesenius say, "*Pro ingenii luxuria et nimia fere ubertate*," has the prophet constructed them. Well may we say, with more emphasis than Winer, "Thus executed, one will not easily recognize the form of the Mosaic cherubim."

Indeed, strictly speaking, they cannot thus be executed at all; and Ewald is certainly right in claiming that the whole of this compound, as Ezekiel thought of it, cannot be represented in drawing or plastic, but only in the imagination of the prophet. Why, then, should the discussion of the subject be perpetually confused by assuming the essential

¹ See Bähr's *Symbolik*. i. 313.

similarity of the cherubim of Ezekiel's vision and the cherubim of the tabernacle and temple?

II. From the inquiry into the form of the cherubim, we now turn to consider their significance. This question and the question of their original throw a slight mutual light or shadow one upon the other. The question of significance is one hard to decide; and though Bähr, who asserts that even the commonest materials and measures of the tabernacle were symbolic, may be sure in every instance, we must be content to know less.

1. As to the significance of the historic cherubim, the first passage in point is Gen. iii. 24, where they are, according to Gesenius and most others, mentioned as guardians of Eden. Indeed, this mention of them leads Herder to conclude that they were a sort of Hebrew griffin. According to Bähr,¹ however, they are set as beings of abounding life, to inhabit, and not to guard, this garden of life. The plain import of the text is that their office was that of guardians. There is another allusion to these guarding cherubim of Eden, which cannot well be passed by. In Ezek. xxviii. 14, the king of Tyre is called "the cherub of extension that covereth" (wrongly rendered, in our Bibles, "anointed cherub," but "cherub extentus," in the Vulgate); because, according to Gesenius, he guards his treasures as the cherub "covered with his wings and protected radiant gems in the holy mount of Eden." With a fierce joy does the prophet say to this guardian cherub, the king of Tyre: "Thou hast sinned, and I will destroy thee, O covering cherub, from the midst of the stones of fire."

We next find the cherubim set up by Moses over the ark of the covenant. Were the chronological relation of these two passages—Gen. iii. 24 and Ex. xxv. 18 sq.—known beyond doubt, we might feel more ready to assert or deny that the cherubim in both instances symbolize the same thought. Their watchful posture, with wings overshadowing, and faces toward the mercy-seat, seem still to indicate the

¹ Symbolik. i. 351.

guardian, and to be constantly saying: "Procul, O procul este profani." And since both records, by whomsoever first written, were doubtless put together by the same hand, we should expect such similarity of office. We conclude, then, that the earliest significance of the cherubim was that of simple guardianship.

But when once placed upon the ark their significance was necessarily farther expanded and defined. They are now enveloped with the visible glory of Jehovah; on them he sits or rides, from between them he speaks or shines forth; and they become, by an easy and natural transition, his throne, his place of most intimate self-revealing. "The cherub became among the Hebrews," says Ewald, "the token of the holy place, where Jehovah, as it were, has descended, and man feels his nearness more intimately than elsewhere."¹ "I will commune with thee from above the mercy-seat, from between the two cherubims," was God's promise (Ex. xxv. 22) to his servant Moses. Of this promise there is recorded one fulfilment (Num. vii. 89). Jehovah's distinctive epithet becomes, "He that sitteth the cherubim" (our version, "dwelleth between"). The presence of "the ark of the Lord of hosts, which sitteth the cherubim" was to vanquish the Philistines. Of "the God of my rock" David sings: "He rode upon a cherub, and did fly." The cry of the exiled and oppressed is: "Thou that dwellest between the cherubims, shine forth" (Ps. lxxx. 1); and his exultation is: "Jehovah sitteth the cherubim, let the earth be moved." It is to the Lord of hosts, God of Israel, who sitteth the cherubim, that Hezekiah sends up prayer for succor. As these quotations prove, no break occurs in the thought. And the same forms have the same significance in the Temple of Solomon as in the ancient tabernacle.

According to Bähr,² cherubim are connected with Jehovah's throne, because, being creatures of most perfect life, they are the most perfect disclosures of his life, and thus belong to the throne, the place of highest disclosure. Upon the

¹ Die Propheten, ii. 342.

² Symbolik. i. 372.

walls and veil of the temple they find place, because here is a state of high life, a miniature Eden, "where everything blooms and is green as in Eden." The plain historic connection is much preferable to this profundity in the interpretation of symbolism.

The importance which attaches itself to the cherubim is not because of their original, intrinsic, and hidden symbolism, but because the cherubim above the ark were to the Hebrew mind, as shrouded in the Shekinah, connected by inseparable association with all that was most occult and most awful in Jehovah's self-disclosure. Being placed there, with perhaps the original significance of guardians, they simply acquired by their place the added significance which we find them possessing in poetry and prayer. If those golden forms had not first raised their wings aloft to overshadow the ark of the covenant, Jehovah would never have been called, "He that sitteth the cherubim." The cherubim receive this part of their symbolism from their place, not impart to the place the prior acquisition of their symbolism.

The expression "chariot of cherubims" (1 Chron. xxviii. 18) probably refers to the movable character of the ark and its apparatus of cherubim, upon which Jehovah is represented as sitting.

2. If we inquire, now, into the significance of the cherubim of Ezekiel's vision, we shall incur all the perplexity which is wont to attend the interpretation of prophetic symbolism. These "living creatures," and through their influence the cherubim of Moses' time, have been found to mean many things, from the vassals or "thunder-steeds"¹ of Jehovah to the most intimate disclosures of his own being and attributes. De Wette understands them as symbols of the strength, power, and wisdom of God and of his nearness. But Bähr, applying his cherubic theory, decides that they are called "living creatures," as possessing creature life, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Being the most perfect creatures, they are the most perfect

¹ So J. D. Michaelis in his "De cherubis equis tonantibus," though his view was founded mainly upon Ps. xviii. 10.

disclosures of God and divine life. The number four is the "signature of the creation, especially in so far as it is a witness and disclosure of God." In particular, the ox is a symbol of the "generative and creative power" — a point it costs him much trouble to prove, and to the knowledge of which he admits that the Hebrews themselves had not attained. The lion, on account of his monstrous strength and irresistible power, and, conditioned on these, his frightfulness, is the symbol of the same characteristics in Jehovah. The eagle, as bird of greatest speed and far-sight, indicates the "unbounded life-power" and "all-seeing eye" of Jehovah. As man is in spirit above all creation besides, he fitly stands the symbol of Jehovah's absolute spirituality, or more particularly, wisdom. Thus much for the separate parts. In its totality the cherub, as before said, symbolizes "creation in its highest stage, an ideal creation, and is thus a witness and disclosure of Jehovah himself." Gesenius, with far more probability in his favor, says these four united in one signify in part the strength, in part the speed, of these ministers of Jehovah.

Though we can offer no detailed explanation of these strange forms, and doubt whether any very occult symbolism belongs to their consideration, and so whether any such explanation in detail is possible, yet we may venture upon one or two suggestions.

Is, then, the state of the prophet's mind such as to search out all these hidden meanings of details, and combine them into one whole so symbolic that each element of that whole must be thought to symbolize something? Has he not rather caught up the forms of remote memory and present sensation, bound them into one strange, indescribable, and changeful whole, and little regarded a meaning for each part, or even for the whole, any further than such meaning was connected with one or two main purposes?

Are these cherubim, if symbolic, to be recognized as symbols of Jehovah at all? We are told, that "upon the heads of the living creatures was the likeness of a firmament," and

“the likeness as the appearance of a man above upon it,” “the likeness of the glory of the Lord.” Thus enthroned upon the “living creatures,” the glory of Jehovah carries the prophet about in sacred vision, and discloses to him strange things, until (Ezek. xi. 24) he is brought back into Chaldea, and the mission of these “living creatures,” these four-faced cherubim, seems accomplished.

In all this there may be some trace, so far as significance is concerned, of the cherubim above the ark, which were at once the guardians and the throne of Jehovah's glory. While, however, the symbolism of the historic cherubim was largely a historic growth due to the position which they originally had in the midst of the shekinah, these cherubim of the vision seem to have been constructed with a view to serve the seer in his vision, and therefore are by their very nature symbolic. The majesty, movement, or universal presence, and the universal insight of these ministers of Jehovah are the characteristics most clearly symbolized by their construction.

III. The third question, Whence had the cherubim their origin? yet awaits us. And to this question, as well as the preceding questions, only a partial answer can be given.

Thus much, however, is clearly manifest: The imagination of the constructor, be he artisan or seer, is very largely, if not wholly, the source whence issue these forms, now wrought in metal and tapestry, and now projected in the air. There is no proof which can be adduced to show that the Hebrews thought of the cherubim as having any antitype in real existences, except that taken from Gen. iii. 24. And in this place it is most likely that the author should not be understood according to the most literal interpretation.

Among the forms which swarm upon the temples, tombs, and palaces of the ancient world there are many which might more or less vividly recall the cherubim; but there is no one form so closely like theirs, even in more prominent characteristics, as to lead all to agree that this is the one sought, and no other. The search for an individual origin is unsuccessful,

for the data are insufficient. The usual method of procedure in the discovery — of which method Hengstenberg's argument is an example — is somewhat as follows: Find first some form more or less remotely like the "living creatures" of Ezekiel, and leaving out such of their elements as you choose, according to the form you have selected, assume that by just these omitted elements did the Mosaic cherubim differ from the cherubim of the vision, and, thus differing, agree with your theoretic original. This argument, however, is open to the objection that the closeness of resemblance which is made the basis of argument is the very thing which destroys the conclusion. For the little we know of the form of the Mosaic cherubim goes to show that they were almost the least possible like the "living creatures" of the prophet.

1. But with regard to the origin of the Mosaic cherubim; if it be unsafe, by comparing your selected form with the strange compounds of a later day, to reason that because it somewhat resembles them, it must exactly resemble something of by-gone centuries which, however, resembles them scarcely at all — if this be unsafe, any more secure method is scarcely attainable.

If the exact original of the Mosaic cherubim cannot be ascertained, shall we conclude that the cherubim were originated by the Hebrews themselves? The variety and kind of work which was done by the artisans of the tabernacle certainly seems to indicate that they were far from being incapable of creative art. And doubtless they fashioned at the first somewhat freely the forms which by their work became afterwards fixed for all Jewish history. But the analogy of the other constructions of these artisans seems to point us to Egypt for the original of the Mosaic cherubim. As a simple, pastoral folk, without religious ceremony and occult symbolism, the Hebrews had gone among a nation as unlike themselves as possible. And when after centuries they were made a nation themselves, we find everywhere in their tabernacle and its copy, the temple, in their priesthood, sacrifices, ark, and details of furniture, clothing, and ceremony, abundant wit-

nesses to the impressions which the land of their bondage had made upon them. "That the cherub as such," says Hengstenberg,¹ "aside from its significance which includes a real original Jewish element, did not spring up on Jewish ground appears probable from the merely scattered notices of it which are found." And again: "we are especially guided to the Egyptian origin of the cherubim, since of all the people with whom in ancient times the Israelites were closely connected, only among the Egyptians are compound animals found in history."

But if from Egypt the Hebrew cherub came, which one of its many symbolic animal forms is the exact original? Bähr declares² that he has examined all the forms in the "great French work" and not one of them resembles the cherubim in anything except the wings. But the sphinx is oftenest pointed out (so Spencer and Hengstenberg). Of it Wilkinson says:³ "The Egyptian sphinx was usually an emblematic figure representative of the king, and may be considered, when with the head of a man and the body of a lion, as the unison of intellect with physical force. Besides the ordinary sphinx, compounded of a lion and a man, was one with the head of a ram, another with the hawk's head and lion's body, and the asp-headed and hawk-headed sphinx with wings." Even if it were trustworthy to infer the exact original of the Mosaic cherubim through the descriptions of Ezekiel, a creature with four heads, one that of a lion, another that of a man, is not remarkably like a sphinx with a lion's body and a man's head. And Bähr judiciously remarks "if we admit the sphinx to have been part man and part lion, yet the eagle and ox are wanting, so that it no more resembles the cherub than the griffin of India which was part lion, part eagle." Something more to the point is to be found in Creutzer,⁴ who, after speaking of the Egyptian ark or boat, says: "On a pylon of the great temple at Philae such a boat has a head of Isis and some other remarkable ornaments, which I pass

¹ Egypt, etc., p. 165.

² Symbolik, i. 358.

³ Ancient Egyptians, i. 226.

⁴ Symbolik, i. 249.

by for brevity's sake, to call to mind some parallels with Hebrew festival rites. Four priests bear it on poles, and a small temple which stands in the boat is, as it were, 'shadowed' with winged figures. Before goes a boy with a smoking frankincense censer. Here Lancret compares the biblical account of the ark, which the Levites in linen clothing carried on staves of shittim wood; nor does he forget to mention the cherubim." Wilkinson as well says:¹ "Some of the sacred boats, or arks, presented the sacred beetle of the sun, overshadowed by the wings of two figures of the goddess Thmei, or Truth, which call to mind the cherubim of the Hebrews." From this or some similar original, somewhat freely handled, we believe that the Mosaic cherubim were derived. At any rate, such similarities and probabilities are the best answers that can be given to the inquiry into an Egyptian origin for the historic cherubim.

2. The imagination of the prophet is the most potent factor in the construction of Ezekiel's cherubim. They are therefore quite distinctively the result of the fancy of an individual, rather than a historic growth. "All the beings," says Ewald, "which he remembered as sacred companions of divine things, formed themselves in his mind into a new, wonderful whole, as though his imagination roamed abroad to conceive and depict in the most extraordinary way the highest that can be conceived or described."

It is to Assyria instead of Egypt that we are to look for whatever historic elements are comprised in the prophet's conception of the cherubim. And Assyrian art was characteristically given to forming images of the divine out of various and seemingly incongruous animal forms. "The imagery," says Stanley, "that Ezekiel sees is that which no one could have used unless he had wandered through the vast halls of Assyrian palaces, and there gazed on all that Assyrian monuments have disclosed to us of human dignity and brute strength combined, the eagle-winged lion, human-headed bull." "The resemblance," says Layard, "between the sym-

¹ Ancient Egyptians, i. 271.

bolical figures I have described and those seen by Ezekiel in his vision, can scarcely fail to strike the reader." "It will be observed that the four forms chosen to illustrate his description, the man, the lion, the bull, and the eagle, are precisely those which are found on Assyrian monuments as religious types. The 'wheel within wheel,' mentioned in connection with the emblematical figures, may refer to the winged circle or wheel representing at Nimroud the supreme deity. These coincidences are too marked not to deserve notice, and do certainly lead to the inference that the symbols chosen by the prophet were chosen from the Assyrian sculptures." According to Spencer it was a Rabbinical saying that four things are highest in the world: the lion among wild beasts, the ox among cattle, the eagle among birds, the man among all.¹

Should it seem that the present Article adds one other to the unsatisfactory attempts which have been made to treat this subject of Biblical Antiquities, we cannot do more to save its reputation than add the information of the learned Josephus: τὰς δὲ χερουβεῖς οὐδεὶς ὁποῖαί τινας ἦσαν εἰπεῖν οὐδ' εἵκασαι δύναται.

¹ Spencer's de Leg. Heb. iii. 5. 4. 2.

ARTICLE III.

WORDS IN NEW TESTAMENT GREEK BORROWED FROM
THE HEBREW AND ARAMAEAN.

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IN a previous Article we examined those words which forced their way into the vocabulary of the New Testament from the Latin. Are there any other foreign words in this vocabulary? This question suggests at once that sacred language which gave both Jews and Christians the Old Testament, and that popular language, the Aramaean or Syro-Chaldaic, which was the familiar tongue of Christ and his apostles. It may seem at first thought, that the New Testament would be full of words borrowed from these sources. This is a question of fact, and easily settled.

In the first place, we should not include among borrowed words those which are quoted as from a foreign language. If an English writer in giving an account of affairs in Turkey should incorporate into his work some Turkish expressions, clothing them in the English alphabet, no one would include them in our vocabulary.

Further, as our object is a practical one, to mark the difference between the Greek of the classics and of the New Testament, we shall not include those Greek words borrowed from any Semitic language which are also found in the classical period.

Having thus ruled out these two classes of words we will introduce them — surreptitiously, it may be thought — by mentioning what are ruled out.

Those of the first class are the following :

Ἐλωί — Aramaean אֱלֹוִי, for the Hebrew אֱלֹי, from אֱל, *God*, with the suffix וִי, *my*, “My God.” Mark xv. 34.

Ἐφφαθά — Aram. אֲפַתָּה, imperative middle from פָּתַח, *to open*; “Be opened.” Mark vii. 34.

Ἥλι — See Ἐλωί above. “My God.” Matt. xxvii. 46.

Κοῦμι — Hebrew, קומי, imperative feminine, from קום, to rise. “Arise.” Mark v. 41.

Λειά, Λαμᾶ — Heb. למה, from the preposition ל, for, and מה, what. “Why?”

Σαβαχθαί — Chaldee, שַׁבַּחְתָּי, second person singular from שַׁבַּח, to leave, with the verbal personal suffix י, me. With Λαμᾶ, above, “Why hast thou forsaken me?” Matt. xxvii. 46; Mark xv. 34.

Ταλιθά — Aram. תַּלְיָתָא, “damsel.” Mark v. 41.

These seven words are in each case translated by the evangelists into Greek, which is sufficient proof that they are to be reckoned as foreign words. Accordingly, we have limited this class to words thus translated, although this rigid test throws into the legitimate vocabulary several words, as we shall see, of decidedly foreign aspect.

The words of Semitic origin which are found also in the classics are the following (the Hebrew word being annexed as the best accessible representative of the Semitic original):

Ἀρράβων — עֶרְבֹון, earnest-money, from עָרַב, to pledge. Hence, the Latin *arhabo*, *arrha*, and *rhabo*, found as early as Plautus. This word is found three times in the New Testament, used by Paul; “Earnest of the Spirit.” 2 Cor. i. 22; v. 5. “Earnest of our inheritance.” Eph. i. 14.

Βύσσος — בִּיץ, from a root meaning white. “Was clothed in purple and fine linen.” Luke xvi. 19. “Merchandize of pearls and fine linen.” Rev. xviii. 12.

Κάμηλος — אֶמֶל, a camel. Used of the raiment of John the Baptist (Matt. iii. 4; Mark i. 6), and in the sayings about going through the eye of a needle (Matt. xix. 24; Mark x. 25; Luke xviii. 25), and swallowing a camel. Matt. xxiii. 24.

Κινάμωμον — קִנְמון, cinnamon. “No man buyeth cinnamon and odors.” Rev. xviii. 13.

Κύμινον — כִּמְון, cummin. “Tithe of mint, anise, and cummin.” Matt. xxiii. 23.

Λίβανος — לְבָנָה, frankincense, from לָבַן, to be white. “Frankincense and myrrh.” Matt. ii. 11. “No man buyeth frankincense and wine.” Rev. xviii. 13.

Λιβανωτός — derived from the preceding, is found in Herodotus in

the same sense, but is used in the New Testament in a different sense. "Having a golden *censer*." Rev. viii. 3 and 5.

Σάπφειρος — שַׁפְּרִי, *sapphire* from שָׁפַר to *scrape*. "The second [foundation was] *sapphire*." Rev. xxi. 19.

Συκάμινος — חֲזִזִי, a *sycamore tree*. "Ye might say unto this *sycamine tree*." Luke xvii. 6.

ῥύσσωπος — יָזוּב, *hyssop*. "Put it upon *hyssop*." John xix. 29. "Scarlet wool and *hyssop*." Heb. ix. 19.

To these ten should perhaps be added ἄλφα, ἄλφ (Rev. i. 8, 11; xxi. 6; xxii. 13), συκομωραία from the same as συκάμινος, if the Greek composition be discredited (Luke xix. 4), ἰῶτα, יוֹד, "*jot*" (Matt. v. 18), and καρχηδών, *carbuncle*, if that be the true reading for καλχηδών in Rev. xxi. 19.

Dismissing now the words thus enumerated as not properly belonging to our subject, we come to those which are introduced by the writers without an avowed translation, and which are not found in classical Greek.

Ἀββᾶ — Aramaean אַבְבָּא, corresponding to the Hebrew אָב, *father*. "And he said, *Abba*, Father, all things are possible unto thee; take away this cup from me." Mark xiv. 36. "Ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, *Abba*, Father." Rom. viii. 15. "God hath sent forth the spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, *Abba*, Father." Gal. iv. 6. It will be seen that "ἄββᾶ, πατήρ" are always joined together, and one might say at first glance that the latter is simply a translation; but this is quite inconsistent with the spirit of the second and third passages. Paul would hardly recommend a lesson in translation as a cry of filial love. "Abba, Father" means more than "Father," and why, if not from association with those words in Gethsemane, some of whose very syllables passed from heart to heart, and were preserved for us by the faithful and exact Mark? A Greek-speaking Jew, if he chose to retain ἄββᾶ would naturally add πατήρ, especially if in the anguish of the hour the ἄββᾶ were twice repeated. It would appear, then, that in the account of Mark πατήρ is virtually a translation, but that the two words once joined represented ever after the tenderest and deepest filial spirit. Luther's "Lieber Vater" was not far from right.

Ἀλληλοῦια — Hebrew הַלְלֵי־יְהוָה, from הָלַל, *praise ye*, and יְהוָה, a shortened form of Jehovah or Yahveh — *Praise ye Jehovah*. This

word occurs four times, and in the book where we look for the fervor of ancient prophecy and psalm. "I heard a great voice of much people in heaven, saying, *"Alleluia."* Rev. xix. 1; also in verses 3, 4, and 6.

Ἀμήν — Hebrew אָמֵן, *firm*, from אָמַן, *to support*. Used often by our Saviour, as reported by all the evangelists, as an adverb of affirmation, "verily," duplicated by John only. "Verily, verily," — once by Paul in a similar sense, "For all the promises of God in him are yea, and in him *Amen*." 2 Cor. i. 20. Used, according to the textus receptus, many times as an exclamatory prayer "Amen"; but in a majority of cases the reading is disputed.

Βάτος — (masculine), Heb. בַּת, *a bath*, a liquid measure of about eight and one-half gallons. Used only once. "How much owest thou unto my lord? And he said a hundred *measures* of oil." Luke xvi. 5, 6.

Γέεννα — Heb. גֵּי-הִנּוֹם, *valley of Hinnom*, from גַּי, *valley*, and הִנּוֹם, *Hinnom*, a valley on the south and west of Jerusalem in which was Topheth (2 Kings xxiii. 10). This word is found in Matthew, Mark, Luke, and James, as follows: "In danger of *hell*-fire." Matt. v. 22. "Whole body should be cast into *hell*." v. 29, also verse 30. "Destroy both soul and body in *hell*." x. 28. "Having two eyes to be cast into *hell*-fire." xviii. 9; also Mark ix. 47. "Two-fold more the child of *hell* than yourselves." xxiii. 15. "How can ye escape the damnation of *hell*?" xxiii. 33. "Than having two hands to go into *hell*." Mark ix. 43. "Than having two feet to be cast into *hell*." ix. 45. "Fear him which after he hath killed hath power to cast into *hell*." Luke xii. 5. "It is set on fire of *hell*." James iii. 6.

Ἑβραῖστί — from ἑβραῖζω, *to speak Hebrew*, from עִבְרִי, *Eber, Heber*; a word used by John only. "Called in the *Hebrew tongue*, Bethesda." John v. 2; also xix. 13, 17, 20; Rev. ix. 11; xvi. 16. The words *Ἑβραϊκός*, *Ἑβραῖος*, and *Ἑβραῖς* may be classed as proper names.

Ἰουδαῖζω — from יְהוּדִי, *Judah*. Used only once. "Why compellest thou the Gentiles *to live as do the Jews*." Gal. ii. 14.

Ἰουδαϊκῶς — from the same through *Ἰουδαϊκός*. Used only once. "Livest after the manner of the Gentiles and not *as do the Jews*." Gal. ii. 14.

Ἰουδαϊσμός — from *Ἰουδαῖζω*. Used twice. "My conversation in time past in the *Jews' religion*." Gal. i. 13. "And profited in the *Jews' religion*." i. 14. *Ἰουδαϊκός* and *Ἰουδαῖος* may be classed as proper names.

Κορβάν, κορβανᾶς — Heb. קָרְבָּן, *an offering*; used over seventy times in Leviticus and Numbers, in our version “offering” or “oblation,” Septuagint, δῶρον. The indeclinable form κορβάν is translated by Mark, but Matthew uses κορβανᾶς without explanation. Each is used only once. “It is not lawful for to put them into the *treasury*.” Matt. xxvii. 6. “But ye say, If a man shall say to his father or mother, It is *Corban*, that is to say, a gift.” Mark vii. 11.

Κόπος — Heb. כֶּרֶךְ, *a cor* (translated “measure” in our version. 1 Kings v. 11), a measure equal to ten baths. See βάτος, above. Used only once. “And how much owest thou? And he said, a hundred *measures* of wheat.” Luke xvi. 7.

Μαμωνᾶς — Chaldee מַמְּוֹנָא. Alford quotes from Augustine, “Lucrum Punice mammon dicitur.” Used four times. “Ye cannot serve God and *mammon*.” Matt. vi. 24. “Make to yourselves friends of the *mammon* of unrighteousness.” “If, therefore, ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous *mammon*.” “Ye cannot serve God and *mammon*.” Luke xvi. 9, 11, 13.

Μάννα — Heb. מָן, a resinous manna, to which the miraculous manna undoubtedly bore some resemblance (Ex. xvi. 15). Used four times, excluding John vi. 58. “Our fathers did eat *manna* in the desert.” John vi. 31; also 49. “Wherein was the golden pot that had *manna*.” Heb. ix. 4. “To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden *manna*.” Rev. ii. 17.

Μαράν ἀθά — Aram. מָרָא, *to come*, and מַרְנָא, or מָרְנָא, *Lord*. The Lord comes. Used only once. “If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema *Maran-atha*.” 1 Cor. xvi. 22.

Πάσχα, Heb. פֶּסַח, *the passover*, from פָּסַח, *to pass over*. This word is used in each of the four Gospels, referring to the literal festival, it being always translated in our version “Passover”; also once in Acts xii. 4, where it is mistranslated (to modern ears) “Easter.” It is found also in the two following: “For even Christ our *Passover* is sacrificed for us.” 1 Cor. v. 7. “Through faith he kept the *Passover*.” Heb. xi. 28.

Προσάββατον, from σάββατον. See below. Used once only. “Because it was the preparation, that is, the *day before the Sabbath*.” Mark xv. 42.

Ῥαββί, Heb. רַבִּי, from רַב, *great man, master*, and suffix יִי, *my*. Used frequently in the Gospels, not in Luke. “And to be called of men *Rabbi, Rabbi*.” Matt. xxiii. 7. “Then Judas which betrayed him answered and said, *Master*, is it I?” Matt. xxvi. 25. Nine

times it is in our version "Master"; at other times "Rabbi." It is translated "Διδάσκαλε" once by John (i. 39).

Ῥαββονί — perhaps not differing in meaning from Rabbi. Used twice, being translated by John, but used by Mark without explanation. "The blind man said unto him, *Lord*, that I might receive my sight." Mark x. 51. "She turned herself and saith unto him, *Rabboni*, which is to say *Master*." John xx. 16.

Ῥακά — Aram. רִיקָא, corresponding to the Heb. רִיק, *empty*. Used only once. "Whosoever shall say to his brother *Raca*, shall be in danger of the council." Matt. v. 22.

Σαβαώθ — Heb. צְבָאוֹת, *of hosts*, the genitive plural being transferred to the Greek. Used twice, the first being a translation from the Septuagint of Isa. i. 9. "Except the Lord of *Sabaoth* had left us a seed." Rom. ix. 29. "The cries of them which have reaped have entered into the ears of the Lord of *Sabaoth*." James v. 4.

Σαββατισμός, from σαββαρίζω, from σάββατον. See the following. Used only once. "There remaineth therefore a *rest* to the people of God." Heb. iv. 9.

Σάββατον — Heb. שַׁבָּת, *a Sabbath*, from שָׁבַת, *to rest*. Used often in the Gospels and Acts, and in the following: "Upon the first day of the *week* let every one of you lay by him in store." 1 Cor. xvi. 2. "Of the new moon or of the *Sabbath*." Col. ii. 16.

Σάτον — Aram. סָאָתָא, Heb. סָאָה, *a seah*, a dry measure of about a peck and a half; in our version simply "measure." Gen. xviii. 6. Used twice. "Leaven which a woman took and hid in three *measures* of meal." Matt. xiii. 33. See Luke xiii. 21.

Σίκερα — Heb. שֵׁכָר, *intoxicating drink*, from שָׁכַר, *to be drunken*. (Do not drink wine nor *strong drink*. Lev. x. 9). Used only once. "Shall drink neither wine nor *strong drink*." Luke i. 15.

Χερουβίμ, Χερουβείμ — Heb. כְּרוּבִים, *cherub*, plural כְּרוּבִים, *cherubim*. Used only once. "And over it the *cherubim* of glory." Heb. ix. 5.

Ὡσαννά — from Heb. הוֹשִׁיעָה נָא, *save now*, from יָשַׁע, *to be safe* and נָא, *now*, a particle of exhortation. ("Save now, I beseech thee, O Lord" (Ps. cxviii. 25). Used three times by Matthew, twice by Mark, and once by John, all concerning one occasion. "The multitudes that went before, and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna to the Son of David." Matt. xxi. 9. Not used by Luke or other New Testament writers.

These twenty-six words are all, so far as I can discover. In reviewing them we remark, —

1. The Hebraistic character of New Testament Greek does not come largely from its Hebrew *words*. The word which makes the strongest impression upon the cursory reader is Ἀμήν, especially as solemnly reiterated in John's Gospel. But this in the Gospels is given as the utterance of one who spoke in a language foreign to Greek. It is also exclamatory, and on its face bears evidence of being but imperfectly incorporated into the vocabulary. The same may be said of ἄββᾶ, Ἀλληλούϊα, κορβάν, μαρὰν ἰθά, ῥαββί, ῥαββουνί, ῥακά, σαβαώθ, χερουβίμ, and Ὡσαννά. Several are found only once, βάτος, Ἰουδαίζω, Ἰουδαϊκῶς, κόρος, μαρὰν ἰθά, προσάββατον, ῥακά, σαββατισμός, σίκερα, and χερουβίμ. The only words which occur with any frequency, and which have in all respects the treatment of native words, are γέεννα, and σάββατον; but the former is used but once out of the first three Gospels. These borrowed words, then, go but a little way in revealing the presence of Hebrew influence. Yet they are a convenient starting-point for investigation, and their existence makes certain a multitude of Hebraisms, of a less obtrusive character, consisting of changes of meaning in single words, and the adoption of Hebrew constructions and phraseology.

2. How many of these words are found in the Septuagint? There are twelve, viz. Ἀλληλούϊα, ἀμήν, βάτος, κόρος, μάννα, πᾶσχα, προσάββατον, σαβαώθ, σάββατον, σίκερα, χερουβίμ, and the proper name Γαιέννα, used in Josh. xviii. 16, as a strictly geographical designation, for which elsewhere is found φάραγξ Ἐννόμ (Josh. xv. 8) and γέ Βενεννόμ (2 Chron. xxviii. 3). The originals of these are pure Hebrew. Of the remainder the following are from the Aramaean: ἄββᾶ, μαρὰν ἰθά, ῥακά, σάτον, and probably Ὡσαννά, for the Jewish multitude in employing this word seem not so much to be quoting from the Psalms as using a familiar interjection.

That no more of these words are found in the Septuagint is what we ought to expect; for the language of the New

Testament is not a book-dialect made up by students of the Septuagint, but the genuine speech of the people, growing by adopting new forms, as *ἀββᾶ*, or taking a word of narrow meaning and expanding it to reach beyond this world, like *γέεννα*.

3. It should be noticed that but few of these words touch important doctrine. Six are titles of respect or expressions of emotion, *ἀββᾶ*, *Ἀλλελούϊα*, *ἀμήν*, *ῥαββί*, *ραββουνί*, *ῥακά*, and *ᾠσαννά*. Three are measures, *βάτος*, *κόρος*, and *σάτον*. Seven are purely historical, *Ἑβραϊστί*, *Ἰουδαῖζω*, *Ἰουδαϊκῶς*, *Ἰουδαϊσμός*, *προσάββατον*, *σίκερα*, and *χερουβίμ*. Five are used in the enforcement of duty, *κορβάν*, *μαμωνᾶς*, *μάννα*, *μαρὰν ἀθά*, *σαβαώθ*. Of the remaining, five, *ἀββᾶ*, *πάσχα*, *σαββατισμός*, and *σάββατον*, have doctrinal reference, but not prominently; thus leaving *γέεννα* as the one doctrinal word, standing out in awful distinctness as the word of doom.

4. The presence of Hebrew and Aramaean words in other late Greek writers ought here to be discussed, but we shall not attempt to do it. Josephus uses *βάτος*, *Ἰουδαῖζω*, *Ἰουδαϊκῶς*, *κορβάν*, *κόρος*, *μάννα*, *πάσχα*, *σάββατον*, *σάτον*, and *χερουβίμ*, besides others not found in the New Testament. The words which have gained currency by association with the life of Jesus we should not expect to find in Josephus. The Greek Christian Fathers took up and bore on most of them in a course that has reached our day, *ἀββᾶ*, *Ἀλλελούϊα*, *ἀμήν*, *γέεννα*, *κορβάν*, *μαμωνᾶς*, *μάννα*, *πάσχα*, *σάββατον*, *χερουβίμ*, and *ᾠσαννά*. Does it not appear from this that devotion, the world over, does literally use "the language of Canaan?"

While we confess our inability to discuss the Hebrew element in the later Greek writers, we wish to ask the following question of those competent to answer it: Does not the Hebrew element (in opposition to the Latin), gradually fade out of Byzantine Greek, and does not a comparative study of this element in Greek authors from Josephus to Eusebius throw some light upon the time of the composition of the New Testament?

It remains to enumerate the proper names of Semitic origin, which we will do without references to chapter and verse, and referring the reader to Robinson's Lexicon and Smith's Dictionary for the origin and signification of the words.

Ἀαρών, Ἀββαδδών, Ἀβελ, Ἀβιά, Ἀβιάθαρ, Ἀβιληνή, Ἀβιούδ, Ἀβραάμ, Ἀγαθος, Ἀγαρ, Ἀδάμ, Ἀδδί, Ἀδμειν (Tisch.), Ἀζώρ, Ἀζωτος, Ἀινών, Ἀκελδαμά, Ἀλφαῖος, Ἀμιναδάβ, Ἀμών, Ἀμός, Ἀνανίας, Ἀννα, Ἀννας, Ἀραβία, Ἀράμ, Ἀραψ, Ἀριμαθαία, Ἀρμαγεδδών, Ἀρνεῖ (Tisch.), Ἀρφαξάδ, Ἀσά, Ἀσήρ, Ἀχαζ, Ἀχείμ, Βάαλ, Βαβυλών, Βαλαάμ, Βαλάκ, Βαραββᾶς, Βαράκ, Βαραχίας, Βαρθολομαῖος, Βαριήσους, Βαρνάβας, Βαρσαβᾶς, Βαρτίμαιος, Βεελζεβούβ, Βελιάλ, Βενιαμίν, Βερνίκη, Βηθαβαρά, Βηθανία, Βηθεσδά, Βηθλέεμ, Βηθσαιῖδα, Βηθφαγή, Βοανεργές, Βοόζ, Βοσόρ, Γαββαθά, Γαβριήλ, Γάδ, Γαδαρηνός, Γάζα, Γαλιλαία, Γαλιλαῖος, Γαμαλιήλ, Γεδεών, Γεθσεμενή, Γεννησαρέτ, Γεργεσηνός, Γολγοθά, Γόμορρα, Γώγ, Δαβίδ, Δαμασκός, Δαμασκηνός, Δανιήλ, Ἐβερ, Ἐβραϊκός, Ἐβραῖος, Ἐβραῖς, Ἐζεκίας, Ἐλαμίτης, Ἐλεάζαρ, Ἐλιακείμ, Ἐλιέξερ, Ἐλιούδ, Ἐλिसάβετ, Ἐλισταῖος, Ἐλμωδάμ, Ἐλύμας, Ἐμμανουήλ, Ἐμμαούς, Ἐμμόρ, Ἐνός, Ἐνόχ, Ἐσλί, Ἐσρώμ, Ἐῶα, Ἐφραίμ, Ζαβουλών, Ζακχαῖος, Ζαρά, Ζαχαρίας, Ζεβεδαῖος, Ζοροβάβελ, Ἡλί, Ἡλίας, Ἡρ, Ἡσαῖας, Ἡσαῦ, Θαδδαῖος (?), Θάμαρ, Θάρα, Θεωδᾶς (?), Θωμᾶς, Ἰάειρος, Ἰακώβ, Ἰάκωβος, Ἰαννά, Ἰαρέδ, Ἰδουμαῖα, Ἰεζαβήλ, Ἰερεμίας, Ἰεριχω, Ἰεροσόλυμα, Ἰεροσολομίτης, Ἰεσσαί, Ἰεφθάε, Ἰεχονίας, Ἰησοῦς, Ἰόππη, Ἰορδάνης, Ἰουδαία, Ἰουδαϊκός, Ἰουδαῖος, Ἰούδας, Ἰσαάκ, Ἰσαχάρ, Ἰσκαριώτης, Ἰσραήλ, Ἰσραηλίτης, Ἰτουραία, Ἰωάθαμ, Ἰωάννα, Ἰωαννᾶς, Ἰωάννης, Ἰωβ, Ἰωήλ, Ἰωνάν, Ἰωνᾶς, Ἰωράμ, Ἰωρεῖμ, Ἰωσαφάτ, Ἰωσήφ, Ἰωσήφ, Ἰωσίας, Καϊάφας, Κάϊν, Καϊνάν, Κανᾶ, Καναῖτης, Καπερναοῦμ, Κεδρών, Κηφᾶς, Κίς, Κλωπᾶς, Κορέ, Κωσάμ, Λάζαρος, Λάμεχ, Λεββαῖος, Λευί, Λευῖτης, Λευιτικός, Λύδδα, Λωῖς (?), Λώτ, Μαῦθ, Μαγδαλά, Μαγδαληνή, Μαγώγ, Μαδιάμ, Μαθουσάλα, Μαῖνάν, Μαλελεήλ, Μάλχος, Μαναήν, Μανασσῆς, Μάρθα, Μαρία and Μαριάμ, Ματθαῖος, Ματθάν, Ματθάτ, Ματθίας, Ματταθά, Ματταθίας, Μελεᾶς, Μελχί,

Μελχισεδέκ, Μεσσίας, Μιχαήλ, Μολόχ, Μωσῆς, Ναασσών, Ναγγαί, Ναζαρέτ, Ναζαρηνός, Ναζωραῖος, Ναθάν, Ναθαναήλ, Ναὶν, Ναούμ, Ναχώρ, Νεεμάν, Νεφθαλείμ, Νηρί, Νινευί, Νινευίτης, Νῶε, Ὀζίας, Ὀυρίας, Ῥαάβ, Ῥαγαῦ, Ῥαμᾶ, Ῥαχάβ, Ῥαχήλ, Ῥεβέκκα, Ῥησά, Ῥοβοάμ, Ῥουβήν, Ῥοῦθ, Σαδδουκαῖος, Σαδώκ, Σαλά, Σαλαθιήλ, Σαλείμ, Σαλήμ, Σαλμών, Σαμάρεια, Σαμαρείτης, Σαμαρείτες, Σαμονήλ, Σαμφών, Σαούλ, Σαπφείρα, Σάρεπτα, Σαρούχ, Σάρρα, Σαρών, Σατάν, Σαῦλος, Σεμεί, Σήθ, Σήμ, Σιδών, Σιδώνιος, Σιλwάμ, Σίμων, Σινᾶ, Σιών, Σόδομα, Σολομών, Σουσάννα, Συμεών, Συχάρ, Συχέμ, Ταβιθά, Τύριος, Τύρος, Φαλέκ, Φανουήλ, Φαραώ, Φαρές, Φαρισαῖος, Χαναάν, Χαναναῖος, Χαρράν, Χοραζίν (?), Χουζᾶς (?), Ὠβήδ, Ὠσηέ.

In this list we have not thought it worth the while to distinguish between words found in the classical period and in later authors. The former are few; and the great number of foreign names thus thrust upon the Greek, a large proportion of them without inflection, give a Hebrew coloring to the text far beyond what comes from the legitimate vocabulary. After setting by themselves the first chapter of Matthew and the third of Luke, there still remain sprinkled through the various portions such unconformable words as Ἀβραάμ, Ἰσαάκ, and Ἰακώβ, which make one feel that grammatically, the Old Testament is going rough-shod over the New.

It is hardly necessary to remark that nearly all the foregoing personal names are found in the Old Testament. Of the exceptions the most notable is Ἑλισάβετ (Elizabeth).

A few words of explanation may be well as to the forms of the three precious names Ἰησοῦς, Ἰωάννης, Μαρία.

Our word Jesus does not closely resemble Joshua, with which it is identical; but taking the later form of Joshua, viz. Jeshua, or Yeshua, and remembering that *sh* must be represented in Greek by *s*, and long *u* by *ou*, we have Ἰησους, which by partial inflection becomes Ἰησοῦς.

Ἰωάννης, though not greatly changed from the Hebrew, seldom brings to mind its Old Testament original; for who identifies John with Johanan, and Jehohanan, although the meaning, God-given, is well worth remembering?

The name *Mapia*, Maria, is curiously set off by an uninstructed imagination in the Latin Hymns as derived from *mare*, the sea,—“Ave maris stella.”¹ But we must rather identify it, as its other form *Mapiapu* shows, with the Miriam of the Red Sea song, even if her name does mean “rebellion.” The Miriam is lost in the Mary.

ARTICLE IV.

THE TRUE BASIS OF FELLOWSHIP IN THE CONGREGATIONAL CHURCHES.

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THE following Article was prepared for “The General Congregational Association of Illinois,” in fulfilment of its appointment, and is now published at its request.

The topic assigned me is :

“What is the True Basis of Fellowship in the Congregational Churches?”

Fellowship is the natural consequence of adoption. When we have become members of the family of God, we are joint-heirs with Christ of the inheritance which God grants to his children. Fellowship is the participation, through the Holy Spirit, of each believer in the sufferings and glory of Christ, and in the blessings which all believers receive from Christ, and enjoy with him. It is not implied that each Christian receives the same degree of divine aid, but that all draw from a common treasury, and that each receives advantage from what is bestowed upon any one. The term, therefore, designates a necessary relation of Christians to one another and to their Lord. It expresses their partnership in a common possession.

The Greek word translated fellowship is *κοινωνία*, and might be translated the commonwealth. But the wealth or

¹ See March's Latin Hymns, p. 267.

weal of the followers of Christ is mainly spiritual, consists in sentiments and aspirations, hope and faith, love and Christian experience; therefore a word expressive of these things is chosen, rather than a word almost appropriated to a certain form of state government. The apostle does, however, by reference to the commonwealth of Israel, show negatively, and then positively, what true fellowship is, in Eph. ii. 12, 19: "That at that time ye were without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise"; but when the Gentiles were converted, he could say to them: "Now, therefore, ye are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God." The follower of Christ, then, through his fellowship or partnership, has a claim to the blessings which Christ as Redeemer bestows upon men, and also, to some extent at least, enters upon present possession of his rights. In partaking of the inheritance common to all the saints, one renounces a claim to all that which, by being personally his own, would abridge Christ's authority as the ruler of the commonwealth, or as the chief and controlling person in the entire fellowship. The converts at Jerusalem, at the Pentecost, made the fellowship of the saints prominent and visible by holding all things common. It is not probable that all the property of the disciples was then actually put into a common stock; but they were ready to give all, and did give whatever was necessary, for the common good. The fellowship of the Christians of the present day manifests itself chiefly in more spiritual forms.

In the development of Christian life, it *must* manifest itself in diverse ways; but the different forms it puts on should not lead us to suppose that there are various kinds of fellowship. It may impose upon us duties which vary according as our relations with the brethren are more close or more remote; but the bond which unites those under the same covenant in one church is essentially the same with that which binds us to any of the sick and imprisoned who represent Christ.

Were the question before us, then, What is the basis of *Christian* fellowship? we could give a very brief reply: It is adoption into the family of God. But if we interpret the question so that it shall include the following: What are the evidences on which we recognize our own Christian fellowship and the Christian fellowship of others? then a more careful and extended reply is needed. But the present inquiry is still more restricted: What is the basis of fellowship in those churches which are congregational in their polity? Here the fellowship cannot be merely that known to God, but that recognized among believers, and accorded by them to each other.

It will aid us, in a reply to the latter question, to answer, first, this: What are the evidences on which fellowship may be recognized? or, How may one, inquiring as to his own spiritual state, know himself to be of the family of God? In treating this question, it would not be proper to satisfy ourselves with a mere statement of the grounds on which one in youth, perhaps in childhood, or one as yet untaught, might be admitted to a church. In such a case there is much implied which is not expressed. The pastor and the maturer members of the church assume many things which the candidate does not think of. The inquiry before us is: On what is a *claim* to fellowship in the church based?

1. None have come into the Christian fellowship except those whom God has called into it. The goods, or good things, of which we participate are those which God has prepared, to which he only can give a claim, and a desire for which he only can create in the mind. This truth is implied in 1 Cor. i. 9: "God is faithful, by whom ye were called into the fellowship of his Son Jesus Christ our Lord." A more positive assertion is found in John vi. 44: "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him."

The drawing of the Father to the Son is by very gentle means; it often is not observed by those who are called; but still every person's Christian experience has this divine origin, and some trace of the influence of God upon the soul

before conversion can generally be found. No one can be considered a follower of Christ who would deny that it was grace, opposing his own nature, which led him to the Redeemer for salvation.

2. Christian fellowship leads to a knowledge of the truth. The Bible is explicit and emphatic on this point. Paul prays that Philemon's fellowship of faith may be energetic in producing a knowledge of all the good which Christ bestows upon his disciples. John affirms that fellowship must be accompanied with light, cannot co-exist with darkness. "If we say that we have fellowship with him [God], and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth; but if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another" (1 John i. 6, 7). Paul commands Timothy to withdraw himself from, i.e. refuse fellowship with, any man who consents not to wholesome words and to the doctrine which is according to godliness (1 Tim. vi. 3-6). In the Gospel of John vii. 17 we read; "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine." It is a principle which pervades all the scriptures, that real communion with God leads to a correct understanding of the truth. Fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ (1 John i. 3), and must, from its nature, be accompanied by a submission of the mind to God, and an acceptance of Jesus Christ as Mediator.

We may rest fully assured, therefore, that those persons are not in fellowship with God and his people who have not clear ideas of the fundamental truths of the gospel, and who do not soon come into clear views of the special doctrines of grace. Those persons who tamper with error, those who pet their doubts, those who are not enlightened in mind so as to see clearly that salvation must be by Christ, by regeneration through the Spirit, by self-renunciation and by simple grace through a Redeemer, cannot be considered to be in a state of Christian fellowship. They may seem to us honest seekers for the truth; but the Bible forbids us to believe that they are enlightened.

3. It is a part of the same idea, but worthy of separate notice, that the fellowship of Christians delivers them from errors. The mind enlightened by communion with God sees the want of consistency between Christian truth and error. This effect of fellowship, and indeed the entire doctrine, with its consequences, is very forcibly stated in the first chapter of Colossians. The following words indicate the spirit of the passage : " Giving thanks unto the Father, which hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light : who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son." A more explicit statement is found in 2 Cor. vi. 14, 15 : " For what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness ? And what communion hath light with darkness ? And what concord hath Christ with Belial ? Or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel ? " There may be a temptation, sometimes, to admit into church fellowship those who cling to error, if they seem to indicate a love of truth, and especially if they exhibit a love of Christ. But there are many kinds of emotion that may be called love ; and we must accept as a ground of fellowship only that which delivers one not only from essential religious errors, but from those tendencies of thought which are more accordant with infidelity than with faith in Christ.

4. Christian fellowship naturally separates one from men who teach error, as well as delivers the mind from their doctrines. A somewhat prominent member of a Presbyterian church in the state of New York was excommunicated, some years ago, for the habit of attending on Sabbath the services at the Universalist church of the village, where he heard lectures from Mr. Garrison and popular speakers of the class to which he belonged. The accused defended himself on the ground that he heard good things at the church ; but was condemned on the ground that he spent the Sabbath with those from whom he was liable to hear false and evil things. In revivals in colleges there are almost always some whose consciences are aroused, but who decline to take an open

position in favor of religion on the ground that they can exert a better influence on the more wayward and hardened if they do not break away from them.

Such facts as these lead us to observe the general principle laid down in the New Testament, that those who are in fellowship with Christ will also be in fellowship with the followers of Christ, and will find the society of those who are unchristian, who teach error, who are profane and godless, repulsive to their feelings. True Christian fellowship evokes nothing more clearly and distinctly than likes and dislikes. There is no love without hate, and to love the brethren is to hate that which weakens and distracts the brotherhood. The texts which bear upon this point are numerous. Paul commands the Ephesians (v. 11) to "have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them." And he says to the Corinthians: "I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils." He says to the Galatians (i. 7): "There be some that trouble you, and would pervert the gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel to you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." The apostle John says: "If there come any unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed; for he that biddeth him God speed is partaker of his evil deeds" (2 John 10, 11).

We may set it down, therefore, that any one who is in real and living fellowship with Christ and his followers, who lives in the fellowship of the Spirit, will fulfil the joy of Christians, which was the joy of Paul, will be like-minded with the brethren, will do nothing through vain-glory, will with lowliness of mind seek to serve the church; but will avoid teachers of error, will detest a new gospel different from that of the Lord Jesus, will find his rest and satisfaction in associating with those who live by faith, and rest on the promises of God. I need not say that such a spirit is consistent with a bold and earnest search for truth; but I also do not need to say that it is neither boldness nor earnestness, but the Divine

Spirit, the pure heart, the docility of love, which lead to the truth.

5. Those who are in the fellowship to which God calls us will keep the commandments of God. There is no anti-nomian piety. Those who are the friends of God will feel themselves called to this discharge of duties, and feel assured that, if they neglect them, they give evidence that they are still aliens from the divine commonwealth. It is true, we are not saved as a reward of obedience; but we are doubly condemned if we continue in disobedience after we have been enlightened, and know the reasonableness and wisdom of the divine requirements. Indeed, obedience to the commandments of God is the external mark of love to God. Much has been said of late about love as the true evidence, the sufficient evidence, the only evidence of discipleship. But such assertions amount to little till love is defined. As all know, it is not an emotional affection merely; it is that state of submission to God which Edwards calls consent, propensity, and union of heart with him. Love is sometimes said to be the sum of all Christian graces; it certainly secures the Christian graces, and its manifestation is keeping the commandments. Christ accepts no love which is not a determination of the will towards himself. We should have been saved much mawkish sentimentalism, if certain writers and preachers had remembered this truth. Our Lord seems almost to have despised a love that consists simply of emotions. He says: "If ye love me, keep my commandments." There seems to be a kind of impatience indicated in his rebuke of those who claimed to be his followers without being obedient: "And why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?"

It has been said that Christ's only question in examining men for a place in his church was, "Lovest thou me?" The blunder as to facts is not greater than the blunder in interpreting the question itself. Christ intended to teach the boastful Peter that love such as he felt on the night of the supper was not enough to make a stable disciple. Show your

love by work, was his direction. "Feed my sheep"; "Feed my lambs." In the last chapter of Revelation, the ground on which man's blessedness is secured is sounded forth in tones which seem fit at once to awe and enchant a world: "Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city."

Thus far we have noticed only traits of character indispensable to Christian discipleship. It might be that some of these characteristics would manifest themselves but feebly in certain cases; but where any of them could be positively denied to exist, the demonstration would be perfect that the ground of fellowship did not exist. One who should fail to find in himself the above-mentioned traits could not honestly suppose himself to belong to the family of God. Those who were of the household of faith could not welcome to their embrace one whom they were assured the Lord Jesus had not welcomed. And if an inevitable judgment should exclude those not affiliated in sentiment to the children of God, much more would the subtile sympathies, the quick, susceptible sense of brotherhood exclude them from a recognized place in the divine household.

The question before us, it is to be remembered, is not the broad one, "What is the basis of fellowship among the children of God?" but "What is the basis of fellowship in our churches?" We must inquire, then, Does the church from its nature exclude from its fellowship any who belong to the company of Christ's disciples? A little reflection will convince any one that an affirmative reply is, at least, not an absurdity. It may now be the common assumption that the church exists simply for the purpose of gathering into a safe retreat the true followers of Christ. But even *this* work, and it is not *all* its work, might forbid the instant acceptance of some true disciples into immediate, formal fellowship. The object for which a church exists, according to the old and often-expressed view, is that the people of God may become visible and militant. In other words, the disciples

of Christ form themselves into churches in order that God's grace among men may acquire a manifestation and a practical efficiency. The church must therefore be an intelligent witness to certain Christian truths, and bear intelligible testimony to them. There may, therefore, be many who enjoy the fostering care of the church, who yet are not fitted to fulfil the offices of membership. The work of the church is not exhausted upon those who sit down at the communion table, but is directed with special earnestness towards those not found there. Children may be, often are, the more carefully watched because they are not able to make a clear confession of their faith. It is mere sentimentalism to argue the propriety of admitting children to the church from the fact that lambs need the shelter of a fold as well as sheep. As good a counter argument (each being good for nothing) is: Chickens are well cared for, if the hen is well sheltered in the coop. To receive the nurture of the church and to profess its faith are two things. And a profession without a confession is simply a pretence.

It will be in place, then, to notice some things which a member of a church by his simple position affirms, and, if the church is not as broad as humanity, affirms with some degree of intelligence.

1. In order to be fitted for a place in the visible church, a person must be able to understand the character of Jesus Christ, as the Son of God and as the Messiah. Near the close of our Lord's ministry, he called his disciples into a remote and secluded region, beneath Mount Lebanon, and examined them as to their faith, and organized his church. This seems to be a fair interpretation—at least it is a common interpretation—of Matt. xvi. 13-20. He asked the disciples, "Whom say ye that I am?" Peter answered, apparently for them all: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." Jesus said this was a revelation to Peter from the Father in heaven, and added: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church." Whatever may be the particular thing here designated as a rock, there can be

no doubt that the foundation of the Christian church is a correct understanding of Christ. Any confession which makes him less than the Son of God, which denies that he is the Anointed of God, the King for whom the Jews were looking, and the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, is not a confession on which church-membership is to be based.

2. In order to come to the sacrament of the Lord's supper properly, one must be able to discern the Lord's body. "For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord's body." All will assent that this passage requires the following things :

One, in order to come to the communion-table properly, must confess his own sinful state, his entire ruin because of sin, and his present condemnation by a holy law.

He must confess, also, that pardon cannot be granted him out of the mere mercy of God, but must be bought by a sacrifice by one who has borne our sins in his own body, and died for them.

He must profess, also, that he finds evidence in his own experience that he has received the benefits of Christ's death in his own soul, so that his own life manifests new traits of character which have become his by divine aid.

He must also profess himself to be rather a member of the church than an independent person ; profess that his life is a church life, and for the church, rather than a life having its springs of action in itself. In a word, he must profess devotion to the church. This thought seems to be clearly contained in 1 Cor. x. 16, 17 : "The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ. For we, being many, are one bread and one body ; for we are all partakers of that one bread." Alford says the meaning is : "By partaking of that bread, we become not figuratively, but literally, one bread ; it passes into the substance of our bodies, and there is in every one who partakes, a portion of himself which is that bread." Such a partaking of the bread sets forth our partaking of Christ, or our fellowship with Christ and with his followers.

3. The very existence of the church demands that those in its fellowship accept the Bible as the rule of faith. The chief things of which we partake in common are objects of faith, and unless these be the *same*, the communion is a mockery. We must have one faith, as well as one Lord and one baptism. And our common faith must embrace all the doctrines essential to the Christian system. The evidences of Christianity are, indeed, addressed to our natural judgment; but when we are convinced that God has sent his Son into the world, and that through him and the apostles the way of salvation is taught, then we have no choice but to accept the teachings of the scriptures, without conditions, and without cunning and far-fetched interpretations. If the scriptures were of private interpretation, a rationalizing spirit might so abrade the sharp outlines of the doctrines—even of those most prominent, like the atonement, regeneration, the resurrection, and eternal punishment—that they would seem quite other doctrines than those found by the ordinary reader in the word of God. But in the nature of things a revelation is not given to be explained away; we might as well be without the revelation. What men need is a disclosure of truth for the common mind, and that we have in the Bible, or we have no Bible. This point the apostle has argued with great clearness and cogency in the first two chapters of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. He shows there, and in other places, that a Greek is no better than a Jew; in other words, a philosopher is no better than a formalist—each must come for life and light to Jesus Christ. He declares that he avoids the wisdom of this world; that he preaches the mysteries of the gospel not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual (or setting forth spiritual things in spiritual forms).

4. No one has a right to be within a church who does not seek the order and harmony of the church. It is very clear that God is specially regardful of order, propriety, and peacefulness in his own house. The apostles urge their

followers to avoid schisms, confusion, contention, anything which engenders strife, and command their converts to live peaceably with all men. There were, probably, peculiar reasons for such entreaties in the early ages of the church; but it still remains true that a harmonious and united church presents a most pleasing spectacle to the eye of God. There is no doubt but discipline should be enforced in a church — enforced for the sake of order and peace. There may be times when earnest men must protest against the delinquencies of the church, and even separate those who are Christ's from those who are not; but this does not change the fact that God calls upon his children to be men of peace, of gentleness, of meekness, avoiding such as walk disorderly, seeking to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace; not striving for pre-eminence, but in honor preferring one another.

All these conditions, indispensable to a witnessing to the truths of the gospel, should be insisted upon as a basis of fellowship in all our churches. But the question before us is subject to a still further restriction.

What is the true basis of fellowship in the *Congregational* churches? This is a twofold question, and we will consider it, understanding by fellowship, first, that which exists within a single church; and secondly, that which exists between different churches.

No one will doubt that, in the present imperfect state of human knowledge and varied faiths, it is better that persons of *like* views *combine* in forming churches, so that the harmony within a church be as complete as circumstances will admit. We should, any of us, advise one agreeing wholly with a certain denomination to connect himself with that denomination, if convenient. And there might be cases — there have been cases — in which we should be obliged to refuse church-fellowship to one whom we believed to be a true disciple of Christ, even though it were impossible for him to find the sect with which he agreed in doctrine.

There are, doubtless, many really converted persons in

the Roman Catholic church ; but they could not properly be admitted to a Congregational church, bringing with them their Romish views. Their ideas of the pope and the Virgin Mary would exclude them from us. They could not be, indifferently, Romanists or Congregationalists, as convenience should dictate. There are probably Universalists who are true followers of Christ ; but if any one should declare that the assertions of eternal punishment in the Bible must be interpreted consistently with the doctrine of universal salvation, because God would not punish men forever, he could not properly be admitted to a church holding that the scriptures are the only and sufficient rule of faith.

A distinguished theologian of the old school has recently expressed his belief that Schleiermacher is now singing the praises of Christ in heaven. Yet he represents the doctrines of Schleiermacher as being far from those taught in the scriptures. No one should teach that Christ's *work* is of little account, that his *power* is in manifesting a true humanity, and in thus awakening the dormant elements of a true humanity in degraded men, that his mission is saving men by developing their latent virtues, could be admitted to a Congregational church.

A man who should reject the Old Testament from the canon of the scriptures and throw out parts of the New Testament, or one who should deny the inspiration of the scriptures, could not be admitted to any of our Congregational churches.

It is not questioned that immersionists are true Christians ; but a person who should declare a Congregational church to be no church, and that all its members must be immersed before he could join them, would find a twofold reason for his exclusion from its communion-table.

The church is not intended to be simply a receptacle of all those who are to be saved. Heaven will receive its own at last. Some will be taken who never entered the church militant, and some will be rejected who will claim to have done efficient work in his kingdom on earth. The church

is, in truth, the body of Christ; but we cannot consider any to belong to that body except those who visibly belong to it.

I shall speak but briefly on the second point under Congregational fellowship, viz. that existing between the churches. Some of my remarks will be suggestions, rather than assertions, inasmuch as the Congregational polity does not seem to be fully developed at this point.

1. It is obvious that the churches must agree in polity, in order to hold the intimate relations necessary in the same denomination.

The platform of the Council of 1865 (published, however, within the present year) affirms that, "A church desiring the approbation and assistance of other churches in the ordination of its officers cannot wisely or courteously ask such approbation and assistance from churches in whose professed theory of government all ordinations must be by a prelate, or in whose theory the power of ordination is given only to a presbytery ruling over many congregations. In like manner, if it desire counsel in any case involving questions of doctrine, it cannot wisely or courteously ask such counsel of churches not accepting that general system of doctrines which is the well-known basis of mutual confidence and intimate communion among evangelical churches of the Congregational polity."

If the mere question of polity is to be considered in searching for the basis of fellowship, much more are doctrines relating to the salvation of men to be considered.

2. Fellowship among the churches should be conditioned upon agreement as to the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion. One Congregational church cannot enter into fellowship with another of like polity, if it deny the Divinity of Christ, the entire depravity of man, the eternal punishment of the wicked. A church adopting a different polity from ours, but holding to the evangelical doctrines, or the distinguishing doctrines of the New Testament may come into far more intimate relations with us than a church with our polity which rejects our view of the system of grace.

3. The fellowship of the churches ought to be based upon, then ought to secure and maintain, an agreement of the churches and of the ministry upon the practical doctrines relating to Christian ordinances and the evangelization of the world. It would be a misfortune to have an exclusive immersionist settled as pastor over one of our churches. It would be a misfortune to have a pastor bring into one of our churches the Romish views of communion. Perhaps the good sense of those opposed to us secures us from any danger on those points, but our own good sense ought also to secure us. I think it would be no less a misfortune to have in our churches preachers who should proclaim that man in his natural state has no religious duties, that his conscience cannot and ought not to condemn him for disobedience to God, till God has given him a gracious ability to obey. Such doctrines cut the very sinews of morality. The preachers of such doctrines are indebted for the Christian virtues of their own congregations, in some degree, to the sounder preaching of their neighbors, as well as to the inherent force of the conscience,

Our Congregational churches are therefore bound by their fellowship to co-operate in educating a ministry which shall be in substantial agreement not only as to the doctrines of salvation, but also as to the methods of proclaiming and applying those doctrines.

4. It is worthy of inquiry whether it ought not to be a fundamental principle of fellowship among the churches, that the ministry in its official work be in some way amenable to councils or associations. The Congregational polity at this point seems not fully developed; for the common sense of the churches has required of councils the exercise of powers not granted them in some of our theories.

One theory is, that a man is a teacher or preacher in virtue of his office in a church; yet practically all our missionaries, our preachers without charge, our clerical teachers in colleges and seminaries are preachers, and accepted as such, though their church connection be with a church a thousand miles away.

A theory is, that the local church ordains a minister, giving him thus the privilege of preaching; but in practice a council can depose him from the ministry. The same body should have power to confer and withdraw the privilege. Moreover, there should be some method of calling a council for the purpose of deposing a minister of scandalous life, other than the mere motion and inclination of the church to which the minister may belong.

A theory is, that ordination is simply the induction by a church of a man into the office of teacher in that church; but practically it gives him power to preach anywhere.

A theory is that a council gives access to the neighboring churches by extending the right hand of fellowship to a newly-settled pastor; but if a church hire a previously-ordained preacher for a year or a month, he has practically the same access to the neighboring churches.

In theory an installation is an attenuated ordination, yet practically ordination is an advanced step to a permanent position in the ministry.

There are thus duties imposed upon councils which the individual churches calling them do not impose. When the Board of Missions wishes to send a young man to one of its stations, it asks the church in Sailem to call a council of the churches in Preachem and Teachem for the purpose of ordaining their missionary. It is a mere ecclesiastical fiction to hold that the church calling the council is the prime and responsible mover in the work. But the remarks here made are intended simply to raise the inquiry whether the Congregational system cannot be made more complete than it now is.

ARTICLE V.

RELATIONS OF THE ARYAN AND SEMITIC LANGUAGES.

BY REV. JAMES F. MCCURDY, PRINCETON, N. J.

I.—HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF THE INQUIRY.

OF the many unsolved problems that lie perpetually in the way of the student of language, there are two which are specially beguiling and distracting on account of their intrinsic interest and profound obscurity. The questions as to the original *source* of language itself, and as to the original *relations* of the various families of speech, have assumed this prominence in the more speculative regions of the science, because the opinions of leading theorists have been so conflicting, and because the methods of proof in each case are so various and uncertain. Each of these questions opens up a field of inquiry practically unlimited; and it is safe to say that, however firmly certain theories or principles may be maintained by the representatives of different schools, we have not yet seen the beginning of the end in the effort to reach scientific certainty upon the basis of established facts. Under these conditions, it is not to be wondered at that extravagant notions have been advanced during the whole history of the investigation. It is, however, natural to suppose that this tendency would be manifested the more strongly in the consideration of the former of the two problems; because when the conditions of the earliest expression of human thought or feeling are brought before the mind, the subject is seen to be so exceedingly complex and obscure—extending at once into the regions of philology, psychology, and physiology, with all their delicate and mysterious correlations—that a certain measure of ingenious theorizing, in default of scientific demonstration, would seem to have a right to indulgence, at least, if not to encourage-

ment. When, however, we regard language not in its nature, but in its manifestations, not in its origin, but in its development, we are shut up almost entirely to a single region of observation, whose limits are well-defined, though its phenomena are perplexing; and here there can be no justification for the exercise of fancy, where it is not called upon simply to furnish illustrations, but intrudes to present the world with a theory or a system. In this investigation we have presented to us a certain number of languages, differing to a greater or less degree in their verbal forms and in their modes of expression; and the object of inquiry is to determine their relations by a comparison of their respective idioms of grammar and vocabulary. This, we mean to say, is the only method whose principles are in accord with the science of language, and whose well-grounded conclusions will be fearlessly accepted by scholars of every sect or party. Side-light may indeed be thrown upon the question through the study of comparative religion, and opinions as to the original identity or multiplicity of languages may be based upon convictions with regard to the original unity or diversity of the race; but these external sources of evidence are either too remote or too indirect in their bearing to satisfy all classes of investigators; while even those who appeal to scripture or to the science of anthropology for the general solution of the question, are as much interested as any in the result of those gradual philological processes by which they admit that its clearest demonstration must be achieved.

But even in this legitimate and restricted sphere, where *a priori* reasoning and philosophical speculation have no proper place, fancy has had greater sway than fact. While this is specially true of the attempts that have been made to exhibit the fundamental relations of all, or of many divergent, languages, it is also manifest in the comparative treatment of the two great inflectional families, the Semitic and the Indo-European. Even since the establishment of comparative philology as a science, and even among men of extensive linguistic knowledge, the abounding temptations to forsake the slow and tedious

methods of rigid comparison have often prevailed. In the course of the present Essay, it will be necessary to take a rapid survey of the various theories that have been propounded as to the relations between these two dominant families, and of the various kinds of evidence by which they are supported; and it will be instructive, as well as interesting, to note the errors of fact and inference into which so many students have been led through hasty examination and the seductive influence of fanciful analogies. Those of us, moreover, who believe in the primal identity of all forms of human speech, would do well to guard against the danger of bringing our dogma into disrepute among more sceptical thinkers by adducing in its defence evidence at all suspicious or easily disproved. We must not forget that the attempt to demonstrate by a strict examination and comparison of all families of language, that they have proceeded from a common source, is an immense, possibly a vain, undertaking. But if entered upon at all, it must be begun by investigating, as profoundly and justly as possible, the relations of those idioms that are best understood and have the greatest mutual resemblance. When an affinity is once established, then, and only then, will the first sure step be taken towards the solution of the wider and final question. Hence the need of soberness and caution in every stage of the inquiry.

Our more immediate concern, however, is with the narrower and more manageable problem, the relations of those two great families of speech that have been most highly developed and cultivated, and have apparently preserved in manifold forms much of their original stock of idioms, and are therefore most amenable to the processes of analysis and comparison. In approaching this question, it will be proper first to glance at some of the many attempts that have been made at its solution, and to examine the various theories that have been propounded with regard to it. This will be our object in the present introductory Article.

Before the establishment of the science of language, it was impossible that any intelligent view of the subject could

be reached. Even the very conditions of the investigation could not be apprehended. Theories the most vague and unsupported were held as to the relations of the various dialects of human speech. Previously to the close of the last century, the comparative treatment of languages was usually only a sort of philological alchemy, in which Hebrew roots played the part of the philosopher's stone. Instead of regarding the several idioms of the world as developed from decayed and germinal forms, one language, accessible only in the literary and cultivated periods of its history, was venerated as the common source of all the rest, and languages the most diverse in structure and in typical character were believed to have been developed naturally and gradually from one of the least flexible and versatile of all forms of speech. This notion was based upon the persuasion that the oldest records of the race must have been composed in the earliest language, and that the most sacred of all tongues in its history and varied associations must have been the form of speech bestowed upon man at his creation by the gift of his Creator. Originating among the teachers of the synagogue, we know not how early, it was embraced by the Fathers of the Christian church,¹ and held almost undisputed sway until the comparison of languages became a subject of sober inquiry.² During the Middle Ages, when the rabbins engrossed the study of the sacred languages, and continued to illustrate the congenial theory of the antiquity and originality of the Hebrew tongue, there was not the interest or the knowledge in the Christian church that would have been necessary for its intelligent criticism. In the period between the revival of learning and the development of the science of comparative philology, there was, indeed, occasional objection to this venerable doctrine; but it was based rather

¹ Gregory of Nyssa, however, surmised that the Hebrew was one of the languages that arose out of the confusion at Babel. *Orat. contra Eunom.*, xii. Quoted by Franz Delitzsch, *Jesurun*, p. 48.

² Theodoret, Philo Judaeus, and some of the rabbins regarded the Aramaic as the more ancient idiom. This, however, is only a sort of collateral theory. Theodoret supposed that the Hebrew was a special divine revelation to Moses.

upon its general improbability, than upon definite scientific evidence. During this period; also, a modification of the old opinion grew into some favor; according to which the Hebrew was held to be, if not the source of all other languages, at least the most ancient, and the one which preserved with the least degree of change the original stock of roots, and therefore the standard with which the verbal forms of all other tongues should be directly compared. The doctrine, in the one or the other of its general forms, was held very tenaciously; and, etymology being rather an art than a science, or rather an art founded upon no science, the task of comparison and assimilation was a very simple affair. For, as the expounders of the theory could not be refuted by an appeal to established laws of relationship between the various forms of speech, they were free to cite at pleasure mere coincidences and fanciful analogies as proofs of true affinity, and thus to vindicate the supposed sacred prerogatives of the Hebrew tongue; being opposed only by the smiles of an incredulous few, which they could afford to ignore, as having the support of nearly all who were interested in the subject. This dogma, so long and widely and firmly held, has now no more than a historical significance, and needs no labored or formal disproof. It is sufficient to remark that the Hebrew has no claim to consideration, in this connection, above its Semitic sisters or reputed Indo-European cousins, and that its long ascendancy has been due, under the conditions of erroneous linguistic principles, simply to its high antiquity and the circumstance that it is the best known and the most highly venerated of its ancient family, by reason of its sacred associations. The Highlander and the Welshman, who affirm that their respective dialects have also a claim to be considered the primitive languages, have much of the same kind of evidence to adduce as that which has always been advanced in behalf of the Hebrew; and they, in their turn, might be met by a strong array of striking analogies, presented with equal confidence, as proof that the idiom of the Sandwich Islanders should not be left out of sight in any candid examination of the question.

It will perhaps be proper to illustrate the methods of this system of comparison by a few instances selected from the works of writers in recent times, and even in the present century. They will forcibly suggest the great advance made in linguistic science within the last sixty or seventy years, and may also serve as a warning to any who may still insist on a radical affinity between verbal forms on the evidence of mere external resemblance.

We find the acute and learned Moses Mendelssohn¹ among the later serious advocates of the doctrine that the Hebrew is the parent of all other idioms. Matthias Norberg,² a respected scholar of the early part of this century, after close scrutiny, detected in the Greek language the inherited lineaments of the same venerable and prolific parent. According to him, *ἔθνος* arose from עַם, through the insertion of *θ*; *λόγος* was a transposition of קוֹל; *μυθέω*, a slight modification of שָׁפַף. But the most frank and hearty exposition of the theory that we have seen is a little book by the Rev. Alexander Pirie,³ a man of considerable linguistic attainments, but of still greater ingenuity. We cite some of his numerous derivations. He supposes that our word *bog* comes from בֹּהַב,⁴ as abounding with springs; that *boggle* (*bogle*) is connected with בֹּהַל, as inspiring terror; and that *tar* is derived from תָּאָר, because it is so much used for marking sheep, sacks, etc. From רָגַם he would deduce the Latin *rego*, because stoning was an exercise of the supreme authority as a judicial punishment. In his opinion, גָּמַל, "to retribute," gave rise among the Hebrews to the word *camel*, on account of the revengeful disposition of that animal.⁵

¹ In prolegomena to his edition of the Pentateuch, cited by Delitzsch, Jesurun, p. 46.

² Opuscula, ii. Dissert. xv., xvi.

³ A Dissertation on the Hebrew Roots, intended to point out their extensive influence on all known languages. Edinburgh, 1807.

⁴ The use of the Hebrew without the points doubtless gave such writers an opportunity to indulge in the greater liberties. They thus did not fail to verify Voltaire's well-known definition of Etymology as a science in which vowels counted nothing, and consonants very little.

⁵ This derivation, however, it should be remarked, was once quite common.

He finds in גנב the origin of our word *knave*, which "at present is used in a bad sense, the same in which the Hebrews used it." Comparing Solomon's description of his spouse as "a garden inclosed," he imagines that גנן includes the idea of beauty, which is guarded with peculiar care, and that hence arises the Greek γυνή; while "the cognate Latin *genita*, a daughter, is plainly the source of our *Janet*." ירין or ירין, in his view, gave birth to a numerous progeny. δέον, what is just, and δεινός, skilled (in judging), do not surprise us very much; but we are further asked to accept δίνη, whirlpool, or whirlwind, "from the idea of vehemence in pleading." And, as the judgment-seats of antiquity were often groves, δένδρον is added to the family, which is next increased by the accession of our English *den*, because oracular judgments were frequently delivered from caverns. For a similar reason any hollow vessel came to be called a *tun*, "the *d* being changed into *t*, as usual." As a judge held a distinguished station, the Spanish *Don* is next admitted to the domestic circle; and since ירין also means to dispute, and "as people in angry dispute are still said to be teethy, or to show their teeth," it was thought inhospitable to leave the Latin *dens* chattering outside in the cold. גלה, with other meanings, has the sense of carrying away captive. "Now the א prefixed forms a noun; before ג it sounds *ang*, hence the Teutonic *angel*, with its cognates." The confusion of tongues at Babel arose, he says, from a defect of labial utterance. When one would have said *Bel* (בעל), he said *Babel*. Hence also our word *babble*. He is very sparing of onomatopoeic affinities; but he would probably concede to that class of analogies the relation he holds to exist between the Hebrew פני and the Irish *och hone*!

These instances, though perhaps more whimsical, are not more unreasonable, than many of the combinations that have long been held, and are still to be met with in current literature. We find a writer so recent and influential as the late Albert Barnes stating, in his popular commentary on Job, that our word *evil* comes from the Hebrew אַיִל. It

is surely necessary, in view of such facts, that the general principles of the science of language should be made an essential part of a liberal education, at least to such an extent that one will not need to be a specialist to be able to detect and disprove such inaccuracies as these.

But we must now consider the more safe and sober attempts that have been made to compare the two great families before us. The study of the Sanskrit, which afforded a clew to the mazes of the varied forms of Indo-European speech, was also the occasion of a more just appreciation of the conditions of the problem we are considering. In that ancient language, so perfect and intelligible in structure, large numbers of Aryan words were detected in their most elementary accessible form, revealing to the acute and delicate perception of such men as W. von Humboldt, Grimm, and Bopp the laws which determined their modification into other varieties of expression. Science having thus vindicated her claim to this vast province of speech, it was felt that other districts — nay, the whole realm of human language — must also be subject to her of right. Henceforth the reign of fancy and caprice in these affairs was at an end; and their intrusions would always be unwelcome to the new *régime*, though they could not always be repelled. In the treatment of the relations between the two great families of speech, now clearly established and defined, as well as between the several languages in each, it was felt that laws regulating the changes of form must be sought and assumed to exist, and hence also that the utmost caution must be used in the comparison. This, we mean to say, was the tendency of the method of inquiry, and the professed aim of the several investigators. Some, however, while recognizing the necessity of this principle, have failed, unconsciously, to act upon it, being frequently led to violent and capricious assumptions through their eagerness to attain the final theory of solution. Others, again, influenced either by dogmatic prejudices or by a conservative temper, have refused to indulge in any speculations upon the subject, or go so far as to assert

that the languages themselves, as well as the races they typically represent, can never be proved to have been originally identical.

With regard to the earliest portions of the present period, we have chiefly to remark a tendency to bring Semitic words into close connection with the widely-related and hospitable Sanskrit. Adelung's Mithridates, the monumental boundary-mark between the old and the new regions of philological research, holds also a certain dividing-place in the history of the present question. Its learned author was the first to compare, to any extent, the Sanskrit with the Semitic vocabulary. As to his method, however, he is to be placed wholly within the old unscientific period. Not being himself a Sanskrit scholar, he was the more inclined to the prevalent error of comparing full-grown words, and not roots, or even stems, in the languages discussed. He connects, for example, the Sanscrit *ādima*, first, with the Hebrew אָדָם.

Some of the greatest pioneers of philological science, also, with all their sagacity and penetration, were carried beyond the limits of probability in their theories, or rather conjectures, upon this subject. Being not, in general, Semitic scholars, and their survey being necessarily rapid and superficial, their analysis was not sufficiently profound to deter them from assuming close relations to exist between forms which had only a casual and external resemblance. The tendency to assimilate the two idioms, excited by the magnificent results of the comparison of the several Aryan languages, may be inferred from the fact that even W. von Humboldt accepted a multitude of the most superficial combinations as proving an essential affinity between the forms compared. Bopp, also, attempted to establish a number of analogies which must be called forced and arbitrary; though that great philologist was unwilling to guarantee the absolute correctness of all his conclusions on this subject.

As we are now approaching the latest period of the investigation, and shall have to speak of the comparative value of theories largely influential at the present time, we may

remark, by the way, that, other things being equal, a philologist who has made a special study of the Semitic languages is likely to have a juster view of this particular question than one who is only at home in the languages of the Aryan family. The reason is obvious. The science of comparative philology has been founded chiefly upon the study of the Indo-European tongues, and its principles cannot be well understood without an acquaintance with the idioms of the leading members of that family. These attainments in Aryan scholars are usually accompanied by only a general notion of the phenomena of the Semitic group; while philologists who are specialists in the latter department are necessarily familiar with the genius of both families, and can therefore gain a more just conception of their original conditions and possible affinities. This circumstance, together with the fact that many of the most eminent students have not sought to elaborate any special theory of the problem before us, but have confined themselves to general statements, will justify us in giving only a bare mention to the names of some of the greatest lights of linguistic science. We therefore only remark, in passing, that, with Bopp and Humboldt, whose relations to the question we have already alluded to, many scholars, such as Lassen, Burnouf, Pott, Steinthal, Bunsen, and Max Müller, have favored, with greater or less strength of conviction, the opinion that both families have sprung from a common idiom containing a stock of the most necessary expressions, which were as yet undeveloped, through the rise of grammatical distinctions, into those divergent and complex systems which have taken its place and remained fixed in typical character through all their history. This proposition is a general statement of what is perhaps the preponderating sentiment of modern philologists. As its discussion would open up the whole broad question of the relations of the two families of language, we shall have necessarily to consider it in a subsequent portion of our Essay. In this retrospect of the history of opinion we can, of course, only criticise special theories.

Among those who have not been specially Semitic students, Lepsius, Bunsen, and Benfey should be mentioned as representatives of a cognate theory deserving of attention. These illustrious scholars have claimed for the Coptic or ancient Egyptian language, which has been with them a favorite study, an intermediate position between the two families, and have attempted to show that its peculiarities reconcile the estranged elements of the primitive Aryo-Semitic speech. They have discovered what they consider organic analogies between the Coptic and the primitive Indo-European vocabulary ; while in the important grammatical elements of the conjugational systems there is an undeniable resemblance between the Coptic and the Semitic languages ; the pronouns and the numerals being also similar in their idioms. This theory has been discussed unfavorably by Renan,¹ as well as by others, who will not concede the correctness of even the more powerfully defended of the propositions, that there is an affinity between certain of the African and the Semitic languages. We are not competent to pass an opinion on the merits of this controversy upon an examination of the ancient Egyptian and other North-African dialects ; and we can only judge of them from the nature and extent of the evidence offered. The theory of Renan is, that the various analogous expressions were simply borrowed by the cruder Coptic from the more highly organized Semitic. This, as an individual instance of contact between strange tribes, might be argued with some plausibility, as the Egyptian idiom seems strangely to have been partly monosyllabic and partly inflectional in its character. But (it is alleged) similar analogies are found to pervade the whole group of North-African dialects ; and, in view of this evidence, the presumption of a mere external resemblance between the so-called families becomes much less probable. Further, it might be conceded that many significant terms may have

¹ *Histoire générale des langues Sémitiques*. 4^{me} édition. Paris, 1863. pp. 80 ff., 456 f. Compare *Mémoire de l'Institut de l'Égypte*, pp. 24 ff., as cited by the same author.

been borrowed by the Coptic from the richer Semitic vocabulary; but when it is shown that grammatical phenomena, such as methods of conjugation and syntactical peculiarities, are strikingly alike in both forms of speech, the theory of a mere external augmentation of the poorer idiom is seen to be less suitable to the conditions. With regard, then, to the question of the relations between the Semitic dialects and the Coptic, there seems to us, from the nature of the evidence furnished, to be some reason to believe that the resemblances are not merely external—that they can hardly be due to the contact of the races in early times, and still less to any assumed analogies of their intellectual constitution.

After the settlement of this question, it would still remain to be decided how nearly the Coptic is related to the Aryan tongues. To the consideration of this branch of the inquiry should be directed the main efforts of those who are interested in the general problem of linguistic affinities, and have at the same time given special attention to the little-known group of North-African dialects. Success in such an enterprise is, however, less certainly to be counted on than that which has apparently attended the attempt to compare the Semitic and African languages; for it depends upon the analysis and criticism of mere verbal resemblances. The grammar of a language being the surest token of its genius or special character, grammatical analogy between two forms of speech, when radical and undeniable, is a certain evidence of organic affinity. Hence the confidence with which many profound philologists maintain that a close relationship exists between the two families last named. But the task of comparing the Indo-European and African families is confessedly unaided by the presence of such conditions, in this respect resembling our problem of the connection between the Indo-European and the Semitic idioms. It is burdened, too, with this additional disadvantage, that, as the African dialects have not received so wide a literary cultivation as the Semitic, their vocabularies have become marked by greater variations, and therefore afford a more precarious basis of comparison.

The investigation, however, has not been without significance. The detection of so many points of analogy between these three groups of languages has rendered less probable than ever the theory that they are connected merely by a fortuitous and external similarity. Encouragement has also been afforded to those who believe that all languages, as well as all races, have descended from one common stock ; while their materials for illustration in these preliminary discussions have been greatly amplified.

If, now, it could be proved that the Coptic is the reconciling bond between the Indo-European and Semitic languages, it would follow, from what has been said as to the apparent relations of the several groups, that the Aryans parted first, and very early, from the original stock ; and that the Semites and Hamites, having remained long enough together for their common speech to acquire the rudiments of a grammar, separated also in their turn ; the language of the former developing into a complete inflectional system, as did that of their Aryan brethren, and that of the latter advancing but little from its primitive simplicity. This would imply that the later pre-historic relations of the races were analogous to those of historic times.

The opinions of Gesenius as to the problem before us are naturally entitled to the very highest consideration. With his unsurpassed judgment and penetration as a student of verbal forms, both in their original force and in their historical usage, he would be likely to deal most successfully with this question in those of its aspects which require the greatest caution and delicacy of treatment. The wide and lasting influence, also, exercised by him, gives to his views peculiar significance. He paid, moreover, considerable attention to the subject, as the most superficial glance at his lexicographical works can satisfy us. The attitude which he maintained towards the problem, however, was in general one of neutrality. True to the empirical principles of his philosophy of language, he refrained from generalizing, without the most broad and careful induction and the most

certain progress towards fixed underlying principles of unity. It is true that both in his *Manual-Lexicon* and in his *Thesaurus* he has instituted a vast number of verbal comparisons with Indo-European forms, which have helped more than all else written upon the subject to bring the question before the minds of ordinary students, and to affect their opinions regarding it. But he refrained from presenting dogmatically a theory of these analogies, being inclined to believe, until further light should be thrown upon the problem, that they were the result either of an early contact of the races leading to an exchange of vocables, or of onomatopoeia, or of mere accident. It should be remembered, however, that his sentiments on this subject were formed before modern science had reached those of its grandest conclusions which might well justify still broader assumptions. Yet he adopted and amply illustrated a theory whose establishment would tend towards the solution of the problem — the doctrine, namely, that the triliteral Semitic stems were reducible to significant and fundamental biliteral roots contained in the first two consonants; the last letter exerting the special modifying influence that determines the meaning of the word. In large numbers of these ultimate roots he discovered close correspondences with Indo-European forms, which, however, he declined to accept as conclusive proof of internal relationship.

We come now to consider the opinions of two authors whose opinions have been so fully elaborated as to entitle them to be considered the founders of a special school¹ of Semitic philology. We mean Julius Fuerst² and Franz

¹ The "Analytico-historical," so-called, because, on the one hand, according to its principles, the various elements of language and of individual words are held to be endowed with inherent significance which is to be determined by a profound analysis, and because, on the other hand, they call to the aid of their investigations a body of Jewish tradition, such as the Targums, the Talmud, the Masora, and the later Rabbinical writings. The name serves to distinguish their system from the so-called "empirical" school of Gesenius, and the "critical" or philosophical school of Ewald. These terms have now little significance, as they serve to designate tendencies or principles rather than well-defined sects or parties.

² *Lehrgebäude der aramäischen Idiome mit Bezug auf die indo-germanischen*

Delitzsch,¹ theorists whose vast learning and patient industry it is impossible not to admire, but whose philological system it is equally impossible to accept. In it the process of verbal analysis for the purposes of comparison with analogous forms is carried to its greatest extreme. The chief monuments of this system are the *Jesurun* of Delitzsch and the *Woerterbuch* of Fuerst; the former an exposition and defence of its principles; the latter, the repository of its practical results. Their leading positions may be summarized as follows: (1) That all languages have been developed from one common stock of elements, all of which, in every part of speech and in every word, have a significance, definite and divinely imparted. (2) That this innate idea is to be educed through a minute analysis of each form, and the widest comparison with the forms of other dialects of the language of mankind. (3) That the Sanskrit is the master-key to unlock the secrets of all Aryo-Semitic speech, there having been originally one "Sanskrito-Semitic" idiom, from which proceeded six families of speech — the Sanskrit, the Medo-Persian, Semitic, Graeco-Latin, Germanic, and Slavonic. They thus annul the ordinary classification, and make all the Semitic dialects together a sister idiom to each member of the great Aryan division. (4) That, accordingly, the chief resort for purposes of comparison is the Sanskrit, while the other related languages should also be consulted as supplementary and illustrative. (5) That all Semitic triliteral forms can be traced to original biliterals, parallel to the most numerous class of Sanskrit roots, and being the significant element in each form, as containing the original and typical idea. (6) That the remaining portion, the determinative modifying element, consists of a suffix, or, far more frequently, a prefix, corresponding in meaning, and as nearly as possible in form, to the Sanskrit prepositions. In the elucidation of this system they have subjected a vast number of forms to examination,

Sprachen. Leipzig, 1835. *Librorum Sacrorum Concordantiae*. Leipzig, 1840. *Hebräisches und chaldäisches Woerterbuch*. Leipzig, 1851–57.

¹ *Jesurun*; sive *Isagoge in grammaticam et lexicographiam linguae Hebraicae*, contra G. Gesenium et H. Ewaldum. Grimmae, 1838.

and have illustrated their conclusions by citations from numerous authors, chiefly of the rabbinical school, the products of whose whimsical fancy they elevate to the dignity of scientific demonstration. The leading objection which Renan¹ makes to the system, in alleging the apparent permanence and inviolability of the Semitic roots, we do not think conclusive; because it merely negatives the question at issue, namely, whether these triliteral forms are really ultimate roots, ignoring all the evidence that led such acute and judicious philologists as Gesenius and Hupfeld² to favor the biliteral theory. This question, whose special consideration we must remit to a subsequent portion of our Essay, should not thus be set down as finally settled. The methods, however, on which any special theory of this question is sustained are more easily criticised. On this view, it must be confessed that the whole system is plainly untenable, and that most of the objections of the scholar just named, and of other critics, are well-founded. Indeed, it is clear at first sight that the theory is altogether too artificial and mechanical for the management of such subtile and delicate things as language and its elements. On more minute examination, it appears that the combinations attempted between the assumed roots and those of the so-called sister-tongues are, as a rule, exceedingly forced and unnatural, as may be seen in many consecutive instances found at random in the symbolical books of these philological sectaries. We cite, for example the following comparisons: ³ טֶּהֱרַח with the Sanskrit *'srâ* and *cremare*; מָנַח with *μένειν* and *manere*; פָּדַח with *pad* and *πάτεω*. The prepositional additions, also, to the biliteral roots, which are supposed to determine the special modifications of the radical idea, do not preserve any certain and

¹ Histoire générale, p. 450. The theory is also rather unfavorably criticised by Pott in the Article *Indogermanischer Sprachstamm*, in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopædie. A letter of partial approval was written by Eugene Burnouf to M. Delitzsch. It is published with the preface to Fuerst's *Concordantiae*.

² He advocated the doctrine of biliteral roots in his *De emendanda ratione lexicographiae Semiticæ commentatio*. Marburg, 1827.

³ Jesurun, p. 177.

invariable meaning in the various instances cited as illustrations; each consonant adduced being apparently capable of an unlimited range of signification. These, as well as other obvious and radical defects in the system have precluded the possibility of its general acceptance, though its thorough-going doctrines and the eminence of its advocates have secured for it a good deal of attention. One result which we cannot but think unfortunate has followed from its publication, namely, that the theory of biliteral roots has met with less favor than it would probably have otherwise received by reason of the self-destructive arguments advanced in its behalf. It is one thing to illustrate the general probability of a doctrine, and another to defend it by insecure and hasty assumptions. A great philological discovery does not break upon the world at once and unprepared, but reaches its full revelation through gradual accessions of light, and by slow degrees. A sudden blaze of bewildering theories may well be distrusted as an *ignis fatuus*.¹

The theory of Ewald comes next under consideration. This distinguished scholar — unequalled in some respects among Semitic students, and perhaps among all his contemporaries — holds a somewhat similar position with regard to this question. After placing the ideas of Fuerst and Delitzsch entirely outside the pale of science, and condemning with the utmost severity the theories of Benfey and Lepsius with

¹ The advocacy by such profound and accomplished scholars, of a system so radical and precarious, is worthy of attention as illustrating the influence of early-formed ideas and pre-conceptions on the most vigorous minds. The theory, no doubt, largely owed its origin to the tincture of Rabbinical philosophy which these authors received through their Jewish education. Their philological doctrines are avowedly founded upon the notion that words and their ultimate constituents possess an inherent actuality and potency imparted by God simultaneously with the creation of the soul itself, with which they exist in mysterious correlation; and that it is the mission of true science to evoke this mysterious significance. The minute analysis they undertake of so many "Sanskrito-Semitic" roots is intended as a step in the progress of this enterprise. See Jesurun, pp. 34 and 43 ff. But what they took for science was only an extravagant philosophy. A similar kind of realism, almost cabbalistic in its tendency, appears sometimes in the admirable exegetical writings of Delitzsch, and pervades his philosophical and theological works.

regard to the analogies of the Coptic and Semitic idioms, he himself devised a scheme of linguistic affinities more comprehensive and radical than either of theirs. Its methods of demonstration, however, are more cautious and scientific. Employing his special gift of insight into the nature and relations of grammatical principles, he has endeavored to prove by research into these phenomena in the Turanian, Indo-European, Semitic, and North-African families of speech that all of these are outgrowths of a common stock;¹ that the Indo-European represents best the primitive idiom; that from this the Turanian family separated first, followed by another offshoot, which again divided itself into the Semitic and the African. These relations are argued in the interest of the general doctrine which he holds of a radical connection between all languages. His present theory is defended by the citation of some striking analogies, in whose production his original and penetrating genius is signally displayed. As the doctrine is amenable to criticism on general philological principles, it has fallen under the judgment of Pott, the very Rhadamanthus of linguistic theorists, who has pronounced with apparent justice against its pretensions. Ewald achieved in this a splendid failure, by exaggerating the extent of the applicability of grammatical comparison in determining the original relations between any two inflectional languages — a prejudice natural to one of his favorite modes of thought and investigation.

Without arguing the question at present, it is sufficient to say that, while a prevailing grammatical analogy would be decisive of a common origin, the peculiarities of inflection and syntax in the two great families before us are so widely and profoundly

¹ The views of Ewald referred to were developed in two *Sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, contributed to the *Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Bde. ix. x. 1861, 1862, and afterwards published separately. They are summarized in his *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache des alten Bundes*. 8^{te} Ausgabe. Göttingen, 1870. pp. 26 ff. His nomenclature of the several families of speech is: Nordisch (Turanian, or Finno-Tartarian); Mittelländisch (Indo-European, or Indo-Germanic); Semitisch und Afrikanisch (Coptic, Berber, and other dialects).

divergent that the comparison of vocabularies seems the only available test of relationship. With regard to the special method of Ewald in this inquiry, it would appear to have only illustrated the natural presumption that there should be some points of agreement between the grammatical systems of the various forms of human speech. To many minds these resemblances alone are not sufficient to demonstrate the original identity of the families so compared. It could be claimed that they might be accounted for on the ground of the similar intellectual tendencies of the race. At any rate, it would be strange and out of harmony with the teachings of experience in philological studies, if the original unity of these widely-sundered groups of language could be proved upon the precarious evidence of a few grammatical coincidences, while the bond of union between vast multitudes of verbal forms which must then, *a fortiori*, be related, is pronounced to be still a mystery. The attempt to compare these families on the basis of an examination of their vocabularies, Ewald regarded as unpromising. He opposed, moreover, the theory that the triliteral Semitic stems could be reduced to more elementary biliteral roots.

Another eminent Semitic scholar, Ernest Renan,¹ attempts to prove that there is no radical connection between the two families, and, in strange contrast to the principles of Ewald, bases this opinion upon the essential *difference* between their respective grammatical systems. We shall hereafter have to traverse this and other arguments relating to the general question. At present it will suffice to state the general principles of Renan's position. He thinks that the grammatical features of a language furnish the proper basis of its classification. This is perfectly true; and it would be decisive in this controversy, if the question concerned the relations of the two families in their present state, and not as they were in earliest times. Now, as to any theory of "ante-grammatical affinity," he thinks it improbable, because

¹ He discusses the relations of the Semitic to other languages, especially the Indo-European, in his *Histoire générale*, already cited, pp. 444-505.

languages, so far as we know them, undergo no change of typical character; inflectional languages appearing in their organized form back to the earliest period, and monosyllabic idioms never becoming inflected. This, however, may not be so certain, when claimed for the primitive forms of speech. And Renan himself, in another part of his work on the Semitic languages¹ has remarked the progress made by the ancient Egyptian from the monosyllabic towards the inflectional stage. As to the resemblances between verbal forms in the two groups he admits their abundance and the naturalness of an interpretation in favor of the doctrine of an original affinity, but considers such an inference ill-founded, because no law of phonetic change has been established, and because many circumstances may have concurred to bring about such analogies—mere chance, onomatopoeia, or that mysterious adaptation of the name to the thing, achieved by the primitive races of the world through their lively, acute, and profound perceptions. It is to be remarked here, that his general ethnological prejudices may possibly have some influence in determining him to this conclusion. While admitting that there is a *quasi* unity of the race, intellectual and spiritual, he hesitates to accept the dogma of a material unity.² On philological grounds alone, however, he thinks it cannot be proved that the Aryans and the Semites had a common origin; while on examination of the various traditions of the two races, which have been held to evince a primitive unity, he finds that they also fail to bridge over the chasm of separation. Yet when he comes to consider the mental and spiritual analogies of the two divisions of mankind, he is impressed by a sense of their extent and variety, and concludes that, as both families constitute the fair-skinned, cultured, reflective, dominant tribes of men, they may perhaps have issued very early from a common home, and separated before their respective idioms were formulated out of their original speech.³ But, to be self-consis-

¹ Histoire générale, p. 87.² Ibid. p. 469.³ Ibid. pp. 492 f.

tent, he should reject the theory of any communication whatever between the races before the development of their varieties of expression, since, as we have seen, he maintains that no language undergoes change in essential character after its formation. He maintains, moreover, that if linguistic evidence is to be adduced it can tell in favor of the doctrine of primitive identity, only as the two idioms betray the impress of a certain analogy of intellectual operation, reposing, so to speak, upon the same psychology, in the categories of human speech.¹ Yet, however uncertain his position may be with regard to the fact of the early relations of the races, he is plainly opposed to the theory that their unity can be demonstrated through philological comparison.

Friedrich Delitzsch, son of the illustrious scholar before noticed, in an Essay² which we trust is only preliminary to further investigations, has also made a contribution towards the solution of the problem. He has brought to his task linguistic accomplishments of a high order, and betrays both acuteness and judgment in their use. He seems also to have the true conception of the method by which the solution is to be reached. He dissents rightly, as we think, from the doctrine of Renan, that the grammatical divergence between the two families is an impossible barrier to any attempt at their successful comparison, and holds that if affinities can be demonstrated from an examination of their respective vocabularies, their inflectional systems do not preclude an admission of their close relationship. In his search after roots suspected to be common to the two families, he accepts, as applying to both, the theory of the formation of composite forms from primordial elements through the addition or repetition of a letter or syllable, though he is unwilling to extend its application to all classes of the Semitic triliterals. A large part of his Essay is devoted to an examination of Semitic stems containing weak or repeated letters, through

¹ See pp. 469 ff.

² Studien über indogermanisch-semitische Wurzelverwandschaft. Leipzig, 1873.

whose elimination he seeks to effect a combination with Indo-European roots having a similar phonetic constitution. In the general result we judge him to have been quite successful. When he comes to consider the Semitic stems of strong radicals, he still endeavors to establish numerous correspondences with Aryan forms, and that virtually on the same principle of comparison. For, though he states it to be "eine unbestreitbare Thatsache" that the strong Semitic stems are based upon trilateral roots,¹ yet he accepts as probable the opinion that, in very many cases at least, the elements of the words do not possess equal degrees of inherent significance; or, more definitely, that in such forms the third radical possesses a determinative force, its function being to express a special modification of the radical idea contained in the first two. He then takes the fundamental element, and compares it with roots supposed to be related in the Indo-European family. Here we think, that, however it may be with his comparisons, his analysis is not sufficiently thorough. It is surely not in accordance with the true notion of a root, that it should be reducible to simpler significant elements.² Nor is it in accordance with his own definition.³ This inconsistency, however, does not affect the value of his comparisons, of which many are plausible and suggestive. In order to facilitate the collection of "Indo-Germanico-Semitic" roots, through the establishment of laws of phonetic change, he has prepared a table,⁴ in which Indo-European (Sanskrit) letters are exhibited as corresponding with certain sounds in Arabic, Ethiopic, Hebrew, Chaldee, and Syriac. The correctness of this list as a basis of philological com-

¹ p. 68.

² We can illustrate our general meaning by comparing such forms as נִפְּק and יִפְּק, the radical idea of which is, to draw together. Ought it to be maintained that in the former case the root is to be represented by the symbol נִק, while in the latter the whole trilateral is required to embody it, there being no doubt that the fundamental notion is expressed in the first two letters of each combination, an additional one being employed in each for its special modification?

³ p. 30.

⁴ pp. 82, 83.

parison he seeks to establish by the citation of a large array of analogies. The limits of our rapid survey of opinion forbid us to enter upon an analysis of these combinations, or, for the present, to offer more than a passing observation upon his assumed laws of phonetic change. We shall therefore only say here that his table is not necessarily an exhibit of phonetic *representatives*, but only a list of approximate phonetic *equivalents*, which might be drawn up on a mere external acquaintance with the alphabets of the several idioms, and that wider and more profound inductions are necessary before such hypotheses can be rightly accepted as establishing fixed phonetic laws, with whose dignity our ingenious author invests his serviceable theory.

In this brief historical survey we have endeavored, so far as our sources of information avail, to notice every theory of the relations between the two great families of speech, and every systematic effort to reconcile their peculiarities, that may be worthy of attention, on account either of their intrinsic value, or of their significance in the progress of opinion. We trust that no important doctrine or hypothesis has been omitted. Other attempts at the solution of the question, made in late years, might have been referred to, but they are either lawless speculations,¹ or new forms of theories that have already been considered.

It may be proper before closing this portion of our Essay to state in brief the leading sentiments at present entertained with regard to the subject before us. A party, small in numbers, but eminently respectable, decline to admit that there is any radical affinity between the two groups of languages, regarding the philological evidence, at least, as indecisive, and assuming that the numerous verbal analogies between

¹ We have before us a recent production : *Gemeinschaftliche Grammatik der arischen und der semitischen Sprachen*, von Andreas Raabe, Leipzig, 1874, which is equally remarkable for the great learning and the great recklessness it displays. The author has this advantage chiefly over the ancient theorists, that he has access to the storehouse of the forms of the Sanskrit, — a language which has been resorted to by almost as many adventurers as have preyed upon its Indian home.

the families may be explained upon other hypotheses. On the other hand, the majority of philologists, with various degrees of confidence, favor the doctrine of organic relationship. A few of them assign but little importance to the comparison of roots, but claim that the problem may be solved on the evidence of grammatical analogies. The majority, however, prefer to examine the vocabularies, being persuaded that they can detect traces of a kindred origin in the faded features of many venerable forms. All agree that the parent language has passed away (having found a grave in some part of Central Asia); but some, with confidence, identify the Sanskrit as the oldest sister, remaining near the old homestead, while the rest have roamed over the whole world, vagrants, but not aliens. Others claim, that through the mediation of the ancient Egyptian all family differences might be adjusted. Others still, are more cautious, though none the less deeply interested, and think that nothing will be lost in the end by a close scrutiny of every claimant to ancient kinship, and hesitate long before admitting any.

In the remaining portion of this Essay we shall endeavor to present as clearly as possible what seems to be the true view of the problem, and of the conditions of its investigation. And, in deference to the eminent authorities who will not accept any theory of internal relationship between the two families of speech, we shall need to show the probability of such affinity, as well as to inquire into its closeness and extent.

ARTICLE VI.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE DIVINE INSTITUTION OF
SACRIFICE.

BY REV. CALVIN E. PARK, WEST BOXFORD, MASS.

[A series of Articles on the subject of sacrifice was commenced in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January, 1859. The first Article gives the theories contained in the somewhat celebrated work of William Outram, which was written originally in Latin, and was printed at Amsterdam in 1638. This Article contains a brief discussion of the origin of sacrifices *in general*, and favors the theory that they were derived not from an express divine command, but from the operations of our own moral instincts. In regard to the origin of *Jewish* sacrifices in particular, Outram takes the ground that God instituted them with the design of foreshadowing the sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The Article then gives Outram's account of the various kinds of sacrifices which were used and their accompanying rites, of the places in which they were to be offered, and of the priesthood to which was specially assigned the duty of presenting them. The idea is then dwelt upon at considerable length, that Mosaic sacrifices were typical of Christ's death, that they had exclusive reference to God; were not designed merely to express the feelings of the worshipper, but to affect the mind of Jehovah — were, indeed, of the nature of vicarious punishments, and intended to accomplish the same purposes that real punishments have in view. Christ's death was a real sacrifice, and was efficacious as a condition of pardon because it was a vicarious punishment.

The second Article appeared in October, 1870. It states the views of Bähr in his *Symbolik*. It first gives an account of the matter of sacrifices, the object which was offered, and of the attendant rites. This is followed by a statement of the purposes which sacrifices were intended to accomplish.

According to Bähr they had as their intended results, the creation, or rather the restoration, of a fellowship between God and man. The blood of the offered animal is its life, and it is offered on the altar in the place of the life of the worshipper. The animal-life of the worshipper, Bähr represents as the root of selfishness, the principle of sin. By sacrificing this, sin is removed and fellowship with God is restored.

The third Article was published in the number for January, 1871. It gives an exposition of the theory advocated by Dr. John Spencer. Sacrifices are not to be traced, he maintains, to a divine command, nor are they to be regarded as positively approved by Jehovah. The origin of them is to be ascribed, rather, to the gross modes of thinking which have always been common among pagan nations. Sacrifices were permitted to be incorporated into the Jewish ritual simply as an act of indulgence on the part of God to the superstitious tendency of the Jewish mind. The third Article gives also an account of Bähr's anthropopathic theory of sacrifice. This theory is in many respects similar to that of Spencer. In discussing the vicarious theory of sacrifice, Bähr attempts to prove that the efficacy of sacrifice is to be traced not to the death of the victim, as if its life was a substitute for the life of the transgressor, but rather to the sprinkling of the blood.

The fourth Article was printed in October, 1874, and contains Bähr's description of the sacrificial usages of various pagan nations, such as the ancient Persians and Egyptians, the Hindoos and Chinese, with a view to the development of the fundamental idea of sacrifice, of the relation of the blood to the efficacy of the sacrifice, of the relation of the sacrifice to the divinity and to the sacrificer himself; and finally, of certain contrasts between pagan and Mosaic sacrifices. The materials for this Article are derived from Bähr's *Symbolik*.

The fifth Article appeared in January, 1875, and exhibits the theory of Dr. Sykes as to the significance of sacrifices. According to this theory, they are to be viewed merely as federal rites, representing either the beginning or the restora-

tion of friendship with God. What has been denominated the gift-theory, as advocated by Portall and the author of the apology of Ben Mordecai is next brought under consideration. The views set forth by Rev. F. D. Maurice are then given, and their unsatisfactory nature attempted to be proved.

The following Article is the sixth in the series, and gives an account of the reasoning of Warburton and Davison and Fales on the question of the divine institution of sacrifices. With this Article, the series is concluded.]

WRITERS on the subject of sacrifice have always been divided on the question whether or not the observance of this rite is to be ascribed to an express divine command. Even those whose views as to the significance of sacrifice we are bound to regard as on the whole correct have by no means been of one mind as to this point. Our particular object in this Article is to give some account of the reasoning of several English writers on this subject.

We shall advert, in the first place, to the method adopted by the once celebrated Warburton to account for the general prevalence of sacrifices, instead of ascribing them to an express divine command. In a manner which would scarcely have suggested itself to a mind differently constituted from his, this author found occasion, in his work on the Divine Legation of Moses, to propound a peculiar theory of the origin of sacrifices. He rejects summarily the idea of any divine command enjoining their observance, on the ground that such a command was wholly unnecessary.

The theory of Warburton as to the origin of sacrifices is founded upon his somewhat peculiar views of language. Language, as he maintains, was in the earliest periods very rude in its structure, narrow in its range, and equivocal in its significance. There would, therefore, as he thinks, be no little embarrassment whenever men attempted to make known to each other any new thought, whenever any unusual event rendered necessary a different form of expression from that which they had been in the habit of using. In

these earlier periods, the various methods to which men at present have recourse in order to enlarge their vocabularies so as to make them correspond to new necessities were wholly unknown. In these circumstances, it would become a matter of unavoidable necessity to supply the deficiencies of spoken language by "apt and significant signs." There would therefore come into use what Warburton chooses to denominate the language of significative action. We are to reject, then, we may remark in passing, what has been with many quite a favorite notion, that significant language,—hieroglyphics, picture-language—was invented for the purpose of enabling priests or the learned class to conceal their doctrines from the mass of the people. It was invented for a reason of exactly the opposite character,—that the learned class might be able by the employment of this species of language to set forth their doctrines in a more impressive and effective manner. The invention was an expedient of necessity, not of choice. Illustrations of this kind of language are frequently to be met with in the Bible. The pushing with horns by the false prophets, as mentioned in the first Book of Kings, in order to represent the utter defeat of the Syrian armies, the hiding of the linen girdle in a hole of a rock near the river Euphrates, are examples of this mode of communicating thought by means of significant action.

It is an altogether natural supposition that recourse to this form of language would be had most frequently in attempts to give utterance to the religious sentiment. Nowhere would the poverty of language be likely to be felt sooner than here. Those who have undertaken to translate the scriptures into any of the less cultivated languages of the world have had occasion to feel the truth of this remark. Religious ideas are so widely removed from the range of thought by which the minds of savages and barbarous tribes are wont to be occupied, that the ordinary forms of language are soon found to be an altogether inadequate medium of communication; so that what Warburton styles "the language of significative signs" would as a matter of course have to be employed.

It is by recurrence to this "ancient mode of converse by action in aid of words" that Warburton thinks he is able to find an adequate explanation of the origin of sacrificial rites — an explanation every way preferable to the supposition of a divine command. Sacrifices are merely significant actions, designed to be expressive of certain religious emotions which the language in common use gave no means of uttering. We will unfold, in as succinct a manner as we can, the mode in which Warburton, in accordance with his theory, explains the various kinds of sacrifice.

Sacrifices, he properly enough asserts, are, eucharistical, those which are expressive of gratitude; propitiatory, such as have the nature of entreaty for some special favor; expiatory, or those which are intended to be indicative of repentance for sin, and of entreaty that the punishment due to transgression may be averted. The efficacy of sacrifice, it would seem to follow logically from this statement, does not lie at all in the sacrifice as such, but exclusively in the religious sentiment of the worshipper of which it alone is an adequate expression. Nothing of the nature of atonement, having for its final cause the removal of legal difficulties in the way of forgiveness, can possibly be supposed to belong to it.

Eucharistical sacrifice was designed to express the sentiment of gratitude. No words that could be employed would be a fitting medium for the utterance of this emotion. The grateful worshipper, therefore, if he was a tiller of the soil, would approach the place of prayer bearing in his hands the first and most precious fruits of his labor, and, placing them on the altar, would offer them to the Divinity; thus, in a manner the most impressive, recognizing God as the giver of all good, by presenting to him that which in the estimation of the worshipper was of the highest value.

In the case of propitiatory sacrifice, the offering would be of such a nature, and would be accompanied by such rites, as would make it most significant of the sentiment of penitence and the act of entreaty.

Warburton's theory of the origin of eucharistical and pro-

pitiatory sacrifices might be accepted without any great difficulty, if it were intended to apply to them exclusively. It is when it is employed to explain the third class of sacrifices — the expiatory — that its claims to be accepted as the true theory become liable to very grave objections. In these sacrifices the worshipper, it is asserted, comes into the presence of Jehovah not with the first fruits of the soil as significant of grateful emotions, or with a symbol of entreaty as in the instance of propitiatory sacrifice, but with a chosen animal — an animal fixed upon because of its peculiar value in the eye of the worshipper. He slays the victim on the altar, accompanying the act of putting it to death with words expressive of the deepest contrition and an acknowledgment of desert of a punishment corresponding in severity to the death inflicted on the animal; uttering this last acknowledgment simultaneously with the blow which deprives the animal of life. As already remarked, it does not appear to be anything in the nature of the act of sacrifice which, according to Warburton, gives to it any degree of efficacy. Its whole virtue is derived from the mental condition of the worshipper, which it is designed to represent. Sacrifice is nothing but a peculiar form of language — the language of significant action. Sacrifice never was commanded. It was resorted to simply as a form of expression, for the same reason that any other mode of communication between man and man ever comes to be employed.

This method of accounting for the use of sacrificial rites we are to accept, according to Warburton, principally, not to say solely, because it is in accordance with “all that we know of plain and simple nature.” It has already been attempted to show in these Articles, — and with success, as we believe, — that the natural view of the origin of sacrifices is that which assigns to the sacrifice itself a truly expiatory virtue; according to which, it is necessary that all manifestations of penitence and all entreaties for pardon should be attended with a sacrifice, not merely as a suitable form of expression, but as something without which these sentiments and en-

treaties, however sincere and earnest, would be altogether inefficacious.

His theory of sacrifice, Warburton conceives to be corroborated by a reference to various usages existent among the nations of antiquity. When, for instance, two nations would enter into a treaty with each other, they gave the greater solemnity, the stronger sanction, to the transaction by the performance of a sacrifice. The sacrificial victim was put to death with appropriate rites, and a supplication uttered at the same moment, to the effect that whichever party should first violate the treaty might meet with the same destruction that had just been visited on the animal sacrificed. It must be apparent, however, to every one, as we may here take occasion to say, that such a transaction as this bears too little resemblance to an expiatory sacrifice—using that epithet in anything like its proper significance—to give it any force as an illustration of the nature of such a sacrifice.

Warburton proceeds to establish his theory still farther by showing that it renders entirely nugatory the doctrine, both of those who would refer sacrifice to a divine command, and of those who would trace its origin to superstition. He repudiates with scorn the idea of those who, like the once celebrated Shuckford, attribute to sacrifice a divine origin, because the unaided human mind never could imagine a reason for such a rite. Of this supposition, that the unaided human mind never could form to itself a reason for the custom of sacrifice, we think that we have already shown the falseness. Expiatory sacrifice is too much in accordance with the instincts of our nature, as we conceive, to allow us to admit this supposition for a moment. Expiatory sacrifice is neither repugnant to right reason nor is it the growth of superstition; and we believe ourselves correct in the opinion that it is a rite just as agreeable to the mind of God, and its observance just as binding, as though an explicit command in relation to it had come from Jehovah, in a form so positive, and in terms so explicit, that neither its existence nor its import had ever been questioned. Nor can we for an instant

allow that because the notion of Shuckford cannot be entertained, the theory of Warburton must be. There is no such absence of reason for sacrifice as Shuckford imagines; and Warburton's doctrine is wholly unsatisfactory, if we are at liberty to ascribe to sacrifice any virtue as such, to give it any real significance, or conceive it to be anything else than a mere form of language; if, in other words, we are not to take away from it its whole expiatory nature.

Warburton rejects in an equally decisive manner the idea that the very early use of sacrifice makes necessary a recourse to an explicit divine command. He conceives that "natural religion" would in the very earliest ages guide men to the practice of sacrificial rites. We understand him, in all this, merely to argue that natural religion in the very earliest times would suggest the propriety of sacrifice, not because natural religion would suggest the necessity of a proper atonement for transgression, but because it would prompt men to express, if possible, their deepest feelings in the ear of the Divinity; and these feelings have no other proper medium of expression than the significant rite of sacrifice. We need scarcely repeat, however, in reply to all this, that the need of uttering our religious feelings in the ears of the Supreme Being is not one of which men become conscious at an earlier period, or in a form more distinct and lively, than they may very properly be supposed to become aware of the need of a truly expiatory sacrifice. That felt necessity, we think, would co-exist, in a shape more or less precise and definite, with the very beginning of a consciousness of sin in the mind of the first transgressor. And in these views we find an explanation satisfactory to our own mind of the supposed absence of an explicit command enjoining the use of sacrifice.

The fact that such a copious body of rules in relation to sacrifice as we find in the Levitical law was afterwards promulgated, may be accounted for not on the supposition that no command on this subject had ever been promulgated before, but rather on this supposition, that it became necessary to counteract, by means of such precise and definite

regulations, the tendency of the mind to lose sight of the proper import of sacrifice, and, by that means, to relapse into such superstitious notions on the subject as would divest sacrificial rites of all their efficacy — render them, indeed, positively offensive to Jehovah. And especially did such a body of rules become needful, in order to perpetuate that isolation of the Israelites from all surrounding nations which it was designed should be maintained. The true idea of sacrifice was to be preserved among them as an essential feature of the true religion; and the minute and explicit regulations laid down in the Mosaic code were the only means by which, apparently, this end could be accomplished.

We have thus set forth, as we conceive, at sufficient length the main elements of that theory by which Warburton would account for the almost universal prevalence of sacrifice without having recourse to any divine command. Its grand defect seems to be that it loses sight of the distinctive nature of sacrifice. Expiatory sacrifice is a symbolical atonement,—symbolical of the real atonement effected by the death of Christ,—the efficacy of which is due to its nature as sacrifice, and not merely to its capability of serving as a medium for the expression of certain religious feelings. These feelings are, indeed, such as every transgressor of the divine law should possess. Without them as an accompaniment, no sacrifice would be at all effective; and, on the other hand, these sentiments, however sincere, without an expiatory sacrifice, would be equally inefficacious as a means of securing pardon. The principle which we have so often laid down, that the type corresponds in nature to the antitype, should be borne in mind — the latter expresses nothing substantially different from the former. If, then, we are to regard sacrifice in no other aspect than that of a certain form of language, a certain means of uttering religious sentiment, we are obliged to explain the sacrificial death of Christ in an analogous manner. And did Christ endure the death of the cross merely to furnish men with a fitting means of giving utterance to their religious feelings? The supposition

shocks the sensibilities of every right-minded man, and seems also to be in hopeless conflict with any just interpretation of the scriptures.

In considering the question whether or not we should trace the custom of sacrifice to a formal divine command, we must be careful not to suppose that the denial of the existence of such a command is necessarily equivalent to a denial of the propriety, or even the moral obligation of the rite of sacrifice — of expiatory sacrifice especially, considered in its distinctive sense as a rite suited to the wants of a sinful race. Those who question the existence of such a command in relation to sacrifice may, however illogically in the eyes of many, yet really, regard sacrifice as a mode of worship acceptable to God, and typical of the sacrifice of Christ, just as they regard the feeling of repentance and the expression of that feeling as binding on men, without waiting for an express injunction. Their reasoning on this subject is not necessarily meant by them to be at all in conflict with the ordinarily accepted evangelical interpretation of the Saviour's death. They may consider it as a proper atonement for sin, and all sacrifices as efficacious just as far as they are typical of his death.

We shall now devote a few pages to an examination of the reasoning of Davison, in his *Treatise on Primitive Sacrifice* (London, 1825), and of G. S. Faber, in his *Treatise on the Origin of Sacrifice* (London, 1827), in reference to this question.

Davison strenuously denies that the doctrine of sacrifices — that is, such as have a proper atoning power — can be deduced from the light of nature or the principles of reason. Nature, as he argues, has nothing to say for such an expiatory power, and reason has everything to say against it. The life of a brute creature never could have been supposed to be a fit ransom for the life of a man. The blood of an animal could never have been imagined to possess any virtue by which it could wash away sin, purify the conscience, or avert the punishment merited by the offender. Reason,

indeed, suggests repentance as an essential condition of pardon. It might possibly suggest the putting of an animal to death as a suitable and impressive act by which to represent one's repentance for sin; but beyond this it would never go. In a word, one of the last resources of natural reason in the mind of a transgressor for removing the guilt of a moral transgression would have been the shedding the blood of a sacrificial victim. "Expiatory sacrifice must have been of God's own appointment to reconcile it either to God or man himself, till he was fallen under a deplorable superstition."

Did expiatory sacrifices, therefore, exist previously to the time of Moses and the establishment of the Sinaitic ritual? If they did thus exist, they are to be ascribed to an explicit command of Jehovah or to a plain signification of natural reason. They could not, as has been stated already, be ascribed to natural reason, for they are utterly abhorrent to our reason. They cannot be ascribed to a divine command, for there are no traces of such a command. It is admitted, indeed, by all, that the scriptures are quite sparing of direct evidences in favor of a divine command touching sacrifice; and very elaborate attempts are made to supply, by means of inference, this deficiency of direct evidence. In the judgment of Davison, these attempts are altogether unsatisfactory. If a command was uttered for the observance of the Sabbath on the ground that that observance was connected very closely with even the existence of religion in the world, such a command was equally necessary in the case of sacrifice, and for an analogous reason. And the higher our conception becomes of the importance of expiatory sacrifices in relation to human welfare, the more intimate we conceive their connection with the very essence of the gospel to be, so much the more imperative are we required to regard the necessity of a divine command for their observance. In this state of the case, Davison takes refuge in the position that we actually have no one positive example of any such atoning virtue ascribed to sacrifice in the primitive religion. There is no proof of the existence of such a virtue

in the sacrifice of Cain and Abel, nor in that of Noah. He admits that sacrifice, regarded merely as an expression of gratitude or of reverential homage, is in accordance with reason. It is equally so, it is admitted by him likewise, as a symbol of repentance or of supplication for the return of the divine favor. But the moment you conceive of sacrifice as an expiation, it at once ceases to be in consonance with human reason. Nature instinctively revolts against it. Sacrifice, in the two former senses, may have existed in the antediluvian ages; but in the meaning of an expiation, no vestiges of it are anywhere discernible. It was not till the promulgation of the Sinaitic law that we have any evidence that sacrifices of this species could be agreeable to the divine mind. It was then explicitly announced: "The life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls. For it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul."

One might suppose, the writer of this Article cannot but remark, that the thought would have suggested itself to the mind of Davison that, if God did thus command the offering of expiatory sacrifices, they could not be in themselves so very repugnant to our nature as he would fain have us believe. No other rite is introduced into the Jewish cultus so abhorrent to all right feeling as Davison supposes expiatory sacrifice to be; and it is very hard to suppose that this rite could have been introduced, if we are to give to it such odious qualities as Davison does not hesitate to do. It will scarcely answer for Davison to resort to the supposition, for the purpose of relieving himself from this difficulty, that God allowed expiatory sacrifice to form a part of the Mosaic ritual because it already formed a part of the Egyptian worship, and the Israelites had become so accustomed to it that it would certainly have been practised by them, even if it had been peremptorily forbidden; for this would be virtually to admit that expiatory sacrifice is, after all, not so very repugnant to our nature, else it would not have been so generally in vogue. It would also be somewhat difficult to

show on what grounds God could properly have directly countenanced such an odious rite as expiatory sacrifice is represented as being, even supposing the Israelites did cherish so strong a partiality for it, and would have practised it in the face even of a plain prohibition. No evidence could command our assent to such a statement, that was not of the most direct and positive character; and no such evidence is to be found in the scriptures. We certainly think that the representations, so often made by Davison and other writers, of the utter incongruity between atoning sacrifices and our natural instincts are greatly exaggerated. Especially do we conceive this to be the case, when we look at the subject in the light thrown upon it by the sacrifice of Christ. No such incongruity with our natural instincts can be conceived to belong to that sacrifice; and if the antitype is in harmony with our nature and our reason, the type must be so likewise. No odious qualities are discernible in the type that are not discernible in the antitype.

Davison will not concede that expiatory sacrifice was incorporated into the Mosaic ritual on the ground that in the antediluvian period they had been very commonly observed. He will not allow us to reason backwards from the time of Moses to the ages before the flood. "Here in the Mosaic law," he says, "the declared expiatory power of sacrifice of a certainty begins." Until this period sacrifice had no typical character. It acquired now, for the first time, its reference to the death of Christ. It became a prophetic service, suited to its pre-ordained antitype in the evangelical dispensation.

The ground taken by Davison is this, — that inasmuch as no command for the practice of expiatory sacrifices before the flood is anywhere to be found, and inasmuch as such a rite is in itself wholly abhorrent to our nature, we are not at liberty to suppose that such sacrifices were in use in the antediluvian ages. Is this doctrine correct? Are there adequate grounds for the belief that expiatory sacrifices were in use before the flood? and may we therefore infer that

they were in use at this time because they were divinely commanded?

The religious usages which existed before the time of Noah, as one might very naturally presume, would have peculiarities analogous, in a greater or less degree, to the evangelical scheme. There would exist in that ancient religion certain elements which could be fully understood only when their typical character was perceived, when they were regarded as emblematic of the sacrifice of Christ. Such is the harmony necessarily existent between Christianity as a scheme of reconciliation between God and man to be brought about by means of the atoning death of Christ, and our nature, that man might almost be expected of himself to contrive observances that should refer to that death, and be — obscurely, it may be, and indefinitely, but yet really — emblematic of it. Or, if this is too much to concede, we must believe that a ritual such as God would prescribe would embody features which would be proper only on the ground of their being symbolical of the great sacrifice, even though that symbolical character might not be always apprehended. We maintain that, even if we were not informed explicitly of the expiatory character of the death of Christ, we might fairly presume that it had that character, on the ground that an expiation is the only method which we should suppose fitting for the purpose of securing the salvation of the human race from sin. Well nigh all the reasoning which has been directed against the idea of an expiation for sin having been effected by the death of Christ derives the greater part of its force from a misconception; as if it was the purpose of that death to render God merciful when he was not so before, instead of simply providing the means by which the actual exercise of mercy could be made consistent with the perpetuity of good government. When this misconception is removed, many, if not all, of the objections to the doctrine of the atonement disappear. And we maintain, at the same time, that, in regard to the question of the existence of expiatory sacrifices before the days of Moses, the presumption

is in favor of the existence of such sacrifices, on what may be denominated *a priori* grounds. We should certainly expect to see such sacrifices prescribed in a system of religion ordained expressly by divine wisdom. If there were to be found in the Pentateuch passages of doubtful significance relating to sacrifices, we maintain that in fixing their sense the expiatory theory, rather than the opposite, should have the benefit of the doubt. And it is specially important to take notice that, as is true in reference to the death of Christ, many of the objections to expiatory sacrifices arise from a wrong idea of their proper function. It would seem to be imagined that an intrinsic power to atone for sin was thought to belong to them — a power altogether separate from their typical reference ; and it is declared to be a preposterous notion that the blood of an irrational animal could possess any such atoning virtue. No intelligent advocate of the expiatory theory ever attributed to animal sacrifices such a power. These sacrifices become a proper atonement only when they are symbolical of the death of Christ.

Mr. Faber states this prefatory argument in favor of the existence of sacrifices in the patriarchal ages, and so of a divine command for their observance, somewhat as follows : The three dispensations, the patriarchal, the Levitical, and the Christian, embody substantially one religious system, the central feature of which is the promise, and eventually the actual appearance, of a Saviour from heaven. These three systems must, of course, have a close affinity with each other. There can be nothing essentially characteristic of any one which does not for substance exist in all, or which, at least, is not in harmony with all the others. Now, in these three dispensations, we notice as a very prominent feature the extraordinary rite of living sacrifice. In the two former dispensations, the victims sacrificed are irrational animals ; in the latter dispensation, the chosen victim is the Lord Jesus Christ. In the next place, it is to be observed that these three dispensations are already progressive ; and we might expect, consequently, that any obscurities noticeable in the

first dispensation would be partially removed in the second, and that the work of elucidation would be completed in the third — that it would throw light on all that had gone before it. If, then, we can find out from the study of the third dispensation what is the nature and significance of sacrifice as illustrated in the death of Christ, and what was the purpose meant to be answered by it, we conceive ourselves authorized to infer that the nature and purposes of the animal sacrifices provided for in the two former dispensations were identical with these. And we are taught, in terms too explicit to be easily misapprehended, that the purpose of the sacrifice of Christ was expiatory. He died that he might atone for our sins; he bore our sins in his own body on the tree that he might effect a reconciliation between God and man.

It must be remembered that hitherto we have only ventured to infer from the acknowledged import of the sacrifice of Christ the import of the patriarchal and Levitical sacrifices. Is there evidence of a more positive character that the purpose of the latter sacrifices was identical with that of the first? In regard to the Levitical sacrifices, the evidence seems to be of a very decided character. It is affirmed, in Lev. xvii. 11, that the blood of the slain animal is shed upon the altar to make atonement for the sins of the people. It is asserted, likewise, in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ix. 7), that the high-priest of Israel went once every year into the tabernacle with blood which he offered for himself and for the errors of the people. Language more explicit and of a clearer signification could not easily be found. The two dispensations were most intimately related to each other. The sacrifices prescribed under the second dispensation were typical of the sacrifice offered in the third. The former had, indeed, no atoning power in themselves, but were efficacious only as they were typical of the sacrifice of the Redeemer.

Can the same identity of nature and purpose be made out in reference to the patriarchal sacrifices? No evidence, it is conceded by Mr. Faber, of a direct and positive character in favor of this identity can be brought forward; but in the

absence of any intimation to the contrary, such an identity might reasonably enough be inferred. It is scarcely possible to imagine that if expiatory sacrifices were deemed needful for the Israelites after the time of Moses, they should not have been prescribed during the patriarchal period.

There are, however, considerations of a more decisive nature going to prove that the doctrine of an atonement effected by means of expiatory sacrifice was known during the patriarchal ages and received the divine sanction; in other words, that expiatory sacrifices, in the proper signification of that phrase, existed before the time of Moses, and, if not directly commanded by Jehovah, were at least so far approved by him that they may be properly conceived to have been, in effect, if not really, commanded by him.

The first of these considerations is, that sacrifices of an expiatory character prevailed throughout the pagan world. The arguments which go to demonstrate the truth of this affirmation may be found drawn out at great length in the well known work of Archbishop Magee on the Atonement. It is necessary for those who admit the general prevalence among heathen nations of expiatory sacrifices to account for it. One method used for this purpose has been to maintain that such sacrifices are in accordance with the natural impulses of our mind. Our very nature seems to encourage the presumption that the anger of God due to us for our transgression may in this way be appeased. It is believed that a human government might be induced to pardon a rebellious subject, under certain circumstances, if such a sacrifice were to be presented. But Faber and the large majority, if not all, of the writers on this subject seem to agree in rejecting this view, and they incline to the belief that the universal prevalence of expiatory sacrifice may be traced to a direct command. By others the prevalence of these sacrifices is ascribed to superstition. In the absence now of direct testimony on the subject,—for all are understood to allow that the scriptures do not give any formal command relating to it,—the supposition of a revelation

from God equivalent to a command affords the best solution of what otherwise is so difficult to explain. But it may be asked here, whether those who conceive the main element in the divine plan of salvation to be the expiatory sacrifice of Christ ought not to admit that such a scheme would, as a matter of necessity, commend itself not only to the conscience as right, but to our natural instincts as proper and suitable to the character of God and of men, and that this felt harmony would be so complete as to lay a foundation for the belief, in thoughtful minds, that some such scheme would at length be actually disclosed, and to prompt them, as it were, spontaneously to present animal sacrifices as symbolical anticipations of the great sacrifice which they conceived it possible, not to say probable, would ultimately be offered. Whatever answer, now, may be given to this question, we must suppose that the doctrine of sacrifice was transmitted by Noah to his descendants, and that it must have come to him as a fragmentary portion of a revelation which had been made, from time to time, to his progenitors. The presumptive evidences all countenance this supposition; and that theory which accounts for an alleged fact the most satisfactorily is, in the absence of positive evidence, to be accounted the true theory.

A second argument for the existence of patriarchal expiatory sacrifices is derived from the record of Job's sacrifice for his children and for his three friends. It is not necessary to narrate at length the circumstances under which these sacrifices were offered. The important question in regard to them is, whether or not they were expiatory. It must be owned that the reply given to this question is not in the highest degree satisfactory. It is admitted that the language in which the account of these sacrifices is given does not in itself afford any positive proof that they were expiatory. But yet the fact that God is represented as saying by implication that if the sacrifice be offered he will avert his displeasure from the friends of Job, would go far to justify the assertion that it was of an expiatory description. It may

reasonably be doubted whether any sacrifice whose avowed object and actual effect were the removal of the divine displeasure could properly bear any different name; especially when, as was the case with this sacrifice of Job, it was presented in accordance with a divine command.

Attention is next directed to the sacrifice offered by Noah after he left the ark. The scriptural narration gives us plainly to understand that on its being presented God smelled a sweet savor, and uttered a promise equivalent to that of forgiveness of the sins by which the flood had been occasioned. It is evident that, as the result of the sacrifice, God, who had hitherto been offended with men, now saw it to be right to exercise grace towards them. He would forbear to inflict on them the punishment which they merited. The sacrifice of Noah appears to have been, we are authorized to infer, of the same character as that of Job, adverted to on a preceding page,—to have had in view a similar object, and to have been productive of a similar result. It may, like that, be fairly considered to have been an expiatory sacrifice.

We now come to a consideration of the more important sacrifice of Cain and Abel. A principal question which we are to discuss relatively to it is: What is meant by the word “sin,” in God’s answer to Cain’s complaint, “If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door.” It is maintained by those who advocate the theory of a direct divine institution of sacrifice, that the word translated “sin” should be translated “sin-offering,” and that what God designed to say to Cain was, that, although he stood self-convicted of sin, he need not despair, inasmuch as a victim, which could be presented as a sin-offering, was at hand, and in this way the just consequences of his sin might be averted from him. Ought, then, the word translated “sin” to have been rendered “sin-offering”? It is contended, on the one hand, that, instead of being rendered “sin-offering,” the proper translation is “punishment for sin.” But to this it is replied, that, out of the whole range of scripture, not one passage can be brought forward in which the word in

question (חַטָּאת) must be translated "punishment for sin." It is doubted, indeed, whether one passage can be produced in which "sin-offering" is not the best rendering, not to say the only one, which the exigencies of the passage require. It is enough, at present, barely to state the argument employed by Faber and others on this subject, without attempting to give the various particulars out of which the argument is constructed.

The evident intention of the answer made to Cain by Jehovah was to show him that he had no proper ground of complaint in view of the different feelings entertained by the Almighty in reference to his sacrifice and that of Abel. If he had done well, he should certainly be regarded with favor; if, on the other hand, he had sinned, there was ready at hand a means by which all ill consequences likely to result from his transgression might be prevented. It is argued that the displeasure of God was directed against Cain not because he had refused to bring a proper sin-offering, but because his character had been so much worse than that of Abel. But there is no proof that his character, previously to the sacrifice, had been worse than that of Abel; at any rate, so much worse as to render his sacrifice displeasing to Jehovah. Or, even admitting that this was so, still his character was not so depraved that no sacrifice he could bring could be considered as a proper atonement. The common views entertained of Cain's character are derived less from what we know of him before the sacrifice in question than from what is told of his subsequent conduct. It is certain that both his conduct and that of Abel had been such as to require that they should offer expiatory sacrifices, even though the iniquities of one of them had been altogether inferior in enormity to those of the other; and if both had presented such a sacrifice with right feelings, it would have been accepted by the Almighty in each case with the same favor. But as it was, Cain was told that the particular sin which he had perpetrated could still be atoned for by sacrificing the victim which stood at the door. We have, then, in this passage, if this reasoning be correct, an indubitable instance

of an expiatory sacrifice to be offered, if not in obedience to a formal command, at least in obedience to an implied command, and with the evident approbation of God. And are we not justified in the presumption that if this sacrifice was of this character, it was not by any means a solitary case? Was not the custom of offering such sacrifices a prevalent one?

Again, we are told in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that by faith Abel offered a more acceptable sacrifice than Cain. What was the nature of this faith cherished by Abel? It is apparent that the faith stated in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews to have been cherished by so many different men must have been in all cases substantially the same sentiment. We must seek for a definition of it, such as will suit all the instances in which it was exercised. It would seem, therefore, to be quite evident that the faith here celebrated could not have been what is ordinarily defined as evangelical faith, — faith in Christ as an atoning Saviour, — because it could not have been by virtue of this faith that we understand the worlds to have been created by Almighty power; neither could it have been by such faith that Noah was prompted to build an ark for himself and his family. We ought rather to understand by it a cordial belief in divine revelation, without any special reference to the particular matter which that revelation had in view. This definition of faith applies to the different examples alluded to in the chapter, better than any other. Abel, then, offered the sacrifice which he did, in compliance with such a revelation from God, in simple faith in its reality. Cain brought an offering of such a material as he thought proper, in disregard of the divine revelation. He may previously have been a worse or a better man than Abel. His conduct, however, in regard to this sacrifice — his acting so independently of the divine will — was the particular feature which awakened so much displeasure against him in the divine mind.

Another argument in favor of the direct divine institution of sacrifice is drawn from a consideration of the language used on this subject in the Levitical law. It would, as a

matter of course, be conjectured that if the rite of sacrifice had not been in use at the time of Moses, if it had not till that time been commanded by Jehovah, some intimation of this fact would have been given in the law. At all events, one would naturally suppose that such language would not have been employed as would lead to the supposition that the contrary was the fact—that expiatory sacrifices were then for the first time commanded to be observed. Now, it is alleged that the terms used in the Levitical law are of the latter kind—that they imply that expiatory sacrifices had been customarily offered by men, and that they were by no means abhorrent, but on the contrary pleasing, to the mind of God.

Let us look, for a moment, at some of this language. In the opening chapter of Leviticus, where, if anywhere, we should look for a command to present expiatory sacrifices, the reader must be struck with the total absence of any such command. The chapter seems to proceed on the supposition that no command of the sort was required. It assumes that no doubt either as to the propriety or the duty of presenting atoning sacrifices existed in the mind of the Israelites. It is said all along: If any man among you will offer a sacrifice, let him offer it in this or that manner. Directions are given as to the kind of animal which should be employed as a victim, as to the rites by which the sacrifice should be accompanied; but this is not preceded by any command to offer sacrifice in the general, as one would presume would be the case if it was now for the first time made a matter of obligation. Let it be carefully noted that there exists this absence of command to offer sacrifice, whatever be the particular kind of sacrifice—whether peace or thank or sin offering—which is referred to. The opponents of the theory of the divine institution of sacrifices before the time of Moses should be able to account in a satisfactory manner for the lack of any divine command relative to the matter.

It may be urged, still further, that God, speaking through the mouth of Jeremiah, expresses himself in such decisive

terms as these : "For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them, in the day that I brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices." The commands to which God must be supposed to have reference in this passage are, unquestionably, those which relate to the original institution of sacrifice. No others can be thought to be alluded to, because commands of a different import, those which relate to the selection of victims and to the accompanying rites, are very frequent.

Those who deny that expiatory sacrifices were commanded during the patriarchal dispensation are still obliged to admit that they were not commanded under the Mosaic dispensation, unless they refuse to give credence to what is affirmed in the preceding citation from Jeremiah as to the want of such a command. At the same time, they can hardly fail to own that these sacrifices, if not commanded expressly in the law, were yet allowed, and to all appearance were divinely approved. In other words, the rite of sacrifice, which it is argued God never formally enjoined, which is said to be only the outgrowth of a degrading superstition, is still confessed to be set forth in the Levitical law, not only as a permitted rite, but as positively countenanced and approved by Jehovah. Now, it would seem to be much the easier course to admit that the Levitical law, while it does not reveal nor command the observance of sacrificial rites, yet recognizes them, and recognizes them on the ground that they had already, in effect, if not literally, been enjoined by Jehovah.

It is a favorite topic with those who will not acquiesce in the idea that expiatory sacrifices were instituted by Jehovah, that they are the offspring of superstitious views of the divine character. Now, if it can be shown that these sacrifices were permitted, not to say positively countenanced, by the Almighty, it would seem to take away no small part of the force of the objection that they are an altogether superstitious observance; for it should not be conceded for a moment that God would either enjoin or approve of a religious service which was simply the offspring of a superstition. Faber

contends, however, that every form and mode of sacrifice, when viewed as not commanded by Jehovah, is marked by gross and unreasonable superstition. We do not regard this notion of Mr. Faber as founded on a view of the real state of the case. God would not command the practice of a rite which was intrinsically superstitious. Neither are we willing to allow that atoning sacrifices deserve to be branded as superstitious, if they are contemplated in their proper aspect. We do not believe, indeed, that the slaying of an irrational animal can itself have the effect of appeasing the wrath of God. It is a conceded point that it is impossible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sin. Wherein, then, does consist the power of a proper atoning sacrifice to take away sin? What is the proper aspect in which it is to be regarded? We acknowledge that the scriptures content themselves with laying down the doctrine that Christ bore our sins and was made a curse for us, without undertaking to explain at all fully how it is that the death of Christ has this atoning power; and on this it becomes us to speak with great caution. But may we not regard all sacrifice as a symbol; and those sacrifices which are expiatory as typical of Christ's death, and that as a species of symbolical punishment — a manifestation of the divine feelings in reference to sin and its evil desert, as well as an acknowledgment on the part the transgressor that he merits a punishment analogous to that now experienced by the substituted victim? And we are not sure but that, without any express injunction from heaven, the reasonableness of expiatory sacrifice might have suggested itself to the mind of a thoughtful transgressor, and that he might have gone on to perform the service without subjecting himself to the imputation of practising superstition.

But, whatever may be thought of this reasoning, we regard the argument of Mr. Faber as being on the whole conclusive that, as sacrifice was in use during the patriarchal ages, was accepted and approved by the Almighty, it should not be stigmatized as a superstitious observance, but as being an act of obedience to a virtual command of Jehovah.

We shall now advert to a number of objections, started by Davison and others, to the doctrine that atoning sacrifices were prescribed by Jehovah under the patriarchal dispensation. That a command was not requisite in the case of eucharistic sacrifices, or indeed of any except those which were strictly piacular, may be readily enough allowed. Men, it may be easily supposed, might offer them spontaneously. Sacrifices might seem to men in those primitive ages to be an apt symbol of gratitude, and especially of the contrition and sorrow which the consciousness of sin enkindles. They may be supposed not to need any revelation from heaven to suggest to them that sacrifices regarded as fines might avert the wrath of God. But we cannot believe, so Faber maintains, that without divine command men would ever arrive at the notion of a strictly piacular sacrifice. We are, then, driven to the conclusion that, if anterior to the time of Moses God ever accepted sacrifices of this nature, then the rite itself and the accompanying idea of an atonement must have been expressly ordained and revealed by the Almighty. Are there any strong, still more any insuperable, objections to this doctrine?

One such objection has already been incidentally referred to. We have, it is urged, an explicit affirmation of the divine appointment of the Sabbath, and from the fact of this appointment we infer the obligation of observing the Sabbath; and therefore, from the absence of any formal direction of this kind in regard to sacrifice, we are to infer that it was not practised, and ought not to have been practised, during the patriarchal ages. No reason, it is alleged, can be given why an injunction should have been laid down in the one case, and in the other an almost perfect silence be observed, except that piacular sacrifices—for they are the ones particularly in view—were not meant to be offered. Warburton is more positive even than Davison in the statement of this objection. The objection has a good deal of plausibility, and it is not to be wondered at that writers on the other side—as Faber, for example—take much pains to refute it. Admitting the

absence of any formal direction in relation to sacrifices, it may be very pertinently asked where we are to look for any formal statement in regard to the duty of observing every seventh day as a Sabbath. We are, indeed, told that God rested on the seventh day from the work of creation, and blessed and sanctified that day ; but we are not told that every successive seventh day was sanctified, nor that every such day should be set apart by man for the duties and observances of religion. We have no doubt that the observance of the Sabbath has always been in agreement with the mind of God, and that the failure to practise such an observance is sinful ; but one will look in vain in the scriptures for any explicit and formal command to this effect, anterior, at least, to the time of Moses. On the contrary, Faber maintains that we do possess, in respect to the primitive institution of piacular sacrifice, evidence stronger and more direct of its having come from God, than we have for the primitive divine institution of the Sabbath. We can produce, he says, an absolute command, addressed to Cain, to present a sin-offering, — that is, a piacular sacrifice, — with the very plainest implication that to do so was a matter of moral obligation on the strength of the divine institution of that species of sacrifice. The obligation to observe the Sabbath grows out of man's moral nature ; it corresponds to his wants as a moral being ; and, in the circumstances in which he is placed, this observance is an indispensable condition of the attainment of the great purposes of our being. We regard the obligation to perform paicular sacrifices as resting on a similar basis. It corresponds to our moral wants. It meets our necessities as sinners as nothing else can.

Another objection to the alleged existence of expiatory sacrifices in the patriarchal ages is put by Davison in this form. If such sacrifices were offered, they must have had exclusive reference to sin in the strict sense of that term — to proper violations of the eternal law of right. No other law had yet been proclaimed. But at Sinai a ceremonial law was put forth, and expiatory sacrifices were directed to be used

in the event of any of these ceremonial laws being violated. They were carefully restricted in their scope to transgressions of this character. Now, it is claimed that had expiatory sacrifices been used before the time of Moses, then in the Levitical law, "the divine economy would have been retrograde; a sacrament of grace and pardon would have been withdrawn, or, which is the same thing, it would have been reduced from greater purposes to less; and this is a change highly inconsistent with our best notions of the progressive order of revealed religion." It is not to be supposed that a transgressor of God's law under the patriarchal dispensation would have had pointed out to him a method of obtaining forgiveness which a transgressor under the Mosaic economy would not be able to use. This would be tantamount to the assertion that God was less merciful under the latter than under the former economy; or, what is still worse, to the assertion that violations of a ceremonial rule were really of greater importance, and stood in more pressing need of forgiveness, than is the case with violations of the eternal law of rectitude.

Now, it should be remembered, in respect to this objection, that under both dispensations, the patriarchal and the Mosaic, expiatory sacrifices are not supposed to have any intrinsic efficacy in the way of procuring pardon for transgressors. It is explicitly asserted that it is not possible for the blood of bulls and goats to take away sins. They had no power of this sort, except as they were typical of the sacrifice of Christ. It may not, indeed, have been necessary that the worshipper should always have been distinctly conscious of the reference of his sacrifice to the death of Christ. All that may have been required of him was to present his offering with that penitent mind and that submission of himself to the mercy of God which constitute the elements of saving faith. The worshipper acknowledged that in nothing he could do of himself did there lie any reason why his sin should be forgiven; that if it were forgiven, it would be exclusively of the divine compassion. Under neither dispensation, the

patriarchal nor the Mosaic, was the sacrifice itself, aside from its typical character, supposed to have any virtue in the procurement of pardon. The Levitical law, then, need not suffer, from any comparison between itself and the patriarchal dispensation, as if the scope of the divine compassion was limited in it to a greater degree than it had before been.

It may be argued, still farther, that the supposition that sacrifices under the Mosaic economy were confined to ceremonial transgressions is not well-founded. It is granted, by Davison himself, that there were "certain cases of moral transgression, in favor of which an exception from the general severity of the law was admitted, and an atonement ordained." Here, then, is an abandonment of the ground first assumed. And it is not enough to plead that the cases specified were exceptional, and of little relative importance. It remains true that moral transgressions, strictly defined, were atoned for by expiatory sacrifices.

Besides, the fact should not be lost sight of, that violations of the law, on the part of the ancient Israelites, were in many cases both sins against God and infractions of the civil code; and the same difficulty which exists at the present day in the way of procuring pardon for the latter class of transgressions would have arisen among the Israelites. The very maintenance of civil society requires an adherence to the principle that violations of the law must be followed by the threatened punishment. No provision for pardon can be involved in the civil law. It does not, and cannot, know anything of mercy. There would have been no propriety under the Mosaic economy in appointing a peculiar sacrifice for transgressions of this character. Under no government, and in reference to no law, can such a provision be supposed to exist. Pardons must originate in a source outside the law. There was not, then, in the Mosaic economy, any retrogression, any peculiar limitation of the divine compassion beyond what had always existed. At the same time, under the Mosaic, as well as under the patriarchal dispensations, violations of the divine, in distinction from the civil law,

— that law whose penalty comes upon the sinner not in this, but in the future life, were forgiven on the ground of penitence and submission to the mercy of God — that mercy which it had been promised should be exercised in view of the sacrificial death of Christ.

It is, no doubt, the doctrine of the New Testament that expiatory sacrifices possess no intrinsic virtue enabling them to atone for sin. This is the principle, without question, which underlies the confession of David that God does not desire sacrifice, nor delight in burnt-offerings. In itself sacrifice is powerless, and when presented with no reliance on anything beyond itself it is positively offensive to Jehovah. God distinctly affirms that when thus presented he is weary to bear it. But the case is wholly different when, on the part of the worshipper, there is a recognition of the typical character of the rite — when trust is placed not in the rite itself, but in the antitype, the death of Christ, to which it refers.

The language of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (vii. 26–28) deserves careful consideration, as going to prove that under the Mosaic dispensation sacrifices were not supposed to refer exclusively to mere ceremonial transgressions. It is asserted in this passage that high-priests under the Mosaic law were required daily to offer up sacrifice, first for their own sins, and then for the sins of the people; but Christ, in contrast with this, offered up sacrifice once, when he offered up himself. The affirmation plainly amounts to this, — that the same thing as to import and design was done by the high-priest of old as was done by the Saviour; that an atonement was meant to be made by each for the same class of transgressions. For what class of transgressions, then, was the death of the Saviour meant to atone? Surely, no one will claim that his death referred only to ceremonial transgressions. That death can be thought to relate only to violations of moral law. And we seem required to infer from this, that the sacrifices daily presented by the high-priest had a similar reference to sins, in the proper sense of that

term. In short, it would appear to be beyond dispute that Mosaic sacrifices were meant to atone for moral, as well as ceremonial, transgressions.

It is objected, again, to the doctrine for which we are contending that the gospel dispensation is spoken of in the New Testament as a "mystery which had been hidden from ages and from generations, but which now at length is made manifest to the saints of God." These words, it is alleged, imply in the plainest manner that, even if there had not been a perfect ignorance of the evangelical scheme on the part of the Jews, before the actual appearance of Christ, we must at least suppose that a disclosure of its chief features, such, for example, as the atoning virtue of the death of Christ, had been withheld. If this doctrine had been made known,—and most certainly it would have been made known virtually had there been a discovery given of the proper expiatory power of sacrifices to atone for moral transgressions,—it could not have been asserted, as it has been, that the gospel was a mystery which had been concealed from the beginning of the world.

This objection is disarmed of its force, when it is conceded, as it is by the very men who urge it, that the gospel was only so far a mystery that the ancient Israelites were not "in possession of the perfect truth." It is very easy to conceive of the possibility of such a faith as should result in the actual forgiveness of sin, even though there exist none other than very indistinct conceptions of the conditions on which God would pardon the transgressor. There might have been, as we have had occasion more than once to intimate, such a conviction of just exposure to punishment and of utter inability to atone for sin, such a submissive reliance on the mere mercy of God as constitutes the very essence of evangelical faith. We may well believe that there may have existed, and may still exist, with thoughtful men to whom the Bible never has been given, such a mental state, as that the instant the fact of a crucified Saviour should be disclosed, he would be at once accepted as the ground of a hope of salvation.

For all that appears, then, there may have existed in the ages before Christ such an ignorance of the precise features of the plan of salvation through an atonement as to make it proper for the scriptures to represent that plan as a mystery hidden from men ; while, at the same time, a sufficient disclosure was made to render possible a faith that should save on the ground of expiatory sacrifice.

What has now been written will, it is thought, afford an adequate view of the controversy on the question, whether or not sacrifice be of divine institution ; so far at least as the practice of expiatory sacrifice in the patriarchal period may be thought to have any bearing on the question. A doubt may still be entertained whether the alleged absence of formal command would prove that this kind of sacrifice was not in full agreement with the will of God, and was not accepted by him. At this point, however, we dismiss the subject.

ARTICLE VII.

REVIEW OF THE "IDENTIFICATION OF MOUNT PISGAH."

BY REV. THOMAS LAURIE, D.D., PROVIDENCE, R.I.

IN the midst of Centennial celebrations of the Revolution, it is pleasant to note the bands of love that now unite the two nations then at war. It is not less pleasant to note that some of these relate to our common inheritance—the English Bible. One of them is our united revision of that time-honored translation, and another our united exploration of the land of the Bible. England has invited us to join in this more thorough exposition of "The Land and the Book," and America has accepted the invitation, with a cordial devotion to the work, and no less cordial reciprocation of the kind feelings that prompted the offer.

Nothing will do more to correct the false impressions of the word of God that scepticism circulates so industriously, and at the same time promote its intelligent study, than the

knowledge of Palestine resulting from its thorough exploration.

The work of the English "Palestine Exploration Fund" west of the Jordan is a monument of conscientious thoroughness. It introduces a new era into biblical knowledge. The variety and wide range of its beneficent results are only beginning to be understood. It is an honor to be associated with such men in such a work, and we mean to show our trans-Atlantic kindred that we are not unworthy of it. We have not yet come up to our own standard of excellence; but the sight of their well-tilled field, that we must needs pass through to reach our own, inspires the purpose to fall behind in nothing possible to be achieved. We have confidence that American Christians will take hold of the work eagerly as soon as they understand its nature and results.

It is the design of this Article to promote that end by a review of "The Identification of Pisgah" that has just appeared in the third Statement of the Palestine Exploration Society. This was written by Prof. John A. Paine, Archaeologist of the Expedition in 1873, and formerly Professor in Robert College, Constantinople, and is an able and thorough discussion of the whole subject.

To appreciate it fairly we need to note what had been previously known of the locality. Josephus calls Abarim "a lofty height, lying over against Jericho, affording a view of the best and greatest part of the land of Canaan."¹ Eusebius says, "It is said also to be Mt. Nabau, and is the land of Moab opposite Jericho, beyond the Jordan, on the top of Phasgo, and it is pointed out in going up from Libias (Livias) toward Heshbon, called by the same names, hard by Mt. Phogor (Peor), also bearing this name still. Thence also the region is still called Phasgo."² Jerome says almost the same words in Latin. The two last authors differ, however, in the location of Mt. Nebo. Eusebius says, "It is shown even now as the sixth mile-mark from Heshbon toward the

¹ Dr. W. L. Alexander's *Kitto*, Vol. iii. p. 298 (Edinburgh, 1870).

² Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, Vol. ii. p. 879, and *Identification of Pisgah*, p. 75.

west"; and Jerome writes, instead of "toward the west," "over against the eastern quarter." Both Eusebius and Jerome speak of Mt. Peor as "seven mile-stones from Heshbon."¹

Dr. Robinson, the Corypheus of biblical geography, says: "Though we saw the mountains over against Jericho from every quarter, yet there seems to be none so standing out from the rest as to be recognized as the Nebo of the scriptures. There is no peak perceptibly higher than the rest; all is apparently one level line of summit. The highest point is Jebel el-Jil'ad, or es-Salt, near the city of that name, about 3000 feet above the Ghôr; but this is much too far north. Possibly one in these mountains might find some isolated summit answering to the position and character of Nebo. Indeed, Seetzen, Burckhardt, and also Irby and Mangles, have all identified it with Jebel Attarûs, south of the Zûrka Ma'în. This, however, is 'far from opposite Jericho,' and would be almost as distant from the plains of Moab as Jebel es-Salt."² Dr. Robinson then concluded that it could neither be Jebel'Osha nor Attarûs; but he did not venture to locate Nebo or Pisgah, either on his map of 1838 or 1856.

In the map of Palestine in Alexander's edition of Kitto (1870) Nebo is put down correctly as to its distance from Heshbon; but both are too far south in relation to the Dead Sea; and Nebo is placed further south than Baal Meon.

In William Smith's Historical Atlas of Ancient Geography (1873) Mt. Nebo or Pisgah (Jebel Nibbeh or Nebâ) is put down nearly where the map of the American Exploration Society locates it, but further south, nearer the Dead Sea, and marked 2670 feet. Ayûn Mûsa (springs of Moses) are located as on the American map, but not quite so much to the west, and marked 1600 feet. Heshbon itself is marked 2880 feet, which makes it higher than the top of Nebo.

Mr. George Grove, of Sydenham,³ says, "There is nothing

¹ Alexander's Kitto, Vol. iii. p. 298, and Identification of Pisgah, pp. 78, 79.

² Biblical Researches, Vol. ii. p. 306 (abridged).

³ Smith's Dictionary of the Bible (1860), *sub voce* Abarim.

to prove this a range of any length," and places it on the east of the Jordan, in the land of Moab, facing Jericho. "Its most elevated spot was the Mt. Nebo head of the Pisgah, whence Moses viewed the promised land before his death." Smith's Historical Atlas, 1873, makes the mountains of Abarim extend up to Wady Hadar, the upper part of Wady Keferein.

Dr. W. L. Alexander¹ says: "It presents many distinct masses and elevations, commanding extensive views west of the Jordan. . . . From the manner in which the names Abarim, Nebo, and Pisgah are connected (Deut. xxxii. 49; xxxiv. 1), it would seem that Nebo was a mountain of the Abarim chain, and that Pisgah² was the highest and most commanding peak of the mountain. . . . The precise appropriation of the three names, however, remains yet to be determined; the locality has not been sufficiently explored."

Mr. Grove says, further,³ "It is so minutely described, it would be impossible not to recognize it,—in the land of Moab, facing Jericho,—the summit of a mountain called the Pisgah, which, again, formed a part of the general range Abarim." Its position is further denoted by "the ravine in the land of Moab, facing Beth-Peor" (Deut. xxxiv. 6), in which Moses was buried. Then, after rejecting 'Osha and

¹ Kitto's Encyclopaedia (1870), *sub voce*, Abarim.

² Dr. Porter maintains this opinion in his latest writings. In the London Athenaeum of May 1, 1875, he speaks of leaving Hesbân, April 15, 1874, for Mount Nebo, and at the distance of five miles he found ruins several acres in extent, which the Arabs called Khirbet Siâghah (ruins of Siâghah); and he at once thought of Pisgah, as the Arabs do not have P in their alphabet, except as it is sounded F. He describes the summit as rich in soil and partially cultivated. A mile due west is a rounded peak, connected with the northwest side of Siâghah by a narrow neck. Here are ruins of an ancient town, with the remains of a Roman castle on the highest point; outside of that the ruins are more ancient. The Arabs call this Nebâ or Nebbeh. It has Wady Ayûn Mûsa on the north, and Wady Judaïd on the south (an error of the press makes this last Judeih). It is four hundred feet lower than Siâghah, but has a more full view of the valley of the Jordan, Dead Sea, and Plain of Jericho; he identifies the ruins with the town of Nebo, which Eusebius places six miles from Heshbon towards Jericho. From hence he went down in half an hour to Ayûn Mûsa, and, looking back from thence, saw the peaks of both Nebâ and Siâghah.

³ Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, *sub voce*, Mount Nebo.

Attarus, because one was fifteen miles too far north, and the other as much too far south, he adds, "Another requisite is a view from the summit corresponding to that which Moses is said to have had from here over the whole land."

He also says: "This must have been a mountain range, the same as, or a part of, Abarim. The field of Zophim was on it, and its highest point or head was the Mt. Nebo. In the late Targums of Jerusalem and the Pseudo-Jonathan, Pisgah is invariably rendered by *ramatha*, "hill." Neither do the Seventy treat it as a proper name; but Eusebius and Jerome report the name as existing in their day in its ancient locality."¹

Dr. J. L. Porter² says: "Deut. xxxii. 49 establishes three points,—(a) Nebo was a peak of the range Abarim; (b) It was in the land of Moab, east of the Jordan, and (c) opposite and in sight of Jericho." He, too, questions whether Pisgah is a proper name or a common noun; and if the former, thinks it an equivalent for Abarim. After quoting Eusebius and Jerome, he goes on: "Therefore, according to them, Mt. Nebo must be some peak on the brow of the mountain range near where Wady Hesbân breaks down from the lofty plateau of Moab; and this agrees with the scriptures."

On the south bank of Wady Hesbân, and about seven miles west of the ruins of the town, Dr. Porter noticed some projecting points of the range, not higher than others, but shooting out farther west, so as to command the Jordan valley and western Palestine, and suggested that one of these might be Nebo; though he adds, it is now impossible to identify the exact spot. He thought, also, that the idea that Nebo must be the highest mountain in the region had misled those who sought it in Jebel Attarûs and Jebel Jil'ad. He infers from Deut. xxxii. 49; xxxiv. 1, that Abarim was a range, Nebo one of its peaks, and Pisgah either a common noun meaning "an isolated hill," or more likely equivalent to Abarim.³

Dean Stanley presents nothing new, but reiterates the

¹ Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, *sub voce*, Pisgah.

² Alexander's Kitto, *sub voce*, Mount Nebo. ³ Ibid., *sub voce*, Pisgah, p. 548.

hopes and desires of other writers, when he says : " Nothing but a fuller description than has ever yet been given of these regions can determine the spot where the great lawgiver and leader of his people looked down upon their embattled ranks, and over the 'land which he was to see with his eyes, but was not to go in thither.' But the general account leaves no doubt that the place intended is some elevation immediately above the last stage of the Jordan." ¹

Professor Paine tells us that in November, 1863, Mons. de Saulcy was riding from Heshbon to Baal Meon, and asked his Arab guide the name of the mountain on his right hand. "Jebel Nebâ" (Mt. Nebo), was the reply. The Frenchman was in ecstasies; for, to use his own words, "I have had the good fortune to recover the famous Mt. Nebo, so vainly sought for many years, and I am proud of it."

The following April, a French nobleman, the Duc de Luynes, crossed this mountain, and laid it down correctly in his map as Jebel Mousa (Mountain of Moses), though elsewhere he calls it Mt. Nebo.

A few days after him, Dr. Tristram, an English clergyman, stood on the summit of the range, and gives an animated description of the view from thence.

April 21st, 1871, Rev. A. E. Northey, another English clergyman, climbed Mt. Nebo.² Descending Wady Hesbân southwest for half an hour, he turned southeast into Wady Suderah, and through this and other wadies climbed steadily for three hours, till he stood on the summit of Jebel Nebâ, with Wady Ayûn Mûsa to the north, and Wady el-Gedid (Jedaid) to the south. He found the view much the same as from Jebel Jabud (Zebbud?). Higher ground to the south intercepted his view, and cut off a part of the Dead Sea. Judging from Prof. Paine's account, he must have stood on Jebel Nebâ; for his view of the Dead Sea corresponds with what Prof. Paine says is seen from there; and he could hardly have gone so far as Jebel Sîâghah, though

¹ Sinai and Palestine, p. 294 (New York, 1865).

² Quarterly Statement of Palestine Exploration Fund (English), p. 62. 1872.

his three hours steady climbing, after half an hour down Wady Hesbân, exceeds Prof. Paine's five miles and a quarter; but then he may have taken a roundabout road, instead of a direct one.

Such was the extent of our knowledge of this locality before the expedition of the American Exploration Society, in 1873. It remained for that to ascertain definitely what till then had only been conjectured or inferred, and verify by actual examination what Dr. Porter so felicitously anticipated concerning "some projecting points of the range," no higher than others, but shooting out west, so as to command the Jordan valley and western Palestine, and also to show that he went too far when he pronounced it "impossible to identify the exact spot."

The paper of Prof. Paine fills nearly ninety pages of forty lines each in small type, and strikes us at once by what, for want of a better name, we may call its "impersonality." It contains no date of his visit, except that, in a note¹ written after the completion of the original document, he tells us that it was written in Hasbân, May, 1873, nor any designation of time, except the one sentence, "A month's investigation of all the district."² It makes not the least allusion to the society that sent him forth and supported him. The only reference to his associates in the work is contained in a single word in the following sentence, "An altitude of 1725 feet, according to one of *our* aneroids."³ If we were to write of him as has been written of Melchisedek, we would say that he had neither tent nor dwelling, that he neither ate nor drank, unless what he says of Ayûn Mûsa indicates the last: "To a thirsty explorer its artless song is more delightful than the sweetest notes of either Nillson or Lucca."⁴ We should not know that he had a horse, if he had not incidentally mentioned the fact in his interesting account of the discovery of the ancient "king's highway,"⁵ leading from Beth-Peor

¹ Identification of Pisgah, p. 11.

² p. 20.

³ p. 22.

⁴ p. 47.

⁵ Dr. Tristram mentions this ancient road in the "Land of Moab" (p. 338). "There is a very perfect ancient roadway from the eastern plain, i.e. the Belqa, to this place, and thence down to the lower terrace."

down to Watat en-Naam, and probably, though he does not mention it, to the plains of Moab below.¹

There is no allusion to any intercourse with the Arabs of the vicinity, only such incidental ones as the confirmation of "names as used by the tribes Benî Sakhr, 'Adwân, and Ghunaïmât," — the latter dwelling on Jebel Nebâ and Jebel Sîâghah,² — and the statement³ that "conversations with the Bedwân of the west revealed the fact that they were well aware of the old road which they called 'the ancient way.'"

His identification is very elaborate. Some may think his specification of the objects visible from the several peaks far too particular. It may be so for general reading; but ministers, at least, will not make this objection; for no description of Bible scenes can be minute enough to furnish all they want to use in the discussion of different truths connected with the same locality. In some parts there may be a little obscurity; but if one thoroughly masters the document, he will find it the next thing to a personal visit to the locality, which is one of the most interesting on the earth. Our author did not over-estimate it, when he commenced his Article with the words: "Among biblical problems on the east of the Jordan yet unsolved, none have enlisted deeper interest... than the identification of long-lost Pisgah." Mr. Grove had already pronounced the fact almost incredible that none of the travellers who believed Attarûs to be Mt. Nebo had even tried to ascend a peak which, if their conjectures were correct, must be the most interesting spot in the world.

Prof. Paine first reviews the search for Mt. Nebo up to the time of the expedition; then goes carefully over the whole range, giving descriptions of the summits and the objects visible from each; then reviews it in the light of the Bible, showing how its heights, headlands, valleys, springs, and ruins confirm and illustrate scripture; and last of all, reviews it in the light of ancient testimony. We will not follow him in his method, but present a brief *résumé* of his results.

¹ Identification of Pisgah, pp. 39-41.

² p. 20.

³ p. 41.

He understands by the mountains of Abarim the five summits of Jebel Sîâghah, of which Pisgah is the most prominent.¹

Nebo he finds (*a*) in Shefâ Nebâ (crest of Nebo),² four and a half miles from Heshbon, and 2725 feet above the sea (3925 feet above the Dead Sea; according to Smith's Historical Atlas [1873], 4017 feet), the highest point in the range, and yet not commanding the most extensive view. Jebel Mäslûbîyeh confines the prospect on the south; to the east the Belqa is shut off by the hill of Kûfair 'Abî Bedd. Some green hills appear beyond Hesbân on the northeast; and the furrowed breast of Jebel 'Ausha terminates the northern prospect. Then follow glimpses of Naphtali and the region around Safed, some peaks east of Tabor and Little Hermon, the mountains of Samaria, parts of the valley of the Jordan, Mt. Quarantana, Jerusalem and the Mt. of Olives, Bethlehem and the hills of the Wilderness of Judea, but none of the Dead Sea, while a peak directly in front shuts off Jericho and the adjoining plain; and (*b*) in Jebel Nebâ (Mt. Nebo),³ five and a quarter miles from Heshbon, and 2685 feet above the sea.⁴ The view here is more extensive. It takes in nearly the whole of the eastern slope of Palestine, and the most of the Jordan valley, extending farther south along the mountains of Judea. In one place he says, "It does not take in more than the northern end of the Dead Sea";⁵ and in another, "Possibly one third of the Dead Sea is visible."⁶ Half the delta of the Jordan is in sight; but the entire plain of Jericho is cut off by the double peaks of a hill in front. If we had no specification of what Moses saw from Pisgah, we should deem this grand enough to answer the purpose; but it commands neither the Negeb (south or dry country), "nor the plain of the valley of Jericho."

That double-peaked hill in front, Prof. Paine holds, is Jebel Sîâghah (Mt. Pisgah).⁷ He explains the translation

¹ Identification of Pisgah, p. 39. ² Ibid., pp. 22-24. ³ Ibid., pp. 25-28.

⁴ Captain Warren (London Athenaeum, May 8, 1875) says 2770 feet.

⁵ Identification of Pisgah, p. 25.

⁶ p. 26.

⁷ Sîâghah, Dr. Tristram writes it, Ziara, an Arabic word, meaning a place visited on account of its sacredness.

of Pisgah in the Septuagint (cut out) by the isolation of the hill, precipitous on three sides, and cut off from Mt. Nebo by Wady Haïsa.¹ Its southwestern peak is 2360 feet above the sea,² and one and a half miles from Jebel Nebâ³; and here Prof. Paine supposes that Moses obtained his view of the promised land before he died.⁴ Peor, the western peak, is one and a quarter miles from Jebel Nebâ,⁵ and 35,720 English feet, or six and three quarters miles, from Heshbon.⁶ The height of this is not given; but the other is said to be "scarcely lower" than this.⁷ From that lower peak the view is the best of all, as it is entirely unobstructed toward the Jordan and Jericho, takes in two thirds of the Dead Sea as far south as Musada, and gives a glimpse of the distant Negeb through an opening in the western hills.⁸ Neither the peninsula (Lesan) nor Jebel Usdum are to be seen.⁹

¹ Identification of Pisgah; see the Map.

² p. 29.

³ p. 79.

⁴ Capt. Warren (London Athenaeum, May 8, 1875), says: "The view is no doubt extensive, but not Pisgah, to my mind. I believe the true Pisgah is a hill north of Wady Ayûn Mûsa, at the northwest corner of the Belqa, 2600 feet high, which the Arabs call "Mushkar," and Mr. Paine "Mushaqqar."

⁵ Identification of Pisgah, p. 79.

⁶ p. 87.

⁷ p. 29.

⁸ p. 29.

⁹ Dr. Porter's account of these peaks (London Athenaeum, May 1, 1875), is somewhat different. He calls the peak which Prof. Paine names Peor, Mount Nebo, and says that from it the whole plain of Jericho, the valley of the Jordan, and the northern part of the Dead Sea are visible. On the north appears the range of Mount Gilead, as far as its culminating peak Jebel 'Osha, the ancient Mizpah of Gilead; all north of that is shut out from view. To the northwest, through the valley of the Jordan, appear the heights of Naphtali and Southern Lebanon. The whole outline of western Palestine extends thence in plain sight to Hebron. The Mediterranean does not appear, and the southern part of the Dead Sea is hidden by a peak half a mile off. He ascended that peak also, and found the view more extensive southward, including the Dead Sea and part of Negeb, but not the plain of Jericho. On the sides and summit of this peak are ruins of square buildings, not very ancient. The Arabs call both these peaks, and another group more to the east by the side of Jebel Siâghah, Jebel Nebâ. While Dr. Porter says the plain of Jericho is not visible from this summit, Prof. Paine says (p. 29): "There is now absolutely nothing between us and all the region around." And again (p. 36): "The great feature of the picture is the foreground, and the foreground is all the plain of the Jordan;" and lest we should think that by some point the plain of Jericho was cut out from this, a little farther, he says: "Only a single work of man appears, where, half-hidden among the trees that line one of the streams of Elisha's fountain, the square tower of Arihâ (Jericho) watches still." Query. Was Dr. Porter here looking

There is a part of the view described here by Prof. Paine so interesting that we must quote it, with some abbreviations:¹

“The eye wanders up to Bethlehem, happily seated at the upper edge of an amphitheatre on the hill-side. These rows are garden terraces, which give a richness of green that brings pleasure to an eye wearied with sterile places. From this point of view its position is charming above all others; for it is elevated as it would not appear from any other quarter, and is set in the verdure of fields of grain, gardens, fig-trees, and olive groves. If one were to choose out a place in all this landscape most worthy to be the birth-place of our Lord, it surely would be Bethlehem.”

“With no background but the white sky, the spires of Jerusalem stand out distinctly. The Mt. of Offence cannot conceal two points on Mt. Zion, one of which must be the minaret of the mosque over the tomb of David. There is the dome of the rock El 'Aqsâ, and the southeast corner of the temple area.

“This part of the city was the scene of our Saviour's teachings, and perhaps of his death. By night he went out to the Mt. of Olives; his abiding-place was Bethany; and both are here. The two roads are easily followed by the glass—one crossing the summit of Olivet, the other winding round its southern shoulder, and therefore the way of triumphal entry. On one of these slopes must be the spot where the Redeemer was parted from the disciples, and carried up into heaven. In the north, hills blend in blueness that lie not far from Nazareth, and look down on Gennesaret. Yonder is ‘this mountain’ on which the eye of the Saviour rested when he spoke of worshipping the Father in spirit and in truth. There is the Jordan of his baptism. Beneath us lies Perea, the Bethabara around Nimrin to which he retired just before he went up to Jerusalem to die. From

from what Prof. Paine calls the third peak of Jebel Siâghah? If not, it is easier to suppose that Dr. Porter misread his notes of one day's researches, than that Prof. Paine erred in his record of such protracted investigations.

¹ Identification of Pisgah, p. 30.

no other point can so many of his footsteps be traced, or so many scenes of his life be brought together."

This view, extending from Dan on the north to the far-distant Negeb, of which one gets a glimpse through an opening of the western hills near Masada, fulfils every requisite of the view which Moses beheld from Pisgah, unless it be the sight of all Judah unto the utmost sea. Concerning this, it is enough to say that no peak east of the Jordan is high enough to look over the higher ridge of western Palestine. The Lord might supernaturally show Moses the land of Judah which extended beyond the range of natural vision to the sea; but from no point south of Hermon, that looks down on the sources of the Jordan, and Kul'at er Râbûd north of the Jabbok,¹ can the Mediterranean Sea be seen. Stanley expresses it well: ² "Immediately opposite was 'all the land of Judah,' beyond which, though unseen, lay 'the utmost sea.'"

Our author follows Balaam from his night's lodging at Kirjath Hûzoth,³ — which he translates "city of divisions," and finds in the ruin of Kûfaïr 'Abî Bedd, laid out in four parts or wards, contrary to the usual custom, — first, to the peak which he calls Pisgah, at the southwestern end of the long outlying summit, marked Field of Zophim on the map, whence the prophet could see the whole camp of Israel; second, to the third summit called "the field of Zophim"⁴ and "the top of Pisgah,"⁵ towards, but not at, the southwestern end of the same summit, with part of the camp hidden by the second or Peor peak of the same; and third, and last of all, to this Peor peak,⁶ whence he uttered his final

¹ Stanley's *Sinai and Palestine* (N. Y. 1865), p. 315.

² *Ibid.* p. 295.

³ Dr. Tristram makes Kirjath Hûzoth to be Kirjathaim and its high place Jebel Attarus. — *Land of Moab*, p. 318.

⁴ *Identification of Pisgah*, p. 85.

⁵ p. 42.

⁶ Capt. C. Warren (*London Athenaeum*, May 8, 1875), says: "The place Mr. Paine calls Baal Peor is the temple and ruin of Nebâ, which I discovered" and identified "with the town of Nebo." Prof. Paine, on the contrary (p. 51), thinks that Kharâb el-Mukhaiyât "presents the best claims for the town of Nebo."

prophecy, and where Prof. Paine thinks Balak did not lead him before because of the temple of Peor which stood there.¹

This last peak is said to look toward Jeshimon, or the wilderness. David also (1 Sam. xxiii. 19), was in the hill of Hachilah, which is on the south of Jeshimon, and (vs. 24) in the wilderness of Maon, in the plain on the south of Jeshimon. Maon and Ziph are both visible from Pisgah, and most likely the hill of Hachilah also, though not yet certainly identified.² So Jeshimon is the wilderness where a line drawn to the north from Maon intersects another drawn west from Pisgah, and just there is a region every way worthy of the name.³

And here we may note a fruitful source of confusion in the valuable paper under review. The map marks the long, narrow plateau in front of Jebel Nebâ "Field of Zophim," and the southwestern end of it "Jebel Sîâghah," translated "Mt. Pisgah"; then (p. 28) Prof. Paine calls "the second summit, Jebel Sîâghah"; and (p. 37), says, "The extreme head of the range is Pisgah," suggesting that Sîâghah is the Arabic form of that name, the P being left out as unsuited to Arab vocal organs.⁴ All this looks as though he meant it to be the name of the extreme southwestern end of the Field of Zophim; but at the top of p. 39 he speaks of "summits of Sîâghah." Farther down on the same page, he says that "the summits of Pisgah, *or* mountains of Abarim, were these summits of Sîâghah." According to this, Pisgah is the "Field of Zophim" of the map, and includes the whole of Abarim. Then on p. 42 we are told that "the top of Pisgah finds its position in the third summit of Sîâghah"; but on p. 85 we are assured that "the third summit, *Zophim*, is a little higher than either Peor or Pisgah"; Peor being the second summit, so named from the temple of Peor that stood there, and Pisgah, as before, the last peak to the southwest. Yet on p. 87 Jerome

¹ Identification of Pisgah, pp. 41-45 and 57.

² Quarterly Statement of Palestine Exploration Fund, p. 47, 1875, makes it "el Yekin" S. E. of Hebron.

³ Identification of Pisgah, p. 66.

⁴ So, also, Dr. Porter; see note p. 133.

is said to have used Peor for the whole range, instead of Pisgah.

Again, "a narrow foreland, bounded by ledges and steep on the north and west, falling quickly down to Wâdî Ayûn Mûsâ far below, and by abrupt descents on the southeast ending in Wâdî el-Jûdaïd,"¹ is called the second summit, obliterating the first summit altogether, according to the map, or at least filling the place elsewhere assigned to it.

On the same page he says the "Wâdî Haïsa, falling into Wâdî el-Jûdaïd on the south, which reaches far up to this point, runs across the mountain, in a longitudinal direction, to the southern side of Jebel Nebâ. It thus cuts off, in a marked manner, Jebel Nebâ from the remainder of the promontory. No name could cross such a boundary line." Now, a glance at the map shows that any valley that runs across the mountain *south* of Jebel Nebâ, so far from cutting off that peak from the promontory of the Field of Zophim, would join them together, and a name would have no difficulty in crossing such a junction.

Then, so far is Pisgah from being represented as cut off from Jebel Nebâ by any valley, that, on p. 69, he speaks of it as the extremity of Jebel Nebâ."

Of these five summits only three are marked on the map — Peor, Siâghah or Pisgah, and Field of Zophim, — though this last seems to cover the whole summit, and no clew is given to the location of the other two, but the reader is left to grope his way to it through confused statements, far apart and sometimes bewildering, as, e.g. "The *first*² best designated as the *fifth* in the series."

Two things would greatly add to the usefulness of this really valuable Article, — one, a map on a scale large enough to locate these five peaks distinctly, and leaving out the translations of the original names, which only mislead, as one never knows which marks the true position, the Arabic or the English ; and the other, a strict adherence to one name for each ; in no case using one for another, or the name of

¹ Identification of Pisgah, p. 28.

² p. 28.

the range for a single peak, unless with explanations that shall make the meaning plain.

An index, also, would greatly increase its value for reference; for the same subject sometimes occurs on pages far apart, and one neither knows where to find it at all, nor, having found one, is he sure that other statements about it are not overlooked.

The description of the mountains of Moab would have gained greatly in clearness and vividness of impression, had the fact that the Belqa is high table-land been made prominent, and its elevation above the sea been given, as well as the height of Shefâ Nebâ above that. Both of these measurements were doubtless made by the expedition in its survey of that region.

Prof. Paine, from his thorough acquaintance with the ground, may have good reasons for his criticism of Mons. de Saulcy;¹ but those who have only the map to guide them cannot see why the Frenchman should not have taken the height along whose base he journeyed as the "crest of Nebâ," or how his "brave youth" may not have told him the exact truth.

According to pp. 8 and 34, the name Wâdî el-Kunaiseh should be moved on the map from under Wadi el-Hiri, and placed north of Râjmet el-Odeimy, as it is the name of the lower part of the Wady from Ayûn Mûsa to the valley of the Jordan, and is so laid down in the map of the southern division of the Holy Land, in William Smith's Historical Atlas of Ancient Geography (London, 1873).

Prof. Paine's criticisms on Dr. H. B. Tristram are severe,² — indeed, too severe; for one who had not seen the book criticized, but only some of Prof. Paine's quotations from it, would see at once that they call for some mitigation of the severity.

The doctor rode at a rapid pace for several miles to the southeast (southwest?), steadily ascending the bleak plateau of the mountains of Moab, the range of Nebo; and the most elevated point, three miles southwest of Heshbon, his guide

¹ Identification of Pisgah, pp. 3-8.

² pp. 11-17.

called Nebbah. From this 'highest point on the range of Nebo,' he speaks¹ of "the shoulder of Carmel, *or some other intervening height*, just showing to the right of Gerizim, while the faint and distant bluish haze beyond it told us that there was the sea." And his critic writes as though he had said Mt. Carmel absolutely, taking no notice of the qualifying phrase, "or some other intervening height." He also says: "It would require something more than a haze to enable one to *look down* over such summits"; but Dr. Tristram does not speak of looking down over them, or of seeing the sea as that looking down implies.

The Doctor also says: "Northward again rose the distinct outline of unmistakable Tabor, aided by which we could identify Gilboa and Jebel Dûhy [Little Hermon]." The Professor replies to this: "These are all completely concealed by the high, wild mountains of northeastern Samaria"; and yet, looking himself² from Shefâ Nebâ, which he calls "the highest point of the grand ridge," just as Dr. Tristram had spoken of its "most elevated point," he says: "The summits and the region eastward of Tabor are visible, as well as the mountains to the east of Little Hermon. A portion of the range of Gilboa may form the very boundary of the horizon." To us, at this distance, it seems as though both stood on the same spot, and looked out on the same prospect, though the Englishman's riding "at a rapid pace" led him to underestimate the distance.

Again, the Doctor speaks of "Mount Gilead, behind es Salt,"³ and Prof. Paine demands: "On what authority does he call Jebel 'Ausha Mount Gilead, behind es Salt?" Now, in the paragraph quoted from Dr. Tristram, where this expression occurs, not a word is said about Jebel 'Ausha; and still the question sounds rather bold, when George Grove of Sydenham speaks of "Jebel 'Osha, or Jebel el-Jil'ad, the highest point in all the eastern mountains."⁴ Robinson's

¹ Identification of Pisgah, p. 14.

² p. 22.

³ Identification of Pisgah, p. 14.

⁴ Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, *sub voce*, "Nebo."

maps, both 1838 and 1856, make Jebel 'Osha a peak in Jebel Jil'ad or es-Salt; and his *Biblical Researches* (i. 349) speaks of a lofty summit, "forming the highest point of the mountains of Gilead, just north of es-Salt"; ii. 243 says, "Mount Gilead, near es-Salt"; and a note says, "I suppose it the same which Burckhardt calls Jebel 'Osha, three quarters of an hour N.N.W. of es-Salt, connected, apparently, with the ridge Jil'ad. It is also called Jebel es-Salt"; and p. 257, note, gives the bearings of "Jebel es-Salt or Gilead." William Smith¹ makes Jebel 'Osha and Mount Gilead (Tell el-Jaludy) two peaks side by side, with a road passing between them.

In an enterprise like this, where two great Christian nations, bound together by ties of blood and attachment to a common Bible, seek to elucidate that Bible by a united exploration of the land where it was written, we want to do everything to please, and nothing to offend, brethren who co-operate with us in the work.²

This work of Prof. Paine is difficult to read, not that it is unintelligible, but the meaning is not always apparent at the first reading; and sometimes one has to go back and re-read a sentence two or three times before its import becomes quite clear. As illustrations of this, take the following:³ "From the east the fields of wheat rise in a smooth plain which ends, at length, in a stony brow. After the descent, a brown level

¹ *Historical Atlas*, 1873.

² Prof. Paine says (p. 11): "Though subsequent to both M. de Sauley and the Duc de Luynes, and though he came no nearer Neba than the neighborhood of Hasbân, yet he ventures to claim everything, the discovery, identification, description of Nebo, all to himself." To this Dr. Tristram replies, and as we think very satisfactorily (*London Athenaeum*, May 22, 1875), 'Mons. de Sauley directed my attention to Nebo, telling me that he had not been able to visit it himself, but left that to me, and I did not learn of the visit of the Duc de Luynes, which occurred only a week before mine, till after the publication of my book.' He adds also with good reason, "Mr. Paine should judge a traveller by his latest, not his earliest utterances." We may here notice that though Prof. Paine is severe on some statements of Dr. Tristram, he almost adopts his identification of Zoar, Dr. Tristram placing it on Jebel Siaghah, and Prof. Paine on this side of Jordan, near the base of the mountains (p. 71), in opposition to its received position at the southeastern coast of the Dead Sea.

³ *Identification of Pisgah*, p. 19.

of ploughed ground lengthens out, toward the end of which a slight elevation behind lifts up just enough to show a line of white rocks and then ceases : a slight inclination westward conducts to a rapid, rocky slope."

Another reads thus:¹ "A thin, blue line of far country colors the horizon, almost evenly drawn save at the point of a mountain near the winding valley (previously described), and of another slowly rising to pitch suddenly off, midway toward the boundary drawn by the headland on our left."

Some of his sentences are still more obscure, as, for instance, this:² "It is remote, as well as of difficult, apparently altogether without, access from the valley of the river"; and also this:³ "Its ruins now, of the city in its latest prosperity of Roman and Christian times, would not indicate a population of 35,000." These are given, punctuation and all, just as they stand.

His use of pronouns is sometimes misleading. In one place⁴ he says: "Crossing over, we find a wide, even height. . . . Beyond rises still another mountain whose top is short and round and plainly lower. *This* height is called Shefâ Nebâ." According to the laws of grammar, "This" ought to refer to the "mountain," immediately before it; but, instead of that, it goes back, across three periods, to the "height" mentioned four lines above.

On the same page he says: "That isolated rounded summit is Jebel Nebâ"; then, five lines after, a new paragraph begins: "As *this* is the highest point," etc. The reader naturally supposes "this" refers to the last summit mentioned; but, instead of that, subsequent statements prove that it refers to another, mentioned in still another paragraph, five lines above that one.

But it is more pleasant to dwell on the many excellencies of the work than on its blemishes. Among other additions to our previous knowledge is a description of the ruins on Mount Peor.⁵ These cover a space of four hundred feet by

¹ Identification of Pisgah, p. 29.

² p. 36.

³ p. 81.

⁴ p. 22.

⁵ pp. 56-65.

two hundred and fifty, and are evidently the remains of a temple and its surrounding buildings. Its pronaos fronted the east. The capitals of the pillars were unique. An inner court measured eighty feet by forty-three, and an outer one, one hundred and twenty-two by a hundred and five. Below the cloisters of the temple were cisterns, one of them cut in the rock; and the larger one, built underground, was forty-five and a half feet long by nineteen and a half feet broad, and upwards of twenty-three in height. We would have liked, however, a more thorough discrimination between the more recent erections and the ancient temple of Baal, such as can be made only after a thorough excavation of the ruins. We hope the American public will give the society the means for such satisfactory work. It may be somewhat costly and difficult; but it pays.

Prof. Paine says:¹ "Until it shall be otherwise proved, we are bound to attribute these walls to the house of Baal-peor." But Dr. Tristram says:² "I hold his Baal temples to be late Christian churches, and his antique capitals late Byzantine."

Then he describes four large stone discs; the largest, at Kūfāir 'Abî Bedd,³ ten feet in diameter and sixteen inches thick; and the smallest, on a conical hill on the border of Wātāt en Na'um,⁴ four feet four inches in diameter, and nine inches thick. The others were at Khirbet el-Quwāijiyeh,⁵ and Kharâb el-Mukhaiyât.⁶ All of them seem to have stood upright on their edges, and each with its flat sides facing the north and south, and its horizontal diameter east and west. Were these high places of Baal? and these stones connected with the worship of the sun? Prof. Paine raises these questions. Captain Warren, however, thinks them mill-stones;⁷ and Dr. Tristram calls them oil-presses.⁸ But Prof. Paine shows that they were not perforated for the insertion of axes of revolution, as would be necessary on these suppositions.

¹ Identification of Pisgah, p. 65.

² London Athenaeum, May 22, 1875.

³ Identification of Pisgah, p. 21.

⁴ p. 68.

⁵ p. 53.

⁶ p. 50.

⁷ London Athenaeum, May 8, 1875.

⁸ Ibid., May 22, 1875.

He gives an account of the "dolmens,"¹ or rude stone huts, found in Abarim, composed of four stones each — two standing upright for the sides, one closing the end, and another covering the whole, which is always the heaviest of all, from seven to ten feet in length and breadth, and from one to three in thickness, and associates them with the "Emim" of old; but how could even giants raise such stones five or six feet from the ground, and put them in place? These were first discovered by the Duc de Luynes, and an engraving of one of them is given by Dr. Tristram, in his *Land of Moab*.²

Mount Nebo, like every other part of Palestine, furnishes its quota of confirmation to scripture history. No vineyards now are found in that vicinity. So that sceptics may demand, How could Israel send messengers to Sihon, the Amorite king of Heshbon, saying, "Let me pass through thy land; we will not turn into the fields or into the vineyards"? But in the solid rock of the slopes of Nebâ³ a wine-press, ten feet long by seven and a half in width and two in depth, remains to testify that vineyards did exist when Israel passed this way.

An enthusiastic picture of the Ayûn Mûsa (springs of Moses) Ashdoth Pisgah fills four pages⁴ of the work. Eleven hundred feet below the summit of Jebel Nebâ, in a wild wady, whose precipitous sandstone sides present every hue of red, from pink to purple, the largest of them gurgles out from under a bed of stones 1570 feet above the sea. It first fills a rocky basin almost invisibly transparent, then plunges forty feet over a cliff. At the foot of that, a rocky rapid is followed by another fall, and a second cataract ends in a third leap of about the same distance as the others. After that, the diminished stream, like a frightened nymph, hides itself among the grass and verdure far below.

There is a beautiful description of the music of these waters, which we cannot forbear quoting:⁵ "From yonder second

¹ Identification of Pisgah, p. 52.

² p. 314.

³ Identification of Pisgah, p. 27.

⁴ pp. 46-50.

⁵ p. 33.

summit, the springs are in full sight a thousand feet down ; yet the streams conceal themselves in pure distance. Still, though the eye is eluded, the ear sometimes catches the music of their cascades. When the day is silent, one hears a low voice of song, which he hearkens, not to lose — a song of rapid notes, that varies in cadences from faint melodies to wild choruses of laughter. If its source were unknown, one might fancy the ruins haunted by their old divinities, whose voices still chant out of the invisible world. Once this music must have echoed within these walls with mysterious charm. Here was the very place for superstitious adoration of the powers of nature.”

The water is full of lime ; yet the springs are the life of the whole region. Every living thing, as far east (“westward,” on p. 49, is obviously a mistake) as the mountains of the desert, fifteen miles away, depends upon them, and has done so for four thousand years, as the ancient roads to them bear witness.

These first-fruits of our harvest beyond the Jordan only whet the appetite for more ; and when our men shall have become at home among the wild Bedawin, when, like their English co-laborers on the west, they shall be able to bring the things hidden beneath the surface out into the light, the Moabite stone may scarcely be missed from the abundant treasures that shall reward their toil.

Travellers have not intruded into this land of promise ; and its tented tribes have not needed to destroy ancient ruins to build the fragments into their rude walls, as the rough dwellers west of the Jordan have done for ages. Thirty years ago, when the writer visited ancient Tyre, Arab sailors were transporting its stones in their shakhtoors to build up Beirut ; and they do it still ; but these ruins are intact, and some of them may even furnish hospitable shelter to their explorers.

Surely a work like this, that supplants the apologetics of past ages with unanswerable confirmations of scripture narrative, and recovers precious treasures from ancient wrecks

in the lowest depths of history, will not be left to languish for lack of the paltry pittance needed to carry it on. The intelligent piety of our country will assuredly appreciate the work, and see that it wants for nothing that can make it more abundantly successful.

[NOTE. — In the citations made from different authors in the preceding Article, the orthography adopted by those authors has been designedly retained, although it differs from the orthography adopted in the main body of the Article. Hence arise the discrepancies which are seen in the method of spelling the proper names.]

ARTICLE VII.

TISCHENDORF.¹

BY CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY, LEIPZIG, GERMANY.

THE life of Tischendorf falls naturally into two parts, one of preparation, and one of work ; though the former shows work enough to have made the name and filled the days of a common man. Let us take a general glance at the years, and then follow them in detail.

I. *Preparation*: Twenty-nine years + (1815–1844).

1. Fourteen years + (1815–1829): home.
2. Fourteen years + (1829–1844): student-life.
 - (1.) Seven years + (1829–1836): studies.
 - (2.) Seven years + (1836–1844): first publications ; 1843, Doctor of Theology.

II. *Work*: Twenty-nine years + (1844–1873).

1. Fourteen years + (1844–1858): two eastern journeys; finds part of great Codex. Extraordinary and Ordinary Honorary Professor.
2. Fourteen years + (1859–1873): third eastern journey; finds larger part of Codex. Ordinary Professor. Applies the Codex to the text of the New Testament.

One year + (1873–1874): fatal illness.

I. PREPARATION.

1. *Home* (1815–1829).

Certain lands which once belonged directly to the German

¹ *Constantin Tischendorf* in seiner fünfundzwanzigjährigen schriftstellerischen Wirksamkeit. Literar-historische Skizze von Dr. Joh. Ernst Volbeding. Leip-VOL. XXXIII. No. 129.

emperor, and which, as ruled by a Voigt, or governor, in his name, were called the Voigtland or Vogtland, now form parts of various sovereignties. The southwest corner of the present kingdom of Saxony is one of these parts, and is called the Saxon Voigtland. It is a hilly country, with winding, bluff-edged streams, but has also open spaces. On broad, gently-sloping grounds, at the mouth of the Sulz valley, stands the town of Lengenfeld, about fifty-five English miles south of Leipzig.

At Lengenfeld, on the eighteenth of January, 1815, — the day named Felicitas, or happiness, in the calendar, — about forty days before Napoleon's return from Elba, a child was born, who proved destined to lead a career more successful than that of the Corsican — a career that shed no blood and destroyed no empire. The father, a Thuringian by birth, was the physician of the town, and as well physician and apothecary for the surrounding district. The mother was a descendant of Triller, who rescued the Saxon princes Ernst and Albert, stolen from Altenburg castle by Kunz of Kaufungen, 1455 A.D. Lobegott Friedrich Constantin Tischendorf was the ninth child of his parents. Shortly before the birth of the eighth child, the mother had seen a misshapen beggar; and in consequence, by the singular but not unknown effect of the impressions received by a woman with child, the infant appeared with a deformity like that of the beggar. As the zig: C. F. Fleischer. 1862. 8°. pp. vi, 98. This work was based on Tischendorf's own papers, and revised by him.

Beilage zur *Allgemeinen Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirchenzeitung*. 1874. Nr. 50. Leipzig, 11 December, coll. 1049–1051.

Am Sarge und Grabe des D. th. Constantin von Tischendorf gestorben am 7., bestattet am 10. Dec. 1874. Fünf Reden und Ansprachen, nebst einem Rückblick auf das Leben und einem Verzeichniss sämmtlicher Druckwerke des Verstorbenen. [Some are now, August 12, 1875, for sale at Hinrichs's store in Leipzig].

The late Professor Tischendorf. By Ezra Abbot, D.D., LL.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in the Divinity School of Harvard University. Reprinted from *The Unitarian Review and Religious Magazine*, for March, 1875. This contains an able, though brief discussion of Tischendorf's works. Probably no other American, and perhaps only Scrivener, Westcott, and Hort in England, can judge so well of Tischendorf's labors as Professor Abbot.

time of the next birth drew near, the mother saw a blind woman. Her alarm thereat, on remembering the former case, led her to pray most earnestly that the child in her womb might not at birth be found to be blind. When the new-born boy was seen to have good eyes, the mother regarded it as an answer to her prayers, and gave him, as his first name, Praise-God, or Lobegott. A further interest is lent to these circumstances by the fact that the child, as after life showed, had unusually good eyes, being able to see and distinguish clearly what others could not. It would seem as if the "direction of the intention" (not Jesuitical) of the mother to the eyes, had induced in the embryo an uncommon vigor and development in those organs.

The boy grew. His earlier training was received at the town-school of Lengenfeld, under the rectors Otto and Krause.

2. *Student Life* (1829–1844).

The gymnasium at Plauen, the chief town of the Voigtland, about ten miles southwest of Lengenfeld, prepared him for the university. Dölling and Pfretzschner were among the teachers. At Easter, 1834, aged nineteen, he entered the halls of Leipzig. The majority of German students wander from university to university, like so many journeymen, and in not a few cases lose half the force and value of their former drill by this rambling. Tischendorf, on the contrary, pursued his studies until graduation solely at one.

The hopes of his teachers, former and present, were not vain. The theological and philological professors at Leipzig were men well calculated to inspire and to urge on the bright student. Gottfried Hermann then led classical research; and Georg Benedict Winer, who had issued the first edition of his New Testament Grammar twelve years earlier (1822), pressed the grammatical and historical exposition of the scriptures. Seven years of student life, since he entered the school at Plauen, had been a time of quiet drinking in of knowledge and of patient mental drill. At the close of 1836, at Michaelmas, the theological faculty — Winzer, Winer,

Illgen, Grossmann, and Krehl — gave him a prize medal for an essay on "The Doctrine of the Apostle Paul as to the Value of Christ's Death as a Satisfaction." The faculty declared it to be "clearly and concisely written, with great diligence, fit knowledge of the subject, and sound judgment." This essay, published at Easter, 1837, opens the young writer's public work. A book of poetry at Christmas of the same year, and a novel two years later, showed a poetic faculty and a power of imagination which found little room in the dry work of his after life. The novel, written while teaching at the school of his after father-in-law, perhaps owed its life in a degree to the mild influences which were gradually weaving themselves into the threads of his destiny. Easter, 1838, awards him another medal, against seven competitors, on the subject: "Christ the Bread of Life; or, on John vi. 51-59." At the same time he took his doctor's degree, the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Master of Arts, which is the necessary precedent to the degree of Licentiate. Closing his work of teaching for Pastor Zehme, near Leipzig, Tischendorf made a short trip through southern Germany, Switzerland, and Strasburg, after which he returned to Leipzig, and began to prepare a critical hand-edition of the Greek New Testament. This was in October, 1839. In 1840, he habilitated as Licentiate and Privat-docent of Theology. We may again observe that, whereas many German privat-docents and professors rise chiefly by change of university, Tischendorf never left his Alma Mater, but rose from Privat-docent to Extraordinary Professor, to Ordinary Honorary Professor, and finally Ordinary Professor, the highest post in a German school.

Just at this point we find Tischendorf involved in a whirl of engagements or undertakings. As we have already said, he is busy at a critical edition of the New Testament; he offers and maintains his licentiate thesis; and, beside minor matters, is preparing scholastically and financially for a journey to Paris, to work at its library. Those who look at him from a distance are in danger of thinking him a man

always well supplied with means. The contrary was often the case; and a poor student may find in Tischendorf's troubles his own consolation, and in Tischendorf's success a pledge of his own. The theological faculty did their best for him; but who does not know the pecuniary position of a theological faculty? After long and almost despairing efforts, one hundred thalers (seventy-five dollars in gold) a year for two years were granted by the Saxon government. This, of course, was too little; so he insured himself in a Life Assurance Company, and secured a letter of credit for a few hundred dollars by leaving the insurance policy as a pledge. His edition of the New Testament appeared, dated 1841, and was received with the best acknowledgments. David Schulz of Breslau, the aged critic, wrote a long review of this edition, hailing it with joy, recognizing in it both good work and great promise, and urging Tischendorf to farther endeavors; saying that, in spite of the indifference of the present, "future generations would value and thankfully own his merit." The edition, fifteen hundred in number, was exhausted in eight years. The twenty-five year old licentiate left Leipzig for Paris on the eve of Reformation-day, 1840.

What thoughts may then have crowded his mind — what proud and ambitious thoughts — yes, and what misgiving and despairing thoughts! Yet his imagination can scarcely have conjured up either the extent of the work or the brilliance of the honors which from that date should engage his moments and reward his labors. At the same time, it is worthy of remark that at no period in his now opening career, in spite of his love of appreciation and his regards for honors bestowed, does he seem to have been so intoxicated by success as to have relaxed for an instant the ardor or the conscientiousness of his endeavors.

Paris. — The library at Paris contained a celebrated palimpsest. A manuscript of the Bible from the early fifth century had been cleaned off in the twelfth century, and used for writings of Ephraem Syrus. The result was such that Capperonier, once head of the library, is said to have

declared that no mortal could read the words of the New Testament; and Lachmann, ten years before 1840, wrote that a Parisian scholar could secure immortal fame by publishing this text. Tischendorf set at it, and read it, to the delight of everybody.¹ Meanwhile he also collated the Paris manuscripts of Philo for Professor Grossmann of Leipzig, and the only remaining manuscript of the sixtieth book of the *Basiliacas* for Dr. Heimbach at Jena. This was the bread-and-butter, or perhaps better, stage-and-car-fare work, meant to increase his funds so that he might visit all places containing manuscripts.

Firmin Didot, the publisher, bargained with Tischendorf for a re-issue of his Leipzig edition of the New Testament; and then Abbé Jager, a professor in the Sorbonne, begged him to edit a Greek text that should conform as nearly as possible to the Vulgate. The first he dedicated to the Protestant Guizot, the head of Louis Philippe's cabinet, and the second to Affre, the Archbishop of Paris. The two conditions of making the Catholic edition were, that they should never publish it without his own preface and his dedication of it to the archbishop, and that his other edition, with the Protestant dedication, should appear as above. The title and preface were, however, at a later date, so changed as to give the credit of the work to Jager, instead of to Tischendorf.

These successful labors secured for the young scholar the acquaintance and favor of Karl Hase, the keeper of the manuscripts at the library, of Letronne, Raoul Rochette, Mignet, Dübner, the orator and writer Coquerel, the archbishop Affre, Count Em. de Las Cases, Guizot, and Humboldt. Affre commended him to the pope, and Guizot gave him letters to the French ministers and consuls in every direction.

¹ Tischendorf was afterwards accused of having injured and blurred the manuscript by chemicals. He replied that the restoration by chemicals had been made by the librarians themselves, for Dr. Fleck, while he himself was a boy at Plauen gymnasium. The only unfortunate thing was, that neither Dr. Fleck nor anybody else but Tischendorf could read it after it had been restored.

As the preface to one of his Paris editions declares, he had determined to visit all the great libraries of Europe, to unearth the most ancient records of the New Testament text. During the stay at Paris he made two northern journeys. The autumn of 1841 found him in Holland, glancing at the manuscripts, and receiving marked attention from the Dutch professors; and at the end of the summer of 1842 he visited England, working in London, Cambridge, and Oxford. December of 1842 brought him the first copies of his edition of the Codex Ephraemi, — that is, of the New Testament fragments, — and opened the way for many tokens of distinction. Schulz, to whom we have already referred, caused the Breslau theological faculty to bestow on him the title of Doctor of Theology — a title of great worth in Germany, and rarely given to one so young.

Rome. — Leaving Paris in January, 1843, and working four weeks on the Codex E of the Gospels at Basel, — where DeWette showed him great kindness, — Tischendorf passed through Berne, Geneva, Lyons, Avignon (Carpentras), and Marseilles, to Rome; reaching it at the last of the carnival days. Italy kept him busy for more than a year, with the treasures of Rome, Naples, Florence, Venice, Modena, Milan, and Turin. At Rome he worked over the Y fragment of John, and inspected closely what is thought to be the oldest evangelistarium, both in the library of Prince Barberini; and he compared the uncial manuscript of the Acts and of Paul's Epistles from the ninth century (L), in the Angelica Library of the Augustine order. Of course, however, the library of the Vatican was the most interesting to him. Here he copied the sixth century fragment of Matthew (N), which is written in silver letters on purple. They also let him use the Codex S of the Gospels, and uncial codices of the Old Testament. This was all very well. But Tischendorf wished to get at the famous Vatican manuscript, which contained a large part of both Testaments. They told him that he could not see it. The pope, they said, would not allow it. Tischendorf worked around and about the point in every way imaginable, but to

no purpose. The recommendations with which he was so well supplied, by his own government, as well as by the French government and church, made him quite at liberty to use the Vatican library, except in regard to the biblical manuscripts. Let a man into the Dresden Gallery with permission to see everything but the Madonnas, meaning, especially, to forbid the Madonna di San Sisto! After several weeks Tischendorf asked to see the pope. The interview was granted; but the minister told the Saxon ambassador that nothing must be said about the Vatican manuscript. He went. The pope, reading aloud the letter from the archbishop of Paris brought by Tischendorf, chatted awhile about the criticism of the text, and the danger of exciting the opposition of theologians thereby. He showed his own position towards such work by bringing out an old Hebrew Bible, and telling of an unsuccessful attempt he had once made to have the Hebrew text of the Old Testament revised. Turning to Tischendorf's preface in the Paris Catholic edition, he expressed his satisfaction at the critical principles laid down. He noticed the statement therein that Tischendorf meant to search out all the treasures of the largest European libraries, and asked how far the work had advanced. This was a fair opening. Tischendorf replied that he had gotten all he wished in France, England, Holland, and Switzerland, but that the Roman manuscripts were still to be seen. The pope at once said that everything would be at his service. Tischendorf, in spite of the injunctions of the papal minister, said that he had been told that it was not possible for him to see the Vatican manuscript. The pope could not understand this, and went in person to the library the same day; only to find, however, that he could gain no more for Tischendorf than permission to use the manuscript three hours each day for two days, and to take a *fac-simile* of it—the first exact *fac-simile* thereof. The pope was not yet infallible. Of course, it was somewhat annoying to be kept from full use of the manuscript. Still, there was, as Tischendorf owned, a fair and good reason for it. He by no means shared in

the hue and cry of Germany against the restriction. As may be seen from the pope's attitude, the question of Romanism and Protestantism had nothing to do with the matter. It was a case between scholar and scholar. Any German, French, or English librarian would have done what the librarians of the Vatican did. Cardinal Mai was just publishing an edition of this manuscript, and showed Tischendorf five volumes ready printed — four of the Old Testament and one of the New Testament. These volumes of text were waiting for the Prolegomena, which he was too ill to write. Of course he had done the work as well as he could, and did not wish to see it in any way put in jeopardy by the immediate collation and revision of the manuscript by any one else. Hence he begged the pope's minister not to let Tischendorf use the manuscript freely. At the same time Mai and Tischendorf were, and remained, on good terms with each other. At a later date Mai answered, most kindly, questions which Tischendorf sent to him about certain readings of the Vatican manuscript. Twenty-four years later Tischendorf did succeed in making an edition of the New Testament part of this manuscript, though on meagre time.

Naples, Florence, Venice, Modena, Milan, and Turin, were visited. In the first three, as at Rome, he had much intercourse with Cobet, a noted Dutch philologist. In Milan he discovered the Revelation of St. Paul, supposed to be utterly lost long before.

Tischendorf completed his Italian researches, and was eager to visit the East. We have reached one of the turning points of his life. Entering the year 1844, we close the first twenty-nine years, the vestibule to his after career, and open the second twenty-nine years, which contain his greatest work as professor and palaeologist.

A single word more about Italy. He also paid attention to some modern manuscripts while there. They were sent to him by mail from Germany. They did not come from a library, but from the house of Pastor Zehme with whom he

had formerly taught. In short, Fräulein Zehme then agreed that in due time she would become his wife.

II. WORK (1844-1873).

1. (1844-1858.) *Finds part of great manuscript.*

The Sinaitic manuscript lends the chief brilliancy to the twenty-nine years upon which we now enter. In the first year thereof Tischendorf finds a bit of the manuscript. He then spends fourteen years wishing for, or trying to get the rest. These are the years of his extraordinary and ordinary honorary professorship.

The busy student has traversed the best European libraries, and seeks a new field. We have seen how he supported himself by side work, and by the editions of the New Testament. For the journey to the East he again needed the help of others. The Saxon government, the banker Seyfferheld at Frankfort, Favre Bertrand at Geneva, Kestner the Hanoverian agent at Rome, and David Schulz, the old professor at Breslau, supplied him with funds.

Leaving Livorno on the twelfth of March 1844, and delaying nine days at cosmopolitan and polyglot Malta, Tischendorf landed at Alexandria on the fourth of April. A Nile boat, sailing on Easter morning, carried him to Cairo within four days. At this time there was enough left of the old modes of travelling, whether by water or land, to fill the traveller's mind with wonder at their thoroughly Oriental character. Nine years later Tischendorf went from Alexandria to Cairo by steamer in from twenty-four to thirty hours, and in 1859 by car in, perhaps, ten hours, though it would only have taken five if the long stops had been left out.

Cairo.—The Catholic monastery at Cairo proved to have but a few manuscripts, and those of small value. The monastery of Mt. Sinai, the mother of the one really at the mountain, said it had no manuscripts at all. Tischendorf did not believe that. They showed him the book-cases and said he might look at the books as much as he pleased. After half an hour's hunting, the monks found the key to the

case, and he at once took down several manuscripts much to their surprise. "Manuscript? manuscript?" they cried. It was his first reward for disregarding the cry that there were no treasures still in the East. This monastery offered in the new discoveries, manuscripts from the eleventh century on. They were church books of various kinds, including five evangelistaria and eight copies of the Gospels. The patriarch's library was not so easily accessible. The Austrian general-consul knew the patriarch very well and thought he could manage the matter. They called. The patriarch put Tischendorf through an examination in reading and speaking Greek, and told him that he had not learned much yet. No reference to Tischendorf's former labors could persuade the patriarch that he knew anything about Greek that was worth mentioning. As for the Greek text of the New Testament, we had the "gospel" and the "apostle," and what could we wish for beyond? Anyhow the library was walled up! It was only after many efforts that, at last, the physician of one of the patriarch's officials succeeded in having the library opened and secured the use of eighteen manuscripts, which were alleged to be all it contained. These were, however, valuable. They dated from the tenth century on, and comprised various church books, saints' lives, homilies, commentaries, and evangelistaria.

It will be seen that we have left the region of exact librarians, and reached that of men who knew little or nothing about their chief treasures.

After looking at the Pyramids and the Sphinx, Tischendorf, on the 18th of April, went by way of Terraneh and Castello Cibara to the four Coptic monasteries of the Libyan desert; the scanty monuments of a former host of hundreds of monasteries which peopled this region. The libraries were in an isolated tower in the court-yard of each. Manuscripts lay on the floor, or packed in baskets, just as it happened. They were in general Coptic and Arabic, with a few Syriac and Aethiopic fragments. Pretty much all contained liturgical or scriptural books. In the fourth monastery Tisch-

endorf was amused by the oldest brother, who, whenever the conversation paused a moment, went over the forms and formulas of reception again; a hint for perplexed European or American hosts, — perhaps the forms of leave-taking would be better.

Tischendorf was in Cairo again on April 27th. He attempted one day to visit a Mohammedan book bazaar. The result was disagreeable. The instant he stopped at the stalls the merchants all around cried, "Shut up the booth, shut up the booth." He was not longer than necessary in getting out of the frowning crowd of Mohammed's followers who thought their Korans too sacred for him.

Sinai, 1844. — Camels were the conveyance for the desert then. On May 12th he started for Suez, and leaving it on the 16th, reached Sinai by the 24th. We cannot delay to tell of the old cloister or to discuss the questions which attach to the mountain itself, with the memory of the Law. This cloister gave shape to the rest of our traveller's life, for it was here that he found the great manuscript. Yet few in Europe knew it at the time, or for years afterwards. It was a secret. In his travels he says nothing of any special discovery here. But we must simply relate. As he examined the library, with its books and manuscripts on shelves around, he noticed, on the floor, a basket stuffed with bits of old manuscripts, and learned that a couple of basketfuls had already been thrown into the fire as useless. In this basket he found several bits which he recognized as belonging to an unusually old manuscript. The monks let him have one of the pieces, numbering forty-three leaves, and he commended the other parts to their careful charge, since they would not let him have them. These forty-three leaves were the Codex Friderico-Augustanus, as Tischendorf named it, in honor of the Saxon king. They contained parts of 1 Chronicles and 2 Esdras, the whole of Nehemiah and Esther, and parts of Tobit, Jeremiah, and Lamentations. At the same time the discoverer copied off a page of the part left behind. This page was for years the goad that urged him to secure

the rest of the precious codex. The first day of June saw him leave the hospitable monastery and start for Cairo. On the twenty-first the desert-ships bore him from Cairo toward Jerusalem, which he reached on the 8th of July, having come by way of El-Arish, Gaza, and Ramleh.

The sights and joys of his two-weeks stay at Jerusalem, with his excursions to Bethlehem and other points, may be imagined, not described. We are with Tischendorf, the manuscript-seeker. One point of these days must be touched. San Saba lies between the Dead Sea and Bethlehem. Our traveller went thither from the latter place. The fortress monastery did not appear at first to have very much of value in the way of manuscripts. They showed him about a hundred in a little room near the nave of the church. But that was not the end of the matter. They passed on to look at the chapel of St. John of Damascus, and inspected the gloomy room which contained hundreds of skulls. Tischendorf had expressed his surprise at the meagre library. The librarian said that there was another in the tower. Of course Tischendorf wanted to see it. That could not be. The custodian had gone off to Jerusalem that morning with the key. This story was worth little. The monks quarrelled among themselves and finally took the European to the tower. Really this was the better part of the library, and contained many patristic, church, and biblical manuscripts, from the eighth or ninth century on. In the case of an old uncial codex, a Greek evangelistarium of the ninth century or earlier, the monk who was with the traveller would not believe that the writing was Greek until he heard a few lines read. This specimen of ignorance was not the last thing in the visit. A heap of fragments of manuscripts lay in one corner, thrown out as good for nothing. The monks said that Tischendorf might pick out some of these as reminiscences of his visit. He made his choice and then they told him that he could not have them. They were glad to have the selection made, and keep it.

Leaving Jerusalem on the 22d of July, the scholar visited

Sichem. Here, among many valuable manuscripts, he found a Samaritan one which to all appearance dated back to the sixth century. Samaria, Nazareth (Tabor, Tiberias), Carmel, and St. Jean d'Acre, led him on to Beyrout. Taking ship on the 3d of August, he reached Smyrna on the 8th. Patmos, with its memories of St. John and with its fine library, demanded a call. Tischendorf pronounced it one of the richest libraries of the East. A Greek made a catalogue of it for him, at the request of the French consul at Athens, and he received it from the French minister at that capital. While on the island he examined each manuscript carefully. There were upwards of two hundred, from the eighth century on, biblical, church, and classical works. Among the Fathers, Basil the Great and John Chrysostom were best represented. He reached Smyrna again on the 16th of August, and left it on the 17th, the steamer arriving at Constantinople on the 19th. The manuscripts there, as far as accessible, were of no peculiar value. Tischendorf bade Constantinople good-by on September 8th, and reached Athens on the 28th, to spend a month.

Thus ended his first Eastern journey. He pursued his homeward way through Italy to Vienna and Munich. In Vienna the *Evangelium Palatinum* busied him awhile. This is a Latin manuscript, or a collection of fragments of a manuscript, containing originally the Gospels entire, but now lacking much of Matthew, a little of John and Luke, and almost all of Mark. The purple parchment and the character of the readings give it the appearance of a production of the fourth or fifth century. The writing is in silver and gold. His eyes gave out while working at the Bobbiensian fragments of the *Itala*. The university library at Munich offered him a Greek manuscript of the Gospels (X), perhaps of the ninth or tenth century, and the *Codex Ingolstadiensis*, one of the oldest manuscripts of the Vulgate. Spending Christmas at his birthplace in Lengenfeld, he arrived at Leipzig in January 1845.

In the course of his accounts of the journey just closed,

Tischendorf often refers to maidens with dark hair and dark eyes. It was in remembrance of one who was waiting for him at home. In the year of his return he published the first volume of his travels. This volume bears the dedication of the work: "To his beloved bride Angelica, presented on the wedding morning." They were married on the day on which the preface is dated, September 18, 1845.

We may pass over the next few years quite rapidly, leaving the close discussion of Tischendorf's various publications to those who are versed in his department. The Old Testament fragments of the Codex Ephraemi, in 1845, remind us again of his work in Paris. The Codex Friderico-Augustanus, published in an exquisite *fac-simile*, is the set of forty-three leaves found in the monastery at Mount Sinai. He naturally did not wish to tell where he had found this, since he expected to go back and buy or copy the rest of the fragments. Hence in the preface he merely says as to place: "These venerable leaves, before my late discovery of them among fragments of old manuscripts that had been cast aside and lost, seem always to have lain concealed in Egypt, or, at least, in the neighborhood of Egypt." The Monumenta Sacra Inedita display the fragments of seven New Testament manuscripts which the traveller had worked over in Paris, London, Vienna, and Rome, etc., or had brought from the East. The book of travels, in two volumes, both dated 1846, and not 1845 and 1846, as is usually said, give the popular view of his journey. Tischendorf's own copy, in two cunning little volumes, bound in red morocco and gold, is now at the writer's side. His Vienna studies return to us in the Evangelium Palatinum of 1847. The year 1849 carried him again to London, Paris, and Oxford. Aside from working over the Greek Apocrypha of the New Testament and some fragments from the Psalms, his chief aim was a new revision of his copy of the Codex Claromontanus. He had copied it in 1840, and revised it twice in that and the following year, but could not rest till he had made this third revision. A fully re-wrought edition of the Greek New Testament appeared in

1849, and was so well received that the edition of sixteen hundred copies was exhausted in seven years. His visit to Florence, on his Italian journey of 1843, now comes to light in an edition of the Codex Amiatinus, one of the oldest manuscripts of the Vulgate, dating from the close of the first half of the sixth century.¹ This he in a wise dedicated to the memory of Pope Gregory XVI., the one who had received him so kindly at Rome. The date of the edition of the Codex Amiatinus is also that of his Ordinary Honorary Professorship, 1850.

The same year unfolds to us the results of Tischendorf's researches in a new line. His name is by many attached almost exclusively to the New Testament. Yet the work he did upon the Greek translation of the Old Testament was also of great worth, and met with success. Ten years exhausted two editions of twelve hundred copies each. The fifth edition has just been issued, 1875. He used the Vatican text, applied his wide knowledge of the New Testament in the comparison of it with the Septuagint, and gave various readings and a full introduction. The book may be said to have gone into general use. He intended later to publish a critical edition of the text.

The next year, 1851, offers the first fruits of his work at still two other subjects, in both of which he proved himself a master, and continued to do service. On the one hand, he discussed the apocryphal Gospels in their origin and use, publishing also the apocryphal Acts of the Apostles; and on the other hand, he issued the first edition of his Synopsis of the Gospels.

Second Eastern Journey, 1853. — The edition of the Codex Claromontanus, in 1852, which he had in vain tried to arrange for in Oxford ten years earlier, now closed his European work for a brief space. Tischendorf has never for an instant

¹ Hamann, reviewing Tischendorf's *Biblia Sacra Latina* of 1873, in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1873, pp. 591-596, speaks of this Codex Amiatinus, and declares on p. 596: "The Codex Amiatinus springs, at the earliest, from the seventh century."

forgotten his darling manuscript at Sinai. He had written to the Egyptian viceroy's physician, and to the patriarch of Constantinople about it, but to no purpose. So in 1853 he again journeyed eastward, intending to copy the manuscript off, if he could not secure it bodily. Unfortunately, however, he did not even catch a glimpse of it this time at the convent, and concluded that it had been carried away to Europe. This annoyed him exceedingly. He determined to let the secret out, and claim the credit of having discovered said fragments, and of having saved them from being burned. This he did in the first volume of his *Monumenta Sacra Inedita, Nova Collectio*, in which he also published the page of Isaiah and Jeremiah which he had copied off in 1844. We shall see, nevertheless, that the manuscript was not laid aside in his mind. He could not give it up.

It is needless to follow him through this second Eastern journey, whose first aim we have thus described. Although he failed in that aim, he found much of value, including sixteen palimpsests. Among these and the other manuscripts were rich gifts for Greek, Syrian, Georgian, Arabic, and Jewish scholars, and several noted students set about working them up. Some of these went to the Bodleian Library at Oxford, some to the British Museum, some to the Leipzig University library, and the larger part to St. Petersburg in 1857. At the latter place an odd thing revealed itself. One of the Karaite manuscripts, a collection of poems, had lost eight leaves from the middle. Not long after a Karaite scholar, Firkowitsch, came thither with manuscripts he had collected. The eight leaves were among them! Tischendorf had bought his at Cairo, and Firkowitsch had gotten his at Jerusalem.

The stream of publications continued. He was also busy in the university. The next three years he used his holidays for journeys to libraries. In 1854 Wolfenbüttel in Brunswick, and Hamburg were the scenes of his work. London, Oxford, and Cambridge were visited in 1855. At the last named place the authorities were delighted with his discovery

of papers held to be lost. The celebrated scholar Bentley had made a second collation of the Codex Vaticanus, through Abbé Rulotta, at least Rulotta's collation is called Bentley's second collation, but no one could tell anything about it; even Tregelles in 1856 bewailing its fate. These papers Tischendorf found, recognized, and used. He spent the holidays of 1856 in Munich, St. Gallen, and Zürich. It will hardly be agreed that this manuscript work was a very healthful way of using holidays.

But we must still dwell upon 1855. Then appeared the first volume of his *Monumenta Sacra Inedita, Nova Collectio*, mentioned above. The name indicates a new collection, in distinction from his book of 1846, of fragments of the Bible which had not before been printed. It supplies the place of the manuscripts, and, like his editions of the larger manuscripts, places critical sources in the hands of the learned world in general. This unfortunately is one of the projects left unfinished at his death. He intended at first to have six volumes, but finally he made it nine—the seventh and the eighth being still unpublished. It should be added, in view of the name of the series, that volume seven is devoted to Chrysostom, whose writings are of great value for the criticism of the text, owing to their numerous quotations of scripture.

Simonides' Uranios.—The year 1856 witnessed a service done by Tischendorf's palaeographic knowledge. A sharp Greek named Simonides took up the manuscript trade, and tried to sell a palimpsest of *Uranios* and a few leaves of the *Shepherd of Hermas* to the Berlin Academy, through Professor Dindorf of Leipzig. The *Hermas* leaves were bought, and two thousand five hundred thalers, half of the price of the *Uranios*, had been paid. Professor Lykurgos of Athens sent word to Tischendorf that he considered both to be cheats made by Simonides. Tischendorf secured a view of them, and at once offered to prove in court that they were forgeries. Nobody would hear of it. At four P.M. on January 29th, he telegraphed to Alexander von Humboldt, and wrote to Boeckh

and Pertz. Humboldt gave the dispatch to the president of the Academy the same evening. Lepsius had by the 27th of January become suspicious, though he had paid the two thousand five hundred thalers, as above said, on the 11th. The Academy had a chemical and microscopical examination made on the 30th, and, in short, Simonides was arrested on February 1st in Leipzig.

This was followed by a contest about the text which Simonides had used for his *Hermas*. Tischendorf insisted at first that it was a text made by retranslation from the Latin; but after he found the part of *Hermas* in the Sinaitic manuscript, he at once said that the text used by Simonides was from the original Greek, though corrupted by use of the middle age Latin text.

The first sheets of his "seventh larger critical edition" of the Greek New Testament were issued early in 1856, and the last of its thirteen parts was published at Christmas 1858. This work surpassed all previous editions of the text, and is, perhaps, only less valuable than his eighth larger critical edition, of which we must speak later.

We have thus reached the close of the first fourteen years of his professional life, the third quarter of his whole life. In these years he has not only worked, but has also fixed the direction of his labors more definitely. Nothing of a new kind appears in the last fourteen years of his work. The bits of Philo in 1868 recall his work on Philo in his younger years, and his Defence of the Gospels is but a part of his text criticism. In the years gone by, he has been longing for the old manuscript which he had once seen. We now pass to his actual gaining of the treasure.

2. (1859-1873.) *Finds the larger part of the great manuscript.*

As early as the close of the year 1856, Tischendorf had sent a proposition to the Russian government to make an Eastern trip at their expense, under their protection, and for their advantage. In spite of the favor of princes, ministers, and scholars, the matter made little progress. It was

an odd mission to intrust to a foreigner and a Protestant. At last, as the Saxon government said it would help him again if need be, he wrote to St. Petersburg for a decided yes or no. The question was settled. In September 1858 he received the answer, yes; and was left to travel as he thought best, upon the funds granted.

Sinai, 1859. He started off on the 5th of January 1859, leaving Vienna on the 9th, and Trieste on the 11th, and landed in Alexandria on the 16th. Everywhere his eye met signs of the rapid advance in modern appliances since his former visits. Instead of five days by camel to Suez, he had only five or six hours, on January 23d. The camels then bore him to the monastery, reaching it at 10 A.M. on January 31st. The monks whom he had met before welcomed him heartily. There are three libraries. The smallest, on the ground-floor, has about one hundred printed books, on shelves. In the second story stands the library proper. Cyril, the monk from Athos, had been professor and librarian of the monastery for a number of years, and had made a catalogue of it. In all, there were about fifteen hundred books. Of these some five hundred were manuscripts, chiefly theological, in Greek, Arabic, Syriac, Armenian, Georgian, and Slavonic. The third library contained the priestly robes, the church vessels, and the lectionaries, liturgies, and patristic and biblical manuscripts. The most gorgeous was a gospel book for church reading. It was written in gold letters on beautiful white parchment, probably in the seventh or eighth century. Nothing, however, was to be seen of the one thing which Tischendorf wished for, and he regarded it as useless to ask for it. On the morning of February 4th, a servant was sent to the Bedouins to order the camels ready by the 7th. That afternoon the steward of the monastery guided Tischendorf on a short excursion. Returning at dusk, he asked the latter to come to his room for refreshments. While there, the steward brought from the corner of the room a manuscript wrapped up in a red cloth, saying that he had a Septuagint. The scholar at once recognized the fragments which he had

saved from the fire in 1844. His joy may be imagined. But better yet; he saw that they had added to the Old Testament fragments the whole of the New Testament, and the letter of Barnabas. The monks who stood about him could see, but could not understand, his delight. The steward allowed him to take it to his own room, to examine it more closely, and he there found that it also contained a part of the Shepherd of Hermas.

This was the decisive point for the rest of Tischendorf's life. The remaining fourteen years are occupied with the publication, the use, and the defence of this manuscript. Looking at it more closely, he found that its three hundred and forty-six leaves included twenty-two of the Old Testament prophetic, poetical, and apocryphal books, most of them complete, the whole New Testament, the letter of Barnabas complete, and the first part of the Shepherd of Hermas. Barnabas and Hermas, both held almost as canonical by the early church, were before this only unsatisfactorily known, partly by translations, and partly by late manuscripts of the original. Tischendorf therefore at once, that night, began to copy off Barnabas, and before leaving the monastery finished it and Hermas. It should be added, moreover, that this is the only complete manuscript of the New Testament of anything like such an age, both the Alexandrian and the Vatican being defective.

The question was, how to secure this prize. He knew they would not wish to sell it, so he told them he would like to copy it. There were no conveniences for that work in the monastery, and therefore he wished to take it to Cairo. All except the librarian, Vitalius, to whose library, the third, such books belonged, wished to let him have it. The prior, who alone could decide, had gone off to Cairo for the election of an archbishop, and might sail at once to Constantinople. Tischendorf left on the 7th, reached Cairo at midnight of the 13th, and saw the prior on the 14th early. The latter sent a sheik with a swift dromedary for the manuscript, and in nine days, on February 23d, it was in Cairo. Prior, vicar

and professor met at the Russian general consulate, and it was agreed that Tischendorf should have sets of eight leaves at a time, the manuscripts being made up of such sets, or quaternions. He worked at it for two months in the Hotel of the Pyramids. Two Germans, a physician and an apothecary, helped him copy, while he revised their work, and studied out the passages which had been corrected by various hands.

A young Englishman, who heard of the treasure, offered to buy it, but the prior said that the monastery would prefer to give it to the Russian emperor. Of course, that suited Tischendorf exactly. But the newly chosen archbishop could not give the manuscript away till he had been consecrated by the patriarch of Jerusalem, and acknowledged by the Porte and by the viceroy of Egypt, all of which would take three months. Accordingly Tischendorf set out for the Holy Land, leaving Alexandria on May 5th for Jaffa. His travels about Jerusalem and its neighborhood were made largely in company with the party of the Russian Grand Duke Constantine. At San Saba he found three palimpsests, and at the monastery of the Holy Cross others came to sight. They told him at San Saba that there was a wonderful manuscript at Laodicea; but it proved to be only an evangelistarium of, perhaps, the twelfth century. Reaching Smyrna on June 26th, he started for Patmos on the 29th, and arrived there on the evening of July 1st. The manuscripts kept him busy for eight days. Before leaving Smyrna for Patmos, he had looked at an eleventh century manuscript belonging to the Greek church in the former place. Fourteen days later, on his return to Smyrna, one of the officers of the church met him, and asked about a manuscript, which he showed him. It proved to be a Greek uncial manuscript of the Gospels, of the ninth century (*II*). Tischendorf wished to add it to the Russian collection. It belonged, however, to a rich private family, in which it had been for a century, and they would not sell it. At last the mother, who held it almost as a talisman, agreed to give it to the Russian emperor if her

darling son, then in England, would consent, and if the emperor would favor her son. Tischendorf went to Constantinople about the Cairo affairs, the Sinaitic manuscript, and the archbishop. Coming by Smyrna again on August 13th and 14th, word had arrived from the son, and the mother gave the manuscript to him. It is one of the ten uncial manuscripts of the Gospels which are nearly or quite complete, and its text is superior to that of most of the later uncials.

When Tischendorf left Cairo at the beginning of May they told him that they would be ready to give him the manuscript in three months, and therefore he returned before the end of July. But the archbishop's election had not been acknowledged by the patriarch, and everything stood still. So off he travelled again to Constantinople, only to find that he could do nothing there. At last a plan was hit upon and agreed to. He was to take the manuscript to St. Petersburg, and publish it. In case, however, the newly constituted authorities should not be willing to let the emperor have it, it was to be returned to the convent. Leaving Constantinople on the 22d of September he reached Cairo on the 27th. The next morning the assembled priors and brethren gave him the manuscript; on November 19th he laid it before the Emperor of Russia at Tsarskoe-Selo, and before the end of the year he had begun a typographical imitation of it.

This year, 1859, is the date of his full, or Ordinary Professorship, a special chair of sacred palaeography having been made for him. While the publication of the manuscript was progressing, in 1860, Tischendorf wrote an account of its projected issue, adding a list of the manuscripts he had brought from the East. In spite of the several other books published in the years 1860 and 1861, the Codex Sinaiticus appeared in 1862, a fitting mark for the twenty-fifth year of the editor's life as an author, and as well for the thousandth anniversary of the Russian empire. The Codex appeared in four folio volumes of the largest size. These contain full Prolegomena, a critical palaeographical commentary on the

corrected places, nineteen photo-lithographic *fac-similes*, to show how the text really stands, two other plates for comparison of the writing with *fac-similes* from the oldest known codices, and the manuscript itself printed off in type specially prepared for this work, so as to make it as like the original as possible. The emperor gave copies away to scholars, or institutions of learning, all over the Christian church.

After publishing his new Eastern travels in 1862, Tischendorf brought out in 1863 a hand-edition of the Codex Sinaiticus, and two pamphlets in defence of the Sinaitic manuscript, one in February and the other in August. The first opposed English and Russian attacks. Simonides, who still kept on with his manuscript forgeries and sales, came out in the Guardian with the announcement that he had, himself, written the Codex Sinaiticus. And Porphyrius Uspenski, a Russian archimandrite, charged the Codex Sinaiticus with heresy. In February 1863 Tischendorf answered these two with a storm of ridicule and sharp speeches. He reminded the manuscript forger of the facts which showed him to have been utterly ignorant of the manuscript before its discovery, and he not only charged the archimandrite with not having seen the book, but also made it plain that the alleged heresy found no hold in it at all. The second was against an anonymous writer in a church paper. The anonymous personage was furnished with dates, figures, and facts, generously seasoned with Tischendorf's too ready sarcasm, and finally the full quotation of Rev. iii. 17, 18, was commended to him, — a passage which, it was added, stood unchanged in the Sinaitic manuscript.

Having now gathered all the manuscript sources that seemed accessible, Tischendorf began the issue of what he intended in a certain sense, it is said, to be his final large critical edition of the New Testament, dating the first of the eleven parts October 1864. We shall speak of it again. The next year's visit to England gave him the homage of Oxford and Cambridge, the former creating him Doctor of Civil Law, and the latter Doctor of Laws.

A little book, however, published this year, 1865, did more to make his name known than a dozen degrees could. His previous popular works, namely, his two sets of travels — to pass by his youthful efforts — had no doctrinal aim, though they included some information as to his manuscript work. This book was professedly to teach about the Gospels. But we must get at it in due form. Since the time of Strauss's *Life of Christ*, in 1835, not to look earlier, there had been an almost constant war waged over the Gospels. The strife was still largely confined to professors and teachers, though Strauss had issued his *Life of Christ*, wrought over for the German nation, only the year before, 1864. In March 1865 Tischendorf struck in with a little book called, *When were our Gospels Written?* The edition of two thousand copies sold in three weeks, and a second came out in May. These were technical. But though the contest was chiefly among scholars, it had an effect on the people, which needed to be counteracted. A society in Zwickau asked him to make the book more popular, so that they could publish it. This he did; prefacing it with an account of his researches, and especially of the discovery of the Sinaitic manuscript. This introduction was dated August 1865. The little book, translated from one edition or the other, spread like wildfire. The sceptics, of course, attacked it with vigor. Tischendorf replied in an enlarged edition of 1866, aiming especially at Hilgenfeld and Volkmar, with his usual freedom in sarcasm and in the application of epithets. There were three French, three English and American,¹ two Swedish, and single Danish, Dutch, Italian, Russian, and Turkish translations.

¹ Tischendorf noted three in each country; but they were, perhaps, double editions of three translations. One is by Rev. Mr. Gage, who writes thus in the *Christian Union* of February 24th, 1875, touching a visit to Tischendorf: "The chief trophy which I brought away from that pleasant interview was the honor done me by his request that I should translate his work . . . ; which I have since then conscientiously fulfilled." Note this, and then turn to Professor Abbot's pamphlet cited at the head of this Article, and read the foot-note on pp. 16 and 17. The translation can hardly be too strongly condemned. Mr. Gage should, as a matter of honor to Tischendorf's memory, and as a means of retrieving his own character, beg the Tract Society to issue a revised edition of

We saw above that Tischendorf had tried in vain, during 1843, to gain full use of the Vatican manuscript. He visited Italy in 1866, and succeeded, at least, better than before. They let him work at it for forty-two hours, and in 1867 he issued the New Testament part much more correctly than Cardinal Mai had. Two pamphlets of 1869 and 1870 gave still further light as to this manuscript.

The Codex Sinaiticus had been taken to St. Petersburg in 1862. It was kept by the foreign office until 1869, when the monks of Sinai completed their part in the matter, and it was removed to the library. The latter year also, 1869, was the date of the imperial ukase, giving Tischendorf place in the hereditary nobility of Russia "in recognition of his great scientific merits and especially on behalf of Russia." One book of this year was a striking business success. Baron Tauchnitz asked Tischendorf to make a hand-edition of the English New Testament with various readings, to be the thousandth volume of the Tauchnitz collection of British authors. Forty-five thousand copies of this are said to have been sold in a single year.

Towards the close of 1872 the last of the eleven parts of the two volumes of the text of the "eighth larger critical edition" of the Greek New Testament appeared. The Prolegomena, to form a third volume, were still to be written. The text of this last great edition is liked by some, disliked by others. After all, Tischendorf's most worthy service is not in the actual text which he determined. He did more than pick out a text. In his Codices and Monumenta he put the records of the past into the hands of all who have access to ordinary libraries. And still more, in his seventh and eighth editions he gives the authorities with such fulness that

the book. His knowledge of German may be better now. If not, he should improve it, and then the translation. In a second Article in the Christian Union of March 17th, 1875, pp. 218, 219, the same writer says that Tischendorf's ninth edition of the New Testament "was not quite ready for publication," at his death. As an American lady remarked, it would have been nearly as pertinent to say that the tenth or fifteenth was not quite ready. The eighth edition was not complete at the time of the author's death, although the seventh had been issued fourteen years before, 1856-1859 (Christmas, 1858).

each scholar, sitting in his own study, may make his own decision as to the proper reading of any passage. He has put the tools and the stuff for text-making in our hands, and we may weave as we like, if his fabric does not please us.

But we near the end of the story. With 1873 we finish the second half of the scholar's life. The scholastic world is waiting anxiously for his new volumes. He himself means to go to the East again, and then to visit the meeting of the Evangelical Alliance at New York. All expectations fail. On the fifth of May, 1873, he is seized by apoplexy. He recovers somewhat from the attack, takes an interest in the newspapers and in things around him, visits the Teplitz baths, but gains no working power. In November 1874, the malady grew worse, a tri-weekly illness beginning. On the 7th of December 1874, he passed away.

The funeral services were held on the 10th. After part of a hymn, Pastor Ahlfeld spoke of the character and life of Tischendorf; Professor Kahnis said a few words of the friendship he had enjoyed with him. The service at the house ended with two more verses of the opening hymn. At the grave, a hymn by the celebrated Thomanerchor was followed by the motette, *Beati mortui*, "Blessed are the dead," by the University Singing Society 'Paulus,' whereon Professor Luthardt spoke of the labors of his deceased colleague, closing with the last farewell: *requiescas in pace et lux perpetua luceat tibi*, "Rest in peace, and perpetual light shine upon thee." A few words by Pastor Müller from Zwenkau, a hymn, and the blessing by Pastor Zehme of Briesnitz concluded the services.

Tischendorf was a man of uncommon quickness, keenness, energy, and ambition. A giant memory helped him in his work, and made him delightful in the home circle. Art and literature were the relief from his toil. His vigor and sprightliness, and the fresh, young look which he retained for some time after his youth was over, were so deceptive

that he was once taken to be a son of, and not actually, the famous and necessarily time-worn text-critic.

One side of his character should be emphasized. He was in many points as open as a child. What he thought, he said. Men counted him as, on the one hand, more vain and, on the other hand, more severe, perhaps, than one intimately acquainted with him would have granted. People came to see him, to hear of his great deeds, and he talked of them with all childish delight. He wrote of what he had done, and enjoyed the subject, and so did the world. While he flattered no one, he did not hesitate to praise when opportunity offered. And when he blamed anybody, he did it likewise with all his heart.

Unfortunately none of his sons follow in his line of studies. Paul Andreas, the eldest, after pursuing Oriental studies, entered the diplomatic service, and has for three years past been dragoman of the embassy of the German empire at Constantinople. The second son, Johannes, is a jurist, and the third, Immanuel, is studying medicine.

We have purposely passed over many of his books, or editions. They will be found in the list of his writings at the close of this number. Little has been said of his lectures at the university, because they were not his strong point. It was always agreed that he should have an unusual freedom in the duties of his chair, so as to pursue his more important work. He lectured upon New Testament Exegesis, Interpretation, and Criticism, on the Life of Jesus, on Knowledge of the East, on New Testament Introduction, and on the History of the New Testament Text.

Probably no theologian ever received so varied and so numerous signs of distinction, academic and civil. His extreme satisfaction in them was no proof that he did not deserve them. He was made a Russian noble, a Saxon privy-councillor, knight of many orders, doctor of all suitable degrees, and member of an indefinite number of societies.

It is as yet not possible to say just when, how, and to what extent, his unfinished works will be published or completed.

The only one already in hand is the third volume of his "eighth larger critical edition" of the Greek New Testament, which is to consist of the Prolegomena. Americans will be interested to learn that Professor Ezra Abbot of Harvard, entirely without his knowledge, was taken into serious consideration for the completion of this important work. National reasons and reasons of business convenience decided against that, as also the pressing engagements of the Professor mentioned would have decided. At last, Dr. Oscar Gebhardt was persuaded to take the material in hand. Hopes are cherished that he may so find his way into the work of Tischendorf as to be able to complete still other parts thereof, and give them to the public.

There are three pictures of Tischendorf. The first is an idealized portrait. We see the young student who has just won his laurels in reading the Parisian palimpsest. He is sitting in an antique arm-chair; at either side of the back sits on the chair-post a tiny carved figure; to our left, a bald-headed, long-bearded hermit, with a manuscript on his lap, but his gaze thrown upward in meditation; to our right, a cowed monk, who is reading intensely a huge old manuscript volume. The subject of the sketch, seated in the chair, is no unworthy companion of these ancients. A fine, oval face with high brow, large eyes, and almost smiling lips, is surrounded by bushy, curling hair. He is looking forward and upward, as if engaged in thought. A loose, rolling collar encircles his neck and contrasts its white with the fur collar of his study gown. A huge manuscript volume stands in his lap, his right arm curled around it below and his left hand holding it up by the middle of the top. This is just before his first Eastern journey and the finding of the Codex Frideric-Augustanus. The flush of Parisian successes urges him to try something greater.

The second is the Ordinary Professor; yet the picture calls up to our thoughts rather the man of the world than the student. He has trodden the halls, and received the honors of all Europe. The double chin, the full, firm mouth,

the short whiskers, the sharp eyes, the high forehead, and the slight baldness tell of a busy, well-to-do, and self-satisfied man. He has found the great manuscript, and he means to have it out in time, and to use it well.

The third picture is from the house of silence. The traveller has made his last journey; the scholar has read his last manuscript; the man has gone to rest. It is a delicate pencil-sketch, taken by Adolf Naumann, December 9th. On the pillow lies a calm face. The broad forehead seems still larger; the bright eyes are closed; we see the slightly aquiline nose, the full upper lip, and the double chin again. The locks, which in the former pictures seemed to press forward with a busy, bustling life, are now smoothed back by quiet sleep. It is the young man of Paris, but matured. His hopes on earth have been more than realized. He is now done with them.

It is a complaint of the present day in Germany that the age of great theological professors is long gone by. The student points back to Schleiermacher, Neander, and De Wette, and declares that there were giants in those days, but that pigmies now possess the land. We do not believe it at all. Perhaps a glance at Tischendorf's life will go far to dispel that illusion. He did not excel in the same points as the men named. Duties change with man and time. He proved, if you please, that a high position could be won in a new line of theological study.

If greatness consists in the unwearying pursuit of one idea, Tischendorf was great. If greatness consists in persistent and successful application to the study of difficult things, Tischendorf was great. If greatness consists in surmounting hinderances and prejudices, scholastic, religious, and national, Tischendorf was great. If greatness consists in the acquaintance with the use of, and the turning to general advantage of, the chief literary treasures of Europe and of the nearer East, Tischendorf was great. If greatness consists in earning the gratitude of the scholars of all lands, Tischendorf was great. And if greatness consists in a par-

ticipation alike in the favor of prince and scholar, of state and of church, Tischendorf was great.

THE WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR TISCHENDORF.

THE following list is the most complete yet made. There are probably a few unimportant articles not noted. The best list before was that in the pamphlet *Am Sarge und Grabe*. That has been corrected and variously enlarged. The owners of the J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung at Stuttgart, who control the *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), kindly forwarded at request a full list of the articles Tischendorf wrote for that journal. The *Jahrbücher der Literatur* (Wien), the *Serapeum*, the *Studien und Kritiken*, and the articles in the *Leipziger Repertorium der deutschen und ausländischen Literatur* as far as given, as well as most of the books proper, have been seen at first hand.

Abbreviations. *Leipz. Rep.* = *Leipziger Repertorium*; *Allg. Zeit. (A.)* = *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg); *Jahrbb. d. Lit.* = *Jahrbücher der Literatur* (Wien); one Thaler = .75 in gold, and one Neugroschen = .025.

1837. *Doctrina Pauli apostoli de vi mortis Christi satisfactoria.*

Commentatio a S. V. Theologorum Lips. ord. prae-mio regio ornata.

Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 8°. ff. 4, pp. 64. 10 Ngr.

1838. *Maiknospen* [Gedichte]. Leipzig: Kollmann. 8½ sheets. 1 Thlr.

1839. *Disputatio de Christo, pane vitae, sive de loco evang. Ioann.*

c. VI. vv. 51–59, coenae sacrae potissimum ratione habita. Praemio [Ammoniano] ornata. Lipsiae: Koehler. 8°. pp. 83 (1). 10 Ngr.

***Der junge Mystiker* oder die drei letzten Festzeiten aus seinem Leben.**

Eine biographische Skizze von Dr. Fritz [Pseudonym]. Leipzig: Köhler. 21½ sheets. 1 Thlr. 10 Ngr.

1840. *Die Geissler*, namentlich die grosse Geisselfahrt nach Strassburg im Jahre 1349. Frei nach dem Französischen [L. Schneegans].

Leipzig: Fritzsche. 6 sheets. 10 Ngr.

Dissertatio critica et exegetica de ev. Matth. c. xix. 16 et sqq.

Lipsiae: Koehler. 8°. pp. 20. 5 Ngr.

De recensionibus quas dicunt Novi Testamenti ratione potissimum habita Scholzii. Lipsiae: Koehler. Habilitation Essay, reprinted in the *Prolegomena* to the Greek Testament, the next book below.

1841. *Novum Testamentum Graece.* Textum ad fidem antiquorum

testium recens. brevem apparatus crit. una cum variis lectionibus Elzev., Knappii, Scholzii Lachmanni subjunxit argumenta et locos parallelos indicavit, commentationem isagogicam notatis propriis lectionibus edd. Steph. iii. atque Millianae, Matthaeianae, Griesbachianae praemisit A. F. C. T. Lipsiae: Koehler. sq. 16°. pp. lxxxv (1), 671, ff. 3. Two of the ff. 3 are a note written from Naples, on the Feast of John the Baptist, 1843, and added to this edition.

1842. N. T. Gr. Ad antiquos testes rec. lectionesque variantes Elz. Steph. Griesbachii notavit C.T. Paris: Didot. 8°. ff. 3, pp. iii-xxii, 534, 91. This is the Protestant edition.

N. T. Gr. et Lat. In antiquis testibus textum versionis vulgatæ Latinae indagavit lectionesque var. Steph. et Griesb. notavit V. S. V. Jager in consilium adhibito C. T. (Editio DD. Affre archiep. Parisiensi dicata.) Paris: Didot. 1842. 1. 8°. pp. (vi), ix, 411, 39. 3 Thlr. 10 Ngr. The Catholic edition.

Eadem editio sine textu Latino. Paris, 1842, etc. 8°. 1 Thlr.

Zur Kritik des Neuen Testaments. *Studien und Kritiken*, 1842. (H. 2), pp. 496-511.

1843. Codex Ephraemi Syri rescriptus sive Fragmenta utriusque Test. e cod. Gr. Paris. celeberrimo quinti ut videtur p. Chr. saeculi. 2 tomi. (Vol. ii. Fragmenta Novi Testamenti, 1843, Vol. i. Fr. Veteris Test. 1845.) Lipsiae: B. Tauchnitz. 4°. Vol. ii. 1843. ff. 4, pp. 44, 358. Plate. 18 Thlr.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1843. Nr. 261, Rom, 7 September; 261, Florenz, 10 September; 297, Romagna, 17 October.

1844. Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1844. Nr. 101, Malta, 25 März; 156, Kairo, 2 Mai; 192, Reise zum Sinai; 238, Wanderung nach Jerusalem; 272, Die Insel Patmos; 273, Von Jerusalem nach Nazareth; 276, Paliologischer Fund; 308, Wanderungen in Constantinopel; 310 (Nov. 5, 1844), Athen, 21 October. This is: *Zur Geschichte der Ministerien Maurokordatos und Kolettis*. 355, Tischendorf.

Neuer Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Textkritik, namentlich zu der dieselbe betreffenden Paläographie. (Mit Beigabe einer Notiz über die griechischen Psalmenpapyrus zu London.) *Studien und Kritiken*, 1844. (H. 2), pp. 471-496. Treats especially of Cod. E of the Gospels; see also pp. 487-489 on his ed. of the Cod. Ephraemi.

1845. Weihnachtspredigt. Bei seiner Heimkehr aus dem Morgenlande in seiner Vaterstadt Lengenfeld gehalten. Leipzig: Koehler. 8°. pp. 14.

Codex Ephraemi Syri rescriptus. Vol. i. Fragmenta Veteris Testamenti. ff. 4, pp. 11, 177. Plate. 9 Thlr. Vol. ii., the New Testament, was published in 1843; see above.

Rechenschaft über meine handschriftlichen Studien auf meiner wissenschaftlichen Reise von 1840-1844.

I. Die von mir aus dem Oriente im Original mitgebrachten Handschriften, in griechischer, syrischer, koptischer, arabischer, armenischer, äthiopischer, und arabisch-drusischer Sprache, pp. 1-15.

II. Die Bibliothek in Patmos, pp. 15-19. *Jahrb. d. Lit.*, Wien, Bd. cx. 1845, *Anzeiger-Blatt*, pp. 1-19.

III. Die Patriarchalbibliothek zu Kairo, pp. 25-30.

IV. Die Bibliothek des Sinaitenklosters zu Kairo, pp. 30-40. Anhang zum ersten Artikel (see I. above), pp. 40-42. *Jahrb. d. Lit.*, Bd. cxii. 1845, *Anz.-Blatt*, pp. 25-42.

1845. Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1845. Nr. 2, Besuch bei Mehmed Ali; 4, Jerusalem (these two were in the *Monatblättern*); 92, Leipzig, 15 März; 226, 227, Koptische Klöster; 342, Das heilige Grab.

1846. Reise in den Orient. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1846. B. Tauchnitz. 40 sheets. 3 Thlr. 15 Ngr. Eng. trans. by Shuckard, W. L. "Travels in the East." London, 1847. 8°. pp. xvi, 287.

Monumenta Sacra Inedita sive reliquiae antiquissimae textus Novi Test. Gr. ex novem plus mille annorum codicibus per Europam dispersis. Lipsiae: B. Tauchnitz. 4°. pp. 29 (1), 431. 3 Plates. 18 Thlr.

Codex Friderico-Augustanus sive Fragmenta Veteris Test. c. cod. Graeco omnium qui in Europa supersunt facile antiquissimo. In oriente detexit in patriam attulit ad modum codicis ed. C. T. Lipsiae: Koehler. Fol. pp. 23, ff. 43. 32 Thlr. This is the set of 43 leaves of the Codex Sinaiticus, which leaves were found in 1844.

Das feste christliche Herz mitten in den kirchlichen Bewegungen der Gegenwart. Predigt am 6. Trinitatissonntag 1846 in der Universitätskirche zu Leipzig gehalten. Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz. 8°. pp. 15.

Rechenschaft über meine, etc.

V. Die Bibliothek des St. Katharinenklosters am Fusse des Sinai. *Jahrbb. d. Lit.*, Bd. cxiv. 1856, *Anzeige-Blatt*, pp. 45–58.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1846. Nr. 3, Der Sinai; 15, Anglisches Bisthum in Jerusalem.

1847. De Israelitarum per mare rubrum transitu. Cum tabula. Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 8°. pp. 32. 10 Ngr.

Description of his *Mon. Sac. Ined.*, 1846, and of the above pamphlet. *Leipz. Rep.*, 6 Aug. 1847, Vol. xix. pp. 201–205.

Evangelium Palatinum ineditum sive Reliquiae textus evangeliorum Latini ante Hieron. versi ex cod. Palatino purpureo IV. vel V. p. Chr. saeculi. Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 4°. pp. xxvii, 456. Plate. 18 Thlr.

Rechenschaft über meine, etc.

Die griechischen Uncialcodices für den neutestamentlichen Text. *Jahrbb. d. Lit.*, Bd. cxvii. 1847, *Anzeige-Blatt*, pp. (1), 2–24.

Arbeiten über die alte lat. Uebersetzung des neuen Testaments.

1. Der Bobbienser Palimpsest auf der kaiserlichen Bibliothek zu Wien. pp. 36–43.

2. Die Bobbienser Evangelienfragmente zu Turin. pp. 43–56.

Jahrbb. d. Lit., Bd. cxx. 1847, *Anz.-Blatt*, pp. 36–56.

Nachricht vom vaticanischen Bibelcodex. *Studien und Kritiken*, 1847. (H. 1), pp. 129–152. Plate of *fac-similes*.

Die Manuscripta Tischendoriana in der Universitäts-Bibliothek zu Leipzig mit Einschluss der übrigen von Prof. Dr. Tischendorf von seiner orientalischen Reise mitgebrachten . . . Manuscripte, u. s. w. *Serapeum.* Zeitschrift für Bibliothekwissenschaft, Handschriftenkunde und ältere Literatur. Leipzig, 28 Feb. 1847, Nr. 4, pp. 49–61. 15 Mai, Nr. 5, pp. 65–78.

1847. Description of Vol. ii. of his *Reise in d. Orient: Leipziger Repertorium*, 20 Aug. 1847, Vol. xix. pp. 305-307.

Description of his *Evangelium Palatinum: Leipziger Repertorium*, 29 Oct. 1847, Vol. xx. pp. 161-164.

1848. *Rechenschaft über meine*, etc.

2. Die Bobbienser Ev.-Frag. zu Turin (continued). *Jahrbb. d. Lit.*, Wien, Bd. cxxi. 1848, *Anz.-Blatt*, pp. 50-72; Bd. cxxiii. 1848, *Anz.-Blatt*, pp. 40-46; Bd. cxxiv. 1848, *Anz.-Blatt*, pp. 1-8.

Review of Bornemann's *Acta Apostolorum*, etc. Grossenhain, 1848, and Muralto's edit. of Greek N. T. Hamburg, 1846. *Leipziger Repertorium*, 8 Sept. 1848, Vol. xxiii. pp. 305-310.

Review of Tregelles's *The Book of Revelation*, in Greek, etc. London, 1844. *Leipziger Repertorium*, 29 Sept. 1848, Vol. xxiii. pp. 405-409.

1849. N. T. Gr. Ad antiquos testes rec. appar. crit. multis modis auctum et correctum appos. etc. C.T. Editio Lips. secunda. Winter (Koehler). 8°. pp. xvi, 768. 2 Thlr. 20 Ngr.

Der Geist der Wahrheit. Zeitpredigt am Sonntag Cantate den 6. Mai, 1849, zu Leipzig gehalten. Leipzig: Winter. 8°. pp. 16.

Rechenschaft über meine, etc.

2. Die Bobbienser Ev.-Frag. zu Turin (continued). *Jahrbb. d. Lit.*, Wien, Bd. cxxvi. 1849, *Anz.-Blatt*, pp. 1-71.

3. Das *Evangelium Palatinum.* *Ibid.*, pp. 72-76.

Review of Schwartz's *Quatuor Evangelia in dialecto linguae Copticae Memphitica*, Leipzig, 1846-47. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1849, Vol. xxv. pp. 6-10.

1850. N. T. Gr. Rec. C. T. Lipsiae: B. Tauchnitz. pp. xix, 412. 27 Ngr. Ed. 2, 1862. pp. xxvi, 412. Ed. 3, 1873. 8°. pp. xxx, 437.

Vetus Test. Graece juxta LXX interpretes. Textum Vat. Romanum emendatius edidit, arg. et locos Novi Test. parall. notavit, omnem lectionis varietatem codd. vetustiss. Alexandrini, Ephraemi Syri, Friderico-Augustani subjunxit, comm. isagog. praetexit C.T. 2 tomi Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 8°. pp. lx, 682, 588 (2). Ed. 2, prolegomenis et epilogom. [i.e. Daniel sec. LXX.] instruxit. 1856. pp. xciv, 682, 616 (2). Ed. 3, ratione etiam habita thesauri Sinaitici nuper inventi et editionis Maianae codicis Vaticani. 1860. Ed. 4, identidem emendata, prolegom. passimque etiam comm. ex cod. Sin. aliisque auctis. 1869. pp. cxii, 682, ff. 2, 616. 4 Thlr. Ed. 5, 1875.

Codex Amiatinus sive N. T. Latine interprete Hieronymo. Ex celeberrimo cod. Amiat. omnium et antiquissimo et praestantissimo nunc primum ed. C. T. Lipsiae: Avenarius et Mendelssohn. 6 Thlr. Ed. repetita 1854. 4°. pp. xlvii, 421. Plate. 4 Thlr.

Description of his *N.T. Graece*, 1849. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1850, Vol. xxx. pp. 1-10; and review of Alford's *Gr. Test.* Vol. i. 1849. *Ibid.* pp. 10-14.

Review of first number of *Magazijn voor Kritiek en Exegetiek des Nieuwen Testaments.* 1850. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1850, Vol. xxxii. pp. 67-69.

1850. Description of his *V. T. Graece juxta LXX interpretes*, 1850. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1850, Vol. xxxii. pp. 233–239, 239–241.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1850. Nr. 31, Nitrische Bibliothek.

Mezzofante. *Blätter für literarische Unterhaltung*, Nr. 176, Leipzig, 24 July, 1850, pp. 703–704, signed “35.”

1851. *De evangeliorum apocryphorum origine et usu.* Disquisitio historico-critica, quam praemio aureo dignam censuit societas Hagana pro defendenda religione Christiana. Hagae Comitum. 8°. pp. xii, 227. 1 Thlr. 5 Ngr.

Acta apostolorum apocrypha. Ex triginta antiquis codd. Gr. vel nunc primum eruit vel secundum atque emendatius ed. C. T. Lipsiae: Avenarius et Mendelssohn. 8°. pp. lxxx, 276. 2 Thlr. 20 Ngr.

Synopsis evangelica. Ex quattuor evangeliis ordine chronologico concinnavit, brevi commentario illustravit, ad antiquos testes denuo rec. C. T. Lipsiae: Avenarius et Mendelssohn. 8°. pp. lxvi, 202. 1 Thlr. 10 Ngr. Ed. repet. 1854. Ed. 2, emend. 1864. pp. lx, 184. Ed. 3, emend. 1871. pp. lx, 184. Translated into Tamulisch by Schanz, H. Tranguebas, 1868.

Description of his *N. T. Latine interprete Hieronymo*, 1850. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1851, Vol. xxxiii. pp. 1–9.

Review of Lücke's Versuch einer vollständigen Einleitung in die Offenbarung des Johannes und die apokalyptische Literatur überhaupt. 2^{te} Aufl. 1^{te} Lief. Bonn, 1848. *Studien und Kritiken*, 1851, pp. 419–456.

Notice of his *Synopsis evangelica*, 1851, and of Ebrard's *Wiss. Krit. d. evang. Geschichte*, 1850. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1851, Vol. xxxiv. pp. 171–176.

Review of Goodwin's *Anglo-Saxon Legends of St. Andrew and St. Veronica*. London, 1851. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1851, Vol. xxxvi. pp. 117–119.

1852. *Codex Claromontanus sive Epistulae Pauli omnes Gr. et Lat. ex cod. Paris. celeberrimo nomine Claromontano plerumque dicto.* Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 4°. pp. xl, 599. 2 Plates. 24 Thlr.

Description of his *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*, 1851. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1852, Vol. xxxvii. pp. 5–9.

1853. *Evangelia Apocrypha.* Adhibitis plurimis codicibus Graecis et Latinis maximam in partem nunc primum consultis atque ineditorum copia insignibus edidit C. T. Lipsiae: Avenarius et Mendelssohn. 8°. pp. lxxxviii, 463. 3 Thlr. 20 Ngr.

Description of his *Codex Claromontanus*, 1852; and review of Hofmann's *Leben Jesu nach den Apokryphen*, Leipzig, 1851. *Leipz. Rep.*, 1853, Vol. xli. pp. 129–134.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1853. Nr. 114, Cairo.

1854. *N. T. triglottum Gr. Lat. Germanice Graecum textum addito lectionum var. delectu rec. Latinum Hieronymi notata Clementina lectione ex auctoritate codd. restit. Germanicum ad pristinam Lutheranae ed. veritatem revocavit A. F. C. T.* Lipsiae: Mendelssohn. ff. 2, coll. cxxvi, pp. 930. 2 Thlr. Ed. 2 (cum triplici tab. terrae sanctae), 1865.

- 1854.** Description of his *Evangelia Apocrypha*, and of *De evangeliorum apoc. origine et usu*. Leipzig. Rep., 1854, Vol. xlv. pp. 257-263.
- 1855.** N. T. Graece. Editio academica. Lipsiae: Mendelssohn. 16°. 1855, pp. lxii, 930; 1857 (1858), 1861, 1864, pp. lxxv, 930; 1867, pp. lxxvi, 930; 1870, 1873, pp. lxxii, 930; 1875. Since 1864, cum duplici tabula terrae sanctae.
- Das Neue Testament. Deutsch von Dr. Martin Luther.** Nach den Originalausgaben revidirt und bevorwortet. Leipzig: Mendelssohn. 16°. pp. xxvi, 930. 20 Ngr. From the N. T. triglottum.
- Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova Collectio. Vol. i.** Fragmenta sacra palimpsesta sive fragmenta cum Novi tum Veteris Testam. ex quinque codicibus Graecis palimpsestis antiquissimis nuperrime in oriente repertis. Addita sunt fragmenta Psalmorum papyracea et fragmenta evangelistariorum palimpsesta, item fragmenta codicis Friderico-Augustani. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 4°. pp. xlviii, 278. 3 Plates. 10 Thlr.
- Pilati circa Christum iudicio** quid lucis afferatur ex Actis Pilati. Lipsiae: Winter. 8°. pp. 30 (1). 10 Ngr.
- Von der Wohlthat Christi.** Das hochberühmte Römische Zeugniß aus dem Zeitalter der Reformation für die Rechtfertigung aus dem Glauben. Nach vermeintlicher gänzlicher Vernichtung neulichst zu Cambridge wieder aufgefunden. Unter Anfügung des italienischen Originaltext in's Deutsche übertragen und bevorwortet von einem evangelischen Doctor der Theologie. Leipzig: Dörffling und Franke. 1855. pp. xxxii, 87, 75. Without the Italian text. 1855. pp. xxxii, 87. New revised edition, 1856. pp. xxxii, 88. Fifth revised edition, 1856. pp. xxxii, 86. Sixth revised edition, 1857. pp. xxxvi, 86. The second edition translated into Swedish by Bishop Hedren.
- Anecdota Sacra et Profana** ex oriente et occidente allata, sive Notitia codicum Gr., Arab., Syriac., Copt., Hebr., Aethiop., Latin., cum excerptis multis maximam partem Graecis et 35 scripturarum antiquissimarum speciminibus [ed. 2, exemplis]. Lipsiae: Graul. 4°. pp. xvi, 240 (2). 4 Plates. 8 Thlr. Editio repetita, emendata, aucta. Lipsiae: Fries. 1861. 6 Thlr.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1855. Nr. 278, Wohlthat Christi; 279, Der Vaticanische Bibelhandschrift und eine Audienz bei Gregor XVI. 6 Oct. pp. 4457-4459; 352, Aegyptischer Fund; 353, Wendt's Atlas.
- 1856.** **Hermae Pastor Graece**, ex fragmentis Lipsiensibus instituta quaestione de vero Graeci textus Lipsiensis fonte. A part of Patrum apostol. opera edit. Dressel. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 8°. pp. xvi, 66.
- Beilagen** to Alex. Lykurgos's Enthüllungen über den Simonides-Dindorfischen Uranios, 2° Aufl. Leipzig, 1856, pp. 67-85.
- Literarisches Centralblatt**, Nr. 20, 1856, 17 Mai, coll. 323, 324. A few lines against Professor Lepsius, about the Uranios contest. Dated Leipzig, 10 May, 1856.

1856. Neue documentliche Schriftforschungen auf deutschen und englischen Bibliotheken. *Deutsche Zeitschr. für christl. Wissenschaft*, 1856. Nr. 2, 3.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1856. Nr. 46, 75, Leipzig; 120, Simonides; 248, Hirt des Hermas (3 Sept. p. 3964); 253, München; 312, Leipzig; 334, s' Norddeutschland.

1857. Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova Collectio. Vol. ii. Fragmenta evangelii Lucae et libri Genesis ex tribus codicibus Graecis V. VI. VIII. saeculi uno palimpsesto ex Libya in Museum Britannicum advecto, altero celeberrimo Cottoniano ex flammis erepto, tertio ex Oriente nuperrime Oxonium perlato. Addita sunt et Novi et Veteris Testam. fragmenta similia nuperrime in codicum sex antiquiss. reliquiis inventa. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 4°. pp. xlvii, 322. Plate. 16 Thlr.

Drei wissenschaftliche Ferienreisen mit einem Rückblick auf frühere Reiseforschungen. *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, 21 März, 1857. Nr. 12, coll. 257–266. Also in the *Allg. Zeit. (A.)* 1857. Nr. 10.

Description of his *Anecdota sacra et profana*, 1855. *Leipziger Repertorium*, 1857, Vol. lviii. pp. 129–138.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1857. Nr. 10, Drei Ferienreisen; 100, Oikonomos; 188, Grossmann; 225, Leipzig; 241, Russland; 265, s' Sachsen; 281, Leipzig.

1858. N. T. Gr. et Lat. Ex triglottis. Lipsiae: Mendelssohn. 16°. 1 Thlr. 10 Ngr.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1858. Nr. 28, Leipzig; 99, Mai's Bibelwerk; 113, Bunsen's Bibelwerk; 123, 's Sachsen; 143, Winer; 190, 205, Leipzig.

1859. N. T. Gr. Ad antiquos testes denuo rec. appar. crit. omni studio perfectum appos. comment. isag. praetexuit A. F. C. T. Editio septima critica maior. Lipsiae: Winter (Hinrichs?). 8°. pp. cclxxviii (2), 696 (1), 681 (2). 8 Thlr. 10 Ngr. Accessit anno 1860 Notitia codicis Sinaitici, pp. xvi.

N. T. Gr. Editio septima critica minor. Lipsiae: Winter. 8°. pp. cxxxviii (2), 422; (1), 473.

Letter from Cairo, March 15th, to the Minister Von Falkenstein about the Codex Sinaiticus. *Leipziger Zeitung, Wissenschaftliche Beilage*, 1859. Nr. 31, April.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1859. Nr. 10, Dresden; 110, Tischendorfsche Auffindungen; 165, Jerusalem; 291, Trieste; 350, St. Petersburg.

1860. Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova Collectio. Vol. iii. Fragmenta Origenianae Octateuchi editionis cum fragmentis evangeliorum Graecis palimpsestis ex codice Leidensi folioque Petropol. quarti vel quinti, Guelferbyitano codice quinti, Sangallensi octavi fere saeculi. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 4°. pp. xl, 300. 2 Plates. 16 Thlr.

- 1860. Notitia editionis codicis Bibliorum Sinaitici** auspiciis imperatoris Alexandri II. susceptae. Accedit catalogus codicum nuper ex oriente Petropolin perlatorum, item Origenis scholia in Proverbia Salomonis partim nunc primum partim secundum atque emendatius edita. Lipsiae: Brockhaus 4°. pp. 124. 2 Plates. 3 Thlr. 10 Ngr.
- Nachricht** von der im Auftrage seiner kaiserlichen Majestät Alexander II. unternommenen Herausgabe der Sinaitischen Handschrift .Leipzig: Giesecke und Devrient. 8°. pp. 33. Printed as manuscript, taken from preceding book. Dated, August, 1860.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1860. Nr. 11, Bibelhandschriften; 166, Lage der Geisten.
- 1861. Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1861. Nr. 28, Leipzig; 35, Mission; 154, St. Petersburg; 311, Codex Zacynthius.
- 1862. Aus dem heiligen Lande.** Mit 5 Holzschn. und 1 lithogr. Tafel. Leipzig: Brockhaus. pp. x (1), 375. 2 Thlr. 10 Ngr. French translation: *Terre Sainte*. Paris, 1868. ff. 2, pp. 312. Also a Swedish translation.
- Bibliorum Codex Sinaiticus Petropolitanus.** Auspiciis augustissimis imper. Alexandri II. ex tenebris protraxit in Europam transtulit ad iuvandas atque illustrandas sacras litteras ed. C. T. 4 voll. folio. Petropoli (Lipsiae: Giesecke et Devrient). 21 Plates. 230, later 175 Thlr.
- Vorworte zur Sinaitischen Bibelhandschrift.** Als Manuscript gedruckt. Leipzig: Giesecke und Devrient. 4°. pp. 51.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1862. Nr. 290, Warschau; 356, Codex Sinaiticus.
- 1863. N. T. Sinaiticum sive N. T. cum epistula Barnabae et fragmentis Pastoris.** Ex codice Sin. accurate descripsit A. F. C. T. Lipsiae: Brockhaus. pp. lxxxi (1), ff. 148. Plate. 6 Thlr.
- Die Anfechtungen der Sinaibibel.** Feb. 16, 1863. Leipzig: Fleischer. pp. 24. 5 Ngr.
- Waffen der Finsternisz wider die Sinaibibel.** Leipzig: Winter. pp. 30. 5 Ngr.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1863. Nr. 195, Leipzig.
- 1864. N. T. Graece et Germanice.** Ex triglottis. Cum duplici tabula terrae sanctae. Lipsiae: Mendelssohn. 16°. pp. lxxv, xxvi, ff. 930, in two vols. 1 Thlr. 10 Ngr.
- N. T. Latine.** Textum Hieronymi notata Clementina lectione ex auctoritate antiquiss. codicum restituit C. T. Lipsiae: Mendelssohn. 16°. pp. lxxv, 930. 20 Ngr. From the N. T. triglottum.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1864. Nr. 149, St. Petersburg; 256, 257, Warschauer Erinnerungen; 296, Berlin.
- Review** of Sabas, Specimina palaeographica codd. Gr. et Slav. biblioth. Mosq. Synodalis, 1863. *Literarisches Centralblatt*, 1864, Nr. 23, coll. 548-550.

- 1864. Berichtigung.** *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1864. (vii.), pp. 202–210. A reply to Hilgenfeld in the same volume (vii.), pp. 74–82, and in turn answered by Hilgenfeld, pp. 211–219.
- 1865. N. T. Gr. Ex Sinaitico codice** omnium antiquissimo Vaticana itemque Elzeviriana lectione notata ed. C. T. Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 8°. pp. lxxxix, 616 (1). Plate. 4 Thlr.
- Memoir** on the Discovery and Antiquity of the Codex Sinaiticus by C. T. Read at a Meeting of the Royal Society of Literature, Feb. 15, 1865. 8°. pp. 26. 2 Plates. (In French).
- Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova Collectio. Vol. v. Epistolae Pauli et catholicae** ex libro Porphyrii episcopi palimpsesto, etc. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 4°. pp. xxiii, 364. Plate. 16 Thlr.
- Wann wurden unsere Evangelien verfasst?** Leipzig: Hinrichs. 1. und 2. Aufl. 1865. Popular edition, 1865, pp. 64. 4. Aufl. Juli, 1866. 8°. pp. xv (1), 130. 15 Ngr. Three French, English, and American translations, two Swedish, and one each of Danish, Dutch, Italian, Russian, and Turkish.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1865. Nr. 1, Leipzig; 62, 77, 82, London; 106, Bibelübersetzungen; 138, Leipzig; 146, Entgegnung.
- 1866. Apocalypses apocryphae** Mosis, Esdrae, Pauli, Iohannis, item Mariae dormitio additis evangeliorum et actuum apocryphorum supplementis. Maximam partem nunc primum ed. C. T. Lipsiae: Mendelssohn. 8°. pp. lxiv, 172. 1 Thlr. 10 Ngr.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1866. Nr. 28, Leipzig; 147, Ulfilas Fragmente; 272, Leipzig.
- Ueber die Vaticanische Bibel** und meine Reise nach Rom. *Leipziger Zeitung*, 1866, Nr. 43, *Wissensch. Beilage*, pp. 189–192.
- 1867. N. T. Vaticanum.** Post Angeli Maii aliorumque imperfectos labores ex ipso codice ed. C. T. Lipsiae: Giesecke et Devrient. 4°. pp. l, 284. Plate. 4 Thlr. 20 Ngr.
- Appendix codicum celeberrimorum** Sinaitici Vaticani Alexandrini. Lipsiae: Giesecke et Devrient. 4°. pp. xx, 52. Plate.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1867. Nr. 182, Leipzig; 210, 211, Codex Vaticanus; 273, Sächsisch. Min. Präs.; 278, Leipzig.
- 1868. Philonea inedita altera**, altera nunc demum recte ex vetere scriptura eruta. Lipsiae: Giesecke et Devrient. 8°. pp. xx, 155. 2 Plates. 2 Thlr.
- Allg. Zeit. (A.)** 1868. Nr. 23, Leipzig; 57, Novum Testamentum; 327, Ueber Schleiermacher; 334, Zur Schleiermacher Feier.
- 1869. Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova Collectio. Vol. vi. Apocalypsis et Actus Apostolorum** cum quarti Maccabaeorum libri fragmento, item quattuor evangeliorum reliquiae. Ex duobus codd. palimps. octi. fere et sexti saec. altero Porphyrii episcopi, altero Guelferbytano. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 4°. pp. xvii, f. 1, pp. 340. Plate. 16 Thlr.

1869. N. T. Gr. Ad antiquiss. testes denuo rec. apparatus crit. omni studio perfectum apposuit commentat. isagog. praetexit C.T. Editio viii. critica maior. Vol. i. [Ev.] 1869. pp. 968. 6 Thlr. 5 Gr. Vol. ii. [Act.—Apoc.] 1872. pp. 1044. Lipsiae: Giesecke et Devrient. The temporary preface and "Notantur interim," are in Vol. i. pp. xx, Vol. ii. pp. (3). In a list of his writings made after he was sick, the statement was made "Vol. iii., Prolegomena, appears in the summer of 1874." Dr. Oscar Gebhardt is now working at these Prolegomena (August, 1875).

The New Testament. The authorised English Version; with Introduction, and various Readings from the three most celebrated Manuscripts of the original Greek Text. Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz. sq. 16°. pp. xvi, 414 (1). Plate. (Published at Christmas, 1868). 16 Ngr. 45,000 copies sold in the first year.

Die Aechtheit unserer Evangelien. Vortrag zu Bremen gehalten. Gotha: Perthes. pp. 28. English translation: "Are our Gospels Genuine, or not?" By T. J. Ormerod, Norwich, Eng., 1869. 8°. pp. 28.

Appendix Novi Testam. Vaticani. Inest Apocalypsis ex cod. unciali Vatic. 2066. cum supplementis et emendationibus N. T. Vaticani. Item illustratur editio cod. Vat. Romana nuperrima. Lipsiae: Giesecke et Devrient. 4°. pp. xviii, 20. 15 Ngr.

Conlatio critica cod. Sin. cum textu Elzeviriano, Vatic. quoque cod. ratione habita. Lipsiae: Mendelssohn. pp. xxii, 109. 15 Ngr.

Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova Collectio. Vol. iv. Psalterium Turicense purpureum septimi fere saeculi addito Danihelis libro ex cod. Prophetarum Marchaliano nunc Vaticano VI. vel VII. saeculi. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 4°. pp. xxiii, 296. Plate. 16 Thlr.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1869. Nr. 178, Leipzig; 346, Mariendogma.

1870. Responsa ad calumnias Romanas. Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 8°. pp. 54. 10 Ngr. Dated Oct. 31, 1869. It will be noticed that this is the Reformation Anniversary.

Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova Collectio. Vol. ix. Codex Laudianus sive Actus Apostolorum Gr. et Lat. ex cod. olim Laudiano iam Bodleiano sexti fere saeculi. Addita sunt nonnulla ex celebri cod. Prophetarum Marchaliano Vaticano. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 4°. pp. xxxiv (1), 248. Plate. 16 Thlr.

1871. Die Sinaibibel. Ihre Entdeckung, Herausgabe und Erwerbung. Nebst 2 Tafeln. Leipzig: Giesecke und Devrient. 8°. ff. 2, pp. 93. 24 Ngr.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1871. Nr. 191, 192, Synode.

1872. Die evangel. Alliance-Deputation an Kaiser Alexander zu Friedrichshafen. Zur Abwehr der groben Entstellungen und Verleumdungen des Herrn v. Wurstenberger. Leipzig: Brockhaus. pp. x, 40. 8 Ngr.

1872. N. T. Graece. Ad antiquissimos testes denuo recensuit C. de T. Editio critica minor ed. viii. maiore desumpta. Lipsiae. 1872. Vol. i. 8°. f. 1, pp. 608.

Allg. Zeit. (A.) 1872. Nr. 181, Serailsbibliothek.

1873. Clementis Romani epistulae. Ad ipsius cod. Alexandrini fidem ac modum repetitis curis ed. C. de T. Lipsiae: Hinrichs. 4°. pp. xx., 44. Plate. 3 Thlr. First edition in the App. Codd. celeberrim, etc. 1867.

Haben wir den ächten Schrifttext der Evangelisten und Apostel? Leipzig: Giesecke und Devrient. 8°. pp. 25 (1). Plate. 15 Ngr. Translated by W. A. Smith in Presbyterian Quarterly and Princeton Review, Oct. 1874.

Biblia sacra Latina Veteris Testam. Hieronymo interprete ex antiquissima auctoritate in stichos descripta. Vulgatam lectionem ex editione Clementina principe a. MDXCII et Romana ultima a. MDCCCLXI repetitam testimonium comitatur codicis Amiatini Latinorum omnium antiquissimi. Editionem instituit suasore Chr. Car. Josia de Bunsen Th. Heyse, ad finem perduxit C. de T. Cum tabula. Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 1. 8°. pp. lxxii, 991. 5 Thlr. 10 Ngr.

N. T. Gr. Ad editionem suam viii. crit. maiorem conformavit, lectionibusque Sinaiticis et Vaticanis item Elzevirianis instruxit C. de T. Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 8°. pp. xxxii, 419.

1874. Liber Psalmorum Hebr. atque Lat. ab Hieronymo ex Hebraeo conversus. Consociata opera edd. C. de Tischendorf, S. Baer, Fr. Delitzsch. Lipsiae: Brockhaus. 8°. pp. xvi, 190.

The following works were in preparation for publication :

Monumenta Sacra Inedita. Nova collectio. Vol. vii. (Chrysostomi cod. Guelferbytanus vi. fere p. Chr. saeculi, cum aliis Chrysostomi fragmentis uncialibus). Vol. viii. (Reliquiae textus sacri utriusque ex pluribus codd. palimps. aliisque veterrimis). — **N. T. Gr.** Editio viii. crit. maior. Vol. iii. (Prolegomena). — **N. T. Gr.** Editio viii. crit. minor. Vol. ii. — **Evangelia apocrypha.** Editio ii. — **De evangeliorum apocr. similiumque librorum origine et usu.** — **Reliquiae Graecarum litterarum antiquissimae sive Menandri, Euripidis, Cassii Dionis fragmenta ex membranis iv. et v. saeculi.** Item fragmenta grammatica ex foliis palimpsestis saec. vii. — **Palaeographia Graeca.** Cum tabulis plus centum form. maximae, etc.

It may be of interest to know how Tischendorf counted his editions: i. 1841, Leipzig; ii. iii. 1842, Paris; iv. 1849, Leipzig; v. 1850, 1862, 1873, Leipzig: Tauchnitz; vi. 1854, 1855, 1857, 1858, 1861, 1864, 1867, 1870, 1873, 1875 (Triglott and academic), Leipzig: Mendelssohn; vii. 1859, mai. et min.; viii. 1869–1872, mai. et min. (not complete).

ARTICLE IX.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR ARCHIBALD DUFF, JR.

THE LATE PROFESSOR EWALD.

THE remains of Ewald, the noted Semitic and biblical scholar, were carried to the grave, in Göttingen, on Ascension-day last, May 6th, followed by a long procession of citizens, apparently chiefly from the tradesman classes, with many of the professors, scarcely any students, and little or no display, academical or otherwise.

We copy the following, for the sake of its dates, from the *Göttingen Zeitung* of May 5th, 1875: "Professor Georg Heinrich August Ewald died (here) yesterday, May 4th, at six p.m. He was born in Göttingen, in 1803 (the son of a poor linen-weaver); received his preparatory training at the schools and gymnasium of his native town, and at its university devoted himself with the greatest eagerness and with unwearying diligence to the study of theology, as also more specially to that of Oriental languages. In 1823, when not twenty years of age, he became teacher in the Wolfenbüttel Gymnasium. At Easter, 1824, he returned to Göttingen, at the instance of his teachers there, whose hearty interest the pushing young man had excited. He now became more closely connected with the university, as Repetent (or Tutor) on the Theological Faculty. In 1827, he became Professor Extraordinary, and in 1831 Ordinary, in the Philosophical Faculty. He soon became one of the most influential and noted teachers here, widely known through his literary activity, and especially prominent in the philological field, fulfilling his duty as teacher faithfully, ever ready to serve the academical youth.

In 1837, in conjunction with Dahlmann, the two Grimms, Albrecht, Gervinus, and Weber, he delivered a Protest to the University Curatorium against the Repeal of the Hanoverian Fundamental State Law, and was obliged to resign his professorship. In 1838, he was called to Tübingen as Professor Ordinary of Theology (where he worked beside Baur). The events of 1848 removed the hinderances which had till then shut him out from position in Göttingen. At the motion of the Royal Curatorium, King Ernst August, in the autumn of 1848, called Professor Ewald back to Göttingen, as Professor Ordinary."

His professorship was that filled in the end of last century by the great J. D. Michaelis, and now occupied by the eminent linguist, Dr. P. de

Lagarde, known by his numerous and very valuable editions of Oriental texts, relating chiefly to the scriptures and to theology more generally; also long resident in England.

In the political changes of 1866, and their results, Professor Ewald remained a strong Guelf, becoming more and more bitter in his opposition to Prussia. He refused to take the oath of allegiance, and yet was allowed to lecture until, at last, on account of attacks on the king and Bismarck, the *venia docendi* was withdrawn. He was allowed the title "Professor Emeritus" and his salary, both of which he enjoyed till death. His political opinions found support; for he was thrice elected to the central, or imperial parliament, by one class of voters, for the city of Hanover. In parliament he protested at every opportunity against the union of Hanover with Prussia. He was twice charged with insult of royalty, tried, and twice acquitted. During the last year, he was sentenced to imprisonment for libel of Prince Bismarck, but was not imprisoned, on account of illness. Last autumn a heart-disease compelled him to return home from parliament, and confined him to the house, a severe sufferer, till the end came.

Professor Ewald's name was probably one of the most familiar of those German names which our theological students hear quoted as notable or as high authority. The student can scarcely conceive of them as living men, but as mysterious intellectual giants who have known astoundingly much, and are either almost oracular or to be approached with caution. But Ewald has just died — a man of seventy-two years, tall, strongly built, wearing long white hair, and with sharp, large, commanding features.

His work and influence have been really remarkable. Besides his Arabic Grammar, written in 1831, — that is, when he was twenty-eight, — and his extended series of works on the New Testament (on the first three Gospels, 1850; Paul's Epp., 1857; John's Writings, 1861, 2 vols.; Heb. and James, 1870; the Seven Epp. of the New Covenant, 1870), he has lived to publish what one might call a complete system of scientific works on the Old Testament. Before speaking specially of these latter, let us say that very probably, in general, his earlier works are the more valuable. His Arabic Grammar, although, of course, behind the times, is still useful. Of his New Testament works, that on the Book of Revelation (1828) seems the most valuable.

In his Old Testament system we count his Hebrew Grammars, smaller and larger, in several editions, his Commentaries, his History of the People of Israel, and his recently completed work on Biblical Theology. Going backward on the line of the system, we remark only briefly, in connection with his latest work, The Theology of the Old and New Covenants (3 vols., 1871-74), that such a work ought to be a history of thought, rather than an attempt at a statement of one system of theology. The reason for this is plain in the nature of the Bible. Even the most eager attempts to give all the books a late origin leave them the products of different periods. Ewald's book has given scholars much dissatisfaction.

Professor Ewald's *History of the People of Israel* (7 vols., 1843 sq.), written in the correct order of study previously to his work on *Hebrew Doctrine*, remains till now, with little doubt, the best work on the subject. Of course, progressing research has made, and is fast making, reconsideration of the *History* necessary. But no better work has been written to replace it. Ewald's peculiar character made the work a very interesting one. He was very constructive. As he approaches a chaos of material, as it were, works it over, and makes system and history spring up, he enchants the on-looker with the appearance of a very creation. This very constructiveness, again, gives ground for careful criticism; for it is apt to lead the builder beyond his facts.

Professor Ewald's *Commentaries on the Old Testament* (including his *Poetical Books of the Old Testament*, 2 vols., 1835 sq., and his *Prophetical Books*, 2 vols., 1840 sq.) — the natural substructure, again, for the history — would have done much good service, even if they had been mere guesses at theories; for such guesses generally rouse to investigation men whom the simple duty of careful, thorough preparation for induction would not have roused.

His grammatical works, appearing in many editions, — of course, the basis of all the rest, — have been of great value, especially as giving an impulse towards a new period of earnest investigation. But here a method which leaps to theory without induction must be superseded. It would make the whole superstructure untrustworthy. Another serious objection is, that the necessary preparatory investigation in Semitic philology has as yet been carried to a comparatively small extent. The facts for induction are, in great part, yet to be collected. To give a very plain sign of this, reference need only to be made to the state of the sister languages of the Hebrew. For example, only in 1837 was completed the first Arabic lexicon which made that language in any convenient sense accessible to the student. That was a very partial work. But since it appeared there has been prepared no other. Scholars in that fundamental branch of Semitic philology hesitate. Professor Wright's *Grammar*, which is very full in respect of forms, is not yet fully published. For Syriac there is simply no lexicon, save Michaelis's small *Castellus* of the last century; and those who make the language a specialty say it would be almost impossible to prepare one just now with anything like the value of our Greek and Latin lexicons. Syriac grammar is almost unwritten. We may here remark, by the way, that Uhlemann's work, in its second edition of 1857, has so many mistakes, and is so far behind even what could be said on the subject, that it is to be hoped the new translation, just published in America, has essentially remodelled and corrected the whole. We regret to be obliged to speak so uncertainly, as the translation has not yet reached us.

Very valuable works in Ethiopic, a lexicon and a grammar, have been

prepared by Professor Dillmann, at present of Berlin, a pupil of Ewald. Other members of the family are also in their childhood. Assyrian is hardly in its infancy. But of Hebrew itself we lack as yet a correct text of the Old Testament, before we can begin to pronounce with absolute certainty concerning its grammar. It scarcely need be said that our text lets us into the language through the liturgical pronunciation. Of course, we can do very, very much with this, but not all. At present, the emperor of Russia is publishing a photo-lithographed copy of the Old Testament ms. possessed by Karaite Jews in Southern Russia, which has the so-called Assyrian-Babylonian punctuation, and may by comparison lighten up many points, as it already promises to do.

It may be of interest to mention that the use of **הוּא** for the fem. as well as the masc. is found in this ms. in the prophets. It is well-known that in our common text this use of **הוּא** is peculiar to the Pentateuch.

Patient search and careful statement of results may be made; but jumping at fancied perfect theory is wrong. No wonder that Ewald's grammatical views should be questioned. One of his scholars, and a great admirer of him, writes: "He recognized, often, with a diviner's insight and remarkable genius, what others afterwards proved to be true." But that is not a method we can trust.

Professor Ewald's confidence in the correctness of his own views was very strong, carrying him, often, too far. The gentleman quoted above says, "He deprived himself, by an unhealthy readiness to take offence at opposition, of much merited honor and influence."

His smaller publications have been very numerous, dealing with many parts of the whole Semitic and biblical field, as well as somewhat with political or ecclesiastical questions. The *Zeitschrift für Die Kunde des Morgenlandes* (Periodical for Oriental Information) was published from 1837 to 1850 by a number of noted men, of whom Ewald was one, and was the forerunner of the now celebrated *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (Periodical of the German Oriental Society). His reviews of books are almost numberless. Among the earlier of these are some very excellent essays. For ten years (1848-65) he conducted a theological review, in which almost every Article is by himself. In it are the odd and bold five letters to the pope and the Roman Catholic bishops.

While it may be remarkable that one man should have wrought ably in so many parts of the field, yet the attempt to publish on so wide a range of subjects ought not now to be made. Far more concentration is absolutely necessary, to secure exactness and to control the material now accessible. We need scarcely add that Professor Ewald's German was by no means classical. It causes well nigh as much trouble to Germans as to foreigners, and more vexation. Among the most noted of his pupils are Professors Bertheau of Göttingen, Hang of Munich, Nöldeke of Strasburg, Schrader of Jena (called to Berlin), Dillmann of Berlin.

The results of his work will be modified as they are used. The cloud brought over his life's close must be deeply regretted by strong friends of Prussia and by her opponents, and also by friends of Berlin, who object to some of her conduct. And yet Professor Ewald has been one of the most remarkable scholars of this century. His energy deserves our admiration. Finally, he was a most unselfish man. His defying the wrath of rulers who paid him his emoluments would suggest this, and the testimony of close critics to this quality is one of his highest honors.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS,

A. GERMAN WORKS.

ACTS OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.—Acta genuina ss. oecumenici concilii Tridentini sub Paulo III., Julio III., et Pio IV., PP. MM. ab Angelo Massarello episcopo Thelesino ejusdem concilii secretario conscripta, nunc primum integra edita ab Aug. Theiner, presb. Accedunt acta ejusdem concilii sub Pio IV. a cardinale Gabr. Paleotto, archiepiscopo Bononiensi, digesta, secundis curis expolitiora. II tomi. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Hartel. 1874. 100 Mk.

This publication of the Acts of the Council of Trent from the official minutes of the Secretary, which, by the way, are not undoubtedly the most trustworthy sources, is reported by a lenient judge to be faulty, and to lack much that was to be desired.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S ADDRESSES ON RELIGION.—Schleiermacher's Reden über die Religion und ihre Nachwirkungen auf die evangelische Kirche Deutschlands. Von Professor Albrecht Ritschl, Dr. Theol., Göttingen. 8vo. pp. 111. Bonn: Marcus. 1874. 2 Mk.

The able author of this pamphlet will become better known to American students, we hope, ere long, by means of an Article written for the Bibliotheca Sacra on a work of his, by Mr. Priv. Doc. Besser of Halle. By his recently completed work in three volumes, on The Doctrine of Justification and Atonement, he has distinguished himself even more eminently than before, as a searching, scientific theologian, taking a place in the very foremost rank of historical and dogmatical writers, practically vindicating the importance of theological science in contrast both to the traditional and — would be — churchly school, and to the negative

school. We have already noticed the appearance also of a published address by Professor Ritschl on Christian Perfection, and hope to refer more fully to that and the Essay here noticed.

PROFESSOR KÖSTLIN'S BIOGRAPHY OF LUTHER.—Martin Luther. Von Professor Dr. Julius Köstlin. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 811, 679. Elberfeld: Friderichs. 1875. 18 Mk.

A reviewer says: "Köstlin is himself quite conscious of one great excellence of his Biography of Luther. He writes: 'I feel, I must here say, that it seems to me quite as foolish to play the anxious apologist as the critical master of the great man'" (Preface p. vi).

LUTHER AT WORMS.—Luther's Rede in Worms am 18 April, 1521. Von Professor Julius Köstlin, Dr. Theol. 8vo. pp. 36. Halle: Buchhandlung d. Waisenhauses. 1874. 60 Pfennig. (Oslerprogramm der Universität Halle-Wittenberg).

Professor Köstlin, the author of the valuable Biography of Luther just published, examines here the question, whether Luther actually spoke the words, "Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise." The little treatise is published in the front of the Catalogue of Professors and Lectures in Halle for the summer semester, according to a German university custom of publishing the like as catalogue-preface.

THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE AND ITS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK, 1873. — Die Evangelische Allianz und ihre Generalversammlung in Neu-York, vom 2 bis 10 October, 1873. Skizzen und Erinnerungen an die Reise nach und in Amerika. Von Dr. Edm. Spiess. Lic. Theol. 8vo. pp. 271. Jena: Dufft. 1874. 4 Mk.

Dr. Spiess has prepared a book which we should read in America. Faithful concerning the good things he saw, and faithful concerning some faults that would be seen, he tells the Germans at home that he now knows there are current, in the minds of otherwise learned and careful Germans, notions about America which are ridiculously wrong. We rejoice, for the Alliance is thus bearing some fruit. Germans see that there are good things outside of their own country, and that others may, perhaps, help them out of the sad plight into which their church affairs have fallen. Yet are we not to blame for the poor information which has hitherto gone to Germany? It is surely because we have little or no scientifically accurate and complete literature on our church history and condition that Hase's Handbook of Church History, recommended to German students above all others, is a farce in its American parts.

Dr. Spiess shared with others the wonder and joy over the great gatherings of people who listened to the religious discussions of the Alliance. He travelled widely, especially studying the condition of Germans in

America, and delivered an address on this point on his return, being well satisfied with the part evidently given up to Germans over the Atlantic, the part of the less movable, slower, but more steadfast element.

He saw evils, but makes little effort to parade before the public others than such as forced themselves on his consideration. On arriving in New York waters, the steamer had cases of small-pox on board. Gentlemen are described as calculating the cost of getting the health officer to let the passengers ashore at once, instead of sending them to quarantine. Whether a sum was paid or not, the immediate landing was effected. This suggests, if it does not necessarily teach, how very much work is yet laid on our churches if they are to leaven the whole civic mass with sound morality.

Dr. Spiess suffered evil from what seems very like a travelling showman's quality in the managers of the meeting to which he went with the expectation of delivering an address he had prepared by appointment. He seems to have spared no entreaties to be excused from being put up to talk on something else. Our practice should be different.

SCHWEIZER'S PASTORAL THEORY. — *Pastoraltheorie oder die Lehre von der Seelsorge des evangelischen Pfarrers.* Von Professor Dr. Alex. Schweizer. 8vo. pp. xvi, 292. Leipzig: Hirzel. 1874. 5 Mk.

The great reformed theologian in Zürich has given a work on certain parts of pastoral theology. Germans rejoice over the gift, from the distinguished writer, of the material contained in the work, although they condemn the title as applied to such a partial work, and find faults in the division into, 1. Watchful Oversight as the Perceiving Spiritual Care (*erkennende Seelsorge*); 2. Direct Influence as the Treating Spiritual Care (*behandelnde*); 3. Influence of our Moral Life on the Members of the Parish as Pastoral Morals. The division is illogical. It suggests to us also the contents, which seem to leave untouched cultus and preaching, although Homiletics falls properly under the Pastoral Theory.

THEOLOGY OF THE PROPHETS. — *Die Theologie der Propheten als Grundlage für die innere Entwicklungsgeschichte der israelitischen Religion dargestellt von Lic. Bernh. Duhm, Privatdocent in Göttingen.* 8vo. pp. 324. Bonn: Adolph Marcus. 1875. 5 Mk.

With scarcely time to look into the work (which is published as we write), we remark that we take exception to the title, for a reason elsewhere stated, but we welcome heartily a contribution of labor on a field hitherto almost unused, but rich in material for the theologian and, through him, for practical Christianity. Mr. Duhm is young, but ranks high as a theologian in the Old Testament department.

A Fifth Edition of the late Professor von TISCHENDORF'S SEPTUAGINT has just been published by Brockhaus, Leipzig. 1875. 12 Mk.

ROTHE'S LECTURES ON CHURCH HISTORY and the History of Christian Church Life are elsewhere noticed. The editor, Professor H. Weingarten, has given, we learn, "Roth's Lectures on Church History as he wrote them," without incorporating correcter results of more recent investigation, but "adding out of other mss (on 'History of Christian Church Life,' on 'History of the Christian Church as such,' and 'History of the Religious Spirit and Life') whatever might be adapted to supplement the principal ms. at various points." The period treated in Part I. extends to A.D. 312. (8vo. pp. 491. Heidelberg: Mohr. 6 Mk.)

PROFESSOR DR. J. HOPPE'S ANALOGY.—*Die Analogie. Eine allgemein verständliche Darstellung aus dem Gebiete der Logik.* Von Prof. Dr. J. Hoppe. 8vo. pp. 63. Berlin: Denicke. 1873. 1 Mk. 50 Pf.

PROF. SIGWART'S LOGIC.—*Logik.* 1 Bd. *Die Lehre vom Urtheil, vom Begriff und vom Schluss.* Von Prof. Dr. Christ. Sigwart. Vol. i. 8vo. pp. 420. Tübingen: Laupp. 1873. 6 Mk.

The appearance of this, and of the first volume (*Logik; Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen.* pp. 597. Leipzig: S. Herzel. 1874), by the distinguished Professor Lotze of Göttingen, of a new philosophical series, which we earnestly hope he will be able to complete, show that there is much busy thought in the speculative fields of philosophy, as well as in the historical.

VISCHER'S CRITICAL PAPERS.—*Kritische Gänge. Neue Folge.* Von Friedr. Th. Vischer. 5 u. 6 Heft. Stuttgart: Cotta. 1866 und 1874. Chiefly on esthetical works by himself and others.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

A DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITIES. Being a Continuation of the Dictionary of the Bible. Edited by William Smith, D.C.L., LL.D., and Samuel Cheatham, M.A., Professor of Pastoral Theology in King's College, London. In two volumes. Illustrated by Engravings on wood. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1875.

Only the first volume of this work has reached us. It is a massive octavo of 898 pages, exclusive of eleven pages devoted to the preface and list of the writers for the work. As this dictionary is a continuation of Smith's invaluable Dictionary of the Bible, so it is to be followed by a Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, and Doctrines; and both of these dictionaries are designed to furnish a "complete account of the leading Personages, the Institutions, Art, Social Life, Writings and Controversies of the Christian Church from the time of the Apostles to the age of Charlemagne" (p. ix). This Dictionary of Christian Antiquities is designed to do for the church, what Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman

Antiquities has done for the classical world. Professor Cheatham has been the acting editor of all parts of the present work, except the parts under A, B, and C. Dr. Smith has been the general superintending editor of the whole. The contributors are among the most learned of the church of England divines, professors, head-masters of classical schools. Some of the writers also are eminent scholars in Scotland, Germany, France, the United States. Many of our readers have looked forward to the appearance of this work with high expectations. We can assure them that what they have anticipated is more than realized. The Dictionary will form an indispensable part of the library of the scholarly pastor.

ST. JOHN THE AUTHOR OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL. By Christoph. Ernst Luthardt, Professor of Theology at Leipzig; author of *Apologetic Lectures on the Fundamental, Saving, and Moral Truths of Christianity*, etc., etc. Revised, translated, and the Literature much enlarged, by Caspar René Gregory, Leipzig. pp. 369. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

Our readers are so well acquainted with the character and works of Dr. Luthardt that we need not utter any words in his praise. The present volume, rich and ripe in its learning, is indebted, in no small degree, for its appropriateness and worth to the translator. Mr. Gregory is well known to our readers as the translator of the Article on the False Views as to the Design of St. John's Gospel, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xxx. pp. 1-29 and 237-253; by his Review of Dr. Krauth's works on the Conservative Reformation and its Theology in Vol. xxxi. pp. 266-302; by his Translation of Dr. Biesenthal on Matthew ii. 23, in Vol. xxxii. pp. 161-174; and by his elaborate Article on Tischendorf in this number of the *Bibliotheca*. We are especially indebted to him for the Literature on the Authorship of the Fourth Gospel, embracing seventy-seven pages of the present volume, which he has so faithfully translated from Luthardt. We have never seen so full a catalogue of the works published on this subject. We have been truly interested in its perusal. The first edition of Dr. Luthardt's "*Das Johannische Evangelium nach seiner Eigenthümlichkeit geschildert und erklärt*" was published at Nuremberg in 1852-53. It is numbered 203 in Mr. Gregory's Catalogue. The first volume of the second edition was published in 1875, and is the 491st of Mr. Gregory's list. An English translation of the second edition is to be published in 1876 by the Messieurs Clark, in Edinburgh. In the second edition there is a summary of the volume now under notice. This volume is an expansion of the argument which is given briefly in the larger work, and could not be presented in its completed form without increasing the bulk of that work unduly. The first edition did not enter into the discussion of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel.

A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF PSALMS; with a new Translation. By James G. Murphy, LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, Belfast, and author of Commentaries on Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus. 8vo. pp. 694. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1875.

This Commentary is well fitted to meet the wants of pastors in preparing their expositions of the Psalms. The more educated teachers of Bible-classes and Sabbath-schools may study it with advantage. They need not be deterred from using it by the presence of the Hebrew words which are conspicuous on some of its pages. Like the other Commentaries of Dr. Murphy, this is distinguished by the ease and perspicuity of its style, its freedom from pedantry, and the excellent religious spirit pervading it. The Introduction, occupying the first fifty pages, is lucid and interesting.

HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SACRED TABERNACLE OF THE HEBREWS. By Edward E. Atwater. 8vo. pp. 443. New York: Dodd and Mead. 1875.

The significance of the Jewish tabernacle must always be an interesting study with every intelligent Christian. It is to be regarded as a presentation, in a different language, of the same great truths as those which are brought out in the New Testament; and every one knows that much is gained by studying the same truths in different languages. Our conceptions become in this way much more vivid and distinct. In the tabernacle, the kingdom of God is exhibited to our mind in an earlier stage of its development. By contemplating it in the different aspect thus brought to view, we are helped to a better understanding of its nature. The reader of the New Testament, by the aid of a previous attention to the tabernacle, is able to comprehend more thoroughly the symbolism of the latter. For these reasons, if for no others, we regard Mr. Atwater's work as one of singular value.

The tabernacle is to be considered as the residence of the Divine King of the Israelites. The remembrance of this will aid one in understanding some parts of the Jewish ritual that might otherwise be comparatively unintelligible. This explains the great importance attached to personal cleanliness and freedom from corporeal blemishes on the part of all the attendants of the sanctuary. Some of the sacrifices — such, for instance, as burnt-offerings — were forms of consecration to the service of the sovereign, — what in modern phraseology would be called homage. In short, the idea of the tabernacle as the palace of the monarch gives to many parts of the Mosaic ritual an interest and an importance of which they would otherwise be destitute.

Quite a large portion of the book is occupied with a discussion of the significance of the tabernacle. The position taken is, that it had throughout a symbolical character, "that the edifice itself, with its equipments, its

attendants, and its various services, as they appeared to the senses, represented a system of truth in the higher sphere of the invisible and the eternal." Symbolic language was in very common use at the time of Moses; and, though it is admitted that the art of alphabetic writing was used to some extent at that period, it is equally certain that symbolic writing must have been the more common and the more effective medium of communication of moral and religious truth especially. This remark is emphatically just in relation to the Egyptians. Much use was made by them, not only of symbolic writing, but of what may properly be styled symbolic institutions. The construction of their temples, the rites performed in them, the garments worn by the priests, were all designed to represent in a visible form the doctrines of their religion. It is, therefore, an altogether natural supposition that a man like Moses, learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and whose task it was to digest a religious system for a people who like the Israelites had lived for centuries in Egypt, would adopt spontaneously a form of language by which those whom he wished to instruct could be reached most readily and effectively. Nor is it at all strange that he should not only use the same form of language in general, but should besides, when trying to express, as he must often have had occasion to do, the same ideas, have had recourse to the same symbols as were employed by the Egyptians. There is nothing, necessarily, any more objectionable in this than there is in printing the scriptures by the use of the same press and the same types as are employed in printing the vilest books.

The tabernacle was meant to be symbolical of Mosaism exclusively. That it was so relatively to every form of pagan worship, admits of no question. It was symbolical of Mosaism in distinction from Christianity; not as if there were any intrinsic contrariety between the ideas inculcated in the two systems, but merely in the fact that the stage of development at which the two set forth the divine plan of redemption was different. The conceptions of the truths of Christianity which existed in the minds of the ancients were less definite, less exact, than those which prevailed after the advent of Christ. The Mosaic symbols were intended to represent these less adequate conceptions, but not to represent different truths.

The views set forth in this book as to the symbolical character of the tabernacle are marked, in our view, by great sobriety. Extremes are carefully avoided. The author conceives that there is a middle path to be taken between the notion that everything belonging to the tabernacle was typical, and the notion that nothing was so, except what is particularly spoken of in the New Testament as having such a reference. The two systems of religion, Mosaism and Christianity, being essentially identical, it is to be presumed that what in the tabernacle was symbolical of Mosaism was typical of Christianity.

A good many interesting details are given in this book in regard to

particular kinds of symbolism; as those of number, form, color, and the like; but in reference to these, the book itself should be consulted. The portion of the book which treats of this subject will well reward careful study.

We have been particularly pleased with the views expressed in this work in regard to the origin and meaning of sacrifices. The question whether or not they were expressly commanded by Jehovah is considered by Mr. Atwater as of no practical importance; because, even if not thus directly enjoined, they were prompted by man's religious instinct, and were approved by Jehovah. The heart of man, in a word, naturally expresses itself by means of sacrifice. It is maintained, besides, that all bloody sacrifices embodied in themselves the idea of expiation; though, very probably, in the patriarchal ages, expiatory sacrifices were not in use any farther than as the idea of expiation entered into the notion of all animal sacrifices. This idea of expiation existed in the mind of the patriarchs only in a vague and indefinite shape, as marking the earliest stage in the development of the plan of redemption. At this period, as well as at all subsequent periods, sacrifices had no intrinsic atoning power. They could atone for sin only as they were symbolic, anticipatory of the real atonement afterwards effected by Christ. The idea which lies at the basis of atonement is that of covering. The sin atoned for is regarded as if no longer in existence; and the transgressor is no more to be punished than he would be if he had not sinned.

The symbols incorporated into the tabernacle had in many cases a prophetic character. They were types. Emphatically was this the case with the priesthood. The priests were types of Christ in reference to the freedom of access to God which was allowed to them. They alone were permitted to enter the tabernacle; and only to the high-priest was it lawful to go into the holy of holies, just as Christ our Mediator enters into the immediate presence of God. The whole body of the people were required to keep themselves ceremonially pure; but this purity was enjoined on the priests with special urgency, on the ground that Christ was literally without sin. In general, the priesthood typified Christ in its official position, in the object to which its functions were directed, and in the means by which that object was effected.

It is an inquiry of considerable importance how far the ancient Israelites comprehended the significance of the tabernacle. The general answer given to this question is, that they were as competent to understand its symbolical significance as men of the present day are to apprehend the meaning of the Bible. The extent to which they understood it depended on their mental character, on the degree of attention and study which they gave to the subject, and on the spirituality of mind which they possessed. On these same things depends the success of any one at present who would understand the scriptures.

It will be apparent, we trust, that we attach great value to this work of Mr. Atwater. We earnestly hope it will be carefully read not by ministers and professedly biblical students only, but by all intelligent Christians. We wish to speak emphatically in praise of the style in which it is written, as contrasted with that of a good many works by English authors which we have lately had occasion to read. Its style is pure, free from all traces of affectation, from unusual and barbarous words, and elaborate attempts at originality in the diction — attempts such as are apt to be violent in proportion to the triteness of the thought. The author evidently does not labor under the delusion, which we think is becoming quite common, that water which is not transparent must necessarily be deep.

BIBLICAL STANDPOINT. Views of the Sonship of Christ, the Comforter, and Trinity. With an Appendix on the Atonement. By Asa Wilbur. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. 12mo. pp. 213. Boston: A. Williams and Co. 1875.

This little volume is the result of long-continued study. The theory which it advocates may be thus stated: God at a certain period of his existence brought into life a being of the same nature and powers as those afterwards breathed into Adam. There were then in existence two beings: one, the self-existent God; the other, the begotten being; in other words, the Father and the Son, each having a will distinct from the other, but always in harmony. At a subsequent period the Father took the begotten being into union with himself; the two beings thus becoming one. The Son, in the use of the divine power imparted to him, created the world and its inhabitant, man. At still another period, the Son came down to the earth, and entered into the human body which had been prepared for him, and appeared among men as Jesus Christ. It is the object of the book to establish this theory by scriptural proofs. The author denies the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, and denies, also, the proper divinity of the Son — assigning a beginning to his existence. The work is written in a candid and reverent spirit. The scriptures are everywhere appealed to as the final authority. We cannot accept the theory which it expounds, but have not space in which to give the reasons of our dissent.

PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. By George Henry Lewes. First Series. The Foundations of a Creed. Vol. i. pp. 434. — 1874. Vol. ii. 12mo. pp. 487. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1875.

Although we cannot regard Mr. Lewes as a careful and accurate metaphysician, and although we look upon several of his theories as false and dangerous, yet we cannot peruse his writings without advantage. He is so well versed in anatomy, physiology, pathology, chemistry, and other natural sciences, that he can illustrate with much ease and pertinence his

views in psychology and metaphysics. In the first of the volumes before us he considers, (1) "The Method of Science and its Application to Metaphysics," (2) "The Rules of Philosophizing." He then examines his first problem, "The Limitations of Knowledge." In the second of the volumes he examines his second problem, "The Principles of Rectitude"; his third problem, "From the Known to the Unknown"; his fourth, "Matter and Force"; his fifth, "Force and Cause"; his sixth, "the Absolute in the Correlations of Feeling and Motion." A large part of both the volumes is devoted, indirectly or directly, to the subject of causation. We think that his theory of cause and effect is not accordant with the intuitions of the human mind; still we coincide with him in believing that "every philosophical opinion must have some truth sustaining it." There is a line of truth running through his unsatisfactory reasonings on the nature of causation.

CHRISTIAN PSYCHOLOGY; a new Exhibition of the Capacities and Faculties of the Human Spirit, Investigated and Illustrated from the Christian Stand-point. By the Rev. George Sutherland, Pastor of St. George's Presbyterian Church, Sydney; author of "The Lord's Supper," "Baptism," "Urgent Appeals to the Unsaved." 8vo. pp. 480. Sidney: William Maddock; Melbourne: George Robinson; Adelaide: W. C. Rigby; Dunedin, N. Z.: H. Wise; Brisbane: Watson and Co; Hobart Town: Walsh and Son. 1874.

Not many of our readers have ever seen an Australian book bearing on its title-page the names of these Australian publishers. We heartily welcome the volume. We regard it as the work of an original thinker. An excellent Christian spirit pervades it. It is the result of faithful study in a parsonage. The excellent Christian minister appears in every "department" of the treatise. It illustrates the intimate connection between theology and psychology. We cannot say that this volume is uniformly accurate; but the errors of it are in their tendency exactly opposite to those of the two volumes of Lewes, noticed above. Mr. Sutherland remarks characteristically: "When it is said that the will is the *seat* of all virtue and vice, we suppose the meaning to be that all virtue and vice *rest there*, and *rise from there*. Such are the purposes of a seat" (p. 295). "But the soul, as a whole, and not the mere will, is the seat of morality; and while it is such, its intellect may be at one time the prominent agent, at another time the emotional nature; and, in both cases, the will may be found concurring rather than leading. . . . If this is correct, it must be improper to represent the will as the seat of all virtue and vice, when it is but the concurrent or actively prominent agent of an interior or inner influence possessed of the true moral character" (p. 297). This passage illustrates the general scope and tendency of the whole treatise.

The volume is divided into five departments: the Intellectual Capacity; Emotional Susceptibility; the Executive Power; the Normal Faculty; Habitudes. For so exhaustive a treatment of psychology we are surprised to find a topical index of only two pages; one page of an index of Scripture references; and only one page of an index of eminent men named in the volume. Buonaparte is named, but not Fenelon nor Jouffroy; John Bunyan, but not Priestley, nor Wardlaw, nor Chalmers, nor Whately.

Notwithstanding all the criticisms which may be made on the volume, it has many and varied excellences. We must pay our tribute of admiration to a man who, amid the parochial calls of an Australian city, has found time to write a treatise so thoughtful and well considered.

SCIENCE AND REVELATION: a Series of Lectures in Reply to the Theories of Tyndall, Huxley, Darwin, Spencer, etc. Belfast: William Mullan; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1875.

These nine Lectures were delivered in Belfast, Ireland, during the winter of 1874-75. The authors are Dr. J. L. Porter, Dr. Moore, Professor Watts, Rev. W. T. Martin, Rev. A. C. Murphy, Professor Wallace, Rev. John Macnaughton, Rev. John Moran, Rev. William Magill. All these authors are worthy of attention. Some of them are well known in this country; others are comparatively unknown. There are many excellent thoughts in these Lectures; not a few of them are very felicitously expressed. See, for example, Mr. Murphy's Lecture on Miracles and Prophecy, pp. 3, 4, 8, 9; and Mr. Moran's Lecture on the Life and Character of Christ, pp. 20-31.

EPOCHS OF HISTORY. Edited by Edward E. Morris, M.A. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

We are glad of an opportunity, even though at a late hour, to speak in strongly commendatory terms of this series of historical works. They are of altogether higher value than any other abridged histories with which we are acquainted. They have very few, if any, of the faults by which such works are apt to be deformed. They will be of great utility even to the more advanced student of history, giving him as it were a bird's-eye view of regions which he has already traversed. They may not prove as entertaining to youthful readers as some other far less valuable works may do; but they will, in our judgment, richly recompense a thorough study. Being the work of different writers, they are not all of equal merit. We have ourselves been much interested in the one entitled "The Era of the Protestant Revolution." They show marks occasionally of hasty composition; but as a whole are in all respects works of unusual excellence. They lead one through fields of historical research with which we suppose American readers are not very familiar.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE CYROPAEDIA OF XENOPHON: ITS HISTORICAL
CHARACTER, AND ITS VALUE IN THE ILLUSTRATION
OF SCRIPTURE.

BY REV. J. EMERSON, PROFESSOR IN BELOIT COLLEGE, WIS.

It is a habit with a modern school of historical critics to exalt Herodotus and depreciate Xenophon. This preference has arisen, probably, from political, quite as much as from critical, considerations; and if it cannot be met except by showing that Xenophon had the same sympathy for popular right, and the same faith in democratic institutions, which are the honor of our historians, and were, so far as in his time they could be, the inspiration of Herodotus, we must leave him under the ban. But if we allow, in his behalf, as well as in the case of his teacher Socrates, and his fellow pupil Plato, that a man may be more conservative than we, and yet speak the truth, we may reconsider the question of his veracity as a historian, especially in view of evidence which has come to light since Niebuhr's day.

It is common to speak of the Cyropaedia as a historical romance, in which we cannot distinguish between the truth of history and the invention of the author, and which, therefore, cannot be considered as authority for any historical fact — which, indeed, its author never intended to be received as history. It is certainly true that Xenophon had a moral

object in view in the book, and so had Herodotus, and so has every other man who has soul enough to be worthy to write history. Xenophon tells us¹ that he has found Cyrus the kingliest man in history, and therefore has carefully inquired into the facts of his life and character, and presents the result in his work. He certainly had some excellent opportunities for such inquiries, and no doubt he improved them, and would have us believe that his book presents correctly the image and the career of the man. He would have been an exception among ancient historians, if he had not filled out his outlines by conversations and speeches of his own composition; and it would be strange if in him, as well as in Herodotus, we did not often find the thoughts of a Greek, rather than of a Persian. But all this would not show that he has perverted those historical facts which he assures us that he has sought out with so much care. He claims to write history. We must judge of his claim by an examination of his work. As a literary Athenian, he must have been acquainted with the work of Herodotus, who precedes him by a short generation, and he himself quotes Ctesias in his *Anabasis*.² But, with these two works before him, he gives us a history differing widely from either of them. He is, then, either a bold inventor, or an original authority, depending upon evidence which he considered superior to theirs.

The leading objection to the accuracy of Xenophon's history of Cyrus has been, that it differs from that of Herodotus. To this it has been replied, that Herodotus himself admits³ that his is only one of four stories of Cyrus which had come to him; so that Xenophon's may be another of the four. This candid statement of Herodotus is certainly of very great force, as invalidating any argument based upon the reliability of the account which he has himself given. But we can hardly believe that the story given by Xenophon could have come to the ears of the Halicarnassian. For he tells us that the monstrous tale which he gives was the one of the four

¹ *Cyropaedia*, i. 1. 6.

² *Anabasis*, i. 8. 26.

³ Herodotus, i. 95.

which seemed to him most like the simple truth. Of course, he could not have heard such a plain history as Xenophon gives, but was compelled to make the best he could of the stories in which Oriental invention revelled, and with which it delighted to entertain the eager Ionic curiosity. It was somewhat as if one should try to make out a history of Haroun-al-Raschid from the Arabian Nights. From such romantic materials he has produced the best history which could be expected from a man so honest and so credulous. It is excellent authority for the existence of certain splendid facts, but not for the precise characters or times of those facts. We may accept his testimony, even without other support, as proof, for example, of the existence and commanding influence of Nitocris; but his silence is no evidence against the existence of Nebuchadnezzar, much less of Belshazzar, or of Cyaxares the son of Astyages.

We have, however, another Greek author, from whom we might expect a more reliable history of the foundation of the Persian empire. Otesias of Cnidus was for seventeen years physician to the Persian king; he was in the army of Artaxerxes-Mnemon, as Xenophon was in that of Cyrus the younger at the battle of Cynaxa; and after his return to Greece in 398 B.C., he published a history of the Assyrian and Persian empires, which he professed to draw from official documents. Of this history we now have only meagre fragments. But they vary so widely from all other evidence, that they are regarded as of very slender authority. And yet it is hard to believe that, with his opportunities for investigation, he has chosen to substitute a mere imposture for the history which he might have written. Perhaps it will be more fair to suppose that he has given, as well as he was able to understand it, the scheme of history which was accepted at the court of Artaxerxes-Mnemon; and its variance from other authorities, may be explained by a fact of which we are continually reminded in Persian matters, namely, that—to borrow an expression from their own inscriptions—“the lie was abounding in the land,” notwithstanding the

needful, but hardly successful, drill of the children in truth-telling.

That the discrepancy respecting Cyrus is especially great between Xenophon and Ctesias may arise from the fact that, while Ctesias was court physician to Artaxerxes, Xenophon was a volunteer follower and ardent admirer of the younger Cyrus. Probably Ctesias depended upon the statements of courtiers, or upon popular tales or romances, rather than upon any personal examination of ancient records; while Xenophon derived his accounts from the officers of Cyrus. With regard to Xenophon this is continually evident. He quotes songs,¹ as well as prose statements, and uses such phrases as "they said"² in quoting his authorities. He tells us stories which savor not of the study at Scillus, but of the Oriental soldiers' mess. There is a remarkable, characteristic difference in tone between the two narratives of Xenophon and of Ctesias. In Ctesias the elder Cyrus is depreciated with a systematic bitterness. Everything, from his birth to his death, is clothed with a meanness and baseness which might have served as a model for the libelers of Cromwell or Bonaparte; while in the *Cyropaedia* we find a somewhat analogous liberty taken with the ancestry of Darius, son of Hystaspes. Probably we shall not be mistaken in supposing that the party of the younger Cyrus aimed to gather around their favorite the enthusiasm with which Medes, as well as Persians, regarded their commander, whom they considered as reproduced in his namesake; while to Artaxerxes and his court the name of Cyrus became odious, and it was their inclination, as well as their interest, to strip it of its fascination. The story of Ctesias certainly reads like a libel, which never could have had a place in public documents, but which, after living and growing through some generations of malcontents, is at last received into favor by a corrupt and jealous court.

It is as follows, if, as seems most probable, we find it in Nicolaus of Damascus,³ and in Photius:

¹ *Cyropaedia*, i. 2. 1.

² *Ibid.* i. 3. 4, etc.

³ Müller's *Fragments*, 66.

“Cyrus was son of Atradates, a Mardian robber, and of Argoste, a keeper of goats. He entered the service of a courtier of Astyages, and at length gained a position near the person of the monarch. A dream of his mother, similar to that of Astyages respecting Mandane in Herodotus, is interpreted by a Babylonian prophet as portending his rule over Asia. By his influence Atradates is made satrap of the Persians. As Cyrus is entering the country of the Cadusians on an embassy, he meets a slave, named Oebares, carrying a basket of manure. By advice of the Babylonian, he makes Oebares his companion; and from this time he continually attends Cyrus as a kind of evil spirit, urging his ambition, and by energy, craft, and crime leading him on to empire. He urges Cyrus to contrive and prepare a revolt of the Persians. He murders the Babylonian, that he may tell no tales, as they are on their way to Persia, where they find an army already assembled by Atradates. After several defeats, in one of which Atradates falls, the rebels are victorious, and Oebares hails Cyrus as emperor.”

Thus far Nicolaus of Damascus. Ctesias, as given by Photius,¹ continues the story.

‘Astyages flees to Ecbatana, where he is concealed by his daughter Amytis and her husband Spitamas, but reveals himself to save his grandchildren from torture. He is confined by Oebares, and released by Cyrus, who pays to Amytis the honor of a mother, and afterwards slays her husband and takes her to wife. Bactria takes up arms for Astyages, but, learning of his kind treatment, accepts the rule of Cyrus and Amytis. Then follow wars with Sacae and with Croesus, told in similar spirit, but with different incidents from those in Herodotus. Afterward, at the instigation of Oebares, a eunuch leaves Astyages to die with hunger and thirst in the desert. The crime is revealed by a dream, and the eunuch is put to death by Amytis with the refinements of Oriental cruelty; and Oebares, fearing a like fate, starves himself to death.

‘Cyrus is mortally wounded, in battle with the Derbices

¹ Bibliotheca, 72.

and Indi, and dies after a reign of thirty years, leaving Cambyses emperor, and his other son Tanaoxarces satrap of the Choramnians, Parthians, and Carmanians.’

On the other hand, Xenophon tells us, that Cyrus was son of a king, Cambyses of Persia, and of Mandane, daughter of Astyages, king of the Medes, that he was educated at the courts of both monarchs; that he became, by his personal qualities, commander of the armies of the Medes and Persians, and gained the empire of the East for his uncle Cyaxares, whose daughter he married, and thus became by regular succession heir of the Median, as well as of the Persian monarchy. These are the two extreme stories, probably neither of them the invention of either Greek who tells it, but that which each found current in the circle in which he moved. That of Herodotus seems to be partially an attempt at compromise between them: that Cyrus was son of Cambyses, a noble Persian, and Mandane, daughter of Astyages; was exposed on a mountain and reared by Mithradates, which may be another form of the name, Atradata, and finally brought to court, and that he afterwards headed a revolt of Persians, by which Astyages was dethroned and Cyrus made king of Persians and Medes, and at last emperor of Asia.

It would be too much, even for modern historical audacity, to assume to find the truth in such a case. Our present question is whether Xenophon’s statement is a fiction of his own, or a result of historical inquiry.

His statement of the parentage of Cyrus is peculiar in its form. “It is *said*¹ that the father of Cyrus was Cambyses, king of the Persians, while it is *agreed* that his mother was Mandane, daughter of Astyages, who was king of the Medes.” Accordingly, we find that Herodotus has heard of Cambyses as father of Cyrus, but not as king of Persia; and it would seem that the courtiers of Artaxerxes-Mnemon gave him a father, who was not a king, nor even of noble family or tribe, but a Mardian, and a robber at that; but, while they claim that his mother was no princess, but a goat-herd girl,

¹ Cyropaedia, i. 1. 2.

they seem to be compelled to resort to the device of making him first adopt the daughter of Astyages as his mother and then take her as his wife, for the purpose, we may conjecture, of making their peace with the prevailing story, that Cyrus was the son and was also the husband of a princess of Media. It may well have been true that the Persian nobles, whom Xenophon saw, did deny that there was any question as to the mother of Cyrus, while they could not deny the difference of statement respecting his father, for which our author has so carefully left room in his record.

The issue between the three authorities respecting the name and rank of the father of Cyrus is so distinct that it may fairly be taken as a test question as to their respective claims to confidence. It has within a few years been determined by the evidence of inscriptions of Cyrus himself and of Darius Hystaspis, with a decisiveness which leaves no further room for doubt. Every scholar now agrees that upon this point Xenophon is thoroughly correct. But scholars have not always observed how much this agreement carries with it. It brands the entire story found in Nicolaus Damascenus as a libel so gross that we need pay no further attention to it. The account given by Herodotus of the early life of Cyrus, originally extremely absurd in itself, is further weakened by the proved error respecting the rank of Cambyses, and by the violent improbability of any such treatment of the son of the king of Persia and of the princess who was, according to it,¹ the heir of the Median crown. Xenophon's further statement that Cyrus was educated in the constant favor of each court, has certainly the greatest verisimilitude, and has now the advantage of the testimony of the only author who has been proved to be correct in the previous test.

Xenophon next introduces Cyaxares, son of Astyages and uncle of Cyrus, whom we do not find in either of the other stories. Herodotus, indeed, says that Astyages had no son.² Which is right? If we examine the statement of Herodotus

¹ Herodotus, i. 109.

² Ibid. i. 109.

we shall find first that it occurs only, and that incidentally, in the midst of the monstrous fable of the exposure of the infant prince; and, secondly, that it is inconsistent with the whole drift even of that fable. For why should Astyages, when already old enough to be a grandfather, be so terrified at the prospect that a grandson, yet unborn, was to become lord of Asia, except upon the supposition that he had some other heir, who was to be displaced by the fulfilment of the dream? If we seek for any probable basis of truth for the fable we shall hardly be able to find it, unless in some machinations of jealous partizans of another and prior heir, whom we may imagine to have attempted some plot at the court of the aged Astyages to set aside the brilliant Medo-Persian prince, from a destiny which his abilities must have foreshadowed. Thus we seem to need Xenophon's Cyaxares in order to give any chance of historical basis for the fable of Herodotus. We may also say that the story of Ctesias,¹ that Cyrus took the daughter of Astyages first as mother and then as wife, admits of no other explanation so natural as this, that it arose from the perversion of the historical facts, which we find in Xenophon, that Cyrus was the son of Mandane, and afterward married the daughter of Cyaxares, or possibly a younger sister of Mandane,² whose name may have been Amytis. Consequently, when the feeble character of Cyaxares had faded out of memory, so as to be unknown to the light courtiers of Artaxerxes, the two princesses are confounded in the grotesque style given in the fiction; a confusion which becomes worse confounded by giving the princess the name of Amytis, the Median queen of Nebuchadnezzar, unless, indeed, we recover here the name of the daughter of Cyaxares and wife of Cyrus. So far, then, as Herodotus and Ctesias are concerned, we may say that their ignorance does not prove the non-existence of such a character as Cyaxares, while the existence of such a prince is indicated by the fact that it is the only way by which we can account for certain anomalies in their own systems. The probabilities in favor

¹ Photius, 72.

² Cyropaedia, viii. 5. 28.

of Xenophon are confirmed by the testimony of Aeschylus,¹ who represents a Mede as first emperor of Asia, who is succeeded by his son, and he by Cyrus; and it seems to us to be made certain by the evidence of scripture, of which we shall speak in its place.

If we are correct in sustaining the testimony of Xenophon in the points already considered, it will be seen that his authorities are proved to have been of a very different and a higher order than those for either of the other accounts. Out of a mist of Oriental exaggeration, both of eulogy and of calumny, they give us a history, which not only has the air of truth, but is able to stand severe tests of historical accuracy. It may be fair already for us to infer that the younger Cyrus had gathered around him friends, who, inspired by that enthusiasm of which he was certainly a wonderful master, had made the history of the elder hero a special study, and were able to answer the questions of our Attic inquirer, without drawing upon the prolific imagination of the Orient.

We may now enter upon the question whether, in respect to public as well as private affairs, we are to consider the leading statements of the *Cyropaedia* as the inventions of a Greek romancer, or as the results of careful inquiry by a Greek competent to sift and to tell the truth, and whose authorities were Persians, whose position gave them the best opportunities of knowing the facts, and whose tastes had led them to search those facts. In this inquiry we must compare the history itself with such other information as is accessible to us.

Coming from such sources we shall of course expect to find the story pervaded by a decided Persian feeling and a strong partiality for Cyrus. We should have reason to suspect its authenticity if we found it otherwise. We must expect it to differ in many things from the story of Herodotus, which in many points is evidently a Median one, and especially from that of Ctesias, whose chief inspiration seems to be a bitter animosity against the very name of Cyrus.

¹ Persae, 771-773.

We may avoid many apparent difficulties by remembering that geographically and nationally our starting-point and continual centre is Persia. Every fact and every thing is seen with Persian eyes and from a Persian stand-point.

The first view presented is that of Persia at the birth of Cyrus. The Persians are represented by Herodotus as a population in the Median realm, consisting of several tribes, but without a king, and apparently without even a satrap of their own. Cyrus forges a commission¹ from the Median king, and leads them into rebellion, and we hear of no Median authority present to interfere with him. Xenophon gives them a regularly established and independent constitutional monarchy, limited by a peerage,² and perhaps a popular assembly,³ and by laws,⁴ to which the king is subject as well as the poorest citizen, sustained by an elaborate system of education, by which the ruling class were trained in military exercise, and to do justice, to reverence the aged and the law, and to speak the truth. This kingdom, though not a ruling state,⁵ is independent,⁶ and is just forming that alliance with Media, out of which grew the empire which appears in history as that, first, of the Medes and Persians, then of the Persians and Medes, and finally of Persia.

Which of these two views is correct? The existence of the monarchy fixed in a royal family, for generations before Cyrus, is fully established by the declaration of Darius in the Behistun Inscription:⁷ "From antiquity our family have been kings. Eight of my race have been kings before me; I am the ninth." Even Herodotus implies as much by the genealogy which he records as claimed by Xerxes.⁸ The peerage is also recognized by Herodotus,⁹ who names, as leading tribes, the Pasargadae, the Maraphii, and the Maspii, of whom the Pasargadae are the noblest, while the royal house of the Achaemenidae are at the head of the Pasarga-

¹ Herodotus, i. 1. 25.

² Cyropaedia, ii. 2. 21.

³ Ibid. i. 5. 4.

⁴ Ibid. i. 3. 18.

⁵ Ibid. viii. 7. 7.

⁶ Ibid. i. 5. 3.

⁷ Rawlinson's Herodotus, Appendix, Book iii. note C. Inscr. col. 1.

⁸ Herodotus, vii. 11.

⁹ Ibid. i. 125.

dae and of the nation. The same is implied by the council of seven Persian nobles, who appear in the revolution against the Magus and in the reconstruction of the government.

The laws of the Persians are famous everywhere. We find them recognized by Herodotus as well as by Xenophon, and by scripture, so that the impression given of the people is that of a nation in whom the instinct of law was more controlling than in any other nation that has lived upon earth, except perhaps the Romans. It is in principle the same idea of order which distinguishes a son of Japheth. It has developed itself differently in various positions and circumstances. But it will come out wherever a son of Japheth acts; and wherever we find a community of them existing for any long period under fixed circumstances it will crystalize in some characteristic form. In Attica was a tribe in a still eddy, by and around which swept the turmoils of wars and revolutions, of commerce and governments and civilizations. It shaped the chaotic fancies and thoughts of men into statues and temples, and harmonies and poems and philosophies, and into forms of civil, social, and individual life which were themselves artistic. In Sparta it formed a camp; in Rome, a legion; in Macedon, a phalanx; all applications of law to war. In Persia, a self-contented people, defended by mountains and deserts from the thoughts as well as the arms of other races, developed certain ideas of civil law, which grew among them into a power even greater than the monarchy. If, in all that race of mankind, the presumption is in favor of the view which recognizes the power that everywhere displaces kings, and sets up in their stead laws of Lycurgus or Solon, or twelve tables, or Magna Charta, or Declaration of Independence, we may be sure that in Persia, above all, the native authority was that of law. Almost the same may be said as to the personal constitution of the government. The Indo-Germanic mind has no idea of government which is not vested in co-ordinate authorities. Agamemnon and Romulus have their senates as well as the kings of Sparta and England, the Archons of Athens, and the President of the United States.

Jove, too, has his Olympian council, and Ormuzd has his six archangels, among whom he is chief, like Darius and Ahasuerus among the seven noblemen of Persia. The race will work out constitution and law, with supreme allegiance to law and right in peace, and in war soldierly obedience. Thus it is not strange that the same people, whose law was mightier than the king in their quietness, should become in an empire the most devoted subjects of their chief.

The idea has been thrown out that Cyrus is to be regarded as an Oriental barbaric chief, like Timour or Genghis Khan. An observation so striking in its tone, and from so acute a man as Niebuhr, naturally finds many echoes. We think, however, that it forgets the essential difference between the Tartar race, which is essentially lawless, and that race whose genius is law, and of which probably no finer specimen has yet appeared than Cyrus, unless he be Julius Caesar or Napoleon, both great generals and greater statesmen. The Greeks at Troy or Marathon or Arbela are not more distinguished by their discipline from the Asiatics than were the body of Persian warriors among the mob which composed the mass of the host of Xerxes or of either Darius. Cyrus is the consummate fruit of this people at the moment of their prime, and we cannot think of him as a Bedouin or a bandit chief.

Whether, therefore, we consider the evidence or the probabilities of the case, we must think Xenophon's account of the Persian constitution before Cyrus substantially correct. Whether his informants were right in representing Persia as then co-ordinate with Media, rather than as a dependent monarchy, is not a point of so much importance, because it is one on which a mistake would be very easy, and not material. Even on this point, however, the way in which the scripture writers speak of the Medes and Persians would imply a league, rather than a subjection of one to the other.

If the Medes had been so insatiate of dominion as to march over four hundred miles of mountain or desert to seek out those Swiss of the East, in their corner of mountains between

the desert and the sea, they could not have conquered them, and if they had they would have gotten no spoil. The Persians were made for war, and went a thousand miles to find service (Ezek. xxvii. 10; xxxviii. 5),—even as far as Tyre,—when Cyrus was a boy, growing up to be their emperor. Indeed, we should infer even from the clearness with which the two nations, similar as they were in blood, are distinguished in Herodotus, that the one could not have been so incorporated in the other as he seems to have conceived. Cyrus must be called “the Mule,” on account of kindred with nations more separated than the English and the Scotch.

The confirmation of authority and of probability is equally complete as regards the Persian system of education. As Xenophon’s account is in its main features confirmed by Herodotus, and by every other authority, we have absolutely nothing to meet here, except the objections raised by a certain class of reasoners, based upon features of supposed resemblance to Spartan education. As these analogies support the argument already drawn from the genius of the people, it would be far from our purpose to deny them, even if the points of likeness were as manifold as they are meagre. The Persians were, in their day, the leading representatives of a race of mankind whose nations are successively coming to greatness in history; and always their greatness is instinctively sought and found by education. The Persians trained the boys to draw the bow, and speak the truth, and keep the law; the Greeks taught them poetry; and the Romans, war; the English, Magna Charta and “Rule Britannia”; and America, letters and the rights of man. Persian victory grew out of Persian education, as Prussian victory now grows out of Prussian education. No doubt Cyrus and his peers, admirers as they were of Sparta, were fond of dwelling on the points of likeness in the two disciplines, and did not extenuate them; but it is also clear that they had substantial foundation for their pictures.

As regards the Medes, there is no conflict of authorities. They had an absolute military despotism, and an irregular

empire, which may have extended from the Caspian to the Halys, and have existed as long as Herodotus, or even Ctesias, represents. But that was the empire of the Medes. The Persians were never, so far as we know, associated with the Medes, or the Medes with the Persians, by either Greek, Hebrew, Babylonian, Assyrian, Armenian, or native authorities, until the time of Cyrus. According to Xenophon,¹ the coalition out of which the Medo-Persian power grew was formed at the time of the marriage of Cambyses and Mandane, and it grew into empire under the generalship of Cyrus. But the Persians acted, in that war, as allies of the Medes, so that the Median king became sovereign of the conquered nations. To them, therefore, Cyaxares was king; while to the Persians he was only the head of the confederation. Astyages and Cyaxares were kings of Media, and as such at the head of the Medo-Persian force while engaged in the wars of Media.

Cyrus was first commander, under Cyaxares, of the combined armies, and afterward king of Persia, as heir of Cambyses, and king of Media, as heir of Astyages and of Cyaxares. Thus the two were peacefully united under one crown — the old empire of the Medes, succeeded by the Medo-Persian alliance under Astyages and Cyaxares, and the Medo-Persian empire under Cyrus and Cambyses, which afterwards gave place to the Persian empire of Darius and his successors.

This scheme is so natural, and so accordant, as we shall see, with the inscriptions, and with Aeschylus, and with scripture, that it would be received as established history, were it not contradicted by Herodotus and Ctesias — positively as to the peaceful transition, and negatively as to the existence of Cyaxares.

Herodotus and Ctesias both give particular, though conflicting, accounts of a war in which Astyages was deposed by Cyrus; and Herodotus certainly, and Ctesias as reflected by his copyists, leave no room for Cyaxares.

The correctness of Xenophon has been so strongly con-

¹ *Cyropaedia*, i. 5. 3.

firmed by previous tests that probably his authority would have been accepted against both of them, but for an impression that Xenophon has testified against himself with regard to the peaceful succession to the Median throne. We will state this argument in the words of Colonel Mure :

“ The discrepancies between these several accounts being so great, and the ingredient of pure mythology, from which that of Xenophon is free, being so copious in those of Herodotus and Ctesias, it were the less fair to Xenophon to assume from the concurrence of the two rival authorities on any one or two points that their version is necessarily right, and that of the Cyropaedia wrong. He has, however, forfeited his claim to credibility by having, in his own properly historical work, the *Anabasis*, concurred with Herodotus and Ctesias in representing the Median empire as conquered by Cyrus.”¹

If this is so, we must at least admit that Xenophon recognizes the existence of a history different from his own, which represents Cyrus as peacefully succeeding Cyaxares in the kingdom of Media. But let us turn to the authority. We are referred to *Anab.* III. iv. 8, 11, 12. The passage is one of the most impressive in history. The ten thousand Greeks are wandering, without knowing it, over the forgotten site of Nineveh. “ They came to the Tigris. There was a great, desolate city, the name of it Larissa [supposed to be the *Resen* of scripture, Nimrud of Layard]. The Medes dwelt there of old. When the Persians were taking the empire from the Medes, the king of the Persians laid siege to it, but could not take it in any way ; but a cloud covered the sun, and hid it until the people fled, and so it was taken. Thence they proceeded six parasangs to a great deserted fortress near a city. The name of the city was Mespila [perhaps the Mound Kouyunjik, near Mosul], and the Medes once lived in it. There the Median wife of the king was said to have taken refuge when the Medes lost their empire by the Persians. This town the Persians could not take by

¹ History of Greek Literature, Vol. v. p. 382.

siege or assault. But Zeus struck the inhabitants with thunder, and so it was taken."

In all this there is nothing said of Cyrus. Probably the poor barbarians who told the Greeks these stories knew no more of him than they did of the great Nineveh, which was buried there scarcely two hundred years before. They only knew of a fierce struggle between the Medes and Persians, which had raged over that ground, and they naturally connected all the legends which haunted those huge, charred heaps with that crisis. Xenophon, with that precision which he had learned in the school of Socrates, tells us no more than the simple people told him,—that "the Persians wrested the empire from the Medes." It will be just to attribute to him only what he does say. Thus the question remains: Who was the "king of the Persians" who, in the view of these poor barbarians, took the sceptre from "the Medes"?

To this question we think that there is an answer, which, while it vindicates the consistency and establishes the accuracy of Xenophon in both his statements, will also show how his rivals fell into their error with regard to the same revolution. The history appears to have been as follows:

Cyrus succeeded peaceably to the kingdom of Media and the empire of Asia as the lawful heir, in his own right as son of Mandane, and that of his wife as daughter of Cyaxares. Cyrus and Cambyzes were kings of Media, as James I. and Charles I. were kings of England. Of this change the dwellers by the Zab and the Tigris knew nothing. But when the line of Astyages expired with Cambyzes, and the sceptre was seized by a mere Persian noble,—Darius, son of Hystaspes,—the spirit of the Medes rose; and then was the conflict, raging across their own villages, between armies bearing Median and Persian banners, which so obliterated all their memories of former wars.

Of this struggle, as between those parties, Herodotus was ignorant. It is strange, but it is true, that a leaf has during our own generation been restored to the history of the East, so that we know of convulsions which shook all central Asia,

not forty years before Herodotus was born, of which he hardly gives a hint. He tells of the accession of Darius in 521 B.C. and of the insurrection of Babylon which followed it, and the next we see of the Persians is the army of the great king on its march to Scythia in 513. But Darius had himself caused the history to be engraved upon the face of the rock of Behistun, overhanging the great road from Mesopotamia to Media in arrow-head characters, three hundred feet aloft, which, after being a dumb wonder for two thousand years, have at last been read to us.

The inscription, after a record of the Babylonian rebellion, proceeds thus: "Says Darius the King, whilst I was at Babylon, these are the countries which revolted against me: Persia, Susiana, Media, Assyria, Armenia, Parthia, Margiana, Sattagydia, Sacia."¹

Of these insurrections, the most formidable seems to have been that in which Media, Assyria, Armenia, and Parthia were united under Phraortes, a Mede, who claimed to be "Xathrites, of the race of Cyaxares." Against this pretender, Darius sends four generals, besides himself, and he records nine battles, occurring in Armenia, Assyria, and Media, in which, as he claims, his forces were victorious. To all this, as belonging to the history of Darius, we find no allusion in Herodotus, except in a remark at the close of his account of the deposition of Astyages, that "the Medes afterward revolted from Darius, but were defeated in battle, and again reduced to subjection."² We think that Herodotus and Ctesias, and all the Greeks, failed to recognize either the fact or the importance of this conflict. During those years Greece heard nothing from the East, because all the East was so engulfed in its own turmoils; and, hearing nothing, they inferred that nothing was going on there; and when, two generations later, they found the East full of the remembrance of a great convulsion in which the empire passed to the Persians, they very naturally referred it either to the time of

¹ Rawlinson's Herodotus, Appendix, Book iii. note C. Inscr. col. 2, par. 2.

² Herodotus, i. 130.

Cyrus, whom they knew as the first Persian emperor, or to that of the false Smerdis.¹

¹ Darius was a man of remarkable craft and wonderful abilities for organizing and administering an empire; but he had absolutely none of those heroic qualities around which popular tales gather. He was simply "the κάρηλος," a huckster, and not an emperor. Consequently his name is great in history, but unknown in legend. The great events of his life were ascribed in story to the hero who stood next behind them in the line of vision of the narrator. Accordingly, the great struggle with Fravartish and the old Median realm, was referred by the Greeks, and perhaps by ill-informed Persians, to the elder Cyrus. Curiously enough, we seem to have in the Book of Judith the same contest as presented in the Jewish traditions of Palestine and Egypt; and here the place which Darius was too pale to fill is occupied by Nebuchadnezzar, — a great name, which for them threw every other in the shade, but which seems never to have been heard beyond the Taurus, so that it cannot be found in the Dictionary of Classical Biography. As this case is so analogous to that in the text, and throws light upon the same events, it will be proper to state the grounds for our opinion. The book refers its events to "the reign of Nabuchodonosor, who was King of Assyrians in the great city of Nineveh," a description which, in itself, betrays a very defective knowledge respecting the central power of the empire. On the other hand, it is evidently at home in Palestine, and we may take its Jewish dates as comparatively reliable. These are fixed by the statement that the temple had been recently rebuilt and consecrated (chap. iv. 3), which occurred in the sixth year of Darius (Ezra vi. 15), and that the high-priest at the time was Joachim (chap. iv. 8), who appears in Nehemiah (xii. 10, 12) as the son of Joshua, the chief-priest in the earlier part of the reign of Darius, and in Josephus (Antiq. xi. 5), as high-priest about the time of the death of Darius and the accession of Xerxes. The time being thus fixed, we have only to inquire into the correspondence of the events. In the Book of Judith, there gathered to the standard of "Arphaxad, king of the Medes at Ecbatana, . . . all the inhabitants of the mountain region and the dwellers upon the Euphrates and the Tigris and the Hydaspes, as well as Erioch, king of Elymacans in the plain, and exceeding many tribes of the sons of Chelod came to his army." Against whom Nabuchodonosor summons the Persians, and also Palestine and Egypt, — but they despise his orders. He, however, defeats his enemy in the field, captures Ecbatana, and finally takes Arphaxad himself in the mountains of Rhagau, and puts him to death. In the Behistun inscription, the revolt of Phraortes, or Xathrites, is supported by Media, Armenia and Assyria, Parthia and Hyrcania, while Susiana or Elymais, and Babylon, the seat of the Chaldeans, appears in arms against Darius at the same time. The reliance of Darius is "the army of Persians and Medes that was with me." The struggle is sufficiently protracted to allow abundant time to send even to Egypt for aid; and the strength of the combination against Darius is enough to encourage the western nations to disregard his summons. But after many battles the pretender is subdued, and finally captured at Rhages, and crucified. In this record we cannot but recognize the original of the war of the Book of

If this view is correct, we should expect that many of the facts of the struggle of Darius would be referred by the narrators to the times of Cyrus. Our want of information will of course in general prevent our distinguishing such points. One, however, comes out very remarkably by comparison of Herodotus with Ctesias, and with Justin.¹ In the latter, we find Cyrus continually attended by a kind of Mephistopheles, named Oebares, or Soebares, who first appears as a slave carrying a basket of horse-manure. In Herodotus, Oebares is the hostler of Darius, by whose low craft his master is made monarch. For the correctness of his own account Herodotus is able to appeal to an equestrian monument, bearing the inscription: ² "Darius, son of Hystaspes, by the good help of his horse [telling the name], and of his groom Oebares, gained the kingdom of the Persians." If he is right in his translation, this is conclusive in his favor, so far as concerns the fact that Darius, and not Cyrus, was the man who vaulted to the empire by the aid of Oebares; though for the filling out of the story we may prefer Ctesias's account of a long course of unscrupulous cunning and audacity, to the single trick of the common version.

Though this is but a single point, it is one of such a character as to carry with it the whole story told by Ctesias, or by Justin, of the war of Cyrus and Astyages. Oebares cannot be spared from their drama, any more than Mephistopheles from the Faust, or Iago from the Othello.

But if the wars related by Ctesias are to be referred for such basis of fact as they may have to the times of Darius, it may still be true that Astyages was dethroned by Cyrus, and that Herodotus has given us a history of the revolution. Let us examine the evidence on this question.

We find in Herodotus, besides the passage already quoted,

Judith, and the history of Darius, as told in Palestine of Nebuchadnezzar, and in Greece of Cyrus, is a most curious instance of the refraction of historic facts as seen through different media of tradition. This, then, was "when the Persians wrested the empire from the Medes."

¹ Book i. 17.

² Herodotus, iii. 8.

three references to the usurpation of the Magus, as an attempt of the Medes to secure the command of the empire.¹ If he is in error in this, his mistake must be taken as proving that there had come to him a report of a struggle between Darius and the Medes, which he did not understand, and which, now that the inscriptions have shown us its magnitude, we see may well have been the original of his war between Astyages and Cyrus.

But if we have sufficiently shown how Xenophon is consistent with himself, and how Herodotus may have fallen into error as to the transition of the empire, the question will still remain, whether we have any evidence, beside that of Xenophon, that the "father of history" actually is in error on that point.

We would call attention, first, to the prevailing view of the Greeks until after the time of Darius Hystaspis.

Herodotus regards the fall of Astyages as the end of the Median, and the beginning of the Persian, empire.² He also tells us that the war of Croesus against Cyrus was taken up in behalf of Astyages.³ Now, it was this war which first brought the Oriental empires prominently within the notice of the Greeks. They had no habits of thought or of speech with regard to them which had become fixed and inveterate. If, then, the invading power which came upon the coast of the Aegean was already Persian, and had overthrown the Median empire by a violent revolution, and was resisted distinctly because it was Persian, instead of Median, it could hardly be that the Greeks should have regarded it as Median. And yet we find that the Greeks did call their enemy "the Mede," not only during the wars of Cyrus, but that the same habit of thought became so fixed in their minds that they still continued to call him the Mede through all the generation which warred against Darius and even Xerxes. This, we repeat, could not have been, unless Cyrus, though known as himself a Persian, had been distinctly and clearly understood as representing the Median power. He was Cyrus the

¹ Herodotus, iii. 65, 73, 126.

² Ibid. i. 129.

³ Ibid. i. 73.

Persian, but his empire was Median, as that of James Stuart or William of Orange was English.

We may add that Aeschylus, who lived very near the time of Cyrus, and who is supposed to have conversed with Medes and Persians captured at Marathon, seems to have had no more thought of a violent revolution at the accession of Cyrus, than Homer had of the quarrels of Atreus and Thyestes. We are to remember that in the view of Xenophon the Medo-Persian power was inaugurated when the forces of the two nations were united in the armies of Astyages, with Cyrus for his general. That power was further developed in the reign of Cyaxares, who, weak as he was, had at least the good sense to leave the work in hands which were able to do it, until it came fully into the hands of the man of destiny.¹

With this view compare Aeschylus :

Μῆδος γὰρ ἦν ὁ πρῶτος ἡγεμὼν στρατοῦ.
 ἄλλος δ' ἐκείνου παῖς τόδ' ἔργον ἤνυσεν,
 φρένες γὰρ αὐτοῦ θυμὸν οἰακοστροφούν.
 τρίτος δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Κῦρος, εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ,
 ἄρξας ἔθηκε πᾶσιν εἰρήνην φίλοις.²

“A Mede was the first *commander of the host*; and another, his son, forwarded the work, for reason guided his heart; and third after him Cyrus, prosperous man, took the rule, and established peace for all that loved him.”

Here, in addition to the idea of the empire as, at first, a military hegemony, we have a list of emperors, in which we need the much-challenged name of Cyaxares, son of Astyages. If we wish to be satisfied of this, we have only to look at the expedients of those who reject it, and endeavor to reconcile Aeschylus with Herodotus, whose list of emperors was Dejoces, Phraortes, Cyaxares, Astyages, Cyrus. Rawlinson,³ for example, rejects Dejoces as a myth, because the record is inconsistent with Assyrian inscriptions; and also Phraortes, because his name corresponds with one found in the Behistun inscription as a Median rebel against Darius. We would

¹ Isa. xlv. 1.

² Persae, 761-765.

³ Rawlinson's Herodotus, Book i. Appendix, Essay iii. p. 7.

suggest that the same expedient be applied to the first Cyaxares, also, for whose existence we have no authority but that of Herodotus, who is unsupported by either Xenophon or Ctesias, and who may very probably have been known to Herodotus only through some Median account of the reign of the uncle of Cyrus which failed to mention that all the achievements which it recorded were really due to Cyrus the Persian. However, we need not disturb either the elder Cyaxares or any of the former emperors from the thrones which they hold in Herodotus or in Ctesias. Aeschylus and Xenophon both give Persian accounts, and they prove that the Persians did not know the Median empire until the time of Astyages.

Now weigh the evidence as to the existence of Cyaxares, son of Astyages.

Darius, in the inscription, says that two pretenders rose against him, each claiming to be "of the race of Cyaxares." One was a Sagartian, and was followed by his countrymen. The other assumed the name of "Fravartish," or Phraortes, and his rebellion extended to Media, Armenia, Assyria, and Parthia. Who was the Cyaxares whose name was such a power in all the old Median realm? It may be possible for us to answer the question from Herodotus, by deposing the wise Dejoces and the mighty Phraortes, because they will not come into our system, and exalting Cyaxares to the position of founder of the monarchy and empire, because he will accommodate it. But how much easier to take the statement of Xenophon, that Cyaxares was the last purely Median king, and the emperor under whom all that region was united, through the agency of Cyrus, under a rule which was loved, as well as feared.

We do not altogether sympathize with that veneration with which modern scholars are wont to take the statements of Herodotus — unless they clash with their own schemes. But we do feel an inclination to defend him from such liberties. If we try to amend his testimony, how much more modest it will be to simply transpose the reigns of Astyages and

Cyaxares. Then we may leave Phraortes and Dejoces, as monarchs who did consolidate the Median power, and preside over the civilization which was already so advanced in the days of Astyages. Their names are too great in tradition to be lightly blotted out. And see what Herodotus will gain by the change.

He comes into natural accordance (1) with the Behistun inscription; (2) with Xenophon, whom we must by this time regard as an authority; (3) with Babylonian authorities, as given in Abydenus and Polyhistor, which represent "Asdahages" as king of Media at the time of the fall of Nineveh¹; (4) Perhaps we should add, with Ctesias; as the name Astyages or Asdahages certainly seems much more convertible than Cyaxares into Arbaces, which is the name of the Median king given by Diodorus, from Ctesias, as the Median conqueror of Sardanapalus.

On the other hand, a similar change in Xenophon's order might be made without seriously impairing our confidence in such general historical accuracy as it would be fair to expect in such a case. For the two names we have the combined authority of the two historians, and the question of their order is one upon which either might easily have been mistaken. The considerations given above would seem to favor Xenophon; to which we should add that the younger Cyrus and his friends were better able and more likely to have consulted the records of the empire and the royal family respecting the elder Cyrus, than the informants of Herodotus.

A history drawn from such sources will necessarily be more particular and definite as to both names and facts, in proportion as they are near to the central figure; and we may test the faithfulness of the picture by its fidelity to this perspective. Let us look at some of the more remote objects.

As we are watching the training of Cyrus at court, — and Astyages and Cyaxares are familiar acquaintances, — word comes of an inroad made by the son of the Assyrian king. Who was that prince? Ctesias would have given us a name,

¹ Müller's *Frag. Hist.* ii. p. 505, and iv. p. 282.

and undoubtedly Xenophon asked ; but none was given him, and he gives us none. But the story itself must have come from Media or Persia, and from the times to which it is referred. If it had grown a generation later, or been invented by a Greek, it would have called the invader a Babylonian. But the Medes had evidently been accustomed to call the region lying to the west and south of the passes of Mount Zagros by the name Assyria ; as the Romans and the Greeks, respectively, called the continent beyond the sea Africa or Lybia, from the quarter nearest to themselves. The national designation is, of course, a mistake ; but it is a mistake of such a character as to vindicate the historian from any charge of tampering with his testimony. It could not have been made by a Greek, but only by a Mede, or, even more naturally, by Persians of the generation of Cyrus. For the Persians probably knew nothing of Mesopotamia, except through the Medes. Even in the days of their glory, the great king could not go through the passes leading westward from Persia but by leave of the tribes who held them ; and between Persia and Babylonia lay the great country of Susiana. They must follow up the eastern slopes of Zagros to Media, and thence to Assyria. When Cyrus came to Media, the generation was dead who had combined with the governor of Babylon against the king of Nineveh ; and men only thought of the kingdom beyond the mountains as Assyria, as to the Greeks and Romans the Ptolemies were Egyptian, and the Seleucidae were Syrian, and not Grecian, kings. Thus the distinction between Assyrians and Babylonians had been forgotten by the Medes, and never known to the Persians. We shall observe that this story understands the Babylonian rule as extending generally over the territory to which the name of Assyrian properly belongs — an opinion which will not seem unlikely, when we remember that the great reign of Nebuchadnezzar has just closed.

We find a similar fact in the narrative of events in Armenia. We have here anecdotes told with much definiteness. But the Armenian actors are merely mentioned as the

Armenian king and queen, etc., except the two princes, Tigranes and Sabaris. These are names which we find in no other Greek historian. Did Xenophon invent them? It is remarkable that, as we have found him sustained on Persian matters by Persian inscriptions, so here we find native Armenian¹ authorities representing their hero Dikran, son of King Erwand, as closely associated with Cyrus in personal friendship and in military enterprises. Their accounts are sufficiently distorted in favor of the Armenians to show their native origin; but they show abundantly that the fame of Tigranes and of his friendship to Cyrus were conspicuous enough to explain the fact that they came down together in stories told in Persian camps for a hundred and fifty years. The name of Sabaris came down with his brother's; but not so that of his father or of his mother. They were only official characters.

In further illustration of the correctness of Xenophon's information respecting the Armenians, we may notice that he represents² the king of Armenia as having been subjugated by Astyages some time in the earlier part of his reign. According to Abydenus,³ Astyages was king at the capture of Nineveh, B.C. 606 — a view which agrees well with Xenophon's. It would appear, from inscriptions found both in Assyria and in Armenia, that Armenia had its native line of kings, who were powerful during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.; and, though crippled by Sargon so that their own inscriptions cease, still, as appears from incursions into their territory recorded by Sennacherib and Esar-Haddon, maintained some kind of independence, which probably grew during the decrepitude of Assyria. But naturally Armenia was unable to cope with the conquerors of Nineveh, and as naturally fell by its geographical position under the sway of Media; while Assyria itself fell to Babylon. By a like geographical necessity, in the close union which followed its re-conquest by Cyrus, it remained still attached to Media,

¹ Moses of Chorene, Book i. Chamich, Part i. ch. 6. ² Cyropaedia, iii. 1-10

³ Müller's Frag. Hist., Graec. Vol. iv. p. 232.

rather than to Persia, and was almost the chief field of the struggle of Darius against the pretender Phraortes.

The position and character of the northern Chaldeans is given by Xenophon, with the distinctness and correctness which we should naturally expect from the fact that they are so intimately connected with the personal story of Cyrus and Tigranes, as well as that the historian himself had passed over the ground in the *Anabasis*.

But with regard to the nations lying north and east of Media, there are some geographical questions, out of which have arisen strong objections to the historical character of the whole work. Mure,¹ for example, affirms that, while "the Oriental geography of the *Anabasis* has been shown by modern research to be reasonably correct, . . . that of the *Cyropaedia*, whether from ignorance or carelessness, is continually at fault." It will be interesting to see what geographical errors an English scholar has been able to find in an Athenian's report of the tent-talk of Persian soldiers.

The greater portion of the criticisms respect the Hyrcanians and Cadusians. Here there can be no excuse for ignorance. The companions of the younger Cyrus ought to be well-informed respecting the situation and power of the Hyrcanians, for Ctesias informs us that the father of Cyrus was satrap of Hyrcania before he was king; and likewise respecting the Cadusians, for Xenophon himself tells us, in his *Greek History*,² that Cyrus was called to their frontiers to visit his father, who had been taken sick on an expedition to suppress an insurrection of the Cadusians. Xenophon, moreover, affirms³ that the Hyrcanians were received by Cyrus as equal allies with the Medes and Persians, and continued to his own time to share the high trusts of the empire with them. This statement is remarkably confirmed by Herodotus,⁴ who, in the catalogue of the host of Xerxes, describes them as "armed like the Persians, having for their chief Megapanus, who was afterwards satrap of Babylon."

¹ *History of Greek Literature*, Vol. v. p. 384.

² *Gr. Hist.*, ii. 1. 13.

³ *Cyropaedia*, i. 1. 4; iv. 2. 6; v. 3. 2.

⁴ Herodotus, vii. 62.

Ctesias, also, as cited by Diodorus,¹ confirms the statement that the Cadusians were brought into the Medo-Persian connection by Cyrus. We must conclude that if the authorities upon which Xenophon relied — which have been proved so cautious and correct on other matters, and even, on other than geographical points, respecting these same tribes — have fallen into gross geographical errors concerning the Cadusians and Hyrcanians, their “ignorance or carelessness” is inexcusable. We must examine this bill of errors.²

1. “The Hyrcanians, on the southeastern shore of the Caspian Sea, hence also called the Hyrcanian Sea, are, on Xenophon’s map, neighbors and subjects of the Assyrians; from whom they were separated, in the real geography of Asia, by the whole breadth of the Median empire.”

2. “They are also described as a small people; being, in truth, one of the most extended of Central Asia.”

3. “Their neighbors, the Cadusians, are, with equal disregard of topographical propriety, characterized by the Hyrcanians themselves as vassals of Assyria.”

4. “As a very numerous race; being but a petty tribe as compared with the Hyrcanians.”

On these charges it is to be observed:

1. It is true that the army of Alexander found the Hyrcanians at the southeast angle of the Caspian Sea, and that the sea was, after that time, often called the Hyrcanian. Whether they were there two hundred years earlier is a question upon which we may perhaps learn as much from Xenophon as from any other author. He regards the Hyrcanians, Caduscians, and Sacians as neighbors,³ and the Hyrcanians as subject to the Assyrian, while the other two are at war⁴ with him. The access to their country is through some pass which is commanded by a single fortress, built for the special purpose of threatening the Hyrcanians and Sacae.⁵ Between this fortress and the principality of Gadatas is a distance of six or seven⁶ long days’ marches over an open and level⁷ country,

¹ ii. 33. ² History of Greek Literature, Vol. v. p. 385.

³ v. 2. 25.

⁴ v. 2. 24; v. 3. 25.

⁵ v. 3. 11.

⁶ v. 3. 28.

⁷ v. 3. 36.

while Babylon is still beyond.¹ These distances would bring us from Babylon to the northern border of the Assyrian lowlands, and the fort is naturally understood as commanding the passes through the Kurdish mountains to the valleys which open upon the Caspian, where the three nations are found together in later history. The circumstance that the subjugation of the Hyrcanians to the Assyrian is mentioned in connection with his designs against Bactria,² may indicate that they are to be regarded as occupying the country between the Caspian and the Elburz mountains, as that was the road from Assyria to Bactria. The association of the Cadusians as a third race with the Medes and Armenians in the principality assigned to the younger son of Cyrus,³ implies that their country added to the other two constituted a domain naturally complete in itself. All these considerations will lead us to place the three nations — viz. the Hyrcani, Cadusii, and Sacae — on the south and west shores of the Caspian, and in the country known in the time of the Greek empire as Media Atropatene, and now as Azerbaijan. This district is separated from Media proper by the mountain range now called Elwand, and from Armenia by the Carduchian or Kurdish mountains. At the angle of the four regions lay the wild region of mountain and forest where we find the common hunting-ground of Assyrian, Armenian, and Mede. By crossing this barrier toward the northwest, the Mede had reached and subdued Armenia; while toward the northeast the Assyrian is carrying his armies into the region of the Caspian. The “breadth of the Median empire” in this quarter, then, is only this comparatively narrow barrier of desolate mountain, which knew no master until the Assyrian built his fort in the pass anciently known as the Gates of Zagros,⁴ and now called Keli Shin, from the two blue pillars, bearing cuneiform inscriptions, which still stand to mark the ancient thoroughfare.⁵

¹ v. 3. 45. ² i. 5. 2. ³ viii. 7. 11. ⁴ Ptolemy's Geography, vi. 2.

⁵ H. C. Rawlinson, in *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. x. c. 4. p. 187—quoted by Bonomi.

2. Hyrcania is described by Strabo as an extensive district with great natural advantages, which are not improved on account of the oppression of the government to which the people have been subject. The people are mentioned by Herodotus as in the army of Xerxes; but their country is not named among the satrapies of the empire. According to Curtius, when Darius gathered the hosts of Asia for his struggle with Alexander, the Persians numbered a hundred thousand; the Medes, sixty thousand; the Armenians, forty-seven thousand; and the Derbices, forty-two thousand; while the Hyrcanians were six thousand footmen. The number of their cavalry is not stated, perhaps because massed with the Medes. We may take the two thousand assigned them by Xenophon¹ as giving the estimate of their horse in his time, which will correspond very well with the six thousand infantry. They were kindred to the Medes, who probably gave their name to territory which contained other nations much larger than they,—among them the Derbices, who supplied forty-two thousand of the same host. All the notices we have of them sustain the statement of Rawlinson,² that they “at no time attained any distinction, military or other, and disappear from history shortly after the time of Alexander,” that is, after the fall of their patrons, the Medes and Persians.

3. The “carelessness” of stating that the Cadusians were vassals of the Assyrian,—though it would involve no geographical difficulty, yet does not belong to Xenophon, who consistently and repeatedly represents the Cadusians as enemies of the Assyrians.³ As to their numbers and power and relation to the belligerents, Diodorus,⁴ copying Ctesias, tells us that in the reign of Artæus, one hundred years before Cyrus, the Cadusians revolted from the Medes, at the instigation of Parsondas, a Persian, and maintained the struggle until the time of Cyrus. They do not appear at all in the satrapies or the armies of Darius Hystaspis, or of Xerxes,

¹ Cyropaedia, v. 3. 24.

² Herodotus, Appendix, Book vii. Essay i. 3.

³ Cyropaedia, v. 2. 25; 3. 24. ⁴ Diod. Hist. 2. 33.

probably because they did not own the sway of either. In Xenophon's *Hellenica*, we find that Darius Nothus was going in person to bring them back to his authority when he was seized with the illness of which he died. And Plutarch¹ relates that his successor, Artaxerxes Mnemon, invaded them with three hundred thousand foot and ten thousand horse, and returned as the son of Hystaspes returned from Scythia, and Napoleon from Russia. The defeat embittered the remainder of his life. Justin² affirms that his successor, Ochus, made the same attempt; and Diodorus agrees with Justin, in illustrating the impression made by these wars upon the Persians, by stating that, after the line of Artaxerxes was extirpated, the throne was given to Darius Codomannus, because he had, years before, slain a Cadusian champion in single combat.³ Poor Codomannus himself, when his hour came, was fain to invoke the same power to avert his fall. Curtius makes Alexander, in his address before the battle of Arbela, guard his soldiers particularly against the terror of the name of the Scythae and the Cadusii.⁴ And Arrian⁵ says that in the next year a false report met Alexander, on his way from Persia to Ecbatana, that Darius was prepared to renew the struggle, relying on an alliance with the Scyths and Cadusians. These estimates of the importance of the Cadusians are abundantly sustained by Strabo, who affirms that the Cadusians occupied the coast of the Caspian for nearly five thousand stadia,⁶ and that their numbers were little inferior to that of the great race of the Ariani.⁷ These notices may enable us to judge whether the Cadusians were "a petty tribe as compared with the Hyrcanians."

5. The next "error" is that "the Bactrians, whose frontier was about eight hundred miles distant from Assyria, and could only be reached through Persia or Media, are represented as having been subjected to a hostile inroad by the Assyrian king, just before Assyria itself was invaded by

¹ Life of Artaxerxes.² Justin, x. 3.³ Justin, l. c. ; Diod. xvii. 6.⁴ Curtius, iv. 14.⁵ Arrian, iii. 19.⁶ Strabo, xi. 7.⁷ xi. 13.

the Perso-Median army." Of this it is only necessary to say that by securing the gates of Zagros and the country of the Hyrcani, the Assyrian commanded the road to Bactria, not only for himself, but against the Medes. The historical probability of such an enterprise we shall consider presently ; there was no geographical barrier.

6. "The Chaldeans, on the frontiers of Armenia, are described as in habitual intercourse with India, and serving as mercenaries in the army of the Indian monarch, from the nearest point of whose territory their own was really distant about fifteen hundred miles." Certainly, one of the Chaldeans tells Cyrus that his organization of peace might be a very fine thing for the rest ; "but that there were some of the Chaldeans who did not know how to work, and could not work, but lived by war—were always plundering or serving for hire, often with the king of the Indians ; for now, they said πολύχρυσος ὁ ἀνὴρ, he is a man of much gold."¹ And why not? They had only to come down from their mountains to come upon the great caravan route by which luxurious Nineveh, and even Babylon, carried on their commerce with the jewelled East. The king of India had gold, and wanted men ; the Chaldeans were brave, and wanted gold, and were not afraid of an overland journey so much shorter and easier than that by which the Yankees made their way to California. We may notice, however, that Cyrus and the Persians used the Chaldeans as guides on their way to India, which may seem strange, if our only ideas of the geographical relations of countries are formed by measuring straight lines on maps, but not when we consider that the Chaldeans were on the line of communication between the Euxine and the Indus, and very near to that between India and Mesopotamia ; while the Persians, behind the desert and the mountains, were very far from either.

7. "The no less anomalous notices of the Indian envoys" will naturally come into our historical review. Geographically, there is nothing difficult in them.

¹ Cyropædia, iii. 2. 25.

8. Mure's only remaining criticism is thus expressed: "In one instance he [Xenophon] seems to write, or rather fancy himself writing, in the person of some Asiatic chronicler, rather than of a Greek man of science. After defining (somewhat vaguely) the empire of Cyrus when finally constituted, as bounded by the Erythraean sea to the east, the Euxine to the north, Egypt and Cyprus to the west, and Ethiopia to the south, he adds: 'The regions beyond those limits [inclusive, therefore, of Greece and all Europe, with the richer parts of Africa] are either seas, arid deserts, or otherwise little adapted, owing to excess of heat or of cold, for human habitation.' This description would be appropriate in an extract from some popular Median work of geography, but reads strangely in the page of an accomplished Greek scholar and traveller." Exactly so; and this is the key to all the geography and all the history of the *Cyropaedia*. The statements are not to be regarded as those of Xenophon, but of the companions of Cyrus, and are therefore made from the Persian stand-point. Unsuccessful as our critic has been in his search, it would be strange if there were no geographical mistakes among them. On the other hand, there are true statements here which Xenophon never would have made, and which he would even have struck out, if he had assumed to modify them by his own views of Asiatic geography. For example, his own idea seems to have been that Media, as well as Babylon, lay to the south of Nineveh, while Ecbatana and Susa were toward the east,¹ perhaps fixing the location of Media by his "wall of Media."² But there is no trace of such an error in the *Cyropaedia*.

In order to test the accuracy of the view of Oriental history implied in the *Cyropaedia*, we must endeavor to fix some of its leading points in time.

If we accept the common opinion, that Cyrus died in 529 B.C., at the age of seventy, his birth will fall in 599 B.C. If his uncle Cyaxares be the same with Darius the Mede, who was sixty-two years of age at the taking of Babylon in 538

¹ *Anabasis*, iii. 5. 15.

² *Ibid.* i. 7. 15; ii. 4. 12.

B.C., that prince was born in 600 B.C., and was only one year older than Cyrus. Perhaps the mere fact that they were related as uncle and nephew may be sufficient to account for the circumstance that the views of private life preserved in the Cyropaedia suppose a greater difference of age; while, on the other hand, the correction of that misconception will help us to receive the story, found also in Ctesias, which Xenophon felt bound to reject, that the bride of Cyrus was daughter of Astyages, and not of Cyaxares.¹ Taking, from Herodotus, thirty-five years as the length of the reign of the Median king, and, from both Herodotus and Ctesias, forty years for his predecessor, and, from scripture, the year 535 B.C. as about the limit of the last reign, we shall put the accession of Astyages about 610 B.C., and that of Cyaxares about 570 B.C. Thus we shall agree with Babylonian authorities² in regarding Astyages as the Median king at the fall of Nineveh, in 606 B.C.; while his father, the elder Cyaxares, may have been the monarch who first joined the Babylonian prince against Nineveh, in 625 B.C., or earlier. Astyages will also be the king who fought with Alyattes the Lydian the battle made memorable by the eclipse of Thales, taking 585 B.C. as the date of that eclipse; and the sister of Croesus (who was born in 595, or at the earliest in 605 B.C.) will become the wife of Cyaxares, rather than of Astyages, thus relieving the story in Herodotus of the strangeness of making Croesus a counsellor at the court of the great-grandson of his brother-in-law. The thirty years commonly assigned to the reign of Cyrus will commence in 559 B.C., which may be the date of his accession to the command of the armies, and so to the virtual direction of the empire.

The public history of the Cyropaedia opens soon after the accession of Cyaxares. Assuming the year 570 B.C. as the date of that event, let us examine the political map of Asia at that time, as it is presented by Xenophon with a fulness which invites scrutiny.

¹ Cyropaedia, viii. 6. 28.

² Berosi, Frag. xii. Frag. Hist. Greece, Vol. ii. p. 505, and Vol. iv. p. 282.

The Assyrian king, having previously subdued Syria and Arabia, has just overcome the Hyrcanians, and is now attacking Bactria,¹ and is at war with the Cadusians and the Sacae.² On the other hand, the Medes have reduced the Armenian king to dependence, and formed an alliance with the Persians. The Indians on the east are independent, as well as Asia Minor, in which are the yet independent states of Lydia, Cappadocia, the two Phrygias, Paphlagonia, Caria, and Cilicia. That map will bear examination. As regards the states of Asia Minor, it is fully sustained by Herodotus, who represents them all, except perhaps Cappadocia, as independent at the time when Croesus came to the throne³—a date variously fixed from 571 to 560 B.C. Herodotus also represents the empire of the Medes as having been carried to the river Halys in the preceding reign.⁴ Ctesias supports it in respect to the independence of the Cadusians;⁵ and it accords remarkably with our accounts of the reign of Nebuchadnezzar, the great contemporary king of Babylon.

For the first twenty-five years of his reign Nebuchadnezzar appears continually in Western Asia, in wars with Jerusalem, Phoenicia, and Egypt. In 585 B.C. he took Tyre; and it is very easy to believe that he may, in conjunction with the Cilician king, have mediated peace between his Median ally and the Lydian king in that year of the eclipse. It is singular to find the monarch whose figure filled all the East, as seen from Palestine by the writer of the Book of Judith, himself, in his one appearance in the Greek horizon, lost behind such a minor figure as Nabonadius, and recorded only as "Laby-netus the Babylonian."⁶ From about the year 580 B.C. the great conqueror disappears from the West. During the eighteen or twenty years which remain, where were the armies which had been upon the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, and on the Nile? Xenophon gives us an answer. And the proof of his reliability lies in the fitting of his mountain district of the dissected map with the map of the

¹ *Cyropaedia*, i. 5. 2.² *Ibid.* v. 3. 24.³ Herodotus, i. 28.⁴ *Ibid.* i. 103.⁵ Diodorus, ii. 35.⁶ Herodotus, i. 74, 77.

plain, which we have from Babylonian and Hebrew sources of which he was entirely ignorant.

His view is in entire accordance with the evidence of all other authorities, that there was peace between the Medes and Babylonians for a considerable period after they had destroyed Nineveh. This time was improved by Astyages in the conquest of Armenia, and the forming of close relations with Persia, and by Nebuchadnezzar in extending his dominion to the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. When at last the West and the South were pacified, and the Assyrian king returns home, he finds himself absolute master of countless millions of men and money; but the mountains all along his eastern and northern frontier are held by his old ally; and the question which shall be lord of Asia can be no longer deferred, at least in the proud heart of Nebuchadnezzar. So Xenophon presents us an "Assyrian king," of great resources and magnificent schemes, whose former conquests have fed his ambition, no less than his power. On the other hand, Astyages was old, and Cyaxares was weak, and the way seemed open for making Babylon as great a head of human pride and empire as the first builders of Babel ever dreamed of.

But Nebuchadnezzar was a scientific warrior. He dealt more in sieges than in battles. And he proceeds to lay siege to the Median empire, by extending his power about it, before meeting the direct and final issue of war. He throws his forces across the narrow, though rough, barrier of Zagros (not a great achievement for the armies which had forced their way across Lebanon and the desert to Egypt), and is behind the northern mountain wall of Media. Not stopping to pacify the Cadusians and Sacians on his left, he subjugates the Hyrcanians, thus securing the essential road between the Caspian and the Taurus, and passes on to the invasion of Bactria. Such distant operations will not seem incredible if we remember that Nebuchadnezzar was a monarch like Alexander, or Caesar, or Napoleon. It was not farther to reach Ecbatana by the way of Bactria and the Caspian gates, than to reach Richmond by the way of Chattanooga and Savannah.

Had Nebuchadnezzar lived, and had the struggle been between him and Cyaxares, the plan would undoubtedly have been justified by the event. Still further to organize victory, like a Chaldean used to deep and long calculations as he was, having secured the north by his conquest of Hyrcania, he sends his ambassadors to India on the east, and to the states of Asia Minor on the west, to enlist them on his side in the coming struggle. His argument is the general danger which threatened all Asia from the accession of Persia to the Median force. In this we have a very natural explanation of the fact that Herodotus has in some way received the impression that Croesus was led into the war by jealousy of the Persians. As we have seen, it could not be that his war was distinctly for the object of avenging the Medes upon the Persians; because it is clear, even from Herodotus, that the Western world in that generation called the enemy of Croesus "the Mede." But very probably Herodotus, in his investigations at Sardis, may have found evidence that at the court of the Lydian king the feeling of hostility was directed chiefly against the Persians. The courts of Sardis and of Pasargadae were both closely connected by marriage with that of Ecbatana, and the jealousies which would naturally arise may have afforded the crafty Chaldean an opportunity for bringing Croesus into his combination against the Medo-Persian power. Considering the nearly equal age of Cyaxares and Cyrus, and the relations of jealousy which are prominent even in Xenophon's history, we may easily imagine that Croesus may have considered himself as really acting in the interests of his brother-in-law in joining the coalition which was to deliver him from the dictation of the Persian general.

But we are anticipating. Our scene opens in the earlier portion of the first decade of Cyaxares, and the last of Nebuchadnezzar — 570–560 B.C. Ambassadors have gone from Babylon; but the coalition is not yet organized. Perhaps Croesus, now newly seated on his throne,¹ did not join

¹ Croesus became king, according to Volney, in 571; according to Rawlinson, in 568. Rawlinson's Herodotus, Book i. Appendix, Essay 1.

it until he had made several of the neighboring princes dependent on himself, and till the successes of Cyrus in Armenia had excited his apprehensions or jealousy. At this juncture Cyrus, now, as we are told, an adult man, — and therefore somewhat more than twenty-seven years of age, — comes in command of Persian auxiliaries.

A rapid glance at the situation convinces him that if the Medo-Persian power is to stand before the masses which threaten it, it must be by means of some system which would make one man equal to many. The method was suggested by the old Persian training, which made the nobles peers of the king and masters of the commons. He begins to organize victory over Asia by the same law, arming and training the light Persian force as heavy infantry, and afterward the nobles as heavy cavalry — thus instituting that military embodiment of law by which the Persian force became ultimately the centre of empire in Asia, and by which, in the forms of the Greek phalanx, the Roman legion, and the modern army, the organizing power and the staunchness of the Indo-European race have been and are moving to the command of the world. The permanence of the empire and the permanence of the Persian heavy infantry and cavalry as the centre of the power may be regarded as a sufficient vindication of this view of the style of the power of Cyrus, as opposed to the view which regards him as a wild chief of barbarians.

The brilliant enterprise next recorded, by which Armenia is converted from a revolted dependency of Media to a most devoted member of the new empire, is supported by native Armenian accounts¹ with a distinctness which is made only more valuable as a testimony by the distortion of facts in the interest of Armenian pride which indicates its authenticity. The leading facts — the previous disturbance of the former relations between Media and Armenia, the government of Armenia by its own line of kings, the name of Tigranes or Dikran as the Armenian hero, and his subsequent close

¹ Moses Choren. i. 24-30.

association with Cyrus, king of Persia, in forming the empire of Asia—are in both stories. The point of difference—whether the empire they constituted was Armenian or Persian—may be left to the verdict of the world's history. The cordial feeling in which Armenia felt the final triumph as her own victory, rather than her degradation, illustrates the view which Xenophon takes of Cyrus as master of a magnetic power to conciliate, as well as to conquer, of which Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon had the rudiments; but none of them developed it into such victory and moral dominion as did Cyrus.

We come next to the great battle which decided the fate of Asia, both because it was, like Marathon, a test of the qualities of the rival powers, and because, as at Mantinea, the man whose genius was all the life of the one party fell, according to Xenophon's account, in the battle. How shall we test the accuracy of this account? Direct evidence for or against the occurrence of such a battle fails us; but the history of Herodotus seems to presuppose that, at the time when he takes up the story, the old Babylonian power has already been driven from the field in Central Asia, and thus, perhaps, gives us all the confirmation which we could expect from a historian who does not know even the name of Nebuchadnezzar. Some such field seems the necessary transition from the victorious position of the golden head of empire to the anxious fear and foreboding which pervade Babylon in the age of Nitocris. Here, then, Xenophon supplies a link so necessary to the continuity of history that it cannot be removed from its place; and yet he supplies it with so little apparent consciousness of the rest of the chain that we see that his informants were cognizant of that fact from the Persian, rather than the Babylonian, point of view. They were, perhaps, as ignorant as Herodotus himself of the name of the great king of Babylon, who returned about the year 580 B.C., laden with the spoils of Egypt and the West, and, after his temporary lycanthropy, was restored to the excellent majesty of his kingdom, and able to apply his genius to the

conquest of the East. They only knew of the "Assyrian king" who about the time of the accession of Cyaxares began to organize a coalition for the subjugation of Media and Persia. The preliminary movements may very naturally bring us to the last year of Nebuchadnezzar (about 561 B.C.), before the decisive collision of the forces. Respecting the fact that Nebuchadnezzar disappeared from the stage just as Cyrus came upon it, there is no dispute. The circumstance that Berosus represents him as dying by disease, rather than in battle, may be explained by the reluctance of the Chaldeans to chronicle his disastrous end; or the Persians may have been led into error in uniting the two nearly contemporaneous events of his defeat and death. We may even refer the battle to a later year, and suppose the "Assyrian" who appears in it to be Neriglissar, without changing the moral conditions of the crisis. The death of Nebuchadnezzar was the death of the old Mesopotamian empire, and the rise of Cyrus was the rise of the Medo-Persian; and the history of the twenty-three years from the fall of the king to the fall of the city is the history of the disintegration of the body from which the imperial soul had gone out, and the reformation of its elements about the new genius which had been born.

After the battle, the allies of Babylon dispersed each to his own. Prominent among them was Croesus the Lydian, who was now the only man of ability left of the host, and who applies himself to the formation of a new coalition against the Medo-Persian power. Here, very probably, is our point of junction with the history of Herodotus; we have only to consider that the Croesus of Herodotus was alarmed by the victory of Cyrus over the Babylonian, rather than over the Median king, to bring him into substantial harmony with Xenophon, and with the general current of Greek as well as Oriental historical conception.

The revolt of the Hyrcanians from the Assyrian to the Cyrean army, and the accession of their neighbors, the Sacae and Cadusii, to the alliance, were natural consequences of

their previous relations to the Assyrians, and of their geographical position as known to the Persian informants of Xenophon and to us, though not such as Xenophon, with the idea of the locality of Media which appears in the *Anabasis*, would have been likely to invent.

Of the other great defections by which the empire of Nebuchadnezzar fell into that of Cyrus, three are related with a particularity which challenges, and has received criticism. The first of them, Gobryas, is called by Xenophon an "Assyrian," while the name he bears is prominent in history as the name of a noble Persian. Of this it is to be observed, that the companions of the younger Cyrus certainly should have been informed with reference to the ancestry of Darius Hystaspis, and the frequent and somewhat familiar references with the strong characterization, not to say caricaturing, both of Gobryas and of his son-in-law Hystaspes, show that they were not inventions of the Attic scholar who pens them, but rough camp stories which he heard and does not attempt to render into Greek refinement. As to their correctness, we may compare their disparagement of the parentage of Darius, with the style of story which Ctesias gives us as current at the same time at the court of Artaxerxes, respecting the extraction of Cyrus the Great. The principality of Gobryas is evidently located on the eastern border of the Babylonish empire; and he was probably a Persian vassal of the king of Babylon, and so was naturally called by the Cyreans an "Assyrian," while the courtiers of Artaxerxes would probably have represented him as a Persian prince.

The next accession is Gadatas, — evidently a Babylonian, — a former companion of the new king of Babylon, whose lawless and heartless cruelty, both to him and to Gobryas and his son, correspond with the character given by Babylonian authorities to Evil-Merodach, son of Nebuchadnezzar, whose barbarities and excesses caused his deposition and death in two years from his accession. No doubt the indictment was true as against the young Nero, whatever personal ambition may have moved his brother-in-law Neriglissar and

his sister, whom we may probably name Nitocris, in urging the issue.

The way to the principality of Gadatas from that of Gobryas, lay past Babylon, which would locate it in the west of Mesopotamia. Thence, the general moves a distance, as represented in the *Cyropaedia*, of not less than seven days march, to the mountain-fort commanding the country of the Sacae and Hyrcani. The relations there established correspond with the honorable union of the Hyrcani with the Medes, and the independence of the Cadusii and Sacae, which continued throughout the history of the empire. A return to the domain of Gadatas, now become part of the new empire, and thence past Babylon again, brings the force back to the eastern border, where it is ready to receive the accession of the king of Susa, whose kingdom was close by them; and its position was evidently better understood by the Persian officers of Cyrus than by Xenophon, who in the *Anabasis*¹ locates Susa somewhere northeast of old Nineveh and near to Ecbatana.

Xenophon, and probably his authorities, would seem to have regarded these events as occurring within two or three campaigns after the death of the great Assyrian king. We can, of course, place no stress upon the accuracy of their chronology. The events and their moral relations are what live in heroic history. The same conditions of a government, impotent to restrain either its passions or its subjects, continued in Babylon until its fall. We shall, therefore, have no difficulty in placing the revolt of Susa late enough to allow the presence of Daniel² the prophet, "at Shushan, which is in the province of Elam," on business for the king of Babylon, "in the third year of the reign of the king Belshazzar."

Meanwhile the coalition, which had fallen with its chief on the Tigris, has found a new head by the Pactolus. Croesus, the Lydian, having by this time, as we gather from Herodotus, brought the greater part of Asia Minor, both Greek and Barbarian, under his sway, and gained the alliance of

¹ *Anabasis*, iii. 5. 15; ii. 4. 25.

² *Daniel* viii. 1, 2, 27.

Egypt and the islands, as well as European support, is ready to take the field again, probably soon after the accession of Nabonahit in Babylon, about 555 or 554 B.C.¹

Of this campaign we have the Lydian account in Herodotus, and the Persian in Xenophon. If we consider the Persian the better authority for events in Central Asia, which produced or accompanied it, we may be willing to accept Lydian accounts of matters upon the Lydian side, though our faith is somewhat shaken, as we find their stories of the most public events, in Sardis itself, utterly fabulous.

The fall of Croesus left not a man to head the immense powers which were still ready to oppose the transference of empire to the Japhetic race. There was, however, still one woman in whom the vigor which had ruled the East was still alive and resolute. For her name and her works we are indebted to Herodotus. And just here is the use of such a historian as Herodotus. He had an ear for the talk and the song of men, and a soul for their sympathies; and therefore he will often give the soul, where he does not give the body, of history. The name of Nitocris does not appear in the mathematical canon of Ptolemy, or in the court calendar of Daniel. On the other hand, Herodotus never heard, or at least never tried to utter with his Ionic mouth or pen, such a name as "Nabu-kuduriuzur"; he did try "Nabu-nahit," and brought out "Labynetus." But the living figure in the history, as it came to him, was Nitocris, wife and mother of the last two kings of Babylon; each of whom, as he understood, was named Labynetus. We have views, then, of the last age of Babylon from four sides — from Greece and Lydia through Herodotus, from the Persian camp through Xenophon, from the official centre of administration through Chaldean authorities and monuments, and from the precincts of the ancestral royalty in the Book of Daniel. In Herodotus, accordingly, we find the last struggles of the once great ally of Croesus to defend itself by means of those dykes, marshes, and walls which Greek travellers found in

¹ Rawlinson's *Herodotus* (Am. ed.), Vol. i. p. 278.

their way to Babylon, and described on their return, without extenuation, to such attentive ears as those of our author ; and they did not fail to refer them to the queen by whose influence not only those works were made, but even the king whose name they bear on their bricks to this day held such royalty as he possessed. The Persian camp, again, was full of rumors and proofs of the disgusts and rebellions which rose around the feeble, licentious, and lawless court which had succeeded to the state of the grand monarch. Berosus and the inscriptions give the names of the men who administered the rule, and scripture gives the names of the princes who held hereditary right. From all these we may derive some such plan as this.

Nebuchadnezzar died in 561 B.C., leaving a son Evil-Merodach, and a daughter Nitocris, whose Egyptian name may indicate that her birth was about the time of those splendid victories in the West, which the conqueror may have desired to commemorate, and whose husband was "Nergal-Sharezer, the Rab-mag," or chief magus, with whom we are already acquainted, as with his master, thirty years before, at the siege of Jerusalem. Berosus¹ tells us that Evil-Merodach succeeded ; but, after two years of lawless and licentious rule, was slain by Neriglissar, his brother-in-law, who succeeded him. We may believe that he deserved his fate, without acquitting his sister and her husband of selfish motives in their conduct. In four years more Neriglissar dies, and is succeeded by his son Laborosoarchod, who, after nine months of depravity, was beaten (*ἀπετυμπανίσθη*) to death "by his friends." Thus the tender mercies of that court of which Nitocris is the leading spirit prepared the way for the reign which appears in Berosus and the inscriptions as that of Nabunidus, or Nabunahit, "a certain Babylonian," "not related to his predecessor" ; while in the book of Daniel the king is called Belshazzar, and Nebuchadnezzar is called his father.

This name of Belshazzar has been one of the great stumbling-blocks in the comparison of sacred and profane history.

¹ Josephus contra Apion, i. 20.

It has stood for centuries as the name of the last king of Babylon, on the sole authority of the book of Daniel. It was contradicted by Herodotus, who names the last king Laby-netus; and by all Chaldean authorities, who name him Nabonahit, or, in Greek form, Nabonidus or Nabonadius. When, in modern days, the old inscriptions came to be deciphered, the same name of Nabonahit appeared repeatedly and continuously; and yet there was the book of Daniel, a professedly contemporary authority, and at the very court itself, giving the name of Belshazzar, with the air of perfect assurance. Moreover, the scriptures¹ elsewhere, as well as Xenophon, represent the king of Babylon as present in the city at its fall; while the Chaldean authorities affirm that on his defeat in the field Nabonadius was cut off from the city, and fled to Borsippa. The accounts of Daniel and Xenophon are, moreover, confirmed, so far as respects the sudden surprise of the city in the riot of a festival, by both Herodotus² and Isaiah.³ Such an array of evidence might suggest a caution in rejecting the witnesses. Yet so strong seemed the evidence of inscriptions, that we find Sir H. C. Rawlinson writing thus to Dr. Lobdell, in 1854: "The Assyrian and Babylonian records confirm in the most satisfactory manner all the genuine portions of scripture history; while, at the same time, they afford positive evidence that the book of Daniel is not genuine,—that, in fact, it should have been left by the Christian church in the Hagiographa, where, as you know, it has ever been held by the Jews."⁴

Thus the question was brought to the point at which human wisdom was at fault; and it was time for the revelation of the key which had lain hidden almost from the time when Daniel the prophet wrote his record. This was a cylinder, deposited by Nabonadius himself in the corner of a temple which he built for the Moon-goddess, at a site now called Mugheir, which is supposed to be "Ur of the Chaldees," from which the "father of the faithful" went forth, but which

¹ Jer. li. 31.

² Herodotus, i. 191.

³ Isa. xxi. 5.

⁴ Journal of American Oriental Society, Vol. v. No. 1. p. 269.

was for many centuries used only as a resting-place for the dead from the later Babylon. This cylinder was found by Mr. J. Taylor, British vice-consul at Busrah, and came into the hand of Sir H. C. Rawlinson; and on it was found, in 1854, the long hidden name of Belshazzar. The inscription is a prayer to the goddess to whom the temple is dedicated. It closes as follows, as rendered by H. Fox Talbot:¹

“And to Bel-sar-ussur, my eldest son, my rising hope, — fix firmly in his heart the awe of thy great divinity. And like the duration of the moon itself may the splendor of this temple endure.”

Dr. Hincks² translates: “As to Binhlu-sar-yushur, the son, the beginning of the issue of my heart, to the worship of thy great godhead his heart make to incline.”

Dr. Hincks supposes that Belshazzar was the son of Nabonadius and Nitocris, whom he also considers a daughter of Nebuchadnezzar. With this understanding, let us see how our key will unlock the riddles of the last years of Babylon.

The death of Nebuchadnezzar leaves the power in the hands of the Chaldeans, whose influence he had represented, and of his family, consisting of Evil-Merodach and the strong-minded Nitocris. Evil-Merodach becomes king; but Nitocris is wife of the chief of the Chaldeans, and in two years the new king is assassinated, and his sceptre passes into the hand of his brother-in-law, Neriglissar. In four years more Neriglissar dies, and his young son, Laborosoarchod is called king; while Nitocris finds another consort in Nabonadius. After a short time, — nine months, the chronicles say, — the young monarch is murdered “by his friends,” and Nabonadius assumes the command; holding the throne, probably, as the representative of his infant son Belshazzar, now the lineal heir of the royalty of Nebuchadnezzar, for the seventeen years which yet remain before the fall of the city. On the monuments erected during these years Nabonadius, with a natural vanity, caused his own

¹ Proceedings of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. xix. p. 195.

² Journal of Sacred Literature, January, 1862. See also Rawlinson's Ancient Monarchies, Vol. iii. p. 515.

name to be inscribed ; while, as we have before supposed, Daniel, the old minister of Nebuchadnezzar, counted them as years of Belshazzar, as he would probably have assigned those of Neriglissar to the infant prince of the seed royal, Laborosoarchod. Daniel was himself of the seed royal of Judah, and he cherished those traditions of royalty which look forward to the Messiah, the Prince. When Nabonadius was excluded from the city, the administration and the conduct of the defence naturally devolved on the queen mother and the ministry. The boy king, however, appears at the feast of the thousand lords on the fatal festival night. But he is still the boy. He does not know his own minister. In his terror he has no resource but to scream, and his mother comes to quiet him. The name of Belshazzar faded from history almost sooner than the hand-writing of doom disappeared from the wall of the palace. But some story of Belshazzar's feast seems to have lingered in the memory of men. It is in Xenophon and in Herodotus, as well as in Daniel. We can very well understand that refugees from Babylon may have told it in Lydia, and so Herodotus would know that the king of Babylon was there, and that he was the son of Nitocris. But Herodotus has also heard, from other sources, that Nitocris was the wife of the Labynetus (Nabonidus) in whose reign the defensive works were made, and also that Labynetus was the last king of Babylon ; it was, therefore, very natural that he should conclude that there were two monarchs of the same name — the husband and the son of the queen, who was really the ruling spirit, for evil and for good, of the last years of Babylon.

It is to be remarked that the discovery of the name of Belshazzar goes far to establish not only the veracity of the history of the Book of Daniel, but its authority as a contemporary document. For it introduces, with the familiarity of present knowledge, a name which did not pass into history at all, and is known to us now only by the sacred record and the contemporary inscription which has providentially been brought to light as an interpreter of God's word.

We have thus far endeavored to establish the character of the Cyropaedia, as being in its historical outlines a faithful representation of the history of the time of Cyrus the Great, as gathered by an intelligent Greek from diligent inquiry of Persian noblemen whose relations and tastes were such as to incline them to make those facts a special study. We should expect it to be liable to such deficiencies and errors as would naturally arise from its point of view, which is the Persian camp, and from the lapse of a century and a half since the events. As such, we may now compare some of its features with those presented by the view which scripture gives us of the same events from the stand-point of Palestine or of the Babylonian court itself, and from times preceding or accompanying the facts.

We shall naturally consider, first :

Its view of the general character, position, and history of the Babylonian kingdom.

Scripture calls it Babylonian. Xenophon calls it Assyrian, as he should ; for its Median and its Greek aspect were Assyrian. Xenophon does not give us the name of Nebuchadnezzar, — no Greek had attempted that as yet, — nor of the different princes who sat on the throne at Babylon during the twenty-two years from the death of Nebuchadnezzar to the fall of his kingdom. No Greek — probably hardly any Persian — had disentangled that skein of domestic conspiracy and crime. We have only the outline, as it would be seen from the Persian camp, and preserved in Persian story : First, a great monarch, who has carried his conquests, on the west, to the Taurus and to Egypt, — as the scripture has told us, from the other side of the view, — and who now, just at the point where his armies disappear from the Hebrew vision, turns them toward the east. To this grand monarch succeeds a reign of imbecility and of lawless passion, which Chaldean authorities separate into several reigns, as our telescopes resolve double stars ; but which in Herodotus is united under the name of the queen whose energy directed whatever of system there was in them ; while at the Persian camp it

mattered little whether the lawlessness which sat on the throne of Nebuchadnezzar was named Evil-Merodach, or Laborosoarchod, or Belshazzar, just as to the suffering world in the generation after Augustus Caesar it mattered little whether the central monster was Tiberius or Caligula or Nero. They only knew that the caprices of "the new king" were continually alienating the strongest supporters of the old monarch. We may compare their view, from their distance in place and in after time, with that of Jeremiah,¹ from Jerusalem, half a century before the facts. "A rumor shall both come one year, and after that in another year a rumor, and violence in the land, ruler against ruler." Each is the like comprehensive glance; one at the interior, and the other at the exterior, aspect of the self-destroying court of Babylon.

By a similar process, the contest for the empire of Asia, which seems to have appeared to Xenophon, and perhaps to his informants, as a short, sharp struggle of not more than two or three campaigns, is seen, from the various points of view open to us, to extend over a quarter of a century.

The story of Panthea and Abradatas is not less full of historical than of sentimental interest. With the latter we have nothing to do here, except to remark that it is clearly Oriental, rather than Greek. Let us study the view which it presents of the history and attitude of Susiana during the struggle of its mighty neighbors.

The country dependent upon Susa — known in scripture generally as Elam — is represented by Xenophon as governed by a king of its own, who at the commencement of the war was subject to the king of Babylon, but is offended by the young Babylonian king, and, charmed by the continence and magnanimity of Cyrus, goes over to the Medo-Persian side, and, with his forces, fights in their armies in the field and at the siege. Now let us turn to the Hebrew books.

1. Had Elam kings of her own, and did they become subject to Nebuchadnezzar?

Jeremiah,² "in the first year of Nebuchadnezzar," recog-

¹ Jer. li. 46.

² Jer. xxv. 25.

nizes their independent royalty at that time, and their coming subjugation, by enumerating "the kings of Elam" among those who were to drink the cup of the Lord's fury. Again,¹ in the eighth year of the same reign, he renews the prediction of their utter defeat, with a promise of their restoration "in the latter days." The fulfilment of this prediction of their subjugation is recorded by Ezekiel² as having taken place before the twentieth year of the king. If we understand Isaiah³ as predicting the presence of Elam in the Babylonian army at the final siege of Jerusalem, which occupied from the seventeenth to the nineteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar,⁴ we come still more closely to the date of the subjugation of Elam. It had therefore been a dependency of Babylon about thirty years before the death of Nebuchadnezzar, and probably continued to be so for several years after. For Abradatas is the last among the important accessions to the army of Cyrus recorded by Xenophon; and we find the prophet Daniel⁵ "at Shushan the palace, which is in the province of Elam," upon "the king's business, . . . in the third year of king Belshazzar." This would imply that Elam was still a "province" of Babylon, and in such relations that a Babylonian minister is there quietly for "certain days" on the king's business, ten years after the commencement of the war. The phrase "Shushan, the palace," is noticeable, as calling to mind that wonderful monument of the ancient royalty and greatness of Susa which is continually presented in the books of Nehemiah and Esther, and whose ruins mark the site to-day, and which, though not mentioned in the Persian story which Xenophon repeats, was almost the only thing, anterior to the Persian occupation, which had made the city known to Greece. As Shushan was known to the Hebrews as the palace or royal castle, so was it to the Greeks as the "Memnonium," and by its association with the son of Dawn, who fought and fell at Troy.⁶

¹ Jer. xlix. 34-39.² Ezek. xxxii. 24.³ Isa. xxii. 6.⁴ 2 Kings xxv. 1, 8.⁵ Dan. viii. 1, 2, 27.⁶ Herod. v. 53, 54; vii 151; Strabo, xv. 3; Diod. ii. 22; Paus. iv. 31. 5; x. 31. 2.

“Susā the Memnonian” seems to be the Greek for “Shushan the palace.”

The remaining fact—the presence of Elam in the army of the Medes against Babylon—we find predicted by Isaiah,¹ three hundred years before Xenophon recorded it.

In confirmation of the existence of a native line of kings in Susā, we have, beside the fame of the palace, the testimony of Assyrian inscriptions of the century before Cyrus, and the repeated rebellions, in the name of the ancient royalty, recorded in the Behistun inscription.²

The scenes of the last night of Babylon, described by Isaiah³ and Jeremiah⁴ as seen in vision long before, and by Daniel and Xenophon as seen by eye-witnesses and actors “in that night,” make a picture so vivid, so consistent, and so significant, and one which recent discoveries have so brought out into the light of certainty as to establish the absolute authority, for that scene at least, of each of the narrators. But they are so familiar that we need not dwell upon them here.

We pass to the next record.

Daniel tells us: “And in that night was Belshazzar the king of the Chaldeans slain. And Darius the Median took the kingdom, being about threescore and two years old.”⁵ And again: “Darius, the son of Ahasuerus, of the seed of the Medes, which was made king over the realm of the Chaldeans.”⁶

Who was Darius the Mede?

Herodotus, Berosus, and the inscriptions alike have no answer. They know only Cyrus, as they knew only Nabonadius. Xenophon alone gives us an answer, whose very simplicity and aptness seems to have offended modern interpreters. He gives us a Mede, who should have been at this time about threescore and two, and who “was made king over the realm” by the victory of Cyrus. The differences between his account and that of Daniel are hardly more than

¹ Isa. xxi. 2.

⁴ Jer. li. 31.

² Col. 1. par. 16; col. 2. par. 4.

⁵ Dan. v. 30, 31.

³ Isa. xxi. 5.

⁶ Dan. ix. 1.

enough to establish the independent character of the witnesses. Xenophon gives the name of Cyaxares, and Daniel that of Darius. But we know too little of Median names or titles to criticise such a difference; especially as we know how commonly the same prince is known by two names; and we might allow that Xenophon or his authorities may have misplaced or mistaken a name, without impeaching the general truth of their statements. Certainly we can attach no such authority to Herodotus as to be disturbed by his omission of such facts. Xenophon also represents Cyrus as assuming the government at Babylon, assigning, however, to Cyaxares a palace for his abode whenever he should choose to go there; while Daniel represents Darius as actually assuming authority in Babylon. On such a point we must, of course, believe the eye-witness. Xenophon does not deny that Cyaxares went to Babylon, and, even without the authority of Daniel, we should be sure, from the character which Xenophon has drawn, that he would go; and the account given by Daniel of his proceedings there is so in keeping with the man with whom we have become acquainted in the *Cyropaedia*, that we cannot fail to recognize him, by whatsoever name he may be introduced. On the other hand, Daniel does not deny that Cyrus arranged the state of Babylon. Indeed, with all the reverence for legitimacy which is in him, we cannot fail to see as much in the phrase, "which was made king." From the two we understand that, upon the conquest, Cyrus arranged the order of things, and then — as policy, as well as duty, required — invited the Mede to assume his royalty. How long he may have continued there we cannot judge, unless the thirty days named in his decree may furnish us a suggestion. When his jealousy was appeased, his desire of ease would naturally take him home again, and leave the administration of the empire to hands able and willing to do the work. Still Daniel, as during the Chaldean rule, recognizes the titular king; while the astronomers and brick-makers, now as before, give the name of the actual ruler, until, after a year

or two, the death of the Mede leaves the title in the hands which already held the reins.

It is interesting to observe, in scripture, exactly the same conception of the character of the Medo-Persian power which we find in Xenophon. The earlier prophets speak only of the Medes. The Persians then were still in their seclusion, preparing their greatness. But in Daniel the kingdom is given to the "Medes and Persians." Perhaps we should consider Darius as "made king" by agreement among the confederates. His administration is under the "law of the Medes and Persians." In every instance, in speaking of the existing state of things, the power is represented as dual, the precedency being with the Medes.¹ As the prophet looks into the future, he sees the ram with two horns, which were the kings of Media and Persia;² and the higher horn comes up last. And when we come to the vision of the more distant future, the name of Persia³ appears alone. In the Book of Esther, which dates after the revolution effected by Darius Hystaspis, the empire is still dual, but the order is Persia and Media,⁴ except in a single instance.⁵ In Ezra we hear only of "the king of Persia"; and in Nehemiah, as in Greece of the same age, only of "the king."

In the Book of Ezra⁶ a decree of Cyrus is found at "Acemetha, in the province of the Medes," indicating that Ecbatana was the seat of his empire; while the date, "in the first year of Cyrus the king," proves that the official records of the empire did not regard Cyrus as the king until a time subsequent to the capture of Babylon.

Here we must pause to mark the decisiveness and the importance of this concurrence of testimony. The Hebrew books of Daniel, Ezra (which even quotes an official document of Cyrus himself to the point), and Chronicles agree in the statement that the first year of the reign of Cyrus in Media and over the empire was the year of the edict for the rebuilding of the temple at Jerusalem, or two years after the

¹ Dan. v. 28; vi. 8, 12, 15.

² Dan. viii. 3, 20.

³ Dan. x. 13; xi. 2.

⁴ Esth. i. 3, 14, 18, 19.

⁵ Esth. x. 2.

⁶ Ezra vi. 2.

fall of the city of the Chaldees; thus agreeing exactly with the Athenian reporter of the statements of Persian princes. Can a fact so established by witnesses so independent be set aside by the silence of other witnesses who have overlooked the minor actors in history? But if we accept it, it carries with it the substantial truth of the whole of Xenophon's plan of the career of Cyrus, and thus answers, at the great culmination of his life, to the test fact as to his parentage, with which the history opened.

Xenophon represents Cyrus, after arranging affairs at Babylon, as returning first to Media, where he finds Cyaxares still on the throne, and then to Persia, where his father Cambyses is still king among the Persian peers. This would defer the accession of Cyrus to the Persian, as well as to the Median throne — a conclusion which agrees remarkably with scripture,¹ and is readily brought into accord with other authorities, by understanding that the thirty years which they assign to Cyrus are to be understood as measuring the term for which he was virtually the *ἡγεμὼν στρατοῦ*, imperator, or generalissimo of the armies of the empire. Cyrus was about sixty years of age when he took Babylon, and about sixty-two when he received the two royalties of Media and of Persia. In the mean time his right to the Median throne had been made complete by his marriage with the daughter of Cyaxares, who had no legitimate son. Cyrus was but two years younger than his brother-in-law, who now became also his father-in-law. But, even in Rome, Pompey weds the daughter of his younger colleague, Julius Caesar; and the polygamy and marriage of kindred involved in the story only mark it as of Oriental, rather than of Greek, origin. The double claim to the Median throne, in right of his mother and of his wife, appears also in the story of Ctesias, that Cyrus adopted Amytis, the daughter of Astyages, first as mother, and then as wife. Moreover, the statement that Cyaxares "had no legitimate son" leaves room not only for the grandchildren of Astyages by his daughter named by Ctesias,²

¹ 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22; Ezra i. 1.

² Photius, 72.

but for the pretenders, who, according to the Behistun inscription,¹ rose against Darius Hystaspis, claiming to be "of the race of Cyaxares."

In the rapid glance at the subsequent achievements of Cyrus, given in the Cyropaedia, occurs a statement which has been grasped as almost a complete proof of the fabulous character of the work. We find the statement: "After this is said to have occurred the Egyptian campaign and the conquest of Egypt."² Here we mark the same form of expression as in the opening statement concerning the father of Cyrus "is *said* to have been." Xenophon only tells what was told him, implying that there were also other and conflicting accounts. Respecting Cambyses, the father of Cyrus, his informants seem to have been correct; as to the Egyptian invasion, probably not. But the truth of Xenophon's statement, that such a story was current, is rendered at least probable by the tradition, twice mentioned by Herodotus,³ and quoted by Athenaeus⁴ both from Dino and Lyceas of Naucratis, that at the demand of Cyrus Amasis sent Nitetis, an Egyptian princess, to his harem. If Amasis held Egypt as a vassal of Nebuchadnezzar, he very probably did accept the suzerainty of the new empire at the first approach of Cyrus or his armies; so that the subjugation of Egypt is highly probable, and the story, at least, of an actual invasion could hardly have failed to arise. We may observe that Xenophon does not say that Cyrus accompanied that invasion.

There remains only the closing scene of the life of Cyrus.

Herodotus⁵ closes the drama with tragic effect, with a defeat and death preceded by an overweening pride of the veteran conqueror, and followed by insult to his remains on the part of an incensed and barbarous enemy. Xenophon⁶ says that, in the fulness of his age and prosperity, he died peacefully in his bed, giving his kingdom to his elder son, Cambyses, and assigning to the younger, Tanaoxares, the

¹ Col. 2, par. 5, 14.

³ Herodotus, iii. 2. 3.

⁵ Herodotus, i. 214.

² Cyropaedia, viii. 7. 20.

⁴ Athen., xiii. p. 560 e.

⁶ Cyropaedia, viii. 7, 11.

satrapy of the Medes, Armenians, and Cadusians. Ctesias¹ gives a similar death-scene, calling the younger son Tanyoxarces, and giving him the rule of the Choramnians, Parthians, and Carmanians; but that scene is preceded by a mortal wound, three days before, in battle with the Derbices. Of these three stories, that of Herodotus is discredited by the existence of the tomb of Cyrus at the old Pasargadae; the other two seem to have been the versions current, respectively, at the court of Artaxerxes Mnemon and in the camp of the younger Cyrus.

We have thus endeavored to study the geographical and historical statements of the *Cyropaedia*. We think that the result of that study has been to show that, throughout the work, such statements are not fabrications of the Greek writer, but careful reproductions of information given to him by high Persian authority. In the majority of cases they are confirmed as true; and even their errors, as well as their facts, are such as to prove their Persian origin.

They deal with the matters of which they treat with the same confidence, unapprehensive of mistake, which marks the scripture accounts with which we have compared them. It is the tone of men who know the things of which they affirm. The agreement of two such independent, distinct witnesses, on such test-points as the relations of Susa in the last struggle of Babylon, the presence of the king in Babylon at its fall and the story of his last night, the Median predecessor of Cyrus, and the date of the accession of Cyrus to the royalty, must be accepted as proving the reliability of each of them. Such a demonstration, in the case of Xenophon, we must welcome, not only because it unites the honor of truth with the charm of his grace, but because it gives us a most valuable addition to our reliable history of the world.

As regards scripture the result of our examination is to transfer the Book of Ezra, and especially that of Daniel, from a defensive position to one of authority, as showing the famil-

¹ Photius, 72.

ilarity of a contemporary with such facts as the existence and position of Belshazzar and of Darius the Mede, with the kingdom of Susa, and with the formal as well as the actual relations of Cyrus the Great to his kingdoms and to his empire.

The general result is the same which we reach in every comparison of scripture with other forms of truth, namely, that, while one record may explain another, none of them, rightly read, are contradictory; and that we may go on without fear accepting and holding fast all proved truth, knowing that, when we come to understand it all, we shall find each part consistent with every other, and contributing to the illustration and support of the highest truth.

ARTICLE II.

HORAE SAMARITANAE; OR, A COLLECTION OF VARIOUS READINGS OF THE SAMARITAN PENTATEUCH COMPARED WITH THE HEBREW AND OTHER ANCIENT VERSIONS.

BY REV. B. PICK, ROCHESTER, N. Y.

OF the Samaritan literature which has come down to our times, first in importance and order is the Pentateuch. As to its merits and demerits, there has always been a difference of opinion. The Jews regarded it with contempt, and charged the Samaritans with a downright forgery. "You have falsified your law," זייפחם תורחכם. This we read very often in the Talmud. Early Christian writers, however, speak of it with respect, in some cases even preferring it to that of the Masoretic text. *Origen* (†254) quotes it under name of τὸ τῶν Σαμαρειτῶν Ἑβραϊκόν, giving its various readings on the margin of his Hexapla (cf. Montfaucon, *Hexapla*, praelim. p. 18 sq.). *Eusebius of Caesarea* (†340), notices the agreement in the chronology of the Septuagint and Samaritan text as against the Hebrew (Chron. i., xvi.

7-11). *Jerome* († 420) in his *Proleg.* to *Kings*, also mentions this fact, and in his *Epistol. ad Gal.* iii. 10, he upholds the genuineness of its text over that of the Masoretic one, which he considers to have been purposely altered. *Sextus Julius Africanus* († 232), as quoted by G. Syncellus, the chronologist of the eighth century (*Chronographia*, p. 85) is most outspoken in his praise of it, terming it "the earliest and best, even by the testimony of the Jews themselves" (τὸ Σαμαρειτῶν ἀρχαιότατον καὶ χαρακτηῖρσι διάλλαττον ὃ καὶ ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον Ἑβραῖοι καθομολογοῦσιν). Having been afterwards unnoticed, its existence began to be doubted, till Pietro della Valle, in 1616, obtained from the Samaritans in Damascus a complete copy which was then published in the Paris Polyglot of 1645. But with the publication of the Samaritan Pentateuch, the controversy took a new phase, and the ablest scholars were called into the field of controversy — a controversy which lasted over two centuries, till the time of Gesenius, who subjected the recension to a rigid analysis, and arranged its variations under different heads. But with the question of the comparative merits of the two texts another question came up, that of the relation of the Septuagint to the Samaritan Pentateuch on account of its striking resemblance in numerous passages to the Alexandrine version. It is not our intention to discuss the question which copied which, or to speak of the merits and demerits of the Samaritan Pentateuch. Suffice it to say, that the Samaritan cannot be put in comparison with the Hebrew version, although the Hebrew text is not immaculate, and none can uphold its absolute integrity. But, says Mr. Davidson, if it needs emendation, why should not the Samaritan recension be taken as one source of evidence? It is not, indeed, a valuable instrument of emendation; but it is not destitute of all worth, and should be classed with the other materials on which a pure text depends. Critical conjecture must sometimes be resorted to in restoring the original text, as the best scholars admit. Why then throw aside the Samaritan as more useless even than conjecture? It may some-

times suggest the right reading, if it does not give it. From this point of view, as Mr. Davidson suggests, we have collected the various readings of the Samaritan Pentateuch, with special reference to the ancient versions, which we here offer in the Hebrew instead of the Samaritan character.

GENESIS.

CHAP. I.

- 11 עץ the tree — Sam. ויעץ and the tree; Sept. καὶ ξύλον; Sam. vers. ויאילן, Syr. and Vulg.
 14 ברכיע השמים להבריל in the firmament of heaven — Sam. ברכיע השמים להבריל על הארץ ולהבריל in the firmament of heaven, to shine upon the earth, and to divide; Sam. vers. למנחרה על ארצה. ולמפרק Sept. ἐν τῷ στερεώματι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἰς φαῦσιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.
 26 כדמותנו after our likeness — Sam. וכדמותנו and after our likeness; Sam. vers. ובחשבונו; Sept. καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν.

CHAP. II.

- 2 ויכל אלהים ביום השביעי and on the seventh day God ended — Sam. ויכל אלהים ביום הששי and on the sixth day God ended; Sam. vers. ביומי שתיחה; Sept. ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ἑκτῇ; Syr. ביומה שתיחיא.
 4 ארץ ושמים the earth and the heaven — Sam. שמים וארץ heaven and earth; Sam. vers. הללה וארצה; Sept. τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν; Vulg. *coelum et terram*; Syr. שמיא וארצא.
 12 טוב is good — Sam. מאד טוב is very good; Sam. vers. טב שריר; Vulg. *optimum*.
 19 ויצר יהוה אלהים מן ויצר יהוה אלהים עוד מן and out of the ground the Lord God formed — Sam. ויצר יהוה אלהים עוד מן and out of the ground the Lord God formed once more; Sam. vers. ויצר יהוה אלה עירי מן; Sept. ὁ θεὸς ἔτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς, κ. τ. λ.
 24 יהיה לבשר אחד and they shall be one flesh — Sam. יהיה משניהם יהיה לבשר אחד and the two shall be one flesh; Sam. vers. משניהם לבשר אחד; Sept. καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν; Syr. ונהיון תריהון חד בסר; Vulg. *et erunt duo in carne una*. The reading of the Sept., which is found as quotation in Matt. xix. 5; Mark x. 6; 1 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. v. 31, is also quoted by Philo, *De Gigantibus*, § 15 (Mangey's ed., Lips. 1828), p. 272, and it seems that either the original ms. had the reading of the Samaritan, which is also expressed by the Targum of Palestine,

“and both of them shall be one flesh,” or that the Samaritan was copied by the Sept., or *vice versa*.

CHAP. III.

- 2 אל הנחש to the serpent — Sam. אל הכחש to the liar. The reading of הנחש instead of הכחש, as the Hebrew has, is only found in Walton's Polyglot, while six other mss. offer the reading הנחש. In support of our reading, which personifies the serpent, we may perhaps say that later Hebrew writers also speak of this serpent as the *Satan*; thus we read in the Wisdom of Solomon ii. 23, 24: “For God has created man for imperishable existence, and made him after the image of his own being. But by the envoy of Satan death came into the world; and it befalls all those who belong to him.” Satan is frequently called the first serpent, הנחש הקדמון, and the notion conveyed by the Samaritan occurs repeatedly in the New Testament; see John vii., xx.; Rev. xii. 9; xx. 2.
- 3 ומפרי העץ but of the fruit of the tree — Sam. ומפרי הוזה of the fruit of this tree; Sam. vers. עילן הרץ.
- 6 ויאכל and he did eat — Sam. ויאכלו and they did eat; Sam. vers. ואכלון; Sept. καὶ ἔφαγον.
- 7 עלה leaf — Sam. עלי leaves; Sam. vers. עלי; Chald. טרפי; Sept. φύλλα; Vulg. *folia*; Syr. טרפא. The reading of the Samaritan is also supported by many Hebrew mss.
- 16 ואל האשה unto the woman — Sam. ואל האשה and unto the woman; Sam. vers. ולאהא; Sept. καὶ τῇ; Syr. ולانחחא.
- עצבונך thy sorrow and thy conception — Sam. עצבונך וחרונך thy sorrows and thy conceptions; Sam. vers. עצרניך בטעניך; Chald. צעריכי ועדיויכי; Sept. τὰς λύπας σου καὶ τὸν στεναγμόν σου; Vulg. *aerumnas tuas et conceptus tuos*. The plural, against the singular of Walton's Polyglot, is supported by six mss.
- 19 ואל עפר and unto dust — Sam. עפרך and unto thy dust; Sam. vers. וליר עפרך.

CHAP. IV.

- 8 After the words “and Cain spoke with Abel his brother,” the Sam. inserts, נלכה השדה let us go into the field; Sam. vers. נהלך לברה; Sept. διέλθωμεν εἰς τὸ πεδῖον; Vulg. *egrediamur foras*. Prof. T. Lewis, the translator of the Book of Genesis of Lange's Bibelwerk, remarks, in a foot-note to this passage

(p. 257^a), "It (viz. this addition) is not in the Syriac, which closely follows the Hebrew, and there is no reference to it in the Targums." But herein the learned Professor is mistaken, as he has probably overlooked the Syriac, which reads **נִירָא לִכְמַחָא**, and the Targum of Palestine, which not only reads, "Come, and let us two go forth into the fields," but also gives the conversation held by the two brothers in the field, which finally resulted in the killing of Abel. (Comp. Etheridge, *The Targums*, i. p. 170 sq., and De Rossi, *Variae Lectiones*, etc. in loc.).

- 10 **צוּעִיקִים** are crying — Sam. **צִעַק** cries; Sam. vers. **צִבֵּעַ**; Sept. **βοᾶ**; Vulg. *clamat*; Syr. **גִּלָּא**.
 דְּמֵי of the bloods — Sam. **דַּם** blood; Sam. vers. **דַּם**; Chald. **דַּם**; Syr. **דַּרְמָה**; Sept. *aīmaros*; Vulg. *sanguinis*.
 25 **וַתִּקְרָא** and she called — Sam. **וַיִּקְרָא** and he called.

CHAP. V.

- 18 an hundred and sixty and two years — Sam. sixty-two years **שְׁחִים וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה**.
 19 **חֲמֵשׁ וְשִׁמְנִים שָׁנָה** eight hundred years — Sam. **חֲמֵשׁ וְשִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה** seven hundred and eighty-five years.
 20 nine hundred and sixty and two years — Sam. eight hundred and forty and seven years **שְׁבַע וָאַרְבַּעִים שָׁנָה וְשִׁמְנָה מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה**.
 25 a hundred eighty and seven years — Sam. sixty and seven years **שִׁבְעִים וְשִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה**.
 26 seven hundred eighty and two years — Sam. six hundred fifty and three years **שְׁלֹשׁ וְחֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה וְשֵׁשׁ מֵאוֹת**.
 27 nine hundred and sixty and nine years — Sam. seven hundred and twenty years **עֶשְׂרִים שָׁנָה וְשִׁבְעִים מֵאוֹת**.
 28 a hundred eighty and two years — Sam. fifty-three years **שְׁלֹשׁ וְחֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה**.
 29 **מִמַּעֲשֵׂי** concerning our work — Sam. **מִמַּעֲשֵׂינֵינוּ** concerning our works; Sam. vers. **עִיבְרִינֵן**; Sept. *ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων ἡμῶν*; Syr. and Vulg.
 30 five hundred and ninety-five years — Sam. six hundred years **שֵׁשׁ מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה**.
 31 seven hundred seventy and seven years — Sam. six hundred fifty and three years **שְׁלֹשׁ וְחֲמִשִּׁים שָׁנָה וְשֵׁשׁ מֵאוֹת**.

[It will be seen that the numbers given in the Samaritan text do not agree with those of the Hebrew. Since, however, there

is also a variation between both the Samaritan and Hebrew texts, and that of the Septuagint, which followed closely Josephus, we subjoin the following tabular view, which will exhibit these variations, where the first column, marked A, gives the *years before birth of son*; the second, B, *the rest of life*; the third, C, *the extent of whole life*.]

	Hebrew.			Samaritan.			Septuagint.			Josephus.		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
1. Adam,	180	800	980	130	800	930	280	700	980	220	700	980
2. Seth,	105	807	912	105	807	912	205	707	912	205	707	912
3. Enos,	90	815	905	90	815	905	190	715	905	190	715	905
4. Cainan,	70	840	910	70	840	910	170	740	910	170	740	910
5. Mahalaleel,	65	880	895	65	880	895	165	730	895	165	730	895
6. Jared,	162	800	952	62	785	847	162	800	962	162	800	962
7. Enoch,	65	800	865	65	800	865	165	200	865	165	200	865
8. Methuselah,	187	782	969	67	653	720	187	782	969	187	782	969
9. Lamech,	182	595	777	53	600	653	188	565	753	182	595	777
10. Noah,	500	—	950	500	—	950	500	—	950	500	—	950
	1556	6569	8575	1207	6480	8587	2162	5989	8551	2156	5969	8575

CHAP. VI.

- 4 הנפלים the giants — Sam. והנפלים and the giants; Sam. vers.; Syr.
 7 ועד עוף and the fowls — Sam. עד עוף the fowls.
 9 תמים perfect — Sam. ותמים and perfect; Sam. vers. ושלם.
 15 חמשים אמה fifty cubits — Sam. וחמשים אמה and fifty cubits;
 Sept. καὶ πεντήκοντα.
 19 מכל בשר of all flesh — Sam. ומכל הבשר and of all flesh; Sept.
 καὶ ἀπὸ πάσης σαρκός.
 יהי shall be, is wanting in the Samaritan, but is found at the
 beginning of the following verse.
 20 מחיות of fowls — Sam. והיה מן העוף and there shall be of fowls.
 מכל רמש האדמה למינהו of every creeping thing of the earth after
 his kind — Sam. and of every thing that creepeth upon the earth
 after their kind; Sept. καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων κ. τ. λ. κατὰ γένος αὐτῶν.

CHAP. VII.

- 1 ויאמר יהוה and the Lord said — Sam. ויאמר אלהים and God said;
 Sam. vers. אלהה; Syr. אלהא.
 2 זכר ונקבה the male and his female — Sam. ונקבה male and
 female. The Samaritan always uses this phrase instead of that
 given in the Hebrew, and which answers to the דכר ונוקבא of the
 Chaldee, and the דכרא ונקבא of the Syriac, and which
 is also reproduced by the Sept. in ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ; Vulg. mas-
 culum et foemininam.

- שנים by two — Sam. שנים שנים by couples ; Sam. vers. חרים
 חרים ; Syr. חרין חרין ; Sept. δύο δύο.
 3 וגם מעוף השמים גם of fowls also of the air. Sam. מעוף השמים
 החור and also of the clean fowls of the air ; Sam. ver. רכיה ;
 Syr. רכיה ; Sept. τῶν καθαῶν.
 8 וכל and every thing — Sam. ומכל and of every thing ; Syr.
 כל ; Sept. καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων.
 9 אלהים God — Sam. יהוה the Lord.
 13 ושמ וחס and Shem and Ham — Sam. שם חם Shem, Ham ; Sept.
 Σήμ, Χάμ.
 16 זכר ונקבה זכר ונקבה male and female — Sam. זכר ונקבה male and
 female, male and female.
 23 ועד עוף and the fowl — עוף עד the fowl.

CHAP. VIII.

- 3 הלכו ושוב went and returned — Sam. הלכו ושוב they went and
 returned ; Sam. vers. הלכו ועזרו ; Chald. אולין וחיבין ; Syr.
 אולין וחכבין ; Vulg. euntes et redeuntes.
 4 אררט Ararat — Sam. הררט ; Sam. vers. סרנדיב ; Chald. קררו ;
 Syr. קררו.
 5 הלכו וחסרו was going and decreasing — Sam. הלכו וחסרו were
 going and decreasing ; Sam. vers. לכו ועסו ; so the Chald. and
 Syr. ; Vulg. ibant et decrescebant.
 11 עלה a leaf — Sam. עלי leaves.
 17 כל החיה כל every living thing — Sam. כל החיה and every living
 thing ; Syr. וכלה ; Sept. καὶ πάντα.
 19 כל החיה כל הרמש וכל העוף כל רמש every beast, every creeping
 thing, and every fowl, every thing that creepeth — Sam. כל
 החיה וכל העוף וכל הרמש הרמש and every beast, and every bird,
 and every creeping thing that creepeth.
 22 and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night —
 Sam. cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night.

CHAP. IX.

- 2 נתתו are delivered — Sam. נתתו I have given them.
 5 ואח דמכם ואך אח דמכם and surely your blood — Sam. ואח דמכם and your
 blood.
 מיד האדם מיד ומיד האדם מיד and from the hand of man, from the
 hand of every man's brother — Sam. ואחיו מיד האדם מיד
 מיד האדם מיד and from the hand of man, from the hand of man and his brother.
 7 ושרצי bring forth — Sam. ושרצי and bring forth ; Sept. καὶ πληθύ-
 νεσθε.

- 10 of the cattle — Sam. **ובבהמה** and of the cattle; Sept. *καὶ*.
 11 and shall not be cut off — Sam. **ולא יכרה עוד** and shall not be cut off any more.
 15 and between every living creature — Sam. **ובין כל נפש חיה** and between every living creature that is with you.
 18 and Ham — Sam. **חם** Ham; Sept. *Χάμ*.
 19 and of them — Sam. **מאלה** of them; Sept. *ἀπὸ τούτων*.

CHAP. X.

- 2 and Madai — Sam. **מדי** Madai.
 and Thubal — Sam. **חובל** Thubal.
 and Moshech — Sam. **ומישוך** and Moshoch; Sept. *καὶ Μοσόχ*.
 4 Elishah — Sam. **אליש** Elis.
 and Doddanim — Sam. **ורודנים** and Rodanim; Sept. *Ῥόδιοι*.
 6 and Phut — Sam. **פוט** Phut; Sept. *Φούδ*.
 7 and Sabtah — Sam. **סבתה** Sabtah.
 10 and Calneh — Sam. **וכלחן** and Calen.
 13 Anamim — Sam. **ענימים** Ainamim.
 17 Arkite — Sam. **הערוקי** Arukite; Sept. *Ἀρουκαῖον*.
 18 the families were spread — Sam. **נפצה משפחת** the family was spread.
 19 And the border of the Canaanites was from Sidon, as thou comest to Gerar, unto Gaza; as thou goest unto Sodom and Gomorrah, and Admah, and Zeboim, even unto Lasha — Sam. **ויהי גבול הכנעני מנחם מצרים עד הנחל הגדול נהר פרת ועד הים האחרון** and the border of the Canaanites was from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates, and unto the hinder [Mediterranean] sea.
 20 and in their nations — Sam. **לגוייהם** after their nations.
 23 and Hul and Gether and Mash — Sam. **וחויל וגתר ומש** and Havil, Gether, and Masha.
 27 Hadoram and Uzal — Sam. **אדורם ואח איזל** Adoram and Izal.
 28 Obal — Sam. **עובל** Ibal.
 29 Ophir — Sam. **אפר** Aphar.
 32 and by these — Sam. **מאלה** by these; Sept. *ἀπὸ τούτων*.
 the nations — Sam. **איי הגוים** the isles of the nations; Sept. *νησοὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν*.

CHAP. XI.

- 7 *that they may not understand one another's speech* — Sam. *לא ישמע איש את שפה* *that one may not understand the speech of another.*
- 8 *to build the city and the tower* — Sam. *לבנות את העיר ואת המגדל* *to build the city and the tower*; Sept. *οἰκοδομοῦντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸν πύργον.*
- 11 *at the end of this verse the Sam. reads*: *ויהיו כל ימי שם שש מאות* *and all the days of Shem were six hundred years, and he died.*
- 12 *thirty-five years* — Sam. *חמש ושלשים ומאת שנה* *one hundred and thirty-five years*; Sept. *ἑκατὸν τριακόντα πέντη ἔτη.*
- 13 *four hundred and three years* — Sam. *שלש שנים וארבע מאות שנה* *three hundred and three years, and begat sons and daughters*; and all the days of Arphaxad were *four hundred and thirty-eight years, and he died* *ויהיו כל ימי* *ארפכשד שמנה ושלשים שנה וארבע מאות שנה וימת.*
- 14 *and Salah lived thirty years* — Sam. *ויהי שלח* *and Salah lived a hundred and thirty years.*
- 15 *four hundred and three years, and begat sons and daughters* — Sam. *שלש שנים ושלש מאות שנה* *three hundred and three years, and begat sons and daughters*; and all the days of Salah were *four hundred and thirty-three years, and he died*, *ויהיו כל ימי* *שלח שלש ושלשים שנה וארבע מאות שנה וימת.*
- 16 *four and thirty years* — Sam. *ארבע ושלשים ומאת שנה* *and begat sons and daughters* — Sam. *שבעים שנה ומאתים שנה* *and begat sons and daughters*; Sept. *ἔτη διακόσια ἐβδομήκοντα*; and all the days of Eber were *four hundred and thirty years, and he died* *ויהיו כל ימי עבר* *ארבע שנים וארבע מאות שנה וימת.*
- 18 *thirty years* — Sam. *ומאת ש' ושלשים ש'* *and begat sons and daughters* — Sam. *חשע שנים ומאת ש'* *and begat sons and daughters, and all the days of Peleg were two hundred and thirty nine years* *חשע ושלשים ומאתים ש'* *and he died.*

- 20 two and thirty years — Sam. a hundred and thirty and two years 'שתיים שלשים ומאת ש'; Sept. *ἑκατὸν τριάκοντα καὶ δύο ἔτη*.
- 21 two hundred and seven years, and begat sons and daughters — Sam. a hundred and seven years 'שבע שנים ומאת ש', and begat sons and daughters, and all the days of Reu were two hundred and thirty and nine years 'תשע ושלשים ומאת ש', and he died.
- 22 thirty years — Sam. a hundred and thirty years 'שלשים שנה ומאת ש'; Sept. *ἑκατὸν τριάκοντα ἔτη*.
- 23 two hundred years, and begat sons and daughters — Sam. a hundred years 'מאת ש', and begat sons and daughters, and all the days of Serug were two hundred and thirty years 'שלשים שנה ומאת ש', and he died.
- 24 nine and twenty years — Sam. nine and seventy years 'תשע ושבעים ש'.
- 25 a hundred and nineteen years, and begat sons and daughters — Sam. sixty-nine years 'ששים ותשע ש', and begat sons and daughters, and all the days of Nahor were a hundred and forty and eight years 'שמונה וארבעים שנה ומאת ש', and he died.
- 27 and these — Sam. אלה these; Sept. *αὗται*.
- 31 and Sarai his daughter-in-law, his son Abram's wife; and they went forth — Sam. ואח שרי ואח מלכה כליתו אשת אברם ונחור and Sarai and Milcah his daughters-in-law, the wives of Abram and of Nahor his sons, and took them out.
- 32 two hundred and five years — Sam. a hundred and forty-five years 'חמש שנים וארבעים ומאת שנה'.

[The following tabular view will more fully exhibit the chronological variations between the Hebrew, Samaritan, and Septuagint. For the explanation of A, B, C, see under chap. v.]

	Hebrew.			Samaritan.			Septuagint.		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
1. Shem,	100	500	600	100	500	600	100	500	600
2. Arphaxad,	35	403	438	135	303	438	135	400	535
3. <i>Kaivân</i> ,	—	—	—	—	—	—	130	330	460
4. Salah,	30	403	433	130	303	433	130	330	460
5. Eber,	34	430	464	134	270	404	134	270	404
6. Peleg,	30	209	239	130	109	239	130	209	339
7. Reu,	32	207	239	132	107	239	132	207	339
8. Serug,	30	200	230	130	100	230	130	200	330
9. Nahor,	29	119	143	79	69	143	179	125	304
10. Terah,	70	(135)	205	70	75	145	70	(135)	205

CHAP. XII.

- 3 ומקללך and him that curseth thee — Sam. ומקללך and them that curse thee; Sept. καὶ τοὺς καταρωμένους; Vulg. *maledicentibus tibi*; Syr. ומליטנך.
- 7 ויאמר and said — Sam. ויאמר לי and said unto him; Sept. καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ.
- 16 and he had sheep, and oxen, and he asses, and men-servants, and maid-servants, and she asses, and camels — Sam. and he had sheep and oxen, a very great possession מקנה כבר מאר, men-servants, and maid-servants, and he asses, and camels.
- 19 למה why — Sam. ולמה and why.
- 20 and all that he had — Sam. and all that he had, and Lot with him ולוט עמו; Sept. καὶ ὅτ μετ' αὐτοῦ (codd. AEFX)

CHAP. XIII.

- 7 ישב dwelled — Sam. ישבים were dwelling; Sept. κατοικουν.
- 18 ויאהל and removed his tent — Sam. ויילך and went.

CHAP. XIV.

- 1 ארייך Arioch — Sam. וארייך and Arioch.
- 2 שנאב Shinab — Sam. ושנאב and Shinab.
- 6 בהרם in their mount — Sam. בהררי in the mountains; Sept. ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι.
- 10 ועמריה and Gomorrah — Sam. ומלך עמריה and the king of Gomorrah; Sept. καὶ βασιλεὺς Γομόρρας.
- 12 ואח רכשו and his goods — Sam. ואח כל רכשו and all his goods. וילכו and they departed — Sam. ויילך and he departed.
- 13 ענר Aner — Sam. ענרם Anram (id. v. 24).
- 19 and he blessed him, and said — Sam. ויאמר אברם ויאמר and he blessed Abram, and said; Sept. καὶ εὐλόγησε τὸν Ἀβραμ.
- 22 אל יהוה unto the LORD — Sam. אל האלחים unto God.
- 23 ואם and that — Sam. אם that

CHAP. XV.

- 1 שכרך הרבה מאד thy exceeding great reward — Sam. שכרך ארבה thy reward I will greatly multiply.
- 3 יורש is mine heir — Sam. יירש will be mine heir; Sept. κληρονομήσει.
- 5 look now toward heaven — Sam. השמים behold now the heaven.
- 10 הצפר the bird — Sam. הצפירים the birds.

- 16 but in the fourth generation they shall come hither again —
 Sam. וְדֹר הָרְבִיעִי יָשׁוּב but the fourth generation shall come
 hither again.
- 21 the Girgashites, and the Jebusites — Sam. the Girgashites, and
 the Hivites וְיָאֵת הַחִוִּי, and the Jebusites.

CHAP. XVI.

- 6 בִּידֶךָ in thy hand — Sam. בִּידֶיךָ in thy hands; Sept. ἐν ταῖς
 χερσί σου.
- 9 וְיָדֶיהָ her hands — Sam. וְיָדָהּ her hand.

CHAP. XVII.

- 13 וְיֻלֵּד he that is born — Sam. וְיֻלִּידוּ they that are born.
- 14 is not circumcised — Sam. is not circumcised on the eighth day
 בְּיוֹם הַשְּׁמִינִי; Sept. τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ὀγδόῃ.
- 16 מְלָכֵי עַמִּים kings of people — Sam. וּמְלָכֵי עַמִּים and kings of peo-
 ple; Sept. καὶ βασιλεῖς; Vulg. et reges; Syr. וּמַלְכָּא.
- 17 וְיֻלֵּד be born — Sam. וְיֻלִּידוּ shall he beget.
- 19 אָבֶל indeed — Sam. אַבְל הִנֵּה behold, indeed; Sept. ναί, ἰδοῦ.
 לְזֶרְעוֹ with his seed — Sam. וְלְזֶרְעוֹ and with his seed; Sept. καί;
 Vulg. et, and Syr.

CHAP. XVIII.

- 3 I have found favor in thy sight, pass not away, I pray thee,
 from thy servant — Sam. I have found favor in your sight
 בְּעֵינֶיכֶם, pass ye not away אֲלֵ נָא תַעֲבֹרֵנִי, I pray you, from your
 servant עֲבָדְכֶם.
- 5 אַחֵר after that — Sam. וְאַחֵר and after that; Sept. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο.
- 10 וְהָיָא אַחֲרָיו which was behind him — Sam. and she וְהָיָא was
 behind him; Sept. ὀψα.
- 19 for I know him, that he will command — Sam. for I know that
 Abraham will command.
- 29 and said, Peradventure — Sam. and said to him אֵלָיו, Perad-
 venture.
- I will not do — Sam. לֹא אֶשְׁחִית I will not destroy; Sept. ἀπο-
 λῶ; Chald. לֹא אַעֲבִיר גְּמִירָא; Syr. לֹא אַחְבֵּלְאֵן (id. v. 30).

CHAP. XIX.

- 6 סָגַר he shut — Sam. סָגְרוּ they shut.
- 9 וְיִשְׁפֹּט גַם שֹׁפֵט will needs be also
 a judge; Sam. vers. וְיִרְדֵּן אֶת יִרְדֵּן.
- 12 and the men said — Sam. and the angels said הַמַּלְאָכִים

12 and thy sons — Sam. thy sons.

of the place — Sam. מן המקום הזה of this place; Syr. *הנא*; Sept. *ἐκ τοῦ τόπου τούτου*; Vulg. *de urbe hac*.

28 ועל כל פני ארץ הכנר toward all the land of the plain — Sam. *ועל כל הארץ הכנר* and toward the land of the whole plain.

30 and his two daughters — Sam. and his two daughters with him עמי; Sept. *μετ' αὐτοῦ*; Vulg. *cum eo*.

CHAP. XX.

3 for the woman — Sam. on account of the woman על-אודות.

8 the men — Sam. כל האנשים all the men; Sept. *πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι*; Vulg. *omnes viri*.

11 and Abraham said, Because I thought — Sam. and Abraham said, Because I was afraid כי יראתי, for I thought.

12 and yet indeed *she* is my sister; *she* is the daughter of my father — Sam. and yet indeed she is my sister אחתי היא, the daughter of my father אבי.

13 מביית אבי ומארץ מולדתי from my father's house — Sam. מביית אבי ומארץ מולדתי from my father's house and from the land of my birth.

14 and Abimelech took sheep — Sam. and Abimelech took a thousand pieces of silver, and sheep אלף כסף וצאן.

16 unto all — Sam. ולכל and unto all; Sept. *καὶ πάσας*.

18 יהיה the Lord — Sam. אלהים God.

CHAP. XXI.

7 I have borne — Sam. I have borne to him לו.

8 Isaac — Sam. Isaac his son; Sept. *Ἰσαὰκ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ*; Syr. *יצחק בנו*.

13 of the bondwoman will I make a nation — Sam. האמה הזאת לגוי גדול אשימני of this bondwoman will I make a great nation; Sept. *τῆς παιδίσκης ταύτης εἰς ἔθνος μέγα ποιήσω*; the Syr. also reads לאמא רבא a great nation; and so the Vulg. *in gentem magnam*.

18 thy hand — Sam. יריך thine hands.

23 according to the kindness — Sam. וכחסד and according to the kindness.

30 and he said — Sam. ויאמר אברהם and Abraham said; Sept. *καὶ εἶπεν Ἀβραάμ*.

33 and he planted — Sam. וישע אברהם and Abraham planted; Sept. *καὶ ἐφύτευσεν Ἀβραάμ*; Syr. *ונצב אברהם*.

CHAP. XXII.

- 13 **אחור** behind *him* a ram — Sam. **אחד** one ram ; Sept. *εἷς* ; Syr. **דכרא** ; Chald. **הרא**.
 16 **thine only son** — Sam. **את יחידך ממני** *thine only son from me* ; Sept. *τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ δι' ἐμέ* ; Syr. **מני**.

CHAP. XXIII.

- 2 **בקריה ארבע היא** Kirjath-arba ; the same is — Sam. **בקריה הארבע** Kirjath-arba, in the valley, which is ; Sept. *ἡ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κοιλώματι*.
 8 of Zohar — Sam. **צוהר החתי** of Zohar the Hittite.
 14 **לומר לו** saying unto him — Sam. **לומר** saying.
 15 **אדני** my lord — Sam. **לא אדני** nay, my lord ; Sept. *οὐχὶ κύριε*.

CHAP. XXIV.

- 14 **עם אדני** unto my master — Sam. **עם אדני אברהם** unto my master Abraham ; Sept. *τοῦ κυρίου μου Ἀβραάμ*.
 15 **לדבר** speaking — Sam. **אל לבי** speaking in his heart ; Sept. *λαλοῦντα ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ αὐτοῦ*.
 20 **והוצר כרה** and emptied her pitcher — Sam. **והוצר כרה** and she took down her pitcher.
 21 **מחריש** held his peace — Sam. **ומחריש** and held his peace ; Sept. *καὶ παρῆσώπα*.
 22 **בקע משקלו** a shekel weight — Sam. **בקע עלאפה** a shekel weight, and put it upon her face.
 25 **גם מקום** also room — Sam. **וגם מקום** and also room.
 27 **מעם אדני** from my master — Sam. **מעם אדני אברהם** from my master Abraham.
 33 **ויאמר דבר** and he said, Speak on — Sam. **ויאמרו דבר** and they said, Speak on.
 36 **זקנתה** when she was old — Sam. **זקנתו** when he was old ; Sept. *τὸ γηράσαι αὐτόν*.
 45 **השקיני נא** let me drink, I pray thee — Sam. **השקיני נא מעט מים מכרך** let me drink, I pray thee, a little water from thy pitcher.
 55 **ואחר** after that — Sam. **ואחר** and after that ; Sept. *καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα*.
ויאמרו — Sam. **ויאמרו** and they said her brother, etc. **ויאמרו** ; Sept. *εἶπαν δέ*.
 60 **שנאיו** which hate them — Sam. **איביו** of their enemies.
 62 **בא מבוא באר** — came from the way of the well — Sam. **בא במדבר באר** went into the wilderness to the well ; Sept. *διεπορεύετο διὰ τῆς ἐρήμου κατὰ τὸ φρέαρ*.

CHAP. XXV.

- 2 זימרן Zimran — Sam. זימרון Zimron.
 4 עפר Ephraim — Sam. ואפר Apher ; Sept. Ἀφείρ.
 5 לִיצָחָק unto Isaac — Sam. לִיצָחָק בְּנוֹ unto Isaac his son ; Sept. Ἰσαὰκ τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ.
 8 וּשְׁבַע and full — Sam. וּשְׁבַע יָמִים full of days ; Syr. וּשְׁבַע יוֹמָתָה ; Sept. καὶ πληρῆς ἡμερῶν ; Vulg. plenus dierum.
 26 וַיִּקְרָא and he called — Sam. וַיִּקְרְאוּ and they called.
 28 צִיד venison — Sam. צִידוֹ his venison ; Sept. ἡ θήρα αὐτοῦ.

CHAP. XXVI.

- 5 that Abraham obeyed — Sam. שְׁמַע אַבְרָהָם אֲבִיךָ that Abraham thy father obeyed ; Sept. ὑπήκουσεν Ἀβραὰμ ὁ πατήρ σου.
 7 my wife — Sam. אִשְׁתִּי היא she is my wife ; Sept. γυνή μου ἐστί.
 11 הָעָם the people — Sam. עַמִּי his people ; Sept. τῷ λαῷ αὐτοῦ.
 18 digged in the days of Abraham בְּיָמֵי אַבְרָהָם — Sam. digged the servants of Abraham עַבְדֵי ; Sept. οἱ παῖδες Ἀβραάμ.
 22 וַיַּחְפְּרוּ and he digged — Sam. וַיַּחְפְּרוּ and they digged.
 31 לְאָחִיו to his brother — Sam. לְרֵעֵהוּ to his neighbor ; Sept. τῷ πλησίον.
 34 Elon the Hittite הַחִתִּי — Sam. Elon the Hivite הַחִוִּי.

CHAP. XXVII.

- 27 שָׂדֶה of a field — Sam. מְלֵא הַשָּׂדֶה of a full field ; Sept. ἀγροῦ πλήρους.
 33 יָגַם yea — Sam. וְגַם and yea.
 34 and when Esau heard — Sam. and it happened that when Esau heard וַיִּשְׁמַע עֵשָׂו ; Sept. ἐγένετο δὲ ἡγνίκα.

CHAP. XXVIII.

- 4 the blessing of Abraham — Sam. the blessing of Abraham thy father אֲבִיךָ ; Sept. τοῦ πατρός μου.
 אֱלֹהִים God — Sam. יְהוָה the Lord.
 9 and Esau went unto Ishmael and took — Sam. and Esau went and took
 10 וַיֵּלֶךְ and went — Sam. לָלֶכֶת to go.
 19 לֹזֶז Luz — Sam. לֹזָה Luzah.

CHAP. XXIX.

- 3 כָּל הָעֶדְרִים all the flocks — Sam. כָּל הָרֹעִים all the shepherds (id. v. 8, where the Sept. corresponds with the Samaritan, reading πάντας τοὺς ποιμένας).

- 27 and with songs — Sam. בשירים with songs.
 29 to do you — Sam. לעשות עמך to do thee.
 of your father — Sam. אבריך of thy father ; Sept. πατρός σου.
 33 and Laban went into — Sam. and Laban went and searched
 through the ; Sept. εἰσελθὼν δὲ Λάβαν ἠρעύνησεν.
 36 what is my sin — Sam. and what is my sin וימה ; Sept. καί τι.
 37 whereas — Sam. וכי and whereas ; Sept. καὶ ὅτι.
 39 I bare the loss of it : of my hand didst thou require it — Sam. I
 bare the loss of it : of my hand (omitting תבקשנה).
 49 and Mizpah — Sam. והמצבה and the pillar.
 53 יושפט judge (plur.) — Sam. יושפט judge (sing.)
 the God of their father אביהם — Sam. the God of Abraham
 אברהם.

CHAP. XXXII.

- 6 צאן flocks — Sam. וצאן and flocks ; Sept. καὶ τὰ πρόβατα ; Vulg.
et oves ; Syr. ואנא.
 21 Jacob is behind us — Sam. Jacob comes behind us בא ; Sept.
 παραγίνεται ὀπίσω, κ. τ. λ.
 24 that he had — Sam. לי אשר כל את all that he had ; Sept. πάντα
 τὰ ; Vulg. *traductisque omnibus* ; Syr. כל דאית לה.

CHAP. XXXIII.

- 11 that is brought — Sam. הבאתי that I brought ; Sept. ἤνεκα ;
 Vulg. *attuli* ; Syr. דאיתתי.
 13 and if men should overdrive them ודפקים — Sam. and if I should
 overdrive them ודפקתים ; Sept. ἐὰν οὖν καταδιώξω ; Vulg. *in*
ambulando fecere laborare.
 16 שלם Shalem — Sam. שלום Shalom.

CHAP. XXXIV.

- 4 unto his father Hamor — Sam. unto his father (omitting Hamor).
 10 and trade — Sam. trade.
 13 שמה he had defiled — Sam. שמתא they had defiled ; Sept. ἐμίλαν
 (Codd. Alex. and Vatic.) ; Syr. דשמתא.
 16 one people — Sam. כעם אחד like one people ; Sept. ὡς γένος.
 18 Shechem, Hamor's son — Sam. Shechem his son.
 21 these men are peaceable with us ; therefore let them dwell —
 Sam. these men are peaceable, with us they dwell אחני ישבי ;
 Sept. μεθ' ἡμῶν οἰκείτωσαν.
 23 their cattle (sing.) — Sam. מקניהם their cattle (plur.) ; Sept. τὰ
 κατήνη αὐτῶν.

- 27 the sons — Sam. **וּבְנֵי** and the sons; Sept. οἱ δὲ υἱοί; Syr. **וּבְנֵי**.
 28 their sheep — Sam. and their sheep; Sept. καὶ τὰ πρόβατα αὐτῶν.
 29 and all their little ones — Sam. and their little ones.
 31 should he deal — Sam. should they deal; Sept. *χρησονται*; Vulg. *abuti debueret*.

CHAP. XXXV.

- 9 and blessed him — Sam. and God blessed him **אֱלֹהִים**; Sept. ὁ θεός.
 10 thy name shall not be called any more — Sam. thy name shall not any more be called **יִקְרָא עֵיר**.
 24 the sons of — Sam. **וּבְנֵי** and the sons of.

CHAP. XXXVI.

- 2 daughter of Zibeon — Sam. son of Zibeon **בֶּן**; Sept. τοῦ υἱοῦ; Syr. **בֶּר** (id. v. 14).
 3 Bashemath — Sam. **מַחֲלַת** Machlath (id. v. 4, 10, 13, 18).
 6 and went into the country from — Sam. and went from the land of Canaan **מֵאֶרֶץ כְּנָעַן**; Sept. καὶ ἐπορεύθη ἐκ τῆς γῆς Χαναάν.
 10 these are — Sam. **וְאֵלֶּה** and these are.
 11 Omar, Zepho — Sam. and Omar and Zepho.
 16 duke Korah, duke Gatam — Sam. duke Gatam (omitting the first).
 17 and these are — Sam. these are.
 19 that is Edom — Sam. **עֵשָׂו בֶּן־אֲדָמ** Esau that is Edom.
 20 these are — Sam. and these are (id. v. 27, 28).
 24 and Ajah — Sam. Ajah; Sept. Ἀἴε.
 the mules — Sam. **הַגִּידִים** the giants; Chald. **יִת גְּבִרִיא**; Sam. vers. **עַם אֵימָאִי** the Emim people.
 26 and Ithran — Sam. Ithran.
 35 Midian — Sam. **הַמִּדְיָנִי** the Midianite.
 39 and Baal-hanan the son of Achbor died — Sam. and Baal-hanan died (corresponding with 1 Chron. i. 50).
 Hadar — Sam. **חֲדָד** Hadad (so likewise 1 Chron. i. 50).
 43 according to their habitations — Sam. **לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָם** according to their families.

CHAP. XXXVII.

- 4 than all his brethren — Sam. than all his sons **בְּנָיו**; Sept. ὥν υἱῶν αὐτοῦ; Vulg. *plus cunctis filiis*. Four Hebrew mss. support the reading of the Samaritan.
 14 see — Sam. **וַיִּרְאֵהוּ** and see.

20 and let us slay him — Sam. let us slay him.

27 and let us sell him — Sam. let us sell him.

our flesh — Sam. and our flesh; Sept. καὶ σὰρξ ἡμῶν.

33 my son's coat — Sam. it is my son's coat בני זיח; Sept. τοῦ υἱοῦ μου ἐστὶ.

36 sold him — Sam. מכרו את יוסף sold Joseph; Sept. ἀπέδοντο τὸν Ἰωσήφ; Vulg. *vendiderunt Joseph*.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

3 and he called — Sam. and she called. The Samaritan reading is supported by nine Hebrew mss. (id. vs. 29, 30).

13 told Thamar — Sam. told Thamar his daughter-in-law לתמר כלחו; Sept. Θάμαρ τῇ νύμφῃ αὐτοῦ.

21 מקמה of that place — Sam. המקום of the place; Sept. ἐκ τοῦ τόπου.

25 and bracelets — Sam. and bracelet; Sept. καὶ ὀρμίσκος.

29 עליך upon thee — Sam. עלינו upon us.

CHAP. XXXIX.

4 grace in his sight — Sam. grace in the sight of his master בעיני אדני; Sept. ἐναντίον τοῦ κυρίου αὐτοῦ; Vulg. *coram domino suo*.

8 careth not with me what is in the house — Sam. careth not with me anything that is in his house אחי מאומה בביתי; Sept. οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ.

10 day by day — Sam. day and day; Sept. ἡμέραν ἐξ ἡμέρας.

11 and he went into the house — Sam. and Joseph went into the house; Sept. καὶ εἰσῆλθεν Ἰωσήφ εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν; Vulg. *ut intraret Joseph domum*.

to do his work — Sam. לעשות מלאכתי בבית to do his work in the house.

12 by his garment — Sam. by his garments בבגדיו.

left his garment — Sam. left his garments; Sept. τὰ ἱμάτια.

13 his garment — Sam. his garments.

and had fled into the street — Sam. and fled and went out into the street; Sept. ἔφυγε καὶ ἐξῆλθεν ἔξω.

15 his garment with me — Sam. his garments in my hands בגדיו בירי.

16 his garment — Sam. his garments (id. vs. 18).

23 and what he did — Sam. and all that he did.

CHAP. XLI.

8 his dream — Sam. his dreams.

10 put me — Sam. put them; Sept. ἤμας.

- 11 according to the interpretation — Sam. according to his interpretation.
- 16 without me, God shall answer — Sam. without God shall not be answered **לֹא יַעֲנֶה** ; Sept. *ἀνευ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ἀποκριθήσεται*.
- 17 behold — Sam. and behold.
- 20 fat kine — Sam. and fat kine.
- 23 blasted — Sam. and blasted (id. vs. 27).
- 25 he hath showed — Sam. **אָגִיד** I will show.
- 32 and because the dream was repeated — Sam. the dream rose a second time **וַיַּעֲלֶה שֵׁנִית**.
- 33 let Pharaoh look out a man — Sam. let Pharaoh look out a man for himself **לִי**.
- 34 let Pharaoh do this — Sam. and Pharaoh did **וַיַּעַשׂ**.
and take up the fifth part — Sam. and took up the fifth part **וַיִּרְחַשׁ**.
- 35 and let them gather — Sam. and he gathered **וַיִּקְבֹּץ**.
of those good years — Sam. of those seven good years ; Sept. *τῶν ἐπτα ἐτῶν*.
and keep it — Sam. **יִשְׁמְרוּ** they kept.
- 43 and they cried — Sam. **וַיִּקְרָא** and he cried ; Sept. *ἐκήρυξεν*.
- 45 Zaphnath-paaneah — Sam. Zaphanti-paaneah.
- 48 which were in the land — Sam. **הָיָה הַשֶּׁבַע בָּאָרֶץ** in which was plenitude in the land ; Sept. *ἐν οἷς ἦν ἡ εὐθηνία*.
- 51 all my toil — Sam. **אֶחָד עֲמָלִי** all toil.
- 53 that was — Sam. **אֲשֶׁר הָיוּ** that were ; Sept. *ἐγένοντο* (Cod. Vat.)
- 55 what he saith — Sam. and what he saith ; Sept. *καί* ; and all the ancient versions.
- 56 over all the face of the earth — Sam. **כָּל הָאָרֶץ** over the face of all the earth ; Sept. *ἐπὶ προσώπου πάσης τῆς γῆς* ; Syr. **כָּלָה אֶרֶצָא** ; Vulg. *in omni terra*.
all the store-houses — Sam. all the store-houses in which there was corn **בָּר**. The phrase, as it stands in the Hebrew, **אֶת כָּל הָהֶם** **אֲשֶׁר בָּהֶם** is elliptical, and must be supplied : Joseph opened all the granaries in which there was corn **בָּר**, as the Sam. reads, or as the Targum Onkelos reads : **יָת כָּל אוֹצְרוֹת דִּר בַּחוּן עִיבּוּרָא** ; Sept. *τοὺς σιτοβολῶνας* ; Vulg. *horrea* ; Syr. **אוֹצְרָא**.
- 57 and all the land — Sam. and all the countries **הָאֶרְצוֹת** ; Sept. *αἱ χῶραι* ; Vulg. *provinciæ* ; Chald. **וְכָל דִּירֵי אֶרֶצָא** and all the inhabitants of the earth.

CHAP. XLII.

- 6 *it was* he — Sam. and *it was* he.
 16 At the end of the verse the Samaritan adds, ויאמרו לא יוכל הנער and they said unto him, The lad cannot leave his father; for if he should leave his father, his father would die. (Comp. xliv. 22.)
 19 אחד let one — Sam. האחד let the one.
 carry corn — Sam. והביא את שבר and carry the corn; Sept. καί.
 21 the anguish — Sam. בצרה in the anguish.
 this distress — Sam. all this distress.
 32 we be twelve brethren — Sam. שנים עשר אחים אחנו twelve brethren are we; Sept. ἀδελφοί ἐσμεν.
 the one — Sam. והאחד and the one.

CHAP. XLIII.

- 13 go again — Sam. and go again.
 14 your other brother — Sam. your one brother האחד
 16 Benjamin with them — Sam. them and Benjamin.
 18 and take us — Sam. לקחת to take us; Sept. τοῦ λαβεῖν.
 22 have we brought down — Sam. לקחנו have we taken.
 23 God of your father — Sam. God of your fathers אבתיכם; Sept. τῶν πατέρων ὑμῶν.
 28 he is yet alive; and they bowed — Sam. עירנו חי ויאמר בריך he is yet alive. And he said, Blessed be this man to God; and they bowed; Sept. ἔτι ζῇ. καὶ εἶπεν. εὐλογημένος ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος τῷ θεῷ, κ. τ. λ.

CHAP. XLIV.

- 7 and they said unto him — Sam. and they said (omitting אליו).
 9 let him die, and we also — Sam. גם אנחנו shall die, we also; Sept. ἀποθνήσκέτω.
 13 and laded — Sam. ויעמסו and they laded; Sept. καὶ ἐπέθηκαν.
 16 what shall we speak — Sam. ומה נדבר and what shall we speak? God hath — Sam. והאלהים and God hath.
 20 and his brother — Sam. אחיו his brother.
 24 my father — Sam. אביו our father; Sept. πατέρα ἡμῶν; Vulg. *patrem nostrum*; Syr. אבין.
 28 the one — Sam. אחד one.
 30 with us — Sam. אחי with me.

- 31 **כי אין הנער אחני** the lad is not — Sam. **כי אין הנער אחני** the lad is not with us; Sept. τὸ παιδίον μεθ' ἡμῶν.
 32 **unto my father אבי** — Sam. **unto his father אביו**.

CHAP. XLV.

- 1 **cause to go out היציא** — Sam. **ויהציא** and he caused to go out.
 2 **house of Pharaoh heard וישמע** — Sam. **house of Pharaoh heard וישמעו**.
 7 **by a great deliverance גלטה** — Sam. **פלטה** a great deliverance; Sept. κατάλευψιν μεγάλην.
 10 **and thy flocks** — Sam. **thy flocks**; Sept. τὰ πρόβατά σου.
 23 **good things of Egypt** — Sam. **good things of the land of Egypt ארץ מצרים**.

CHAP. XLVI.

- 9 **and Hezron** — Sam. **Hezron**.
 12 **and Shelah** — Sam. **Shelah**.
 and Hamul — Sam. **המזאל** and Hamuel; Sept. Ἰεμονήλ.
 13 **and Job** — Sam. **ישיב** and Jashub; Sept. Ἰασούβ.
 16 **Ziphion** — Sam. **צפון** Zaphon; Sept. Σαφών.
 Shuni — Sam. **ושיני** and Shuni; Sept. καὶ Σαννίς.
 Eri — Sam. **ערי** Edi.
 Areli — Sam. **וארולי** Aruli.
 21 **Ehi** — Sam. **אחים** Ehim.
 Hupim — Sam. **ואפים** Appim.
 22 **which were born** — Sam. **which she bare ילדה**; Sept. ἔτεκε;
 Vulg. genuit; Syr. **דילדה**.
 24 **and Jezer and Shillem** — Sam. **Jezer and Shalum**.
 28 **to direct his face** — Sam. **להראות** to show before him.
 and they came — Sam. **and he came**.
 34 **every shepherd** — Sam. **כל רעי צאן** all shepherds; Chald. **כל רעי** כנא; Syr. **כל רעיי** כנא; Vulg. omnes pastores. The Samaritan reading is also supported by twenty-two Hebrew mss.

CHAP. XLVII.

- 1 **and said** — Sam. **and said unto him אליו**.
 2 **he took** — Sam. **לקח עמו** he took with him.
 3 **to his brothers אל אחי יוסף** — Sam. **אל אחי יוסף** to Joseph's brothers; Sept. τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς Ἰωσήφ; Syr. **לאחיו יוסף**.
 9 **to the days of the years of the life of my fathers** — Sam. **the days of the life of my fathers**.
 16 **I will give you for your cattle** — Sam. **I will give you bread לחם** for your cattle; Sept. δώσω ὑμῖν ἄρτους.

- 21 העביר אתו לערים he removed them to cities — Sam. העביר אתו לערים he made them to servants; Sept. κατεδουλώσατο αὐτῶ εἰς παῖδας; Vulg. *subjectique Pharaoni*, etc.
- 29 ועשית and deal — Sam. ועשית נא and deal I pray thee.
- 30 according to thy word — Sam. כדברייך according to thy words.

CHAP. XLVIII.

- 5 and Simeon — Sam. וכשמעון and as Simeon.
- 7 from Padan — Sam. פדן ארם from Padan Aram. .
Rachel died — Sam. Rachel thy mother died רחל אמך; Sept. *Ῥαχὴλ ἡ μήτηρ σου*.
Ephrath — Sam. אפרתה Ephratha.
- 12 and he prostrated — Sam. וישתחוין and they prostrated; Sept. καὶ προσεκύνησαν.
- 14 his right — Sam. יד ימיני his right hand; Sept. τὴν χεῖρα τὴν δεξιάν κ. τ. λ.; Vulg. *manum dexteram*.
- 16 the lads — Sam. את הנערים האלה these lads; Sept. τὰ παῖδιά ταῦτα; Vulg. *benedicat pueris istis*.

CHAP. XLIX.

- 4 unstable as water — Sam. פחות כמים thou art unstable as water.
- 5 כלי חמס instruments of cruelty — Sam. כלי חמס they executed violence; Sept. *συνετέλεσαν*.
- 6 unto their assembly — Sam. ויבקהלם in their assembly.
אל תחר be not thou united — Sam. אל יחר shall not glow; Sept. *ἐρίσαι*.
- 7 אריר cursed be — Sam. אריר brilliant is.
and their wrath, for it is cruel ועברתם — Sam. and their society
והברחה, for it is of great duration.
- 8 thy hand — Sam. ידך thy hands; Sept. αἱ χεῖρές σου.
- 10 מבין רגליו from between his feet — Sam. מבין רגליו from among his banners.
- שילה Shiloh — Sam. שלה Shiloh? It is very difficult to say what is meant here, since the reading is שלה, which is supported by more than twenty-six Hebrew mss., and almost all Samaritan copies. Now the word in question may mean *Shiloh*, since the town Shiloh is, in the Old Test., written as the Samaritan presents it (comp. Judges xxi. 12; 1 Sam. i. 3, 9; iii. 21; iv. 3, 4, 12; xiv. 3; 1 Kings ii. 27, etc.), or can be read שְׁלִיחַ, which would be equivalent to אֲשֶׁר לוֹ to whom it is or belongs, which corresponds to the Sept. τὰ ἀποκείμενα αὐτῷ; Aquila and Sym-

machus, "till he comes to whom it is destined," $\phi\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\iota$; Syr. מן דרילה חי; Onkelos, Targum Jerus. and Jonathan refer it to the Messiah thus; Onkelos, עד דייחתי משיחא; Jerusalem, עד זמן דייחתי מלכא משיחא; and so also Rashi, who explains מלך המשיח שהמלוכה שלו by עד כי יבא שילה, i.e. the king Messiah, to whom the kingdom belongs. The Vulgate translates, *qui mittendus est*, reading שלח for שלה.

עמים obedience of the people — Sam. the nations will flock ויקהו; Aquila $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\tau\eta\mu\alpha\ \lambda\alpha\omega\nu$; Rashi אסיפת העמים. The translation of the Sept., Vulg., and others, by "expectation," $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \pi\rho\sigma\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \xi\theta\nu\omega\nu$, *et ipse erit expectatis gentium*, is, however, not confirmed by any parallel passage.

11 יסחר עירו his foal — Sam. עירי his city. Targum Onkelos יסחר ישראל לקרהיה Israel shall pass round about in his cities.

אחני his ass's colt — Sam. בני איתני the sons of his strength.

13 על צידן upon Zidon — Sam. עד צידן unto Zidon; Sept. $\xi\omega\varsigma$.

22 בנות צעדה עלי שור whose branches run over the wall — Sam. בני צעורי עלי שור my youngest son ascended the wall; Sept. $\nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma\ \mu\omicron\nu\ \nu\epsilon\acute{\omega}\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$. $\pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \mu\epsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\rho\epsilon\psi\omicron\nu$, taking שור as a verb, "to lie in wait for, to lurk."

23 וירבו and shot at him — Sam. וייריבהו and contended against him.

25 ואל שרי and by the Almighty — Sam. ואל שרי and the Almighty God; Syr. ואיל שרי.

26 אביך of thy father — Sam. אביך ואמך of thy father and thy mother; Sept. $\pi\alpha\tau\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \sigma\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\eta\tau\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \sigma\omicron\nu$.

of my progenitors — Sam. of the mountains; Sept. $\delta\rho\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$.

31 there they buried Isaac — Sam. and there they buried.

CHAP. L.

5 made me swear — Sam. השבעני לפני מותי made me swear before his death; Sept. $\acute{\omega}\rho\kappa\iota\sigma\epsilon\ \mu\epsilon\ \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\eta\gamma\sigma\alpha\iota$ (Codd. AEFX).

and bury my father — Sam. ואקברה את אבי כאשר השבעני and bury my father, as he made me swear.

8 and his brethren — Sam. his brethren.

11 Abel-Mizraim — Sam. למצרים mourning to the Egyptians.

15 and will certainly requite us — Sam. חשב ישיב he will certainly requite us.

19 for am I — Sam. I am (omitting כי).

20 God meant — Sam. והאלהים and God meant.

23 על ברכי יוסף upon Joseph's knees — Sam. בימי יוסף in the days of Joseph.

25 from hence — Sam. מזה אתכם from hence with you; Sept. ἐντεῦθεν μεθ' ὑμῶν; Vulg. *vobiscum de loco isto*; Syr. עמבין; the addition אתכם in the Samaritan is also supported by more than twelve Hebrew mss.

[At the end of each book of the Pentateuch the Samaritan gives the number of paragraphs, termed קצין; at the end of our book we read: וְכֵן מֵאָתַיִם וְחָמֵשׁ : קָצִין הָרִאשׁוֹן : i.e. this is the first book (with) two hundred and fifty Kazzin.]

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE III.

THE RELATION OF THEOLOGY TO OTHER SCIENCES.

THE present age is characterized by a tendency of scientific men to throw suspicion over the trustworthiness of the Bible. The prevalence of such a suspicion blunts the edge of biblical appeals. "If Christianity *may be* a fable, then I need not care for its promises or threatenings"; this is the natural exclamation of many a young man who hears that some new discoveries in science have proved the Bible to be false. The bare *suspicion*, not less than the positive *belief*, that the Bible is false, weakens its practical authority.

To many minds Christianity *seems* to be in danger from recent theories of scientific men. We believe this *seeming* to be no *reality*. So far forth as these theories are true, they harmonize with the essential spirit of Christianity. So far forth as they are in conflict with this spirit, they are not true. A narrow view of science may lead a man into infidelity; a broader view will lead him back to the Bible. The more profound our studies become, so much the clearer will it be that certain speculations in science which have threatened to encourage scepticism are really aids to faith; and that other speculations which are in irreconcilable

variance with the divine word are equally at variance with sound logic.

Men in general, however, do not addict themselves to profound study on religious themes. They may be led into the right way by well-instructed guides, or into the wrong way by sophistical reasoners. There are merchants, and merchants' clerks, and youthful mechanics who affect to disbelieve in the authenticity of Genesis, in the narratives of miracles, in regeneration by the Holy Spirit, in the efficacy of prayer, and in all supernatural providences, because there are said to be philosophers who have discovered that there is no personal God; or that, if there be such a Spirit, he never interposes his own volition between one and another of the fixed laws of nature. There are young men in our halls of learning who are inclined to relieve themselves from the restraints of their religious education, because they cannot answer the arguments which are said to disprove the freedom of the will, the authority of conscience, the immutable difference between right and wrong, the immateriality and immortality of the soul. These tendencies to pantheism, or atheism, or scepticism, or some other form of infidelity ought to be arrested. In order to arrest them, the harmony between theology and the secular sciences ought to be distinctly shown; our pastors ought not only to perceive this harmony, but also to aid their sceptical or inquisitive hearers in perceiving it; the young men in our theological schools ought to be familiar with it, and able to illustrate its details. In these schools elaborate lectures ought to be delivered on the relation of theology to other sciences. These lectures would not only help the candidates for the ministry, but would also help our older ministers to grapple with the scepticism of the day. A theological school should be like a city set on a hill and illumining the broad valleys around it. Such lectures are delivered in some foreign universities; professors are appointed whose office is to prove and elucidate the agreement between secular and sacred science, and to show that all philosophy which contravenes the vital teachings

of the Bible is a philosophy "*falsely so called.*" Our theological literature would be improved, if professorships were established for the purpose of giving clear statements of those biblical doctrines which are so often impugned by the scientist, and of distinguishing those doctrines from the caricatures which he so ignorantly makes of them; for the purpose of giving clear statements of those scientific facts which are supposed to be at variance with the Bible, and of distinguishing those facts from the conjectural theories which the scientist so often associates with them. Let the facts which he discovers be received with loyal faith, but let the hypotheses which he combines with them be carefully scrutinized. The facts belong to the solid ground; the windy hypotheses often belong to "the prince of the power of the air."

We might here enlarge upon the excellences, but also the deficiencies, of several treatises which have been recently published on Science in Religion and Religion in Science, — treatises which were originally delivered as Lectures in Theological Seminaries. We will, however, simply produce an extract from the volume on Christian Psychology, published in 1874, by Rev. George Sutherland, an Australian pastor. "Next in value," he says, "to the noble science of theology is the important science of psychology. This science treats of the soul of man — his powers, capacities, condition, and consequent duties. As man, however, possesses a body as well as a soul, the full consideration of his nature embraces the two cognate sciences of physiology and psychology, the one treating of his material frame-work, the other of his spiritual endowments. From the nature of the subject, psychology takes precedence over physiology."¹ "The author was led to the investigation of this extensive and difficult subject from the duties of his office, as an expounder of the doctrines of Christianity. Meeting in the sacred volume with the term 'conscience,' as expressing a power which should regulate human conduct, the questions

¹ Page iii.

arose : What power is this ? What authority does it exercise ? What was its original purpose, and what its present condition ? Questions relating to conscience soon led to questions relating to the emotional nature, the intellect, and the will. Unable to find satisfactory answers in all the works within reach, and constrained to differ widely from the arrangement, treatment, and general conclusions adopted by some of the most distinguished authorities on this science, the resolution was formed to explore the whole field from an original and independent position.”¹

Many instances like these might be cited to illustrate the intimate connection between the sacred and secular sciences ; the former exciting an interest in the latter, and the latter sometimes undermining the faith in the former. Our theological students need to be disciplined far more than they have been, or at present can be, in regard to the interdependence of these sciences upon each other. At this particular time, the man to whom Providence has given wealth enough for endowing such a Theological Professorship as is described in this Article, may well be congratulated. Heaven has empowered him to remain a defender of the Bible for ages after he is dead. “ His days shall be long in the land ” ; for while he is in his grave he will live in the lectures and books of the professors whom he enables to study and to prove the truth of the Scriptures. Long after his entrance into heaven he may welcome there the arrival of multitudes whom he will have been the means of rescuing from infidelity.

Between the years 1808 and 1841 the Theological Seminary at Andover had a friend ever watchful and ready to raise the standard of its education. That William Bartlet “ aimed to furnish to this beloved Seminary, the best and richest means of mental cultivation and enlargement ; that he wished it to send forth young men with minds truly liberalized and accomplished — affluent in intellectual stores — saturated with knowledge human and divine — this is known to all.” [See the Sermon in Commemoration of William Bartlet,

¹ Pages iii, iv.

Esq., by Daniel Dana, D.D., p. 30.] He gave his hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars for the purpose of sending into the world a highly educated ministry. In the persons of nearly three thousand ministers who have attended lectures at this Seminary, Mr. Bartlet has been a defender of the Bible throughout our land. In the persons of more than a hundred and seventy foreign missionaries he has been, and will continue to be, going into all the world and preaching the gospel to every creature. In the persons of nearly two hundred teachers in our institutions of learning, he, being dead, yet speaketh. He died at the age of ninety-three; but in his power of doing good he will live as long as Andover continues to send forth ministers and missionaries of the cross, and as long as the influence of her past and future *alumni* shall remain in the church. He has been, is, and will be, a defender of "the faith once delivered to the saints."

Every Theological Seminary in our land needs its own William Bartlet. The Union Theological Seminary in New York has a benefactor, Mr. James Brown, who a few years ago, by his princely donation of three hundred thousand dollars awakened the admiration of all friends of sacred learning. Will he not awaken their *emulation* also? Where are the men who have been so richly favored of Heaven, that they will come forth in defence of the Bible, and provide for each of our Theological Seminaries, more adequate instruction in the topics above named? Where are the men whom Providence will enable to live as champions of the truth in hundreds and thousands of pastors hereafter to be trained in schools of sacred learning? Seldom, very seldom, does Heaven give to any man so precious an opportunity of doing good for ages after he has lain down in the grave.

ARTICLE IV.

THE JOHN CARTER BROWN LIBRARY.

BY REV. J. C. STOCKBRIDGE, D.D., PROVIDENCE, R. I.

THE writer of this Article has no doubt that many of the readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* have some knowledge of the valuable collection of books known as the "John Carter Brown Library," and are acquainted with some of the leading facts in the life of the gentleman from whom the library takes its name. There must, however, be not a few individuals, who may with propriety regard themselves as scholars, who are ignorant of both the founder of the library of which we shall speak, as well as of the library itself. To such there may be a satisfaction in learning some of the outlines in the history of one who did such noble service to the cause of letters, and whose costly collection of books is a better monument to his fame than sculptured granite or marble.

John Carter Brown was born in Providence, Rhode Island, August 28, 1797. He was the second son of Hon. Nicholas Brown, whose munificent gifts to the university which bears his name have placed him among the most distinguished benefactors of his native State. In 1841 he came into possession of a large patrimony, and succeeded to the position which his deceased father had held for so many years, as the senior partner of the well known firm of Brown and Ives. His love for books, showing itself in a taste for those which were rare and costly, early developed itself; and the ample fortune which was at his command enabled him to gratify this taste. He spared no pains and no expense in procuring the best works in different departments of literature; and there were found in his library, even many years ago, copies of the most elaborate editions of the classics, and some of the most complete Polyglot Bibles that have ever been pub-

lished. But his attention began to be turned early in life to what, with him, became almost a passion for gathering from every possible source any and every thing that could throw light upon American history. It is in this department, as we shall have occasion hereafter to see, that his library became so valuable. Our purpose is not to dwell at length on the details of the life of Mr. Brown or to attempt to give a portrait of his character. It is only as a bibliophile — a lover of books — that we now allude to him. Year after year saw additions made to his singularly valuable collection of the best works illustrative of the themes in which he took a special interest. He could, in the riper years of his life, refer with an honest pride to the result of his long and unwearied efforts, reaching over a period of fifty years, to bring together from every quarter the best materials for adding to the stock of our historical knowledge, and preserving, in the safest way, the records of races and deeds which, but for his loving care and lavish expenditure, might have passed into oblivion. It is pleasant to know that this passion for collecting books bore no resemblance to the selfish passion of the miser in gathering into his coffers the gold and silver which he clutches with greedy hands. Professor Gammell has well said that “it has not been with him, as is sometimes true of such collections, a mere hoarding, for personal gratification, of the historic treasures of past centuries. This collection has always been accessible to scholars and authors who were studying the subjects to which it relates. Eminent men from other States, and even from Europe, have visited Providence on purpose to consult or to study some work which they could find nowhere else than in Mr. Brown’s library. So great, indeed, has been his readiness to make this collection useful to historians, even in other countries, that, in at least three instances, he has sent across the Atlantic books which, if they had been lost, could never have been replaced. In one instance this was done to meet the wishes of Sir Arthur Helps, the historian of the Spanish Conquest in America, who, in one of the volumes of that work, makes

a graceful and glowing acknowledgment of the unexampled courtesy which he had thus experienced." I cannot forbear to quote the words of Sir Arthur in which he makes this "graceful and glowing acknowledgment." They are found in the third volume of the elegantly bound copy of his "Conquest" which Sir Arthur presented to Mr. Brown. On p. 128 of this volume is a foot-note, as follows :

"Puga's Collection of Ordinances, printed in Mexico in 1563, in folio, is the earliest summary of Spanish colonial law, relating to the New World. It is a work of the highest rarity ; there is not a copy known to exist in England. The one I have made use of, belongs to John Carter Brown, Esq., of Providence, R. I., in America, who kindly sent it over to his friend Mr. Henry Stevens, in order that I might be permitted to consult it. As far as I have been able to judge, the American collectors of books are exceedingly liberal and courteous in the use of them, and seem really to understand what the object should be in forming a great library."

From what has been said, the reader will be able to form a good conception of the character of Mr. Brown. He was a "merchant prince" of generous culture, deepened and broadened by foreign travel and intercourse with gentlemen of literary taste ; courteous in his manners, simple and modest in his bearing, and ever ready to throw open to the seeker after knowledge the vast stores of the best information which he had gathered on subjects which will never cease to interest and instruct scholars. His library was to him one of the dearest spots on earth, and as he looked around on its well-filled shelves, he might reasonably pride himself in seeing a collection of books which, in some respects, is without a rival in this or in any other country. Mr. Brown died at his own mansion in the city of Providence, June 10th, 1874, in the seventy-seventh year of his age.

We now pass from the collector to the collection itself. It is not the large number of books which arrests our attention as we enter the cheerful room in which the writer sits while preparing this Article. Not a few private libraries can count up many more volumes than we now look upon. But it is the value of the library, as estimated by the exceeding rarity

and intrinsic worth of so many of these costly books, that awakens our admiration, — I will not say, excites our envy, — since, for all practical purposes, these treasures of knowledge are at our free and ready command. One heaves an involuntary sigh, even in the midst of the glow of delight of which he is conscious, as he gazes upon treasures so rich, that he can have but the most superficial acquaintance with such a mine of intellectual wealth. Although a constant visitor for several months to this most charming of all literary retreats, the writer confesses his utter inability to prepare such an Article as this, but for information derived from other sources than his own investigations. Especially is he indebted to the Hon. J. R. Bartlett, the cherished friend of Mr. Brown, and better acquainted with the library, even to its minutest details, than any living person, and whose catalogue, with biographical and other annotations, is among the best contributions that has ever been made to bibliography. Indeed, it is in part with the desire of preserving in a more permanent form information presented by Mr. Bartlett in a newspaper article in the Providence Journal of July 22, 1874, that this Article has been prepared. The writer will not charge himself with having committed plagiarism, if he draws largely on the interesting facts which he finds in this sketch. He hopes, also, to present some other facts not contained in the article alluded to, which may gratify lovers of good books.

Some years after his graduation from Brown University in 1816, Mr. Brown went abroad; and his taste for rare books was one of the things which gave a peculiar charm to his travels, for it led him to make such literary retreats as the Bodleian Library at Oxford and the British Museum in London the favorite places of his resort. It would hardly be just to Mr. Brown to say that he was beginning to show the symptoms of the disease which Dibdin, in his amusing way, has described in his *Bibliomania*. This malady, it will be remembered, he discusses under three heads. 1. The history of the disease; 2. The nature or symptoms of the

disease; and 3. The probable means of its cure. There is certainly something quite pertinent to our present subject in what he says under the first head. "The disease will be found to have been attended with this remarkable circumstance, namely, that it has almost uniformly confined its attacks to the *male* sex, and among these, to people in the higher and middling classes of society, while the artificer, laborer, and peasant have escaped wholly uninjured. It has raged chiefly in palaces, castles, halls, and gay mansions; and those things which in general are supposed not to be inimical to health, such as cleanliness, spaciousness and splendor, are only so many inducements towards the introduction and propagation of the Bibliomania! What renders its character particularly formidable is, that it rages in all seasons of the year, and at all periods of human existence. The emotions of friendship or of love are weakened or subdued as old age advances; but the influence of this passion, or rather disease, admits of no mitigation; 'it grows with our growth, and strengthens with our strength;' and is oft-times

'The ruling passion in death.'"

As affording proof of the hopelessness of cure in cases of confirmed Bibliomania, Dibdin quotes the saying of Seneca, found in chap. iii. of his treatise, *De Tranquillitate*. "If you are fond of books, you will escape the ennui of life; you will neither sigh for evening, disgusted with the occupations of the day, nor will you live dissatisfied with yourself or unprofitable to others." The younger Pliny was a downright Bibliomaniac. "I am quite transported and comforted," says he, "in the midst of my books; they give a zest to the happiest, and assuage the anguish of the bitterest, moments of existence! Therefore, when distracted by the cares or the losses of my family or my friends, I fly to my library as the only refuge in distress; here I learn to bear adversity with fortitude." Under the head of the symptoms of the disease, there is, first, a definition of Bibliomania which is said to be a passion for possessing books, not so much to be instructed by them, as to gratify the eye by looking on them.

He who is affected by this mania knows books only by their titles and dates, and is rather seduced by the exterior than interior." D'Israeli, in his *Curiosities of Literature*, remarks that "Bruyère has touched on this mania with humor; 'of such a collector' (one who is fond of superb bindings only) he says, 'as soon as I enter his house, I am ready to faint on the stair-case from a strong smell of morocco leather. In vain he shows me fine editions, gold leaves, Etruscan bindings, etc., naming them one after another, as if he were showing a gallery of pictures.'" Eight symptoms of the disease are enumerated. A passion for, 1. large paper copies; 2. uncut copies; 3. illustrated copies; 4. unique copies; 5. copies printed upon vellum; 6. first editions; 7. true editions; 8. a general desire for the black letter.

It is gratifying to know that while Mr. Brown was a passionate lover of good books, his was never "a zeal without knowledge." He had definite aims to accomplish in making up his library, and he was himself familiar with the books which came into his hands. In short, he was a *bibliophile*, but never a *bibliomaniac*. In his early visit to Europe it was his good fortune to make the acquaintance of one of the most eminent book collectors in London, the late Henry Perkins, and, without doubt, the examination which he made of the magnificent library which belonged to this gentleman quickened his own tastes, and awakened an emulation to surround himself also with the best books. Mr. Bartlett alludes to the delight with which, as Mr. Brown assured him, he turned over the leaves of the famous Mazarin Bible, which, at the sale of Mr. Perkins' library in 1873, realized the great sum of £3,400. Mr. Brown made purchases of valuable books in Paris and London, in his first visits to these cities, and forwarded them to his home in Providence. Not long after this there came into his hands a catalogue of Mr. O. Rich, of London, a bookseller who had given special attention to the collection of all the works he could find relating to America. Another distinguished bookseller of Paris, Mr. Henri Ternaux, had, in like manner, made a specialty of collecting

books on America. Making himself familiar with the titles and general contents of these books, Mr. Brown sent out his orders to book collectors in Europe to spare no pains nor reasonable expense in securing the coveted treasures for his library. When the libraries collected by Messrs. Rich and Ternaux were thrown upon the market, many of the most valuable of their books found what we trust will prove to be a permanent home in the library of Mr. Brown. Some of them were so rare, that in no subsequent sale of books in Europe, has it been possible to purchase a single one of them. From Mr. Rich's collection there came several hundred books and pamphlets, published during the ten years preceding the revolutionary war, and presenting to the reader the general drift of opinion and discussion during that important period when American affairs occupied the thoughts of men, and became the theme of so much earnest controversy, on both sides of the Atlantic. A large number of pamphlets also embraces the whole period of the revolutionary war, and several years after the struggle was over. These pamphlets have all been put into substantial bindings, and at this centennial period of our history they possess a value which can hardly be estimated. Besides these pamphlets, having a special interest as relating to American affairs, there are scores of others, dating back as far as the year 1701, the topics discussed by the writers of which cover a large ground, and are of the most various characters. Probably some of them may be of little worth, while others are doubtless so rare, that each passing year will greatly enhance their value.

It may not be amiss to devote a short space in this Article to a reference to some of the more important of these many hundred pamphlets. "An Essay upon the Government of the English Plantations on the Continent of America," published in 1701, presents a picture of the general aspect of affairs in this country at that early period. "Proposals for carrying on an effectual War in America against the French and Spaniards," 1702, an elegantly bound pamphlet of twenty-

four pages, has much historical interest. "An Account of the Society for Propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts," 1706, gives a sketch of the doings of that venerable association founded by William III. George Keith's "Journal of Travels from New Hampshire to Caratuck on the Continent of North America," 1706, is one of the earliest American itineraries of which we have any knowledge. Its author shows himself especially bitter against the Quakers and their peculiar doctrines. There are several pamphlets on the "South Sea Trade," that bubble which cost the financial ruin of so many English people. "An Historical Account of the Voyages and Adventures of Sir Walter Raleigh," 1719, a pamphlet of some historical value. "The Chimera; or the French Way of paying National Debts laid open," explaining one of the famous schemes of the notorious John Law for extricating a burdened people from their pecuniary difficulties with the least possible trouble. "A full and impartial Account of the Company of Mississippi, otherwise called the French India Company; projected and settled by Mr. Law," 1720. This pamphlet is referred to in the catalogue as *scarce* and *curious* — very rare. "A Proposal for the better supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations, and for converting the Savage Americans to Christianity, by Bishop Berkeley," 1725. The scheme set forth by Bishop Berkeley, he attempted to carry out himself. "The Speech of Mr. John Checkley upon his Tryal at Boston in New England." Mr. John Checkley reprinted and sold in Boston, Leslie's well-known work entitled "Short and Easie Method with Deists," first published in London in 1699; to which he prefixed "A Discourse concerning Episcopacy, in defence of Christianity and the Church of England against the Deists and Dissenters." In this Discourse he endeavors to show that Dissenters, not being episcopally ordained, are no ministry. Having used severe terms towards the Dissenters in New England, he gave great offense, and was, in consequence, prosecuted at the Inferior Court, in 1724, for publishing "a false and scandalous libel." Being convicted, he appealed to the Superior Court. In his

"Plea in arrest of Judgment" he says in conclusion: "Be that as it will, the Dissenters are affirmed to be no *ministers*, to be *schismatics*, and excommunicate by the canons of the Church of England, which are part of the law of the land; therefore to say the same things of them, I humbly hope, shall not be deemed a libel." The court, however, found Checkley guilty, and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pounds. "South Carolina: a New and Accurate Account of the Provinces of South Carolina and Georgia; with many curious and useful Observations on the Trade, Navigation, and Plantations of Great Britain, compared with her most powerful maritime neighbors in ancient and modern times," 1732. This tract, as we learn from Mr. Bartlett's annotation, is reprinted in the first volume of the "Collections of the Georgia Historical Society," and is supposed to have been the production of the illustrious founder of Georgia, General Oglethorpe. As such, it will ever command an attentive perusal, and though "the gorgeous and utopian descriptions he gives of these provinces have ceased to influence the visionary and the avaricious, yet it is interesting to behold the medium through which he viewed his darling project, and the means by which he prosecuted his designs." "Whitefield's Journal of a Voyage from London to Savannah, 1739"; a valuable relic. Original editions of Whitefield's Journals are found among these bound pamphlets, and quite a number of controversial tracts written by himself or his opponents. "An accurate Journal and Account of the Proceedings of the New England Land Forces during the late Expedition against the French Settlements on Cape Breton to the Time of the Surrender of Louisbourg," 1746; valuable for historical reference. "The Journal of Major George Washington, sent by the Hon. Robert Dinwiddie, etc., 1754," said to be "an excessively rare tract, the existence of which has been doubted by many collectors, who have never been able to find a copy." There are four of Benjamin Franklin's tracts of the date of 1760. "A Description of South Carolina," the authorship of which is attributed to Governor Glen, is said,

with one exception, to be the most complete early history of the State we have.

The above titles of pamphlets, issued between the years 1701 and 1764, are samples, representing the character of the subjects which are discussed in some three hundred of these little books. As we approach revolutionary times we find a large number of them which treat of matters connected with our great struggle with the mother country. We note a few of these: "Sentiments of a British American," 1764, "in which the writer presents arguments against taxing the colonies, and gives his reasons for his opinion. He shows that the war with France was more for the advantage of Great Britain than for the colonies; that the colonies contributed their full proportion towards the conquest of French territories; that they are no particular gainers by these acquisitions, while Great Britain gained immensely." "Considerations relative to the North American Colonies, London," 1765, said to be one of the most important pamphlets of the period. A London edition of James Otis's "The Rights of the British Colonies asserted and proved," 1765. "Considerations on the American Stamp Act, and on the Minister who planned it, London," 1766. The author recommends the repeal of the Stamp Act, as the only means to reconcile the colonists to their mother country, and to restore peace, plenty, and cordiality to every part of the British empire. "The Justice and Necessity of Taxing the American Colonies, demonstrated; together with a Vindication of the Authority of Parliament," 1766. The Monthly Review calls the author "a most fiery politician," and his pamphlet a "mere fire-brand," and adds, that the colonists "have need of the *gentlemen of the blade* to polish and refine their manners, and rub off the rust of Puritanism." There are other pamphlets, bearing date of 1766, which throw light on the state of American affairs at that date, and several of great interest on the stamp act. We cannot enumerate others which we find written in the succeeding three or four years. Of tracts published in 1770, we notice several relating to the famous

“Boston massacre”; and as we pass on to the several years so memorable in our national history, the number of these pamphlets is literally hundreds, in which are discussed *pro* and *con* the topics which, in the days of our forefathers, were of such thrilling interest. The perusal of these little waifs, which have been preserved from destruction by the care and forethought of one who was always a true patriot, gives us a distinct view of the spirit and temper of the times in which they were written, and makes us acquainted with the conflicting opinions which stirred men’s passions, and developed themselves in living action in the events which marked the epoch of our great contest with the mother country.

Resuming now our sketch of the steps taken by Mr. Brown in laying the foundations for the building up of his library, we remark that he proceeded with the orderly methods of a man of business. In London and Paris he had his correspondents, who were ever on the alert to obtain information respecting rare and valuable books, which was at once transmitted across the Atlantic, and orders returned to secure everything that was deemed worth purchasing. Catalogues of the collections of booksellers in Berlin, Leipsic, Amsterdam, London, and Paris, as well as catalogues of great private libraries, were sent to him, that from them he might cull out such works as he thought worthy of a place on his shelves. It is said that for many years there were no important sales in Europe from which he did not secure something of importance. As illustrations of this statement we are told that the library of the late Emperor Maximilian, sold at auction in Leipsic, particularly rich in Spanish literature, and that of M. Sobolewski, a learned Russian of Moscow, furnished many treasures for his collection. The library of M. Sobolewski was especially rich in works which related to the discovery and settlement of the Spanish and Portuguese possessions in America, and a considerable number of these valuable books are on the shelves of the John Carter Brown Library. Mr. Bartlett, who is competent authority, ventures the assertion that Mr. Brown was enabled, during the period

of half a century, to form a library of books relating to America, printed before the year 1800, unsurpassed in the world.

The principle of classification which has been adopted in the library is to divide it into two great parts, the one including all books printed before the year 1700, and the other, works published in the eighteenth century. Smaller subdivisions include histories of North America in general, and of the United States in particular. Writers on the history of almost any or all of the older states of the Union, would find ample resources from which to draw, in the preparation of their histories, in this library. Thus, we have counted between fifty and sixty volumes large and small, having reference to the State of Georgia, and between eighty and ninety referring to Pennsylvania. There are several most valuable works on California, treating particularly of its early history. New England history in all its earlier phases is largely represented, the best works on the subject being found in the library. The old French empire in North America has its story told in what is said to be the most complete known collection of the "Jesuit relations," beginning with the year 1632, and reaching on to the year 1688. These "relations" correspond somewhat to the letters and journals of our modern missionaries, and give us a faithful account of the transactions of the Jesuits, in their attempts to propagate the Roman Catholic faith in Canada, large sections of New York, Western Pennsylvania, the country north of the Ohio, and all the Western States. "The Protestant missionaries," says Mr. Bartlett, "have left us nothing that can compare in historical value with these records of the labors of these early Jesuit missionaries. They are exceedingly simple in their style, but this simplicity has not contributed less to give them a great celebrity than the curious and edifying matter they contain."

As may be readily supposed, the John Carter Brown Library is rich in Puritan literature; all the leading fathers of New England being largely represented. There are in it between

seventy and eighty works of Increase and Cotton Mather, from forty to fifty of John Cotton, and the productions of the pens of John Eliot, Shepard, Hooker, Wise, Cobbet, Robinson, Winslow, Chauncey, and Pynchon; every known work of Roger Williams, Coddington, Gorton, John Clark, and other Rhode Island writers. Not a few of the editions of these works are first editions, and are very rare and valuable. I find two copies of Eliot's Indian Bible; one of the edition of 1663, a small quarto. It is a fine copy, and is one of the twenty-six copies which are known to exist in this country. The printing of this Bible was begun in 1660 and finished in September 1663. The edition was one thousand copies. The other copy is of the edition of 1685. According to the testimony of a correspondent of the New York Times, it is an odd coincidence that there are just twenty-six copies of this edition, and they are distributed very nearly as are those of 1663. "It is a remarkable event, not only in the propagation of the gospel in America, but in the history of printing in the New World, that a second edition of Eliot's Indian Bible should have been printed in 1685, when that art was but in its infancy here, and when scarcely anything above a pamphlet had then come from the press. The proposition for the printing of this edition was submitted to the Commissioners of the United Colonies of New England for their consideration in 1678-79 by Mr. Eliot, who among his several appeals said, that King Philip had sent to him for books to read. The work, which was commenced the following year, proceeded but slowly, as there was but one man, the Indian printer, who was able to compose the sheets and correct the press. In 1684, Mr. Eliot, writing to the Hon. Robert Boyle, says, "We have but few hands, one Englishman, and a boy, and one Indian." It was completed the following year, and two thousand copies printed. In this second edition of Eliot's Bible lies a single loose sheet, the history of which will be interesting to those who were acquainted with the late George Livermore of Cambridge, one of the most enthusiastic collectors of rare editions of the holy scriptures

in the country. The sheet to which I refer, is the Dedication to the Hon. Robert Boyle, Esq. Mr. Livermore writes to Mr. Brown under date of Boston, August 7th 1854, the following note :

"My Dear Sir,—I have just sent to you by Earle's Express two parcels of books which came in a case to me from Henry Stevens, London. Please inform me if they arrive safe. I have had a fac-simile executed of the rare dedication to Robert Boyle, found only (as far as I can learn) in the copy of Eliot's Indian Bible, formerly belonging to Rev. Thomas Prince. A few impressions only were taken, and I send you one of them to perfect your copy. The notice of Cromwell's Bible may interest you.

Truly yours, GEORGE LIVERMORE."

Besides the full Bible there are two copies of the New Testament of the edition of 1661. Pasted on the inside of the cover of one of these copies, I find a slip on which is written the following :

"Sunday, Jan. 25th 1795. — I took this Testament from the Prince of Orange's Library in his palace at Loo which was abandoned to pillage, as a memorial of the melancholy scene. H. TURNER."

The appearance of the book, which is bound in a very strong style, does not justify the belief that it had ever been very devoutly read. Indeed, it is quite certain that his high mightiness could not have been very profoundly versed in the Indian dialect, not being able, probably, to read a word of this Testament except as the word was a literal transfer of the English, or found in some familiar passage where the remembered idea gave the clue to the meaning of the Indian expression.

The two Bibles and Testaments to which reference has been made, by no means exhaust the Indian literature of the library. I find over forty books, some of which are in the Indian language. The larger part of the collection, however, is made up of works relating to Indian matters. Of the former may be mentioned "The Massachuset Psalter," published in 1709. The first verse of the twenty-third Psalm, "The Lord is my shepherd," is herewith given as illustrating the construction of the language: "Jehovah nuffohkommoonuk oowaencum matta pish nukquenawehuhkoo." There is also

a copy of Capt. Joseph Brant's translation of the Book of Common Prayer into Mohawk, 1787; a copy of "Some Communications of Christianity" in the Iroquois tongue, 1707, and a copy of the "Practice of Piety" in Indian, 1685, elegantly bound in red morocco, with gilt edges, bought from the Ternaux collection. The following letter in a manuscript note is prefixed :

Letter from John Eliot to the Hon. Robert Boyle :

"Roxbury, August 29th, 1686 (third month of our overthrow).

"Right Honorable, unwearible, and nursing father :

"I have nothing new to write but lamentations, and I am loath to grieve your loving and noble soul.

"Our Indian work yet liveth, praised be God. The Bible is come forth; many hundreds bound up and dispersed to the Indians, whose thankfulness I intimate and testify to your honor. *The Practice of Piety* is also finished and beginneth to be bound up, and my humble request to your honour is, that we may again reimpose the Primer and Catechism; for though the last impression be not quite spent, yet quickly they will; and I am old, ready to be gone, and desire to leave as many books as I can. I know not what to add in this distressing day of our overthrow; so I commit your honour to the Lord, and rest

Your honors, to serve you, in Jesus Christ,

JOHN ELIOT.

Of the other works relating to the Indians, all, with three or four exceptions, are in English. The latest in date is a richly bound copy, with gilt edges, of "Dictionnaire de la langue des Cris, par le Rev. Pere Alb. Lacombe, Ptre. Oblat de Marie Immaculée, Montreal," 1874. Another monument of the zeal of the Roman Catholics in the work of converting the Indians to the Christian faith.

But we must hasten to glance at another class of books which treat of matters pertaining to American history. We allude to the productions of writers in Spanish and Portuguese. In this class are included most of the works printed previous to the year 1800, on Mexico, Yucatan, Central America, Chili, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Surinam, Guiana, and other parts of South America; a perfect storehouse of reliable information to the scholar who wishes to go to the original sources for knowledge. In the department of voyages

and travels, the library is very rich. All the early navigators who sailed from the Old to the New World are here represented, and in some cases by very rare and costly editions of their works. A special illustration of this class of works is found in a copy of a Dutch translation of some of the letters of Americus Vesputius which was sent to the order of Mr. Brown, by F. Muller of Amsterdam. It is doubtful if the book could be replaced if it should be lost.

The very early date at which some of these books of which we now make note were printed, is worthy of remark. A few of them were published before the discovery of America, such as the *Cosmographies* and *Geographies* of Claudius Ptolemy, and Pomponius Mela; the "*Imago Mundi*" of Peter d'Ailly, a great favorite with Columbus, whose copy, filled with marginal notes in his hand-writing, is still preserved in the "*Bibliotheca Columbina*" at Seville. The date of the copy of this last work, in the John Carter Brown Library, is wanting, but it is supposed to be 1483. The letter of Columbus, has, of course, a peculiar charm. There are seven editions of it, all published, it is supposed, in the year 1493. All these editions are represented in the library, four being original copies, and three fac-similes. We are told that all the editions of the Columbus letter are now very rare. A copy was priced by Messrs. Ellis and Greene, London, in 1872, at one hundred and forty pounds. A copy, beautifully bound, of what was once a popular book, now not easily found, Brant's *Stultifera Navis*, or Ship of Fools, is in this library. It is a German satire upon the follies of all ranks. The writings of Americus Vesputius, to one of which reference has already been made, are quite numerous represented. They will always be of interest to all students of the early history of America.

Time and space would fail us to glance at even a tithe of the works embraced in the class of which we are now speaking. They relate to the discovery and conquest of all the countries in South America which were subdued by Spanish arms, and are among the very best of the original documents

upon which writers rely in their compilations of the history of those countries. But the most valuable, in some respects, is the De Bry collection. The conception and beginning of this truly magnificent series is due to Theodoric De Bry, an engraver and bookseller of Frankfort on the Main. After his death, in 1598, the work which he had commenced was carried on by his widow and two sons; and the collection, as fast as it was made up, was published at Frankfort. The publication of the whole series covers a period of forty-five years. Nearly one hundred pages of Mr. Bartlett's last "Catalogue of Books relating to North and South America" are devoted to the titles and brief annotations on the different volumes in the collection. In summing up what he has said, Mr. Bartlett remarks: "Each part and volume of the copy of De Bry's collection, described in the preceding pages, is full bound in crimson morocco, in a uniform style, by Mr. Francis Bedford of London, and is without a stain or other blemish. The set of the Great Voyages (so designated on account of the size of the volumes) is particularly tall, and nearly uncut, most of the volumes being from fourteen and a quarter to fourteen and one half inches in height. It was not obtained as now found, but was made up from a number of copies and odd volumes, in every possible condition, during a period of thirty years." The whole of the Great Voyages, in Latin, German, English, and French, is included in fifty-seven volumes; and of the various editions of the Smaller Voyages, in Latin and German, there are thirty-five volumes; and of the Latin and German abridgments of the Great and Small Voyages there are five; making a total of ninety-seven volumes. These books fill one section, nearly two feet by seven in size, of a mahogany case, and at once arrest the attention of every visitor of the library. What the pecuniary value of the De Bry collection is, it is difficult to say. We presume a good many thousand dollars could not purchase it. Few, if any sets of it, have been put into such costly and beautiful binding; and it is probably true that the De Bry of the John Carter Brown Library is without a rival in the world.

But if the class of books relating to the more southerly sections of America is a large and valuable one, not less worthy of attention is the department which contains the best works on Greenland and the Polar regions, written previous to the more modern explorations into these Arctic lands and seas. Not the English tongue alone is represented, but I find valuable works in the French, German, Dutch, and Swedish languages. The whole domain of nature in this Polar country had been subjected to careful study before the present century, and the results of long and unwearied investigation are here at the ready command of the curious scholar. There is one work on Greenland, published in Skallholte, Iceland, in the year 1688. A century earlier, in 1580, was published "A shorte and brief Narration of the two Nauigations and Discoveries to the Northwest Parties called Newe France." Of course such works as the narratives of Frobisher, Baffin, and Hudson have found a home in this Arctic collection. Nine volumes, some of them gotten up in the highest style of the binder's art, contain the story of Frobisher's adventures. This glance, necessarily very cursory, at this single department will show how rich it is. It embraces not far from two hundred volumes.

Returning now to the Southern sections of America, we find a large number of works in the aboriginal languages of Mexico, Yucatan, and all parts of South America. Mr. Bartlett remarks that "of the language of every great nation with which the colonists had intercourse they compiled dictionaries and grammars. The oldest book published in America in this collection is the '*Doctrina Christiana*,' printed in Mexico in 1554, which is of this class." Not only rare treatises in print, but in manuscript, on subjects kindred to those now referred to, are found in the library. One of the most valuable of these is a Dictionary of the Maya or Yucatan language, and the Spanish. The Maya is believed to have been the spoken tongue of that people, who must have made great progress in the arts of civilized life, if we may judge from the appearance of those remarkable ruins in

Yucatan, the knowledge of which, by us, is of a comparatively recent date. Through the kindness of Mr. Brown, a distinguished German scholar, who had for some time been in search of this manuscript, was allowed free access to his library ; and with the patience so characteristic of his nationality, he made a copy of the Maya dictionary, a task which occupied his time for a whole year.

But we have dwelt at sufficient length on this department of literature in the library. Some idea of its great extent may be formed, when we are told that between four and five hundred works pertaining more or less to America, and all printed before the year 1600, are upon its shelves.

All scholars are aware of the great value of the issues from the celebrated Aldine press of Venice, and they will comprehend the richness of the library in the Greek and Roman classics, when told that there are between two and three hundred of these elegant works, the publications of the Aldus family. There is a remarkably fine collection of National Polyglot Bibles, among which is a copy of the " Complutensian " — that marvellous monument of the zeal and sanctity of Cardinal Ximenes. This Polyglot was the production of the best scholars of the age, and the first of the kind ever published. Fifty thousand ducats were expended in its preparation. The purchase of rare and costly manuscripts absorbed a large part of this sum. Only six hundred copies were published. Although it has been superseded by other Polyglots, which, with the ample resources to which biblical scholars have been able to resort, have been made richer and fuller, the Complutensian is still regarded as a work of great value, and will always command a high price as a rare and exceedingly valuable set of books. The ten immense folio volumes of the Paris Polyglot, 1645 ; the Antwerp, in eight volumes, 1539 ; Walton's, published in London, in six volumes, 1654 ; and Hutter's, Nuremberg, 1599, in three volumes ; are all found in the library, and the copies are in an excellent condition.

It will be seen from the imperfect sketch which has been

given, that we may place the John Carter Brown Library among the best private collections of books in the country. Indeed, in the department which he made a specialty, that of works on America, it probably stands, it may be, with one or two exceptions, without a rival in any public or private library in this country, perhaps in the world. But it is not only this department which is so well represented, but other departments hold a prominent place. We find elegant editions of works which may be called American classics. For instance, the copy of Irving's *Life of Washington*, in ten quarto volumes, with upwards of a thousand portraits and other illustrations, probably has not its counterpart in many libraries. The same may be said of Marshall's *Life of Washington*, quarto, in five volumes, with even more illustrations than the Irving. Cunningham's *Life of Nell Gwynn*, in three folios, with three hundred and sixty portraits, and other illustrations, belongs to the same class of books. I have not found a single work of fiction or what may be called a "trashy" book in the whole library. Everything is of the most solid and substantial character, unless we choose to include such works as have just been referred to in the department of "light literature." To preserve the library in its present condition, does not include all that may be said of the intentions of the family of Mr. Brown. It is their purpose, in the spirit and with the zeal of its founder, to go on making additions to its rich stores; especially, to secure every rare work that may throw more light on American history in all its departments, and thus afford every possible facility for the collation of all the facts, and the careful arrangement of all the records which may furnish information respecting the early settlement and growth of all sections of the Western Continent. A work, nobly begun, will be still carried forward, thus perpetuating, in a way worthy of all praise, the name and the memory of one who deserves to take a high rank among the lovers of good learning.

ARTICLE V.

ON THE READING "CHURCH OF GOD," ACTS XX. 28.

BY PROFESSOR EZRA ABBOT, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Common version : — "Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood."

Received text : — Προσέχετε οὖν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ παντὶ τῷ ποιμνίῳ, ἐν ᾧ ὑμᾶς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἔθετο ἐπισκόπους, ποιμαίνειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἣν περιποιήσατο διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος.

Various readings : — οὖν, "therefore," is bracketed by Lachmann, and omitted by Tischendorf, Tregelles, Green (*Twofold New Test.*), and Westcott and Hort, but is retained by Alford and Wordsworth. For τοῦ θεοῦ, "God," Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, and Green read τοῦ κυρίου, "the Lord"; Alford, Wordsworth, and Westcott and Hort retain θεοῦ. But Tregelles places θεοῦ in the margin with a mark of interrogation, implying some doubt whether it should not be regarded as an *alternative* reading; and Alford on the other hand puts κυρίου in the margin, in large type, as of nearly equal authority with θεοῦ. All the editions named above read in the last clause διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου for διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος.

Of those who have written treatises on the textual criticism of the New Testament, Porter, Davidson, and Hammond give the preference to κυρίου; Scrivener and Milligan defend θεοῦ. Among recent commentators and translators, θεοῦ is preferred by Dr. Gloag; on the other hand, Meyer, Ewald, Lechler (in Lange's *Bibelwerk*) very confidently, Overbeck, Dr. David Brown (with hesitation), Holtzmann (in Bunsen's *Bibelwerk*), the new Dutch translation (1868), and Weizsäcker adopt the reading κυρίου.

To recount the opinions of the earlier critics, or to give a sketch of the literature of the subject, would carry us too far. But as a mistake made by one scholar often leads many astray, it may be well to say that Matthaei does not read θεοῦ, as stated by De Wette,

Davidson, and Alford, but *κύριον καὶ θεοῦ*, in both of his editions; that Gratz does not reject *κύριον*, as is affirmed by Bloomfield (9th ed.), but adopts it; and that although Michaelis defends *θεοῦ* in his Introduction to the New Testament (4th ed., 1788), in a later work (*Anmerkungen zu seiner Uebers. d. N. T.*, 1790, ii. 407 ff.) he gives the preference to *κύριον* as the best supported reading.

The passage presents one of the most interesting and important problems in the textual criticism of the New Testament; but no thorough investigation of the evidence for the different readings has been published, so far as I am aware, since the time of Wetstein. The recent accession of the Sinaitic manuscript to the authorities for *θεοῦ* may be thought by some to turn the scale in its favor; and the fact that this reading is received into the text by scholars so eminent as Professor Westcott and Dr. Hort might alone justify a new discussion of the question, if any excuse were needed.

In stating the evidence for the different readings, we may begin with

I. THE AUTHORITIES FOR *κύριον*.

Manuscripts.—AC*DE, $\frac{13}{\text{XI}}$, $\frac{15}{\text{X or XI}}$, $\frac{18}{\text{XIII}}$, $\frac{36}{\text{XIII}}$, $\frac{40}{\text{XI}}$, $\frac{69}{\text{XIII}}$, $\frac{73}{\text{XI}}$, $\frac{81}{\text{XI}}$, $\frac{95^*}{\text{XI or XII}}$, $\frac{130}{\text{XII}}$, $\frac{156}{\text{XI}}$, $\frac{163}{\text{XIV}}$, $\frac{180}{\text{XII}}$, $\frac{\text{ascr}}{\text{XII}}$, $\frac{\text{B-C ii. 7}}{\text{XIII}}$, and Lect. $\frac{58}{\text{XII}}$; in all, 4 uncial and 16 cursives.¹ As to date, 2 are supposed to be of the fifth century, 2 of the sixth, 1 of the tenth or eleventh, 5 of the eleventh, 1 of the eleventh or twelfth, 4 of the twelfth, 4 of the thirteenth, and 1 of the fourteenth. Here the high character of the cursives which read *κύριον* is particularly to be remarked. Eight of them, Nos. 13, 36, 40, 69, 73, 81, 95, and 180, are marked by Tischendorf with an asterisk in the Prolegomena to his seventh critical edition as noticeable for their agreement with the text of the most ancient copies; and there are three others at least, namely, Nos. 15, 18, and a^{scr}, which deserve to be so marked. The first in the list, No. 13

¹ I omit Tischendorf's "cat", by which he means not "some catenae," but the text of the manuscript (New Coll. Oxford, 58), published by Cramer with its catena in 1838. Tischendorf sometimes cites this as "cat", sometimes as "cat^{ox}", but does not seem to be aware that it is identical with No. 36 — Bloomfield (*Crit. Annot.*, Lond. 1860, p. 194) says, "I am now, indeed, enabled to add to the evidence for *κύριον*, 9 Lam. and Scr. mss." But *κύριον* here must be a mistake for *κύριον καὶ θεοῦ*. B-C. ii. 7 is one of the Burdett-Coutts mss. recently collated by Scrivener; see his *Introduction*, 2d ed., pp. 221, 540.

(33 Gosp., 17 Pauline Epist.), is said by Eichhorn to be "full of the most excellent and oldest readings." He styles it "the Queen of the cursive manuscripts." No. 40 Tischendorf designates as "codex admodum insignis." No. 73 is called by Griesbach "præstantissimus." "Optimis adnumerare non dubito," says Birch (*Variae Lect.* 1798, p. ix). No. 180 is justly spoken of by Scrivener as "important." Finally, Scrivener's "a" represents, according to him, "a very interesting and valuable text . . . being found in harmony . . . with the most ancient mss., and very conspicuously with that most precious document designated . . . as p" [now 61, formerly Tischendorf's "10^{ti}"]. (*Introd. to Cod. Augiensis*, p. lvi.) The excellence of most of the cursives that support *κνρίον*, in contrast with the inferior character of those which read *θεοῦ*, is an important point, and will be illustrated hereafter.

Ancient Versions. — The OLD LATIN (2d cent.), as shown by the quotations in all the earlier Latin fathers (see below), confirmed more or less by the Latin interpreter of Irenæus, and the Graeco-Latin manuscripts D and E; the MEMPHITIC or COPTIC (3d cent., or perhaps the 2d), the THEBAIC or SAHIDIC (same date), the ARMENIAN (5th cent.), and the HARCLEAN or PHILOXENIAN SYRIAC (A.D. 616) in the *margin*, representing an Alexandrian manuscript "very accurate and approved," according to Thomas of Harkel, and which certainly exhibits an early form of the text, though, like D, disfigured by interpolations.

Fathers. — IRENAEUS (cir. A.D. 180), *Cont. Haer.* iii. 14. § 2, in a very early Latin version (already used, it is thought, by Tertullian): *Attendite igitur et vobis et omni gregi in quo vos Spiritus sanctus praeposuit episcopos, regere ecclesiam Domini, quam sibi constituit per sanguinem suum.* This is the more important, as it is part of a quotation embracing six verses (ver. 25–30), and therefore probably not made from memory. I know of no particular reason for doubting that this version represents the Greek of Irenæus; certainly there is nothing in the context (*pace* Mr. Nolan) to suggest such a doubt; and we may at any rate say with Lachmann, "licet aliquando non Irenaeum sed Latinos novi testamenti codices secutus sit [Latinus interpret], eos cum Irenaei libris in plerisque omnibus consensisse multis documentis cognoscitur" (*N.T.*

tom. i. p. x). But if it be assumed, without proof, that the translator here followed the Old Latin version instead of Irenaeus, we have at all events a testimony for *κυρίου* which reaches back to the second century.

APOSTOLICAL CONSTITUTIONS (3d or 4th cent.?), ii. 61. § 4, an allusion rather than a quotation, and from which, though it favors *κυρίου*, we cannot draw any confident inference: *συντρέχετε εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ κυρίου, ἣν περιποιήσατο τῷ αἵματι τοῦ χριστοῦ τοῦ ἡγαπημένου, τοῦ πρωτοτόκου πάσης κτίσεως*. Here, according to Lagarde, Codd. x y z of the 14th and 16th cent., but of different families, with the edition of Turrianus, which he follows, read *κυρίου*, while Cod. w (A.D. 1111) has *θεοῦ*. Comp. the allusion vii. 26. § 1; viii. 12. § 18. I do not include ii. 57. § 13; viii. 11. § 2; 41. § 4; see 1 Pet. i. 18, 19. The compiler of the Apostolical Constitutions, if he refers to Acts xx. 28, may possibly, though not very probably, have interpreted the *διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου* as equivalent to *διὰ τ. αἵμ. τ. ἰδίου υἱοῦ*, as is done by Erasmus (Paraphr.), Limborch (though he prefers the reading *κυρίου*), John Milton, Lenfant and Beausobre, Doederlein, Van der Palm (note in his Dutch trans.), Granville Penn, and Mr. Darby. But if he read *θεοῦ* in the Acts, he would hardly have substituted the unusual expression, "the church of the Lord," which occurs elsewhere, I believe, but twice in the Constitutions (ii. 20. § 9; 43. § 4), for his familiar phrase, "church of God," which he uses at least 16 or 18 times.

ATHANASIUS (fl. A.D. 328, d. 373), in *Ep. i. ad Serap.* c. 6, as edited, reads *θεοῦ*; but Cod. Reg. 1, of the 10th or 11th century, and "egregiae notae" according to Montfaucon, has *κυρίου*, and three other good manuscripts *χριστοῦ*. (Athan. *Opp.* i. 653^e ed. Bened., or ii. 544^b in Migne's *Patrol.* xxvi.) That the true text of Athanasius here is either *κυρίου* or *χριστοῦ*, is made almost certain, I think, not only by the passage cited by Tischendorf from his treatise against Apollinaris, but by many other passages in the same work. See below, Supplementary Note A, p. 343 ff.

DIDYMUS of Alexandria (A.D. 309–395), *De Trin.* ii. 8. § 2 (*Opp.* col. 621^b in Migne's *Patrol.* xxxix.), quotes the passage *Προσέχετε . . . διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος*, with the reading *κυρίου*. So also in his treatise *De Spiritu sancto*, c. 24 (*Opp.* col. 1054^e), as preserved in

the Latin translation by Jerome. In a reference to the passage in Cramer's Catena (p. 337), he uses the expression τῷ ποιμνίῳ ὃ περι-εποιήσατο ὁ σωτὴρ τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι.

CHRYSOSTOM (A.D. 347-407) quotes the passage with the reading κυρίου in *Hom. xi. in Ep. ad Eph.* (on Eph. iv. 12; *Opp.* xi. 83^a (95), ed. Montf.). Here the mss. of Savile, Montfaucon, and Field present no variation, and Matthaei's ms. of Chrysostom confirms the reading (see his *N.T. Gr. et Lat.* viii. 92, note on Eph. iv. 9). That Chrysostom's text in his Comm. on the Acts,¹ as edited by Montfaucon, which reads θεοῦ twice (*Opp.* ix. 333 (372)), has been corrupted, as often elsewhere (see Tregelles, *Textual Criticism*, p. 335), is proved, I think, by five distinct considerations:—(a) By the context, as Mill perceived: εἴ γε ὁ δεσπότης ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὐδὲ τοῦ αἵματος ἐφείσατο τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ, κ. τ. λ., though this alone might not be decisive. (b) By the extract in Cramer's Catena on the passage (pp. 336, 337), shown to belong to Chrysostom instead of Ammonius not only by its contents, but, what has not been noticed, expressly ascribed to Chrysostom (Τοῦ Χρυσοστόμου instead of Τοῦ αὐτοῦ) in the *Paris* ms. of this catena (Cod. Coislin. xxv. i.e. No. 15 of the Acts), which is much older and better than the *Oxford* ms. (see Cramer, p. 446, and his preface, p. iv). This catena reads twice, in both manuscripts, ποιμαίνειν τ. ἐκ. τοῦ κυρίου where Montfaucon has θεοῦ. (c) By the anonymous commentary on the Acts published by Finetti with the works of Theophylact from a ms. in the Medicean Library at Florence, and which here, as often elsewhere, abridges Chrysostom. This reads Ὁρᾶς; παρὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχετε τὴν χειροτονίαν, ποιμαίνειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ κυρίου. Ἴδου καὶ ἄλλη ἀνάγκη· τοῦ κυρίου ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκκλησία. (Theophylacti *Opp.* ed. De' Rossi and Finetti, iii. 620^e, or iii. 1115^e in Migne's *Patrol.* cxxv.) (d) It has not been observed that this reading of Chrysostom in the catena is further confirmed in part by one or more of Savile's manuscripts. In his edition of Chrysostom (vol. iv. p. 855), for the text of Montfaucon, εἶτα, ποιμαίνειν τὴν ἐκ. τοῦ θεοῦ, ἰδὸν καὶ δευτέρα [sc.

¹ That θεοῦ stands in the text prefixed to the comment is hardly worthy of notice, as editors and transcribers very often in such cases conformed the text to that of the copies with which they were familiar. See Wetstein's *N.T.* ii. 867; also, Tischendorf's notes on Acts xi. 20, p. 97, and 1 Cor. vii. 5, p. 489, bottom.

ἀνάγκη] · he gives the various reading, Ἰδοὺ καὶ ἄλλη, τοῦ κυρίου ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκκλησία.¹ (e) Adding to these considerations the fact that Chrysostom on Eph. iv. 12 unquestionably reads κυρίου, we cannot reasonably hesitate, I think, to regard the catena as preserving the true reading here. If Dr. Tregelles is right (*Printed Text*, p. 232) in regarding the Homilies on the Acts as not really Chrysostom's, this last argument falls away; but the others appear to be decisive, and we have then two authorities for κυρίου instead of one.

PSEUDO-CYRIL (5th cent. ?), *De sancta et vivif. Trin.* c. 26, published by Cardinal Mai as Cyril's, but regarded by Dr. Tregelles (*Account of Printed Text*, p. 232, note †), to whose judgment I defer, as belonging to a later author: Προσέχετε ... κυρίου ... διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου. (Cyrilli *Opp.* viii. 1185^b, in Migne LXXV.)

CONSTANTINE VI. and IRENE, Letter to Pope Hadrian I. (*Divalis sacra ad Hadrian. papam*) at the time of the second Nicene Council (A.D. 787):—"Et iterum divinus ... apostolus ... sic mandavit: *Pascite gregem Domini cum disciplina, quam acquisivit proprio sanguine.*" (*Concilia*, ed. Coleti, viii. 677^a, 678^a.)

THEODORUS STUDITA (A.D. 759–826), *Epist.* lib. ii. ep. 56: ὁρῶν οὕτω κινδυνεύουσιν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἣν περιποιήσατο κύριος διὰ τοῦ οἴκειου αἵματος. (In Sirmondi *Opp. Var.* v. 379^d, or Migne xcix. 1269^b.)

ANTONIUS MELISSA (8th cent. ? 12th cent. ?), in "Loci communes Sententiarum ... collecti per Antonium et Maximum monachos," etc. Genev. 1609 (appended to Stobaeus), *Serm.* clxxiii. p. 286: Προσέχετε ... κυρίου ... διὰ τ. ἰδ. αἵματος.

But this is not all. The quotations given by Wetstein (*N. T.* ii.

¹ In the case of another important passage, 1 Tim. iii. 16, Savile's mss. preserve, as I believe, the true reading of Chrysostom. In his *Hom.* xv. (al. xiv.) in *Joan.* (on John i. 18, *Opp.* viii. 86 (99) ed. Montf.), the printed editions read: Εἰ δὲ ἀλλαχοῦ φησι, θεὸς ἐφανέρωθη ἐν σαρκί, μὴ θαυμάσῃς · ὅτι ἡ φανέρωσις διὰ τῆς σαρκός, κ.τ.λ. But here Savile (Chrys. *Opp.* ii. 613, l. 27) gives the various reading, Διὰ τοῦτο φησιν, ὃς ἐφανέρωθη ἐν σαρκί, ἢ γὰρ φανέρωσις, κ.τ.λ. This is confirmed by the Latin translation of Chrysostom's Homilies on John made in the fifteenth century by Francesco Accolti of Arezzo (Franciscus Arctinus), which reads:—"Propterea inquit, *Qui manifestatus est in carne*," etc.

Cramer's catena on 1 Tim. iii. 16 likewise preserves the genuine text of Chrysostom in opposition to the text of Montfaucon, and is here confirmed by an old Latin version of this father, as is remarked by Dr. W. H. Ward in his valuable Article on this passage in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for Jan. 1865, p. 26 f.

597, 598), to which I must content myself with referring for want of space, from ORIGEN (A.D. 230),¹ GREGORY OF NYSSA (A.D. 370), ISIDORE OF PELUSIUM (A.D. 412), EUTHERIUS (not "Eucherius") OF TYANA (A.D. 419), THEODORET (A.D. 423) — see especially his Third Dialogue, NESTORIUS (A.D. 428), and JOANNES MAXENTIUS (A.D. 520), seem altogether inconsistent with the supposition that they could have regarded "the blood of God" as a scriptural expression. We may with great probability consider these writers as supporting the reading *κυρίου*, or possibly in some cases (as in that of Theodoret), *χριστοῦ*. To these I would add EUSTATHIUS OF ANTIOCH (fl. A.D. 325), who maintains that he has shown *ἀπαθὲς τὸ θεῖον τοῦ χριστοῦ πνεῦμα* (see the passages preserved by Theodoret in Migne's *Patrol.* xviii. 681); who affirms, as quoted by Gelasius, "vesaniunt et bacchantur et furiunt et insaniunt et suis mentibus excesserunt, qui Deo Verbo passionem applicare praesumunt" (Migne xviii. 694); who says, as quoted in Syriac by Sabarjesus (Assemani *Bibl. Orient.* iii. i. 542), "Si quis dixerit Deum Verbum quascumque creaturarum passiones passum fuisse, maledictus esto in caelo et in terra," and who, like Theodoret, in discussing this question, meets the argument of his adversaries founded on 1 Cor. ii. 8 (see Migne, xviii. 681^a), but seems never to have heard of an argument from Acts xx. 28. Sabarjesus (*ibid.*) also quotes "Gregory" ("perhaps Thaumaturgus," says Assemani), as saying "Stultus est et insipiens qui affirmat Deum Verbum cum suo templo passiones tulisse." GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS (fl. A.D. 370) is shocked at the idea that our Saviour *τῇ ἰδίᾳ αὐτοῦ θεότητι πάθος δέξασθαι* (*Epist.* cciii. *ad Nectarium*; *Opp.* iii. 333^a, in Migne

¹ The passages of Origen cited by Wetstein are *Cont. Cels.* ii. 36 (hardly relevant) and vii. 16 (see cc. 13–17); *Opp.* i. 416, 705 ed. De la Rue. To these may be added *Comm. in Joan.* t. xxviii. c. 14, *οὐκ ἀπέθανεν ὁ θεὸς λόγος κ.τ.λ.*; t. xxxii. c. 17, *Opp.* iv. 392^{de}, 446^b; and especially *Comm. in Matt.* t. xvi. c. 8 ad fin., *Opp.* iii. 726, 727. "The godhead of Christ," as Redepenning remarks, "Origen everywhere taught had no share in his suffering" (*Origenes*, ii. 410, n. 7). — The expression "Deum crucifixerunt," which Dr. Burton ascribes to Origen (*Testim. of the Ante-Nicene Fathers to the Div. of Christ*, pp. 223, 312) rests only on the notoriously untrustworthy authority of the Latin translation of Rufinus. (Origen, *Opp.* ii. 676^b.) The reader of Dr. Burton's book needs also to be warned that the comments ascribed to Origen in *Catenae* are often of very doubtful genuineness. See the Preface to Vol. ii. of De la Rue's edition.

xxxvii.). AMPHILOCHIUS OF ICONIUM (fl. A.D. 370) also says: Εἰ μὲν οὖν θεότης ἔπαθεν, εἶπας τὸ βλάσφημον (Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* xxxix. 100^b), with much more of the same sort (Migne xxxix. 104^c; 108^c; 113^{abc}; and Sabarjesus in Assemani, as above).

We may notice here some misleading references. EUSEBIUS, *Comm. in Isa.* xxxv. 9, 10 (*Opp.* vi. 341^c, in Migne xxiv.), cited by Wetstein and many others, seems to me to prove nothing. The διὰ κυρίου belongs to Isaiah; and the οὗς αὐτὸς δηλονότι ἐλυτρώσατο τῷ ἰδῷ αἵματι may as well refer to 1 Pet. i. 18, 19 and Eph. i. 7, as to Acts xx. 28. Equally inconclusive is the passage referred to in the Epistle of MAXIMUS to Nicander: καθολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τὸν ταύτην δι' αἵματος οἰκείου καὶ ζωοποιοῦ κατὰ θέλησιν ἄρμοσάμενον κύριον (*Opp.* ed. Combefis ii. 47, or Migne xci. 92^d). The Epistle of IBAS to Maris or Mares (not "Marinus") has been cited on both sides without reason. In the passage referred to, the Greek text or version reads "God," while three *independent* Latin versions have "Lord"; but the passage is not a quotation, and it may be doubted whether it contains even an allusion to Acts xx. 28. See *Concilia*, ed. Coleti, iv. 1577^c, 1578^c; vi. 132^e; and the translation of Facundus Hermianensis, *Pro Def. trium Capitulorum*, lib. vi. c. 3 (Migne lxxvii. 665^a).

We come now to the Latin fathers. Their quotations are of interest only as serving to determine the reading of the Old Latin version.

LUCIFER OF CAGLIARI (fl. A.D. 354, d. 371), *De non parcendo in Deum delinquentibus* (Migne xiii. 997^a): *Attendite ... regere ecclesiam Domini ... sanguine suo.*

The AUTHOR of *Quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test.* (A.D. 370), Q. 97: *Attendite ... regere ecclesiam Domini Jesu* (Migne xxxv. 2296). This is ascribed to HILARY THE DEACON by Cave and many others, and was written, as Cave remarks, about A.D. 370 (see *Quaest.* 44). It was formerly attributed to Augustine, and appears in many editions of his works.

JEROME (cir. A.D. 345–420), *Epist.* 146 (al. 85) *ad Evangelium* (al. *Evagrium*): *Attendite ... ut regeretis eccles. Domini ... sanguine suo.* (*Opp.* i. 1193; Migne xxii.) So in his *Comm. in Ep. ad Tit.* i. 5 (*Opp.* vii. 563; Migne xxvi.): *Attendite ... pascere eccles. Domini ... per sanguinem suum.* That Jerome's text is here

faithfully preserved is evinced by the fact that the passage is cited in precisely the same words by SEDULIUS SCOTUS (8th or 9th cent.) in his *Collect. in Ep. ad Titum* (Migne CIII. 243^d), who is here borrowing from Jerome; and by AMALARIUS of Metz (9th cent.), *De Eccles. Offic.* ii. 13 (Migne cv. 1089), who expressly quotes from Jerome.

AMBROSE of Milan (A.D. 340–397), *De Spir. Sancto* ii. 13. § 152 (*Opp.* ii. 663 ed. Bened., or Migne xvi. 775^d): *Attendite ... regere eccles. Dei*, as edited. But it has not been observed that the Benedictine editors in their appendix of "Variae lectiones inter omissas non contemnendae" inform us, "Quidam mss., *regere ecclesiam Domini*." Now when we consider that this reading is supported by the other authorities for the Old Latin version, and that the tendency of transcribers would be to conform their text to that of the Vulgate rather than the reverse, it seems very probable that these manuscripts represent the true reading of Ambrose. That he did not read *Dei* here is confirmed by various passages of his writings: e.g. *De Incarn.* c. vi. § 52: "cum utique Scripturae dicant quia Christus secundum carnem passus est, non secundum divinitatem"; comp. c. v. §§ 37, 40; *De Fide*, ii. c. 7, §§ 56–58; c. 8, § 65; and v. c. 8, § 106, "quod creatura omnis sine passione aliqua divinitatis *Dominici* sanguinis redimenda sit pretio."

ARATOR (A.D. 544) in his poetical paraphrase of the Acts lib. ii. lines 850–853 (Migne LXVIII. 221^b), favors the reading *Domini* or *Christi*: "— Servate, ministri, | Ecclesiam Christi [*al.* Christus] pretium quam sanguine nobis | Fecit in orbe suo; famuli retinere laborent | Quae Dominus de morte dedit." I do not know for what reason Wetstein, Griesbach, Scholz, and others cite this work under the name of Alcimus.

The collection of Scripture passages called the SPECULUM, ascribed on very slight evidence, and against strong presumptions, to Augustine, but at any rate a sort of authority for the Old Latin version, quotes the passage thus: "Attendite ... universo gregi, in quo sanctus Spiritus conlocavit vos esse episcopos, ad pascendam ecclesiam Jesu Christi." (*Spec.* c. 3; Mai, *Nov. Patr. Bibl.* i. ii. p. 10.) The SPECULUM often quotes very loosely; but it will be

admitted, I think, that in a loose quotation *Jesu Christi* would be more naturally substituted for *Domini* than for *Dei*.¹

The argument from silence must be used with caution; but considering the nature of the writings of TERTULLIAN, CYPRIAN (see especially his *Testim.* ii. 6), and NOVATIAN (*De Regula Fidei sive de Trinitate*), it seems almost incredible that they should not have cited this passage if they had the reading *Dei*; and I think we may reasonably regard them as decidedly confirming *Domini* as the reading of the Old Latin version.

We see thus, if I mistake not, that *all* the authorities for the reading of the Old Latin version whose testimony is of any weight favor the reading "Lord." The only apparent exception is PRIMASIUS, who is too late to be of any importance, flourishing in the middle of the sixth century, and who, though preserving some readings of the Old Latin, is so poor an authority that Dr. Tregelles remarks in his *Book of Revelation in Greek*, etc. (Lond. 1844), p. xxvii, note †, "I have purposely omitted the readings of the ancient Latin version cited by Sabatier out of Primasius; — many of the readings so cited are undoubtedly really ancient, but many of them have been *indubitably* modernized, — perhaps by transcribers and editors."²

We now proceed to

II. THE AUTHORITIES FOR THE READING θεοῦ.

Manuscripts. — $\aleph$ B, $\frac{4}{XV}$, $\frac{22}{XII}$, $\frac{23}{XI \text{ or } XII}$, $\frac{25}{A.D. 1087}$, $\frac{87}{XIII}$, $\frac{46}{XI}$, $\frac{65}{XIII}$, 66* (?) , $\frac{68}{XII}$, $\frac{84}{X \text{ cir. 600}}$, $\frac{89}{1093}$, $\frac{154}{XV}$, $\frac{162}{XV}$, $\frac{\text{Lect. 12}}{1022}$; and *ex silentio*, "on

¹ Cardinal Mai assigns the manuscript of the *Speculum* (designated by Tischendorf as "m") to the 6th or 7th century. Being of interest as perhaps the oldest copy that contains the famous passage 1 John v. 7 (it has also the spurious Epistle to the Laodiceans), it may be well to note that Reifferscheid, a much better authority as I suppose, dates it as "Saec. viii.-ix." (*Die römischen Bibliotheken*, in the *Sitzungsberichte d. phil.-hist. Cl. d. kais. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Wien*, Bd. i. 1865, p. 753.) Hartel agrees with him (Pref. to his edition of Cyprian, p. xxv; see also p. 34).

² We may here again note some irrelevant references. The Acts of the THIRD COUNCIL OF CARTHAGE (A.D. 258 or 256), *Sent.* 79 (al. 80), merely use the expression "ecclesiam Domini gubernantes," or in the Greek, τὴν ἐκκλ. θεοῦ κυβερνῶντες. (*Concilia*, ed. Coleti, i. 815^e, 836^{de}.) AUGUSTINE, *Cont. Parmen.* i. 12 (al. 7, al. 6), cited by Wetstein and many others, simply has, "ille Dominus noster qui emit totum mundum pretio sanguinis sui." (*Aug. Opp.* ix. i. 71^b, ed. Par. alt. 1837.)

EPIPHANIUS (fl. A.D. 368), *Haer.* lxxiv. c. 7, transferred from the *Ancoratus* c. 69: Προσέχετε (+ δὲ Anc.) ... ἐν ᾧ ἔθ. ὑμᾶς (ὑμ. ἔθ. Anc.) ... ποιμ. ὑμᾶς (Anc. om. ὑμ.) ... τ. ἐκκλ. τ. θεοῦ. Not quoted in proof of the deity of Christ, but of the Holy Spirit.¹

BASIL THE GREAT (fl. A.D. 370), *Moral.* lxxx. c. 16 (*Opp.* ii. 316 (442) ed. Bened.): Προσέχετε οὖν ... ποιμ. τ. ἐκκλ. τοῦ θεοῦ. Not quoted for any dogmatic purpose.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA (fl. A.D. 412, d. 444), *Quod B. Maria sit deipara*, c. 22 (*Opp.* ix. 281^d ed. Migne; in his *Patrol.* lxxvi.): Προσέχετε γὰρ ... θεοῦ ... διὰ τ. αἵμ. τ. ιδίου. Here the word θεοῦ is repeated and commented on. This is the earliest and the *only* example which I find in the Greek fathers of the quotation of this passage in reference to the deity of Christ.

PSEUD-ATHANASIUS (uncert.), *Testim. ex S. Script.* c. 3 (*Opp.* ii. 4^a ed. Montf.; Migne xxvii.): Προσέχετε ... ποιμενίῳ [*sic*] ... ἐν ᾧ ὑμ. ἔθετο ... ποιμ. τ. ἐκκλ. τ. θεοῦ. Quoted in proof of the deity of the Spirit.

ANTIOCHUS THE MONK (fl. A.D. 614), *Hom.* lxi.: Προσέχετε ... (ἐπισκόπους om.) ... ποιμ. τ. ἐκκλ. τ. θεοῦ. (Migne lxxxix. 1617^c.) Again, *Hom.* cxii.: Προσέχετε ... θεοῦ ... διὰ τ. ἰδ. αἵματος. (Migne, *ibid.* 1812^b.) In both places, quoted for no dogmatic purpose.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM (uncert.), *De S. Joan. Apost. Serm.* (Chrys. *Opp.* viii. pars ii. 135 (785), ed. Montf.): ὡς ἔφη ὁ ἅγιος Παῦλος: Ποιμάνετε τ. ἐκκλ. τοῦ θεοῦ. Montfaucon remarks, "Jure hanc orationem praetermisit Savilius, utpote indignum quae legatur; nam est otiosi cujusdam Graeculi, ut nemo non videt."

AN ANONYMOUS SCHOLIAST in Cramer's *Catena* (p. 338): τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ... ἣν γὰρ φησι περιεποιήσατο ὁ θεὸς διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ιδίου· θάρρει οὖν ... καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδοιάσεις [-σης?] ἀκούειν ὥσπερ Ἰουδαῖοι αἷμα καὶ σῶμα θεοῦ τὸ σωτήριον κ.τ.λ. The writer has just quoted John vi. 47-58. The same scholion is found in mss. No. 15,

¹ I venture to suggest here a small, but not unimportant, emendation of the text of Epiphanius. Even in the recent editions of Dindorf and Oehler we read, ἡ, "αὐτὴ ἡ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος καὶ τοῦ λόγου. προσέχετε" κ.τ.λ., as above, as if the quotation began with αὐτὴ. Read, ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ διακ. κ.τ.λ., — "The ministry of the Spirit and of the Word [i.e. the ministry to which they appoint] is the same"; which is illustrated by the two quotations that follow, viz. Acts xx. 28 and 1 Tim. i. 12.

18, and 37, though the first two, as well as No. 36, from which Cramer published his *Catena*, read *κυρίου* in the text.

OECUMENIUS (10th cent.?): Προσέχετε οὖν . . . θεοῦ . . . διὰ τ. ἰδ. αἵματος. (*Opp.* i. 260^a, in Migne Cxviii.) This is merely the text; there is no allusion to θεοῦ in the commentary.

THEOPHYLACT (11th cent.), or rather the commentary No. 2 published under his name by Finetti from a Vatican manuscript.¹ Just as in Oecumenius, whose text and comment are copied *verbatim*. (*Opp.* iii. 1016^b, in Migne Cxxv.)

I do not follow Bengel in citing the ORTHODOXA CONFESSIO ECCL. ORIENT., P. i. Q. 85 (Kimmel, *Libri symb. Eccl. Or.* p. 158), as that document belongs to about the middle of the seventeenth century, and also quotes 1 John v. 7 (P. i. Q. 9).

Tischendorf should not have cited Pope CAELESTINE I. (A.D. 423), *Ep.* xviii. *ad Syn. Eph.* (Migne l. 508^a, or *Concil.* ed. Coleti iii. 1145^b), as an authority for the *Greek* here, as the Greek text of this Epistle is plainly a mere translation from the Latin which it accompanies: Προσέχετε ἑαυτοῖς καὶ πάσῃ τῇ ἀγέλῃ, ἧς ὑμ. τ. πν. τ. ἄγ. ἔταξεν ἐπισκόπους, διοικεῖν τ. ἔκ. τ. θεοῦ, ἣν περιεπ. τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι. This is shown also by the translation of other passages of Scripture in the same Epistle.

The earliest writer not Greek who seems to have quoted this verse with the reading "God" is the Egyptian monk ORSIESIUS or Oresiesis (fl. A.D. 345), *De Inst. Monach.* c. 40 (Migne, *Patrol. Gr.* xl. 886^a): "scientes vos reddituros rationem pro omni grege, super quem vos Spiritus sanctus constituit inspicere et pascere ecclesiam Dei, quam acquisivit proprio sanguine." But we have him only at third hand. The treatise was written in Coptic, then translated into Greek, from which version Jerome, as he tells us, dictated to a *notarius* his Latin translation, in which alone it has come down to us.

The Latin fathers who have quoted this verse with the reading *Dei* are all later than Jerome, most of them much later, and only

¹ The designation of this commentary by Griesbach and Scholz as "Theoph. 2," and of that mentioned above under I. as "Theophyl. 3," has led to the erroneous statements by Davidson, Tregelles, and others, that Theophylact reads θεοῦ twice, and κυρίου three times.

attest what is already settled, the reading of the Vulgate. I will then simply name those in whom I have found the reading *Dei* down to the time of Beda in the eighth century, referring to the places.

CAELESTINE I. (A.D. 423) has been already cited; next come CASSIAN (cir. 430), *De Incarn.* vii. 4 (Migne L. 204^b),¹ JULIANUS POMERIUS (A.D. 498, *al.* Prosper Aquitanus), *De Vita contemp.* ii. 3. § 1 (M. LIX. 446^a), *bis*; PASCHASIUS the Deacon (A.D. 501, *al.* Faustus Rejenensis), *De Spir. sanct.* ii. 10 (M. LXII. 21^{ab}); FULGENTIUS (A.D. 507), *De Fide* c. 19, *al.* 60, and *Cont. Fabian.* fr. 33 (M. LXV. 699^b, 807^a); ANON. (6th cent.?) *Brev. Fidei cont. Arian.* (M. XIII. 662^{ab}), Pope JOHN II. (A.D. 532-5), *Ep. ad Senat.* (M. LXVI. 22^b), FERRANDUS (A.D. 533), *Ep.* iii. *ad Anat.* c. 14 (M. LXVII. 902^d, 903^a), PRIMASIUS (A.D. 550), *In Apoc.* vii. 10 (M. LXVIII. 852^a), Pope MARTIN I. (A.D. 649), *Ep.* i. (M. LXXXVII. 129^c, or *Concil.* ed. Coleti vii. 386^{ab}, see also col. 95^a), BEDA (A.D. 701), *Super Act. Ap. Expos.*, in loc. (*Opp.* iii. 986^a ed. Migne, in *Patrol.* XCII.), and ANON. (8th or 9th cent.), *De xlii. Mans. Fil. Isr.* c. 13 (M. XVII. 24^a). I refer to this last treatise, often printed with the works of Ambrose, merely because it is cited by Sabatier, and might be mistaken for a witness to the Old Latin. But Sabatier assigns its date to the time of Beda or Rabanus (*Bib. Sac. Lat. Verss. Ant.* I. p. lxii.).

The allusion of ARCADIUS, delegate of the Church of Rome at the Council of Ephesus, A.D. 431 (Act. ii. — *Concil.* ed. Coleti, iii. 1147-48), does not determine the reading: — "pro ecclesia Dei, quam Dominus noster Jesus Christus sanguine suo acquisivit, *Gr.* ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκ. τοῦ θεοῦ, ἣν ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χ. τῷ ἑαυτοῦ αἵματι περιεποιήσατο.

Of the Latin writers named above, Cassian, Paschasius, Fulgentius (*bis*), Ferrandus, Pope John II., Primasius, and Beda, cite the passage with reference to the deity of Christ; the anonymous authors of the *Breviarium Fidei* and the treatise *De xlii. Mansionibus*, adduce it in proof of the deity of the Holy Spirit; the others do not quote it for a doctrinal purpose.

On the use of the expression "the blood of God," and many

¹ Following a mistake of Griesbach in copying from Wetstein, Scholz, Tischendorf (eds. 1849, 1859), Alford, Porter, Davidson, and Scrivener substitute *Cassiodorus* for Cassian.

kindred expressions, in the writings of the fathers, see Supplementary Note A.

III. AUTHORITIES FOR THE READING κυρίου καὶ θεοῦ.

Manuscripts. — C³HLP, all of the 9th century and of inferior character, with more than 110 cursives (cent. x-xv) most of them of little value. Nos. $\frac{5}{\text{XII}}$, $\frac{27}{\text{XV}}$, $\frac{29}{\text{X or XI}}$, $\frac{31}{\text{XIV}}$, $\frac{96}{\text{XI}}$, $\frac{114}{\text{XIII}}$, $\frac{137}{\text{XI}}$, and $\frac{142}{\text{XII}}$, are marked with a star by Tischendorf as distinguished from the rest by a more frequent accordance with the oldest copies, but none of them seems in the Acts remarkably distinguished in this respect. Most noteworthy, perhaps, are No. 31 (Gosp. 69), and No. 137, which has a singular agreement with the eccentricities of D and with the margin of the Harclean Syriac.

Ancient Versions. — The SLAVONIC, of the ninth century.

Fathers. — THEOPHYLACT, as edited by Sifanus — No. 1 of the Commentaries on the Acts of the Apostles published under the name of Theophylact — has this reading in the text, with no remark on the words in the commentary. (*Opp.* iii. 777^{de} ed. Migne; *Patrol.* CXXV.)

Manuscripts No. 3, 95**, and the Arabic of the Polyglot read κυρίου θεοῦ, and No. 47 θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου. The GEORGIAN version (6th cent.) is cited by Scholz as reading κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ. But we have no trustworthy edition of it.

IV. AUTHORITIES FOR THE READING χριστοῦ.

Manuscripts. — None.

Ancient Versions. — The PESHITO SYRIAC in all editions but Lee's, and in many manuscripts (one of the 6th cent., others of the 7th, 8th, and 9th), both Jacobite and Nestorian (see Supplementary Note B); the AETHIOPIC in Platt's edition, and in most of the manuscripts; and the ERPENIAN ARABIC, made from the Syriac.

Fathers. — ATHANASIUS, *Ep.* i. *ad Serap.* c. 6, in three mss.; see above, under I. p. 316; THEODORET (A.D. 423), *Int. Ep. ad Philip.* i. 1, 2 (*Opp.* iii. 560^{bc} ed. Migne; *Patrol.* LXXXII.): Προσέχετε ... ὑμ. ἔθετο ... ποιμ. τ. ἐκ. τ. χριστοῦ; and PSEUD-ATHANASIUS, *Dial.* i. *cont. Maced.* c. 13 (*Opp.* ii. 550^c ed. Bened.; Migne xxviii. 1312^b),

quoting precisely like Theodoret, above.¹ PSEUDO-FULGENTIUS (6th cent.), *Pro Fide Cath.* c. 9 (Migne LXV. 716^d): *Attendite gregem Christi, in quo vos Spiritus sanctus constituit episcopos.* For the SPECULUM, which has *Jesu Christi*, see above, under I. p. 321.²

LET us now attempt to weigh the evidence. The question lies, of course, only between the readings *κυρίου* and *θεοῦ*.

The MANUSCRIPT authority for the rival readings may seem, at first view, nearly balanced; but I must regard it as decidedly preponderating in favor of *κυρίου*. *Σ* and *B* are excellent manuscripts, but we must not over-estimate their value. One of the two is often wrong, for they often differ; and the cases in which they are both wrong, though much rarer, are sufficiently numerous to teach us that their combined testimony is far from decisive. One clear example, unless we suppose these two MSS. right in opposition to *all* the other MSS. and *all* the ancient versions, and to internal evidence, is to be found in Acts xvi. 32, where, for the less familiar expression, *τὸν λόγον τοῦ κυρίου*, *Σ* and *B* have substituted the more familiar, *τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ*, as I believe they have done here.³ In the Acts and Catholic Epistles, so far as I can judge without a thorough examina-

¹ Garnier attributes this Dialogue to Theodoret, and publishes it as *Dial.* iv. *de Spir. sancto* among seven *Dialogi de Trinitate* which he ascribes to that author; others, as Petavius, Combefis, and Du Pin, more correctly, as Schulze thinks, assign it to Maximus the Confessor (A.D. 645). Tischendorf cites it both under "Dialmaced" and "Thdrt 5, 1052," as if these were two independent authorities.

² Other authorities cited for *χριστοῦ* are not quotations, and afford no proof that Acts xx. 28 was in the mind of the writer; as Origen, *De Orat.* c. 28, *χριστοῦ ὠνησαμένου ἡμᾶς τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι*; *Exhort. ad Mart.* c. 12, *ὁ ὠνησάμενος ἡμᾶς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ τιμῇ αἵματι*, and c. 50, *ὥσπερ τιμῇ αἵματι τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἡγοράσθημεν* (*Opp.* i. 252^f, 282^d, and 309^c, ed. De la Rue). The *breviarium* of Basil referred to by Wetstein and others, which Davidson says "can only mean Basil's *Regulae brevius tractatae*," where he has "searched for it in vain," is simply the summary or heading of his *Moral.* lxxx. c. 16, quoted under II. above, p. 324, and amounts to nothing. It has merely the expression *ὡς ποιμένες προβάτων χριστοῦ*.

³ See particularly Tischendorf's note on that passage, and to his five examples in which "*λογ. τ. θεοῦ non solet fluctuare*," add Acts xiii. 46; xvii. 13; xviii. 11. — For other instances of the agreement of *Σ* and *B* in readings manifestly or probably false, see Matt. vi. 8; viii. 9; ix. 32; xxvii. 49; Mark iv. 21; Luke xv. 21; John x. 18; xix. 41; Acts xii. 25; xxviii. 12; Gal. ii. 12; Eph. i. 15; 1 Thes. ii. 7; Jas. i. 17; 2 Pet. ii. 13.

tion, A is right nearly, if not quite, as often as $\aleph$. The manuscript authority for $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$ is made exceedingly strong by the fact that its uncials represent both the Alexandrian and the Western forms of the text, and that it embraces *nearly all of the best cursives*. In cases where our chief uncials differ, the testimony of those mss. which are remarkable for their frequent or general agreement with them is obviously of special importance. To show how great is the superiority of the cursives which support $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$ over those which have $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ we need not go far, though numerous examples of a striking character will be found in the Acts. (a) The omission of $\omicron\upsilon\upsilon$ in ver. 28 is supported by $\aleph$ ABD, 13, 15, 36, 81, 180, σ^{scr} ; of these six cursives all but one read $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$, and none reads $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$. (b) In the last clause of the verse the reading $\delta\iota\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \alpha\dot{\iota}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \dot{\iota}\delta\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$ is found in $\aleph$ ABCDE, 13, 15, 31, 33, 34, 36, 40, 69, 73, 81, 105, 130, 142, 156, 163, 180, a c m of Scrivener, and Lect. 12. Of the 15 cursives¹ which support $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$, 12 have this reading; while of the 14 which support $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ only one has it, Lect. 12; or, if we include those counted *ex silentio*, of the 22 which read $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ only 2 have it. (c) In ver. 29 $\epsilon\gamma\omega$ without a conjunction is the reading of $\aleph^*\text{AC}^*\text{D}$, 13, 15, 36, 81, 130, 180, *all* of which cursives read $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$. (d) In the same verse, $\omicron\dot{\iota}\delta\alpha$ without $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ is the reading of $\aleph$ ABC^{*}D, 13, 15, 36, 68, 69, 105, 163, 180, α^{scr} . Of these 9 cursives, 7 support $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$, and only one, No. 68, $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$. We see clearly, then, that in the present case $\aleph$ and B are caught in bad company; which affords a strong presumption that they are in the wrong, and that the uncials and cursives which usually agree with them are right.

The numerous manuscripts which read $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$ *καὶ* $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ seem to me to confirm the reading $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$. "The church" (or "churches") "of God" being a familiar expression, occurring 11 times in the Epistles of Paul, and "the church of the Lord" being unique, if $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$ were original, *καὶ* $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ or $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ would be a natural marginal addition or interlineation, which would readily pass into the text. Further, when $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ had been introduced into some mss. by unconscious substitution of the familiar expression for the unusual one, or by the substitution of the marginal $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ by those who were pleased

¹ Sixteen, including B-C. ii. 7; but I do not know how this ms. reads in the last clause.

with that reading, copyists of manuscripts with *κυρίου*, finding that others had the reading *θεοῦ*, would think themselves safe if they took both into the text. But, as Tischendorf says, "Quis τοῦ κυρίου additurus fuisset, si τοῦ θεοῦ invenisset?"

The authorities for *χριστοῦ* also, such as they are, seem to favor the reading *κυρίου* rather than *θεοῦ*. The abbreviation $\overline{\text{XY}}$ resembles $\overline{\text{KY}}$ more than $\overline{\text{ΘY}}$; and in a version or quotation the substitution of "Christ" for "Lord" (but not so for "God") might have seemed a matter of indifference, or have been unconsciously made.¹ A deliberate falsification of the text is the last supposition to be resorted to. That *χριστοῦ* has not played a great part as a marginal gloss for either reading appears from the fact that it is found in no Greek manuscript.

The authority, next, of the ANCIENT VERSIONS decidedly confirms the reading *κυρίου*. It is supported by the *three oldest*, the Old Latin, the Memphitic, and the Thebaic, which carry us back to a far earlier date than any of the authorities for *θεοῦ*; and these are confirmed by the Armenian, with the margin of the Harelean Syriac, and indirectly, I think, by those that read "Christ," though their testimony is more or less uncertain. That Jerome should adopt the reading *Dei* in the Vulgate need excite no surprise, or that the Monophysite translator of the Philoxenian or Harelean Syriac should prefer the reading favorable to his doctrine.

The evidence of the FATHERS is pretty well balanced, but the *earlier* testimony (as that of Irenaeus), though not absolutely free from doubt, favors *κυρίου* rather than *θεοῦ*. The authorities for *κυρίου* also represent the principal divisions of the Christian world. (See the detailed statements above.) I have already observed that the earliest and the only Greek father who quotes the passage as

¹ How easily "Christ" might be inadvertently substituted for "Lord" in a version or quotation may be illustrated by modern examples. Ewald, who reads "Lord," in his paraphrase substitutes *Christus*, printing it in italics as a translation (*Die drei ersten Evang. u. d. Apostelgeschichte*, 1872, ii. 209; comp. p. 500). Reuss, who in his *Théol. Chrétienne*, ii. 341, n. 2, 2d ed., p. 308 Eng. trans., adopts the reading *κυρίου*, actually cites Acts xx. 28 (*ibid.* p. 186, note, or p. 169, Eng.), as containing the expression *ἐκκλησία τοῦ χριστοῦ*; and Adler, *Nov. Test. Verss. Syr.*, 1789, p. 36, speaks of the reading "pascatis ecclesiam Christi" as found in "nonnullis graecis codicibus."

bearing on the deity of Christ is Cyril of Alexandria, in the fifth century, who adduces it once. In connection with this point, I may quote the important remark of the Rev. Thomas Sheldon Green: "According to the common reading, the passage bears strongly upon more than one great dogmatic controversy, and, accordingly, had this form possessed established currency in the age of those disputes, its employment as a dogmatic weapon ought to be of no unfrequent occurrence in the writings of that age; whereas the contrary is evidently the case." (*Developed Criticism*, etc. p. 112.)

WE will now consider the *internal evidence*. What supposition will best explain the various phenomena?

Alford says, "If θεοῦ was the original, *but one reason* can be given why it should have been altered to κυρίου, and *that one was sure to have operated*. It would stand as a bulwark against Arianism, an assertion which no skill could evade, which *must therefore be modified*. If θεοῦ stood in the text originally, *it was sure to be altered to κυρίου*."

I perceive no ground for this confident assumption, and must reject it for the following reasons. (1) The Arians were as devout believers in the sacredness of Scripture as their adversaries, and would equally have regarded a deliberate falsification of the record as a horrible impiety. There is no evidence that they tampered with the text in any other passage of the New Testament.¹ The absence of 1 John v. 7 from our manuscripts of the Greek Testament and from the ancient versions is not now ascribed to them. (2) Such an attempt would have been absurd and useless. The Arians did not have possession of the orthodox copies; and how would a wilful corruption of their own have helped them in controversy? It was sure to be detected, and to expose them to shame. (3) We have no evidence that the Arians were troubled by the passage; it does not appear to have been quoted by any Greek father in the Arian controversy. (4) The reading θεοῦ would have been really favorable to the Arians. They did not hesitate to apply the term θεός to Christ; but lowered its meaning. They were fond, as we learn from Athanasius, of "calling τὴν θεότητα τοῦ λόγου παθητήν"; of saying that

¹ On John iii. 6 see the note of Wetstein or Tischendorf.

"God suffered through the flesh, and rose again"; and of using the bald expression "the blood of God." Referring to such expressions, Athanasius exclaims: *φεῖ τῆς ἀτοπίας καὶ τῆς βλασφημίας!* Ἀρειανῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα πολήματα. — *Cont. Apollinar.* ii. 11, 12, 13. (See Supplementary Note A.) And very naturally. "A God whose blood was shed," says Professor Stuart, "must surely be a θεὸς δεύτερος as the Arians would have it, and not the impassible and eternal God, which I believe the Logos to be." (*Amer. Bibl. Repository* for April 1838, p. 315.) We do not find, however, that the Arians and Apollinarians ever appealed to the reading θεοῦ in this passage. They justified such language on other grounds. (5) This hypothesis does not explain the existence of the reading *Lord* in authorities which reach back to a century or more before the Arians were heard of.

In truth, Dean Alford's theory of wilful alteration would have been much more plausible, if he had ascribed the substitution of κυρίου for θεοῦ to the orthodox. But such an imputation would, I believe, be doing them great injustice. If they had found the word θεοῦ in the text, they would have been much more likely to reverence it as containing a mystery; and there was less occasion to stumble, as the opinions of the earlier Christian fathers respecting the passibility of the Logos differed from those which afterwards prevailed. They also used the words θεός and *deus* rather loosely. From an early period there were many rhetorical writers, like Tertullian and Lactantius, who were fond of startling and paradoxical expressions, which would also suit the popular taste. (See Supplementary Note A.) At a later date, the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* bridged the difficulty. In the Latin Vulgate the reading *Dei* has been undisturbed, being found, apparently, in all the manuscripts.

But though we reject the supposition of a wilful alteration of the text on the part either of the Arians or the orthodox, it may still be said that κυρίου may have been a marginal explanation of θεοῦ, which would readily and innocently be substituted by those who might stumble at the harshness of the latter. This is possible, but not very probable; for the natural marginal addition would rather have been the unambiguous χριστοῦ, which has been found in no Greek manuscript. "The churches of Christ" occurs once in Paul's writings; and "the blood of Christ," "Christ died," and "Christ suffered," are familiar expressions.

On the other hand, supposing *κυρίου* to be the original reading, we can easily explain all the variations without resorting to the hypothesis, *a priori* extremely improbable, of a deliberate corruption of the text. We have only an example of what has occurred in a multitude of instances, the *substitution by the copyist of a familiar expression for an unusual one*; a substitution often made unconsciously, but sometimes, perhaps, because the more common form had been noted in the margin. The expression "the church" (or "churches") "of God" occurs, as has already been remarked, *eleven* times in the Epistles of Paul, while "the church of the Lord" is found nowhere else in the New Testament; the former expression is also frequent, while the latter is rare, in other early Christian writings; see, e.g. the statement respecting the Apostolical Constitutions under I., above, p. 316. The resemblance of 1 Pet. v. 2 to the present passage, — Ποιμάνετε τὸ ἐν ὑμῶν ποίμνιον τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπισκοποῦντες (om. by *NB*, and perhaps derived from ἐπισκόπους in Acts xx. 28) κ.τ.λ. — "might aid," as Dr. Tregelles remarks, "in suggesting τοῦ θεοῦ."

This tendency of transcribers to substitute the familiar expression for the unusual, which would be particularly strong in the present case, may be illustrated by a few examples.

Acts xv. 40, παραδοθεῖς τῇ χάριτι τοῦ κυρίου. "The grace of God" being a very common expression, and occurring in a similar passage (xiv. 26), θεοῦ is here substituted for κυρίου by CEHLP, and all but about six of the cursives.

James iii. 9, for τὸν κύριον καὶ πατέρα, the familiar τὸν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα has been substituted in KL, and, apparently, all the cursives but two.

1 Pet. iii. 15, for κύριον δὲ τὸν χριστὸν ἀγιάσατε κ.τ.λ., κύριον δὲ τὸν θεόν appears in KLP, and, apparently, all the cursives but seven.

Col. iii. 16, for ὁ λόγος τοῦ χριστοῦ, *N^cD^eE**K*, and all but about seven of the cursives read ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ. For Acts xvi. 32, where *NB* seem to be clearly wrong, see above, p. 328.

Col. iii. 22, for φοβούμενοι τὸν κύριον, *N^cD^eE**K*, and all but about twelve of the cursives read φοβ. τὸν θεόν, the more common expression.

Eph. v. 21, for ἐν φόβῳ χριστοῦ, K reads ἐν φόβῳ κυρίου, comp. Acts ix. 31; 2 Cor. v. 11; and most of the cursives ἐν φ. θεοῦ, comp. Rom. iii. 18; 2 Cor. vii. 1, and the use of the verb φοβέομαι.

2 Thess. iii. 16, for ὁ κύριος τῆς εἰρήνης, FGL, 7 cursives, and many Latin mss. read ὁ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης; comp. Rom. xv. 33; xvi. 20; Phil. iv. 9; 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. xiii. 20. — For other examples, see Col. iii. 15; 2 Thess. iii. 3; Acts viii. 22, 24. I will only notice further, that in the single instance in which we have the phrase, αἱ ἐκκλησίαι πᾶσαι τοῦ χριστοῦ, Rom. xvi. 16, the mss. 3, 23, 42, 69, 106, 120, 177, a^{**scr}, k^{scr}, and two of Matthæi's Chrysostom manuscripts, read θεοῦ. See Wetstein, Scholz, and Scrivener; Tischendorf does not note the variation.

Thus I think it clearly appears, that on the supposition that κυρίου was the original reading, the variations may be easily and satisfactorily explained; and we may adopt the language of Dr. Tregelles, who remarks that "even if the evidence for ἐκκ. τοῦ κυρίου had not been so strong, it would have been confirmed by its peculiarity, and by the immense probability of the familiar phrase being substituted for it." (*Account of the Printed Text*, etc. p. 233.)

Bengel's explanation of the origin of the reading κυρίου is as follows: "Ex LXX. apud quos saepe dicitur ἐκκλησία κυρίου." The "saepe" is 7 times in all, viz. Deut. xxiii. 1, 2, 3 (*bis*), 8; 1 Chron. xxviii. 8; Mic. ii. 5, the phrase being applied to the congregation of Israel. Of this far-fetched explanation it is enough to say, that there appears to be no reason why the cause of error assigned should not have affected the other passages where ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ (in the singular or plural) occurs in the New Testament as well as Acts xx. 28. But in these eleven passages the various reading κυρίου is not once found, according to the critical editors, in a single manuscript. Bengel's hypothesis, therefore, has no foundation.

Another argument of Dean Alford and many others for the reading θεοῦ is this. Paul is the speaker. He has used the expression "church" (or "churches") "of God" eleven times in his Epistles, but never "church of the Lord." Does not *Pauline usage*, then, strongly confirm the genuineness of θεοῦ here?

I agree with those who regard Pauline usage as very important in its bearing on this question. In the divided state of the external evidence, it is entitled to be regarded as a decisive consideration. But it has been strangely misapprehended.

Paul has used the phrase (ἡ) ἐκ. or αἱ ἐκ. (τοῦ) θεοῦ eleven times, eight times in the singular, three in the plural. But has any respectable commentator in any one of these passages understood him to mean *Christ* by θεοῦ? In four of them, 1 Cor. i. 2; 2 Cor. i. 1; 1 Thess. ii. 14; 2 Thess. i. 4, Christ is in the immediate context clearly distinguished from θεός; and in none of the others (1 Cor. x. 32; xi. 16, 22; xv. 9; Gal. i. 13; 1 Tim. iii. 5, 15) has Dean Alford suggested, or would it occur to any reader, that θεοῦ is used as a designation of Christ. So far, then, as the phrase in question is concerned, the appeal to the usage of Paul shows that it is extremely improbable that he would have employed it here to describe the church as belonging to *Christ*.

Let us look a little further. What is the usage of Paul in the rest of this discourse? Examine the use of the words κύριος and θεός in vv. 19, 21, 24, 25, 27, 32, 35; note especially vv. 21 and 24. Is it not clear, without argument, that the usage of the Apostle *here* favors the supposition that he would employ κυρίου rather than θεοῦ to denote Christ in ver. 28?

If he had occasion to describe the church as belonging to Christ, he *might* have used the name "Christ," as he has done in Rom. xvi. 16; but in such a connection as this, in speaking of the Chief Shepherd of the flock, after reference to the ἐπίσκοποι, — overseers of the church, but servants of Christ, — it was particularly appropriate that κύριος should be used, the term by which the Apostle especially delights to designate Christ in his exaltation; see Phil. ii. 9–11. Arator in his paraphrase, quoted above under I. p. 321, seems to have felt the point of the expression: "*Famuli* retinere laborent Quae *Dominus* de morte dedit." See also on this matter Wordsworth's note.

But much more is to be said; and as two or three of the passages to which I shall have occasion to refer have been sometimes appealed to in theological controversy, I beg that it may be understood that I am not attempting to argue a doctrinal question, which

would here be out of place, but wish simply to call attention to certain important facts in relation to the New Testament *use of language*.

If τοῦ θεοῦ here denotes Christ, we have ὁ θεός used *absolutely*, not as θεός is *predicated* of the λόγος ἄσαρκος in John i. 1, but *assumed* as a designation of Christ in his mediatorial relation, and this when the term has just before been used in the same discourse in marked distinction from Christ. What is PAULINE USAGE in regard to this point?

The term θεός occurs in Paul's writings, not including the Epistle to the Hebrews, more than 500 times. How does he employ it? We all know that his *habitual* use of language in his Epistles is in perfect accordance with 1 Cor. viii. 6, ἡμῖν εἰς θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἰς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ. I need not refer to other passages, as Eph. iv. 5, 6; Phil. ii. 9-11. Paul certainly had a most exalted conception of Christ; see, e.g. Col. ii. 9; i. 15-20; but I am now speaking simply of his *use of language*; and it cannot be denied that he generally sharply distinguishes θεός and χριστός; e.g. 1 Cor. iii. 23; xi. 3; 1 Tim. ii. 5. Has he *ever* given the name θεός to Christ? Alford himself finds only *one* instance in all his writings in which he supposes him to have done so; viz. in Rom. ix. 5. But I need not say that the application of θεός in Rom. ix. 5 depends on the *punctuation* and *construction*, on which the most eminent scholars have differed; and when we observe that Lachmann, Buttmann, Kuenen and Cobet, and Tischendorf have so punctuated the passage as to exclude the reference to Christ, and that their construction has been adopted or favored by commentators so able and unprejudiced as Rückert (2d ed.), Fritzsche, Lücke,¹ De Wette, Meyer, Ewald, Clausen (author of the *Hermeneutik*), Van Hengel, and Jowett; by such a grammarian as Winer, and by many eminent recent translators, as Holtzmann (in Bunsen's *Bibelwerk*), Noyes, Oltramare, Lipsius (in the *Protestanten-Bibel*), Professor Godwin, Davidson, Volkmar, Weizsäcker, and in the new Authorized Dutch Version (1868), we can hardly, I think, rely with any con-

¹ De Invocatione Jesu Christi, Part. i. (1843), p. 8; and ms. Notes of his Lectures on Romans, taken by Professor E. J. Young.

fidence on this supposed exception to the otherwise *uniform* usage of the Apostle.¹ And consider the extent of this usage, the exceeding frequency with which the words in question occur! If the *usus loquendi* of a writer is ever to be regarded in textual criticism, I hardly see how there could be a stronger case than the present.

In treating a critical question like this, we must not confound the style of the fourth century, or even of the second, with that of the first, or allow ourselves to be unconsciously influenced by the phraseology with which custom has made us familiar. We find in some writers in the latter half of the second century and afterwards, — or as some suppose, even earlier, — when the application of the names *θεός* and *deus* to Christ had become frequent, such expressions as the blood, the sufferings, the birth and death, the burial and resurrection of God; but I need not say how foreign this language is from the style of the New Testament.

It appears to me, then, in fine, that the evidence of manuscripts, ancient versions, and the early Christian writers, when fairly weighed, decidedly preponderates in favor of the reading *κυρίου*; and that, even if the external testimony for *θεοῦ* were far stronger than it is, we should not be justified in adopting it, in the face of the extreme improbability that Paul (or Luke) should have here used an expression so foreign from his own style and that of the New Testament writings; especially when the origin of *θεοῦ* and of all the other variations can be so easily and naturally explained, on the supposition that *κυρίου* is the genuine reading.

Two matters of interest remain which require some further notice, and which, for convenience, have been reserved for

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.

A. ON THE USE OF SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS "THE BLOOD OF GOD" IN THE WRITINGS OF THE CHRISTIAN FATHERS.

In a few passages of early Christian writings the expression "the blood of God" occurs, and it is urged, not without plausibility, that

¹ On Eph. v. 5 and Tit. ii. 13, on which few would now lay any stress, it may be enough to refer to Alford, Meyer, Huther, and Winer; and on Col. ii. 2, if we adopt the reading *τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ θεοῦ, Χριστοῦ*, to the notes of Bishop Ellicott and Dr. Lightfoot.

"nothing short of scriptural authority could have given early vogue to a term so startling." The fathers who use it are thus regarded as indirect witnesses to the genuineness of the reading $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ in Acts xx. 28.

If the writers who employ this expression used it in such a connection as to show that this particular passage was in their minds; and if they were generally careful not to use startling expressions analogous to this without some Scripture precedent, the argument would have much weight. But so far as my examination of their writings has extended, — which indeed has not been exhaustive, — the reverse is true. Though language of this sort was freely used by some, and strongly condemned by others, and though the passage would seem to have a direct bearing on the Patripassian controversy and on the Gnostic controversies of the second and third centuries; yet I cannot find that it was ever adduced, on the one hand, by way of justification of such expressions, or that, on the other, attempts were made to explain it away. Other passages, far less relevant, were appealed to; but concerning this, *altum silentium*. The reading $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ had doubtless found its way into some manuscripts as early as the first part of the fourth century; but it had not become current; it had not attracted attention; and it is not till the fifth century that we find it actually quoted in reference to the deity of Christ and the propriety of such language as "the blood of God."

The expression $\alphaἷμα \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ occurs in IGNATIUS, *Eph.* c. 1, ἀναζωπυρήσαντες ἐν αἵματι $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ τὸ συγγενικὸν ἔργον τελείως ἀπηρτίσατε, according to the Shorter Greek form of the Epistles, and in the Syriac version of the Three Epistles as published by Cureton; the Old Latin version of the Shorter form reads "in sanguine *Christi Dei*"; and the Longer Epistles ἐν αἵματι *Χριστοῦ*. The Armenian version, made from the Syriac, omits the phrase altogether; and Petermann in his edition of Ignatius (p. 6) says, "Equidem dixerim, primitus scriptum esse *Χριστοῦ*, deinde ex nota Monophysitae cujusdam marginali in textum irrepsisse $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, ac deinde vocem *χριστοῦ* excidisse." Bunsen puts a comma after αἵματι, and connects $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ either with τὸ συγγενικόν (*Die drei ächten . . . Briefe des Ignatius*, 1847, pp. 42 and 86, n. 7), or with ἔργον (*Hippolytus*, i. 95, 2d ed.). But for brevity I waive all question of the reading, or the construction, or the genuineness of the Epistles, which so far as I can venture at present to judge (and this is the view of eminent scholars) cannot be regarded as earlier in any of their forms than the latter half of the second cen-

tury. The phrase suits the style of these Epistles very well, and the only point important to notice is that there is nothing in the context to suggest in the slightest degree a reference to the passage in the Acts. The appeal sometimes made to Ignat. *Rom.* c. 7 rests on a false reference of αὐτοῦ, to say nothing of the fact that θεοῦ after πόμα is probably spurious.

The next example is in TERTULLIAN (*Ad Uxor.* ii. 3): "Non sumus nostri, sed pretio empti; et quali pretio? sanguine Dei." Here again there is no allusion in the context to Acts xx. 28; and even Burton admits (*Testim. of the Ante-Nicene Fathers to the Div. of Christ*, 2d ed., p. 25) that "his words bear such a direct reference to another text, 1 Cor. vi. 19, 20, that we cannot say, whether he had the words of St. Paul to the Ephesians also in mind." I will add that Roensch, who in his *Das Neue Testament Tertullian's* (1871) has collected with extreme care all the allusions of Tertullian to passages of the New Testament as well as his quotations, finds no allusion in his writings to Acts xx. 28.

The remaining example of this expression is in CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA (*Quis dives salvetur*, c. 34): "Not knowing how great a treasure we bear in an earthen vessel, δυνάμει θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ αἵματι θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δρόσῳ πνεύματος ἁγίου περιτετειχισμένον. Here again there is in the connection no allusion to Acts xx. 28.

These are all the examples that have been adduced, so far as I am aware, from the Ante-Nicene fathers, of the expression "blood of God."¹ They are found in highly rhetorical writers, remarkable generally for the harshness and extravagance of their language. They are connected with a large number of kindred expressions, in which the fathers speak of the birth, conception, flesh, body, sufferings, death, crucifixion, burial and resurrection of God, for which no Scripture precedent can be pleaded, but which are founded merely on inference. Under these circumstances, it seems to me extremely rash to single out this, one of the rarest, and claim that it implies the existence of the reading θεοῦ in Acts xx. 28, against the very strong presumption that if it had existed there, it would often have been directly appealed to.

¹ In the *Paul. Samos. Quaest.* (Q. iv.), ascribed to Dionysius of Alexandria, we have the expression τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (*Concil.* ed. Coleti, i. 888^b); but Dr. Burton should not have cited this work as he has done, together with the so-called Epistle of Dionysius against Paul of Samosata (Burton, *Testim.* p. 25 f., 92 f., 161, 397-419), without warning the reader of their probable spuriousness. See Lardner's *Works*, ii. 685 ff., ed. 1829.

I regret that the wholly unexpected length to which the preceding discussion has extended forbids any detailed illustration of what has been stated in regard to the language of the Christian fathers, and of the extent to which, when the use of *θεός* and *deus* as appellations of Christ had become familiar, they use the most harsh and startling expressions without Scripture authority, and simply as the result of inference. I can only refer to the collection of such expressions given by Wetstein in his note on Acts xx. 28 (*N. T.* ii. 596 f.), and add some references to passages not noticed by him.

See IGNATIUS, *Rom.* c. 6 : "Suffer me to be an imitator τοῦ πάθους τοῦ θεοῦ μου. Here again there are various readings (see Lipsius, *Text der drei syr. Briefe*, pp. 77, 78). *Eph.* c. 18 : ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστὸς ἐκνοφορήθη ὑπὸ Μαρίας. — TATIAN, *Or. ad Graec.* c. 13 : "rejecting τὸν διάκονον [the Holy Spirit] τοῦ πεπονθότος θεοῦ." — MELITO, *Ex Serm. de Passione*, ap. Anastasium Sin. : ὁ θεὸς πέπονθεν ὑπὸ δεξιᾶς Ἰσραηλίδος, but in the Syriac : "God was put to death ; the King of Israel was slain by an Israelitish right hand" (see Cureton, *Spicil. Syr.* p. 55, cf. p. 56 ; or Otto, *Corp. Apol. Christ.* ix. pp. 416, 422, 444 ff., and 459, n. 119). Cureton has some doubt whether this and some other pieces in which similar language occurs belong to Melito ; there may be a confusion between Melito and Meletius, "the honey of Attica," who flourished in the fourth century. See his *Spicil. Syr.* pp. 96, 97. — TERTULLIAN, as might be expected from his fiery intensity of feeling, and the audacities of his glowing style, has much language of the kind referred to. See, e.g. *De Carne Christi*, c. 5. After speaking of the "passiones Dei," he exclaims : "Quid enim indignius Deo . . . nasci an mori ? carnem gestare an crucem ? circumcidi an suffigi ? educari an sepeliri ? in praesepe deponi an in monumento recondi ? . . . Nonne vere crucifixus est Deus ? nonne vere mortuus est, ut vere crucifixus ? nonne vere resuscitatus, ut vere scilicet mortuus ?" He goes on to speak of the "interemptores Dei." On the passage just cited, which contains the famous sentence, *Certum est, quia impossibile*, so often misquoted, I would refer to the valuable notes of Mr. Norton, *Genuineness of the Gospels*, 2d ed., iii. 175 ff., or ii. 272 ff., Eng. ed. For other examples of similar language in Tertullian, see *ibid.* c. 4 ; *Adv. Marcion.* ii. 16 (mortuum Deum), 27 (Deum crucifixum) ; iv. 13 (quia Deus homo natus erat) ; v. 5 (nativitas et caro Dei) ; *De Patient.* c. 3. — IRENAEUS, *Cont. Haer.* v. 19. § 1 : "[Maria] per angelicum sermonem

evangelizata est, ut portaret Deum." — CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, *Paed.* ii. c. 3, p. 190 ed. Potter: τοὺς πόδας ἐνιπτεν αὐτῶν σαβάνῳ περιζωσάμενος ὁ ἄνθρωπος θεὸς καὶ κύριος τῶν ὅλων. *Ibid.* c. 8, p. 214: ἐδίωξεν τὸν θεόν. — HIPPOLYTUS, *De Antichristo* c. 45 (Migne, *Patrol.* x. 764^b): τὸν ἐν κοιλίᾳ παρθένου συνελημμένον θεὸν λόγον. *Ex Serm. in Elcan. et Annam*: ὡς ὁ ἀπόστολος λέγει, Τὸ δὲ πάσχα ἡμῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐθύθη Χριστὸς ὁ θεός. (Migne, col. 864^a.) 'Ο θεός is in the same way added to 1 Cor. v. 7 in ms. No. 116, and in one ms. of Chrysostom; and that passage is so quoted, according to Wetstein, by the Lateran Council. Such cases are instructive. — NOVATIAN, *De Reg. Fid. sive de Trin.* c. 25, opposes those who argued, "Si Christus Deus, Christus autem mortuus, ergo mortuus est Deus." — SYNOD OF ANTIOCH (A.D. 269), *Epist. ad Dionys. et Max.* (in Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* iii. 312, 2d ed.): θεὸς ἦν ἐν γαστρὶ συνουσιωμένος τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ; and see what precedes. — SIBYLLINE ORACLES, vi. 26, ὃ ξύλον ὃ μακαριστόν, ἐφ' ᾧ θεὸς ἐξετανύσθη. vii. 66, τλήμων, οὐκ ἔγνωσ τὸν σὸν θεόν, ὃς ποτ' ἔλουσεν Ἰορδάνον ἐν προχοῇσι [Friedlieb ἰδάτεσσι]. viii. 288, καὶ δώσουσι θεῷ ῥαπίσματα χερσὶν ἀνάγκαις, quoted by Lactantius, iv. 18. viii. 462, δέξαι ἀχράντοισι θεὸν σοῖς, παρθένε, κόλποις. See also vii. 24. — There is a great abundance of such language in LACTANTIUS; see *Inst.* iv. cc. 10, 14, 18, 22, 26, 29, 30. — ALEXANDER OF ALEXANDRIA, *De Anima et Corpore*, c. 5 (Migne xviii. 595, cf. 603), preserved in Syriac and Arabic: "Quaenam, oro, necessitas Deum coegit in terram descendere, carnem assumere, panniculis in praesepi involvi, lactante sinu ali, baptismum in famulo suscipere, in crucem tolli, terreno sepulcro infodi, a mortuis tertia die resurgere?" — APOSTOLICAL CONSTITUTIONS, lib. viii. (late) c. 1. § 4: ὅτι συγχωρήσει θεοῦ σταυρὸν ὑπέμεινεν αἰσχύνῃς καταφρονήσας ὁ θεὸς λόγος, καὶ ὅτι ἀπέθανε καὶ ἐτάφη καὶ ἀνέστη κ.τ.λ.

The subject has been very imperfectly presented, but the foregoing references and citations may be sufficient to establish the position taken. They may also serve to show, in reference to the argument that θεοῦ is the *lectio durior*, that expressions which seem very harsh to us were well suited to the taste of many in the second and third centuries. And how ready the Christian fathers were to confound their own *inferences* with the language of Scripture may appear, to take a single example, from Cyril of Alexandria, who says: Τίς ἐπὶ τοσούτον μέμνηνεν, ὡς μὴ βούλεσθαι μετὰ τῶν Εὐαγγελίων θεοτόκον ἀποκαλεῖν τὴν ἁγίαν παρθένον; (*Quod B. Maria*

sit deipara, c. 23; *Opp.* ix. 284^b, in Migne LXXVI.) One who thinks the fathers would have been very scrupulous about using such expressions as *μονογενὴς θεός*, *αἷμα θεοῦ*, etc. unless they had found them in Scripture, may look into Sophocles's Greek Lexicon under such words as *θεογενήτωρ*, *θεοκτόνος*, *θεομήτωρ*, *θεοπάτωρ*, and *θεοπρομήτωρ*, to say nothing of *θεοτόκος*. The title *Dei avia* applied to Anna, the mother of the Virgin, became so popular that, as Wetstein remarks, Clement XI. had to issue an edict against it, as offensive to pious ears.

One very early passage, wrongly supposed, as I think, to speak of "the sufferings of God," requires a little discussion, which has been reserved for the present place.

In the First Epistle of CLEMENT OF ROME to the Corinthians (c. 2) we read τὰ παθήματα αὐτοῦ ἣν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὑμῶν, τοῦ θεοῦ being the near antecedent. But as the term *θεός*, with or without the article, is throughout the Epistle applied exclusively to the Father, and is used in marked distinction from Christ (see, e.g. cc. 1, 7, 12, 16, 20, 42, 46, 49, 50, 53, 59), this reference of the αὐτοῦ would seem to make Clement a Patripassian; and such is the view of Lipsius (*De Clem. Rom. Ep. ad Cor. priore*, pp. 101, 102), comp. Hellwag in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1848, p. 255 f. But this supposition, as well as the supposition that the second person of the Trinity is intended by the τοῦ θεοῦ preceding, is so entirely out of harmony with the rest of the Epistle (see above, and in reference to the blood of Christ, cc. 7, 12, 49), that I should regard as much more probable the conjecture of *μαθήματα* for *παθήματα*, proposed by the first editor of the Epistle, Patrick Young (Junius), and adopted by Fleury (*Hist. Eccl.* liv. ii. c. 33), Whitby (*Disq. Mod.* p. 18), Hilgenfeld (*N.T. extra Can.* i. p. 5, note), and Donaldson (*Apost. Fathers*, 1874, pp. 157, 158). The older forms of the Mu and Pi were sometimes hardly distinguishable;¹ and as Dr. Lightfoot (*in loc.*) remarks, "the confusion of *μαθητής*, *παθητής*, in Ign. *Polyc.* 7, and *μαθήματα*, *παθήματα*, in Ign. *Smyrn.* 5, shows that the interchange would be easy." And I do not perceive much force in the remark that "the reading *μαθήματα* would destroy the propriety of the expressions in the parallel clauses . . . 'the words in your hearts, the sufferings before your eyes.'" The eyes of the

¹ See Silvestre, *Paléogr. univ.* pl. lvi.; and the Copto-Greek form of M in Uhlemann's Coptic Grammar or Schwartz's Memphitic Gospels. See also Donaldson, as referred to above.

mind — what Clement calls τὰ ὄμματα τῆς ψυχῆς (c. 19) and οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ τῆς καρδίας (c. 36) are certainly referred to; and the use of such language with μαθήματα is perfectly paralleled by τὴν παράδοσιν (τῶν ἀποστόλων) πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχων, in Iren. *Haer.* iii. 3, § 3; comp. *Const. Apost.* ii. 36, § 1, and *Mart. Polyc.* c. 2. But the conjecture, however plausible, does not seem necessary; we have only to suppose a somewhat negligent use of αὐτοῦ (of which we have an example near the end of the same chapter, and others in cc. 32, 34, 36, 50), referring to Christ *in the mind of the writer*, though not named. This is the view of Dr. Samuel Clarke (*Works*, iv. 569), Rössler (*Bibliothek d. Kirchen-Väter*, i. 47, n. 2), Martini (*Gesch. des Dogma von der Gottheit Christi*, p. 24, note), Dorner (*Lehre von der Person Christi*, i. 139, or p. 99, Eng. trans.), Bunsen (*Hippolytus*, i. 46, note, 2d ed.), Ekker (*De Clem. Rom. Epist.* p. 92, note), and Reuss (*Théol. Chrétienne*, ii. 326, 2^e éd.). For such a use of αὐτός, see Luke ii. 38; 1 John ii. 12, 27, 28, and other places; and comp. Wahl, *Clavis N. T.* s. v. αὐτός, 2. c. bb-dd, and Winer, *Gram.* § 22. 3, and § 67. 1. d. In the passage in question I adopt the punctuation of Lightfoot and Gebhardt (who put a colon after ἀκούμενοι), and their interpretation of ἐφοδίοις. Observing then that Clement has just borrowed a saying introduced in Acts xx. 35 by the phrase "*remembering the words of the Lord Jesus*" — how natural that, with Christ in mind, he should go on to say, "and diligently giving heed to his words, ye had laid them up in your hearts, and his sufferings were before your eyes." I refer, it will be seen, both of the αὐτοῦ's to Christ. This is also, perhaps, favored by the use of the plural, τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ; comp. in this Epistle cc. 13, 46; also Acts xx. 35, 1 Tim. vi. 3, *Const. Apost.* viii. 45; whereas except in Rev. xvii. 17; xix. 9, where the reference is to the words of a particular prophecy, we always have in the New Testament, and I think in the Apostolical Fathers, ὁ λόγος, not οἱ λόγοι, τοῦ θεοῦ. The general resemblance in sentiment (noticed by Professor Lightfoot) between c. 2 of Clement and c. 13, in which "the words" of Christ are twice appealed to, lends confirmation to this view, on which I have dwelt the longer, as no notice is taken of it in the editions of Cotelier, Jacobson, Hefele, Dressel, Lightfoot, Gebhardt and Harnack, or in any other within my knowledge.

An important passage of ATHANASIUS remains to be considered, which I quote in full, as different views have been taken of its

bearing. *Cont. Apollinar.* ii. 14 (*Opp.* i. 951 ed. Bened., or Migne xxvi. 1156^b): Οὐδαμοῦ δὲ αἷμα θεοῦ δίχα σαρκὸς παραδεδώκασιν αἱ γραφαί, ἢ θεὸν διὰ σαρκὸς παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα. Ἀρειανῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα πολήματα, ἐπειδὴ μήτε θεὸν ἀληθινὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ὁμολογοῦσιν. Αἱ δὲ ἄγαι γραφαὶ ἐν σαρκὶ θεοῦ καὶ σαρκὸς θεοῦ ἀνθρώπου γενομένου, αἷμα, καὶ πάθος, καὶ ἀνάστασιν κηρύττουσι σώματος θεοῦ, ἀνάστασιν ἐκ νεκρῶν γενομένην. I would propose a different punctuation of the last sentence, — placing a comma after κηρύττουσι, and removing it after γενομένου and after the last θεοῦ. We may then translate as follows: "But the Scriptures have nowhere spoken of 'blood of God' apart from the flesh, or of *God* as having suffered and risen again through the flesh. Such audacities belong to the Arians, since they do not confess that the Son of God is true God. But the holy Scriptures speak of blood and suffering and resurrection *in the flesh* of God and *of the flesh* of God become man, — a resurrection from the dead of the *body* of God."

I have italicized certain words made emphatic by position. Here, for αἷμα θεοῦ δίχα σαρκός, the edition of Athanasius *ex Officin. Commeliniana*, 1601 (i. 503^a), reads αἷμα θεοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς, which is also the reading of the Paris edition of 1627 (i. 645^{bc}). Wetstein, who used, the former edition, quotes the passage with ἡμᾶς for ἡμᾶς (probably a misprint, as the two words are often confounded), whereupon Dr. Burton charges him with inserting καθ' ἡμᾶς "from his own head" and leaving out the words δίχα σαρκός, "upon which the whole meaning of the passage turns." (*Testimonies of the Ante-Nicene Fathers*, p. 20 f.) This is unjust to Wetstein; and the charge is the more unfortunate, as Dr. Burton himself immediately *misquotes* the edition (the Benedictine) which he professedly follows, substituting δίχα σαρκός for διὰ σαρκός in the second clause, and in citing the last sentence (p. 22) omits the last clause, which is important as determining its construction. He has also, if I mistake not (I would speak with deference), misconstrued and mistranslated the sentence.¹

¹ He renders: "But the Holy Scriptures speaking of God in the flesh, and of the flesh of God when he became man, do mention *the blood* and sufferings and resurrection of the body of God." But if αἷμα κ.τ.λ. is connected with σώματος, what does σαρκός depend on? — I venture to think that the construction I have adopted is confirmed, and the whole passage illustrated, by c. 16 (Migne, col. 1160^a). In answer to those who ask, "How did they crucify the Lord of glory, and not crucify the Word?" Athanasius says, "they nailed the *body* of the Word to the cross. He was God who was rejected; σαρκὸς δὲ θεοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος, καὶ ὁ θάνατος, καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις γέγονε."

In saying that the Scriptures nowhere αἷμα θεοῦ δίχα σαρκὸς παραδεδώκασιν Athanasius means, as I understand him, that they have nowhere used this naked expression. As Dr. Humphry remarks, "if θεοῦ were the reading in our text [Acts xx. 28] there would be mention of the blood of God δίχα σαρκός." (*Comm. on the Acts of the Apostles*, 2d ed., p. 164.) Mr. Darby takes the same view of the language of Athanasius in the note on Acts xx. 28 in his new translation of the New Testament (2d ed., 1872). This view seems to me to be confirmed by the whole tenor of the treatise against Apollinaris, as well as by many particular passages. See, for example, lib. ii. c. 13 (Migne, col. 1153^b): Πῶς οὖν γεγράφατε, ὅτι θεὸς ὁ διὰ σαρκὸς παθὼν καὶ ἀναστὰς; εἰ γὰρ θεὸς ὁ διὰ σαρκὸς παθὼν καὶ ἀναστὰς, παθητὸν ἐρέϊτε καὶ τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν παράκλητον. *Ibid.* c. 19 (Migne, col. 1165^a): Μάταιοι οὖν οἱ τῇ θεότητι αὐτοῦ πάθος προσάγοντες. See also lib. i. cc. 3, 5, 11, 15, 20; lib. ii. cc. 3, 7, 11, 12. "The Scriptures," says Athanasius, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ πάθος ἰστώσι, καὶ οὐχ ὑπερβαίνουσιν· . . . περὶ δὲ τῆς θεότητος τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀτρεπτότητα καὶ τὴν ἀφραστότητα ὁμολογοῦσι (*ibid.* lib. ii. c. 18); and neither he, nor those with whom he argues, seem ever to have thought of the passage, Acts xx. 28, as opposing this view on the one hand, or favoring it on the other.

The use of the phrase δίχα σαρκός may require further notice. Dr. Burton, in discussing this passage of Athanasius (*ubi supra*, p. 22), makes an assertion which even his own translation does not justify. "Since that Father tells us," he says, "that the Scriptures do speak of the blood of God, we ask, where else do they speak of it, except in Acts xx. 28?" — He does not observe that Athanasius represents the Scriptures as speaking, *not* of the blood and suffering and resurrection "of God," but "of the *flesh* of God," or, according to *his* rendering, "of the *body* of God;" expressions which Athanasius here and elsewhere employs to denote the flesh or body which, together with a human soul, ὁ θεὸς λόγος assumed. He does not mean that the Scriptures use even these expressions; but that in speaking of the blood and passion and resurrection of Christ they do not use the word θεός, which is a term δίχα σαρκός, one that does not suggest or imply the flesh or human nature, but such names as χριστός, which, as he says, is *not* given δίχα σαρκός; that is, it implies the incarnation. Οὕτε οὖν τὸ χριστὸς ὄνομα δίχα τῆς σαρκὸς προσάγεται· ἐπειδὴ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ ὀνόματι τὸ πάθος καὶ ὁ θάνατος, τοῦ μὲν Παύλου γράφοντος κ.τ.λ., citing Acts xxvi. 23; 1 Cor. v. 7;

1 Tim. ii. 5, 6; 2 Tim. ii. 8. (*Cont. Apollinar.* ii. 2.) Thus he refers repeatedly to 1 Pet. iv. 1, where we read that "*Christ* suffered for us in the flesh." (See *Or.* iii. *cont. Arian.* cc. 31, 34; *Cont. Apollinar.* ii. 18, 19.) It is just because the word *θεός*, without modification, does not, like *χριστός*, suggest "the flesh," in other words, because it is *δίχα σαρκός*, that Athanasius regards such expressions as *αἷμα θεοῦ* and *ὁ θεὸς ἔπαθεν καὶ ἀνέστη* as senseless and blasphemous (see above, p. 332).

B. ON THE READING OF THE PESHITO SYRIAC AND THE AETHIOPIC VERSIONS.

Before entering upon this subject, I wish to express my hearty thanks to Dr. William Wright, Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge, for very important and interesting information, most kindly communicated, concerning the Syriac and Aethiopic manuscripts in the British Museum. The statements here made respecting their readings in Acts xx. 28 all rest on his authority. For a detailed account of the manuscripts, his Catalogues are of course to be consulted.

Of the SYRIAC manuscripts in the British Museum the following read in Acts xx. 28 "the church of *God*":

Addit. 14473 (6th cent.); 17121, f. 59^a (6th cent.); 14472, f. 39^b (6th or 7th cent.); 18812, f. 35^a (6th or 7th cent.); and 14470, f. 160^b in its later supplement (9th cent.). It is also found in Addit. 17120 (see below) as a late correction; and in 14681 (12th or 13th cent.) as a marginal variant, the text reading "of *Christ*."

The reading "God" is also found, as is well known, in a Syriac Lectionary in the Vatican Library, No. 21, dated A.D. 1042 (see Adler's *Novi Test. Verss. Syr.* p. 16 ff.), in a manuscript brought by Dr. Buchanan from Travancore, "*Codex Malabarensis*," now in the Library of the University of Cambridge, Oo. i. 1. 2, which Dr. Lee considers 500 years old; and a ms. in the Bodleian Library, "Dawk. 23," which he regards as "much older."¹ Dr. Lee admitted the reading "God" into the text of his edition of the Syriac New Testament in 1816 on the authority of these three manuscripts.

Of the Syriac manuscripts in the British Museum the following read "the church of *Christ*" (or the Messiah):

Addit. 17120, "written in a good regular *Estrangelā* of the sixth

¹ See the letter of Dr. Lee in Hug's *Introduction*, trans. by Wait, i. 368-370, and his *Prolegomena in Bibl. Pol. Lond. min.*, iii. § 4, c. 14.

century"; altered "at a much later period into 'of God'" (Dr. Wright); 14448 (A.D. 699-700), f. 143^a; 7157, f. 121^a, "a very fine ms. of the year A.D. 768" (Wright; see also Scrivener, *Introd.*, 2d ed., p. 279, n. 2); 14474 (9th cent.); 14680 (12th or 13th cent.); 17124 (A.D. 1234); and 14681 (12th or 13th cent.) in the *text*, but with "of God" as a marginal variant.—The two mss. numbered 7157 and 14448 are Nestorian.

Respecting the Syriac manuscripts in other libraries I have little information. We may set down, I suppose, as supporting the reading "of Christ" the manuscripts on which the printed editions that have that reading were founded, or in which no variation was noted by the collator; but our knowledge of them is imperfect. Among these editions are those of Widmanstadt (1555), resting on one or two Jacobite manuscripts; the edition of Tremellius (1569) who used a Heidelberg manuscript; that of Le Fevre de la Boderie (Fabricius Boderianus) in the Antwerp Polyglot (Vol. v. 1572), in which he used a manuscript, dated 1188, brought by Postel from the East; that of Rapheleng (1575), who used a "Cologne manuscript," but Marsh thinks this was probably identical with the one just mentioned; that of Gutbier (1664), who had a manuscript borrowed from L'Empereur; and that published by the Propaganda at Rome in 1703 from a copy made by Antonius Sionita in 1611 from three mss. belonging to the College of Maronites. (See Hug's *Introd.*, Part I. § 69, p. 215, Fosdick's trans.) Two Nestorian manuscripts in the Vatican Library, No. 16 (al. 10), assigned by Assemani to the thirteenth century, and No. 17 (al. 9), dated A.D. 1510, described by Adler (*ubi sup.* p. 20 ff.) also have that reading. To these I can only add the ms. Ff. 2. 15 in the Library of the University of Cambridge, Ridley's No. 14, who says that it is dated A.D. 1524; and what is more important, "a Syriac ms. of about 1000 years old, belonging to Mr. Palmer of Magdalen College," mentioned by the Rev. J. B. Morris (*Select Works of S. Ephrem the Syrian*, Oxford, 1847, p. 395, note).¹

We have thus an interesting question respecting the primitive reading of the Peshito in this passage. A majority of the *oldest*

¹ The passage of Ephrem which gave occasion to Mr. Morris's note reads: "Flee from it [Judaism], thou that art feeble; a light thing is thy death and thy blood to it; it took [upon it] the Blood of God, will it be scared away from thine? . . . It hung God upon the Cross, and all created shook to see Him." — *Rhythm i. concerning the Faith*, c. 46 (*Opp. Syr. et Lat.*, iii. 189f.).

manuscripts, so far as our information at present extends, support the reading "the church of *God*"; and as *χριστοῦ* is found in no Greek manuscript, and in but few patristic quotations, is it not probable that *θεοῦ* was originally read by the Syriac translator?

This is a question on which I am not qualified to express a confident opinion; but I will state the considerations which incline me to a different view.

(1) The manuscript evidence for both readings extends back to the sixth century; but it is important to notice that *all* the Nestorian manuscripts have the reading "Christ," while the Jacobite or Monophysite manuscripts are divided, the majority in point of number, including one of the sixth century, also supporting that reading. In the controversies of the fifth century, when it became known that some Greek mss. supported the reading *θεοῦ*, and after the Philoxenian Syriac, prepared at the instance of a leading Monophysite bishop, had adopted this reading in the text, it is not strange that some of the Jacobites or Monophysites should have *corrected* (as they thought) their copies of the Peshito by the Greek or by the Philoxenian, and that thus the reading "God" should have found its way into a considerable number of mss., since it is a reading which would especially favor the Monophysite doctrine.¹ Latin influence, so far as it went, would also tend in the same direction. I lay no stress upon the fact that the Nestorians (as Sabarjesus at the end of the tenth century) *charged* their adversaries with corrupting this passage and Heb. ii. 9 (see Assemani *Bibl. Orient.* III. i. 543). Such charges amount to little on one side or the other. But we must consider the probabilities. Had "God" been the original reading, the Nestorians were not likely deliberately to change it to "Christ," which must have been found in few if any Greek manuscripts; they would rather have substituted "Lord," which has so much very ancient authority; but passing this by, if they *had* thus corrupted the text, how could their reading, in opposition to the text which had been handed down for centuries, have found its way into a majority of the manuscripts of the hostile sect, after controversy had become bitter?²

¹ "Iacobitarum codices post editam versionem Philoxenianam ad textum Graecum corrigi coeptum est." — Wichelhaus, *De N. T. Vers. Syr.*, p. 231; comp. p. 190: "Haec versio [Philoxeniana] . . . nacta est haud exiguam apud illos famam et auctoritatem, ita ut plurimum transscripta sit et variis temporibus a Iacobitarum doctoribus laudata."

² "Fuit ni fallor haec rerum conditio, ut Nestoriani omnes legerent 'Christi,'

That the Nestorians were not the authors of the corruption appears probable from the similar case of Heb. ii. 9, where their manuscripts and some Jacobite manuscripts also read, "For he *apart from God* (χωρὶς θεοῦ for χάριτι θεοῦ) tasted death for all men"; while most of the Jacobite manuscripts read, "For *God himself, in his grace*, tasted death for all men." That the reading χωρὶς θεοῦ was not invented by the Nestorians is shown by the fact that it was current two hundred years before they existed, being found in the manuscripts of Origen and many other ancient fathers (see Tischendorf, and Bleek *in loc.*), whereas the Jacobite reading has in Greek no manuscript support.

It must be confessed, however, that the authority of the Synod of Diamper is against them. In the Acts of that Council (A.D. 1599) the Nestorians are charged with maliciously corrupting both Heb. ii. 9 and Acts xx. 28. "Nam ipsi Nestoriani, a Diabolo acti, veritatem Catholicam scilicet Deum pro nobis passum sanguinemque fudisse fateri nolunt." (Mansi, *Concil. Coll. Nova, seu Supplementum*, etc. tom. vi. col. 24.) That very learned and judicious body also restored to the Syriac text the passage about the Woman taken in Adultery, the reading "the love of *God*, because he laid down his life for us," 1 John iii. 16, the 'Three Heavenly Witnesses,' 1 John v. 7, 8, and some other gems from the Clementine Vulgate.¹

Should it be urged that the majority of the *oldest* manuscripts in the British Museum collection support the reading "God," though very ancient manuscripts are found on both sides, I would call attention to the fact that most or all of these manuscripts come from the monastery of St. Mary *Deipara* in the Nitrian desert, a Jacobite establishment, and that what is really remarkable is the fact that they do not all have that reading.² The *tendency* to alter the reading "Christ" to "God" is illustrated by the manuscripts Addit. 17120 and 14681; see above, and note the changes in Rich's ms. 7157, described by Tregelles (*Textual Criticism*, p. 262, n. 2).

Iacobitarum alii codices 'Christi' exhiberent alii 'Dei,' quam Graeci textus lectionem genuinam et veram habemus." — Wichelhaus, *ibid.* p. 150.

¹ See La Croze, *Hist. du Christianisme des Indes*, 1758, i. 341 ff.

² "Neque id mirum est, quod Iacobitarum potissimum libri in Europam translati sunt. Etenim qui in Nitriae deserta confugerunt ibique in monasterio Mariae Deiparae sedes fixerunt, Monophysitae erant et codices attulerunt ex Iacobitarum monasteriis; deinde plus omnino commercii fuit ecclesiae occidentali cum Iacobitis quam cum Nestorianis, qui interioris Asiae tractus incolebant." — Wichelhaus, *ubi sup.*, p. 147.

(2) The genuineness of the reading "Christ" is favored by its existence in the Erpenian Arabic, made from the Peshito.

(3) It is also favored by the fact that all or most of the earlier fathers of Syria and its neighborhood, as Eustathius of Antioch, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, Nestorius, Amphilochius of Iconium, the Gregories, and Eutherius of Tyana, appear to have been averse to such expressions as "the blood" or "the sufferings of God;" see p. 319 f. Perhaps Ephrem is an exception; see the note quoted above; but he was a poet, and fond of extravagant and paradoxical language. Moreover, Sabarjesus quotes him as saying, "Deus Verbum neque passus, neque mortuus est." (Assemani *Bibl. Orient.* III. i. 542.)

Such being the state of the case, I incline pretty strongly to the belief that "Christ" was the original reading of the Peshito in Acts xx. 28.

The AETHIOPIA VERSION as printed in Walton's Polyglot, as has already been mentioned (see p. 323), uses a word regarded by Griesbach, Tischendorf, and others as ambiguous, but which seems to me to support the reading "God."¹ But the Polyglot text (from the Roman edition of 1548-49) represents but a single manuscript, parts of which in the Acts were defective, and supplied by the native editors from the Greek or the Vulgate. Thomas Pell Platt's edition, printed for the British and Foreign Bible Society in 1830, was also made, in the Acts and Epistles, from a single manuscript. (Tregelles, *Textual Criticism*, p. 318.) This edition reads "Christ." In this uncertainty about the text, the following account, for which I am indebted to Dr. Wright, of the readings of the Aethiopic manuscripts in the British Museum, is of special interest:

Orient. 526, f. 67^a; 527, f. 111^a; 529, f. 93^a; 530, f. 39^b; and 531, f. 78^a, agree in reading "church of *Christ*." Or. 532, f. 116^b, omits the word *Christ* altogether. Or. 528, f. 18^a, has "church of *God*," using the word *egziabher*.

"These manuscripts," Dr. Wright remarks, "are all of the

¹ I would add, in further illustration of the statement that the word *egziabher* appears to stand for *κύριος* only when *κύριος* was regarded by the translator as equivalent to Jehovah, and that it is the common representative of *θεός*, the examples of its use in 1 Cor. ii. In vv. 1, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, it stands for *θεός*; in ver. 16 for *κύριος*; but *not* for *κύριος* in ver. 8—"they would not have crucified the Lord of glory."

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; but we have none older in the British Museum."

I would add that Dr. Lightfoot has kindly examined for me the only one of the MEMPHITIC manuscripts in the British Museum containing the Acts, or at least the only one accessible at the time, viz. Orient. 424, and states that "the reading is clearly τοῦ κυρίου."

POSTSCRIPT.

On p. 322, note ¹, the manuscript of the *Speculum* published by Cardinal Mai is spoken of as "perhaps the oldest copy that contains the famous passage 1 John v. 7." I have not yet had the opportunity of examining Ziegler's *Italafragmente der Paulinischen Briefe nebst Bruchstücken einer vorhieronymianischen Uebersetzung d. ersten Johannesbriefes aus Pergamentblättern der ehemaligen Freisinger Stiftsbibliothek* (Marburg, 1876), but in the *Theol. Literaturblatt* for Jan. 15, 1876 there is an interesting notice of the volume by Dr. Reusch, who states that the Freising manuscript mentioned in the title just given contains the disputed passage in the following form (supplying the gaps):

"et spiritus est testimonium, quia spiritus est veritas. Quoniam tres sunt qui testificantur in terra: spiritus et aqua et sanguis, et tres sunt qui testificantur in caelo: Pater et Verbum et Spiritus sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt."

As this Freising fragment of the Old Latin version (containing 1 John iii. 8-v. 21) is said to be "of the seventh century at the latest," it is probably entitled to the distinction of being the oldest Latin copy in which the Three Heavenly Witnesses have yet appeared. The La Cava manuscript of the Vulgate, which, like the *Speculum*, contains the spurious Epistle to the Laodiceans, is, indeed, referred by Cardinal Mai to the seventh century; but Tischendorf assigns it to the eighth, and Ziegler, as the result of a special investigation, would place it even later.

In regard to the authorship of the *Speculum*, the opinion expressed above (p. 322), and in the American edition of Orme's *Memoir of the Controversy respecting the Three Heavenly Witnesses* (pp. 187, 188), is confirmed by Ziegler, who remarks, as quoted and endorsed by Dr. Reusch, that "the *Speculum* is not by Augustine, but by an unknown, probably African author; and that it is not even certain

whether he took this verse with the Heavenly Witnesses from a manuscript of the Bible, or added it himself; at any rate, the citation in the *Speculum* is of no more importance than that in Vigilius." As the passage was quoted by Vigilius Thapsensis (cir. 484) and by Fulgentius (507–533), we need not be surprised to find it in a Latin ms. of the sixth century.

ARTICLE VI.

RELATIONS OF THE ARYAN AND SEMITIC LANGUAGES.

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II. — CRITERIA OF RELATIONSHIP.

IN passing now from the more critical to the more constructive portion of our Essay, it will be well to throw some light on the nature of the task before us, by exhibiting the more obvious points of contrast between the two families of speech.¹ Bringing thus into view the distinguishing features of each idiom, we shall be the more able to propound the conditions of a just investigation, and to establish the true criteria of evidence as to their relations.

In every language, or group of languages, there are three elements, whose peculiarities determine its special character, and help in different degrees towards its classification. These are, its sounds, its structural principles, and the contents of its vocabulary. In the case before us the numerous points of dissimilarity seem at first sight radical and indicative of a diverse origin, while the points of agreement appear accidental and superficial.

As regards the first element, the sounds of the respective languages, great divergence is apparent among the dentals, in which the Semitic family has developed a strong tendency to multiply sibilant and lisping sounds, and a wider differ-

¹ Comp. Ewald, *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache* (8th ed.), 1870, p. 26 ff.; Renan, *Histoire générale des langues Sémitiques* (4th ed.), 1863, p. 18 ff., 454 ff.; Whitney, *Language and the Study of Language*, p. 300 ff.

ence still among the gutturals, in which the same family exhibits an astonishing variety of phonetic expression.

On examining the roots and the general structure of the words, we are at once struck by the strange and unique principles that control the Semitic dialects. While in the Aryan family, roots may consist of only a single (vowel) sound, or of one or more consonants accompanying or grouped about a vowel, it is an almost invariable Semitic law, that the roots of nouns and verbs, so far as the analysis of living forms can testify, are based upon three consonantal sounds. As to Semitic words in actual speech, we see exemplified as universally the peculiar principle that the vowels are used to express subordinate, modified, or accessory notions, while the consonants, which form the framework of the word, embody its fundamental idea. Again, this family has only to a small extent the habit or capacity of compounding words, a circumstance which tended to multiply the number of its roots, while the Aryan languages, having developed that principle largely, were enabled to economize their original stock. Further, the more strictly grammatical features of the two idioms appear to be no less radically divergent. Renan characterizes the Semitic grammar as a sort of architectural and geometrical structure, as contrasted with the latitude and flexibility that mark the inflections and syntax of Aryan speech. In the Semitic verb there is a great variety of forms ("species," *quasi* conjugations) to express modifications of its general notion, which represent chiefly simple subjective conditions, e.g. causative, declarative, desiderative forms; while in its tenses, which are few, the more metaphysical idea of time is vague and indeterminate, and in those dialects which in a more reflective stage in the history of the race, attained to greater precision in expression, could only be definitely indicated by the help of limiting words. In the same way its moods are also few and entirely foreign in typical structure to those of the Aryan languages. With regard to its noun, the original absence of case-inflections, and the formal modification before a limiting noun, called the con-

struct state, are among the obvious peculiarities. The objective suffixes of verbs, and the possessive suffixes of nouns, are further important Semitic characteristics.

Within the sphere of the lexicon we are not led, immediately at least, to unmistakable marks of radical affinity. If the stock of roots in the respective vocabularies was originally the same, the scientific evidence of the fact does not lie on the surface.

The leading differences between the two families being thus indicated, the character of the problem to be solved becomes more intelligible. The following mode of procedure in the discussion suggests itself to us as the most natural and serviceable. After a glance at the sounds of the two systems of speech, we shall first take up their grammatical features; because, in general, they are the surest tests of linguistic relationship, and because, in this special case, they are the elements which are most strikingly divergent. After estimating the results of this inquiry, it will be necessary to decide whether any other criteria have a right to be admitted,—whether, on general linguistic principles, we are at liberty to introduce other kinds of evidence, which at present it is becoming the fashion to decry. We shall then have to see whether a presumption of identity of origin may not be raised through the consideration of analogies between the most common and essential elements of speech, such as the pronouns, numerals, and certain terms of ordinary life. We shall then examine the main contents of the vocabularies, and attempt to compare the verbal roots of the two families. This will involve a discussion of the question as to what constitutes the ultimate roots and fixes the limits of the true analysis of actual forms. It will finally be in place to offer a general estimate of the extent and nature of the early relations of the two systems now so divergent.

We must first, however, state in general terms what is expected to be accomplished through the discussion. After the results of the history of the inquiry given in the former Article, it would seem presumptuous and idle for us to hope to

present a comparative system of the two forms of speech. Nor do we even expect to reach the very highest kind of certainty in our conclusions. It is in only one of the great groups of languages that linguistic science has secured rigorous demonstration of principles and practical results in the province of the lexicon as well as in that of the grammar. Outside of the mutually related facts of the members of the Indo-European family, comparison is still more or less tentative, and its achievements are of various degrees of worth.¹ What we hope to do is to show, upon proper linguistic evidence, the extreme probability, perhaps amounting to moral certainty, of the original identity of the two families, and to draw a few inferences as to the range of their primitive common stock of ideas. The discussion is also intended to be a practical protest against the theories of those, who in a most unscientific spirit, wish to discourage, upon professedly scientific principles, any effort towards the assimilation of the two systems, because no attempt is likely to result in the construction of a comparative grammar worthy to stand by the side of Bopp's monumental work.

First, then, we shall make a few observations upon the sounds that form the elements of Semitic and Aryan words. It is not customary with those who maintain the radical separation of the two families to lay much stress upon the striking difference in the contents of their respective alphabets. As a general principle, to do so would be to appeal to an unsound canon of comparison. The influence of climate, food, mode of life, and other external conditions, upon the organs of speech, even among communities which are distinguished only by dialectical differences, is extensive and familiar; and it may very readily be believed that through the course of ages, and after long separation under different skies, each of the branches of an originally identical language might naturally have developed certain sounds quite unknown to the phonology of the other. It has lately been urged, however,

¹ The Semitic dialects form, of course, a well-established family; but no comparative system of its dialects has yet been produced.

by a prominent linguistic scholar of England,¹ that a phonological comparison excludes the supposition of Semitic and Aryan relationship. It may be well therefore to examine this question briefly.

It may be first remarked that if this criterion were to be accepted it would preclude all attempts at comparison outside of the families of language already established. And what would have been the result if the founders of our science had early come to the conclusion that, because Sanskrit possessed a class of sounds (the so-called cerebral, or cacuminal linguals²) altogether different from any employed by the languages of Europe, it would be useless to endeavor to establish any sort of relationship between those idioms?

The sounds which are regarded as the peculiar property of the Semites, and are thought worthy to discourage attempts at a comparison of the languages, are the gutturals. Doubtless these are characteristically Semitic; and yet there are to be found in some foreign languages, especially in Armenian, sounds similar to א and ע, the most anomalous of the class.³ When, however, we analyze physiologically these sounds and their mutual relations,⁴ it appears that the transition from the ordinary simple guttural breaths is much less violent than might be supposed, while in the Aryan languages also there are guttural sounds which throw light upon their various gradations. Moreover, these breaths are so easily modified, that, as the history of each of the Semitic dialects

¹ A. H. Sayce, *Principles of Comparative Philology*, 1874, p. 101 f.

² It has been conjectured that these sounds were borrowed from the Dravidian group of languages, namely, those spoken in Southern India by the descendants of the early inhabitants of the peninsula, who were dispossessed by the Aryan invaders. The occurrence of the peculiar aspirated letters in Sanskrit might have been adduced with as good reason against the theory of a common Indo-European speech. The Celtic dialects, also, possess sounds unheard among the other languages of the family.

³ Ewald, *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache* (8th ed.), p. 143.

⁴ See Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language* (Second Series), p. 148 f., comp. with 143 f.; Ewald, *Ausf. hebr. Lehrbuch*, p. 143 ff.; *Grammatica critica linguae arabicae*, § 46; A. Dillmann, *Grammatik der aethiopischen Sprache*, p. 35.

shows, they may be gradually changed so as to become quite different from their original character. Being all based upon the cardinal breathings represented by א and א', we find that after a course of development, varying in the several dialects, they relapsed in many cases into their original sounds, and were heard no more in current speech. Such was the case in Ethiopic,¹ which in its later history possessed only the ordinary smooth and rough breathings; while in the Assyrian, the Samaritan, the Galilean, and the Talmudic dialect,² to a certain extent the ancient Phenician, and to a greater degree the later Punic,³ א assumed the place of א', and the gutturals generally were more or less confounded. The Mandaite dialect of the Aramaean, also, has gone as far as the Ethiopic, and in some cases even farther.⁴ Such facility in development and degeneration in this class of sounds ought surely to preclude the notion that they are an essential and original dividing mark between the two families.⁵

¹ For the gradual steps in these changes, see Dillmann, *Aethiop. Gramm.*, p. 38.

² See Fürst, *Lehrgebäude der aramäischen Idiome*, pp. 15-17.

³ Renan, *Hist. générale*, p. 193 f.

⁴ See especially in the recent important work of Theodor Nöldeke, *Mandäische Grammatik*, Halle, 1875, p. 57 ff., where will be found a full exhibition of these changes within the Aramaean sphere. The Mandaite (not "Mendaite," Nöldeke, p. xx.), affords the best field for the study of Semitic sounds in their degeneration, probably on account of the influence exerted upon it, as upon the dialects of Babylonia generally, by the many foreign tribes that have always been found in that neighborhood. On the other hand, the Arabic best exhibits their possibilities of development, as it was at liberty to grow unchecked by any contact with the outside world of speech.

⁵ Mr. Sayce also claims (*l. c.*) that "qu is an essentially Aryan sound, unknown to the pure and unadulterated Semite," and thus makes the apparently inconsistent statement that the Ethiopic seems to have borrowed the sound from its African neighbors. If this latter statement were tenable it might be urged consistently in favor of an affinity between the North African and Aryan languages, — a theory which Mr. Sayce would be the last to accept. But as qu is not a simple sound, we can remove the second semivowel element, and the first constituent is seen to be a sound common to Aryans and Semites, being merely k modified into a deeper palatal by the influence of the accompanying u, thus being intermediate between k (כ) and פ. The sound ought, therefore, rather to be cited as in illustration of the way in which פ is developed — an essentially Semitic sound. It might as well be claimed that gu (which has also

We must now turn to the structural peculiarities of the two systems of speech. Here we shall have to regard the languages just as they appear in actual use, and inquire whether anything can be inferred as to their early condition. In other words, we must, by analyzing and comparing the verbal and syntactical forms, endeavor to reduce them to common primordial principles. In our previous Article we had hinted at the general value of grammatical comparison in this field of inquiry; but here it will be necessary to consider the question more at large.

The conditions for this investigation are both favorable and unfavorable. On the one hand we find the two groups based upon fully-developed inflectional systems. There is also abundant material, in the form of a large literature in both idioms, bequeathed to us by a long line of intellectual ancestors. Moreover, the internal laws of each of these types of human expression are sufficiently intelligible; for the principles of Aryan speech have furnished the more familiar elements of Comparative Philology, and the Semitic dialects, in their simple and regular structure, reveal easily the process through which their vocables are built up. But, on the other hand, we have this disadvantage, that we do not possess in either idiom literary remains that throw any direct light upon its primitive form. Go back as far as we may, we meet with only full-grown words, in whose complex sounds we seem to hear no more than a faint echo of the simple language of the world's childhood.

Taking up now the word and the sentence as the two main elements of human speech, and regarding the structure of both as the surest distinguishing features of a language or linguistic group, the inquiry naturally divides itself into two branches. First, as to the word, we may assume its special character to be exhibited in its typical form, as this is associated with the process of its development from the

an Ethiopic analogue) in the Latin *lingua* is an essentially Aryan sound. From the facts collected by Dillmann, *Aethiop. Gramm.*, pp. 41-43, it may be inferred that these and the kindred sounds in Ethiopic are not due to foreign influence, but were developed from capacities inherent in the language itself.

root. In this way, e.g. we may contrast the structure of *dictum* from *dic* with that of *דִּקְטָה* from *קִטַּה*, or *dicens, dicentes* with *קִטְּלִים, דִּקְטָלִים*; noting such matters as the part played by the vowels in each set of words, as related to the function of the consonants, and the significance of the prefix or affix as entering into the inflectional system of each type of language. Secondly, we have to compare features of syntax; the Semitic sentence is placed side by side with the Aryan, and the endeavor should be to determine whether the existing forms can be reduced to a common system of expression.

Now, it must be acknowledged that hitherto such inquiries as these, conducted, as they have been in some cases, most acutely and profoundly, have had but ill success so far as their main object is concerned. The result, at best, has merely added to other presumptions in favor of an organic relationship, through the exhibition of a few analogies in the more fundamental structural principles of the word and sentence, which have, however, arrayed against them numerous divergences, apparently no less radical and essential. Our more definite conclusions, however, must be reserved until we have analyzed the evidence.

If we consider the structure of Semitic and Aryan vocables, we find the following to be, perhaps, the most striking difference: in the latter class the radical portion of the word is almost always modified by additions at the end, whether in the base forms of nouns and verbs, or in the various inflections to which these are subject; while in the former the principle of augmentation at the beginning is also followed, as, for example, in the formation of the species (conjugations) of verbs, of the future (imperfect or aorist) tense, and of a large portion of the derivative nouns. This fact is seized upon by Ewald,¹ who compares it with the

¹ Abhandlung über den Zusammenhang des Nordischen (Türkischen), Mittelländischen, und Koptischen Sprachstammes (aus dem Zehnten Bande der Abhandl. der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen). Göttingen, 1862. The full title of Professor Pott's treatise, in which it was severely criticized, is as follows: *Anti-Kaulen; oder mythische Vorstellungen vom*

predominance which the Coptic gives to prefixes in the formation of words, and infers from this, among other evidences, that the Semitic holds an intermediate position between that language and the Indo-European. He ascribes to this strong inclination for prefixes in the Semitic dialects the absence of terminal inflections in the nouns, or of cases, properly so called.¹ Yet from the circumstance that such elementary inflections as those that express person, gender, and number are formed through affixes, he assumes this to have been the original principle of formation. On this he rests one of his pleas for the acknowledgment of an original affinity with the Indo-European stock.² Not a very strong case, surely. Yet when we consider the intermediary relations which the Semitic seems to bear to the Aryan and the Coptic,³ the presumption upon this ground does not seem worthy of being slighted altogether.

We need, however, to look a little more closely into the structure of such forms in the respective types of language. When we examine an Aryan word, and arrive at what is considered the root, we find that the latter is transferred to a derivative or to an inflected form without internal modification. In all cases, certainly, the principle is clear that the parts of the root are inseparable, and that its vowel as well as consonantal elements must enter into the combination. But the Semitic principle is totally different. The consonants

Ursprunge der Völker u. Sprachen. Nebst Beurtheilung der zwei sprachwissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen Heinrich von Ewald's, Lemgo u. Detmold, 1863. Although Professor Pott made an effective presentation of the more obvious difficulties of Ewald's system of comparison, neither his arguments nor ours have any tendency to lessen the merit of the permanently valuable portion of the treatise, in which, starting from fundamental principles common to both families (which appear to us probable, though to him as scientifically established), he has traced with unsurpassed penetration and ingenuity the structural development of the two idioms.

¹ The accusative and genitive in Arabic, and the accusative in Ethiopic bear no true analogy to the cases of like appellation in the Aryan tongues. Ewald traces the *a* of the accusative to the אֶ directive in Hebrew; *Ausf. hebr. Sprachlehre*, § 216.

² *Comp.* § 107 c. in his *Ausf. hebr. Sprachlehre*.

³ See p. 88 f. in our first Article.

which form the root or stem, while remaining themselves unchanged in their new relation, are separable, and may admit between them any of the whole stock of vowel sounds. Each of them, in fact, seems to be the centre of functional activity for itself within a certain range. Now, this divergence from the Aryan system seems to be even more radical than would be the assumed primitive correspondence in formative methods which we have just considered. It seems to be nearer the sources of the individual life in each system of speech, and therefore to be a more important element in determining their early relations. Thus we find that while from one plausible analogy we would be led to hope that a bond of union had been discovered, we are warned by a more searching analysis that the breach is wider than we had thought.¹

From this one point of view, therefore, we seem compelled to abandon the expectation of proving a structural relationship, and unless stronger evidence is forthcoming from other

¹ Ewald does not seem to have recognized this necessary priority of more essential to more formal characteristics in these languages. He thinks that the formative elements in the Semitic family, where prefix and affix were both employed, largely determined the principles of "inner mutation in the roots" (*Zweite sprachw. Abhandlung*, p. 64). He says that these appendages, pressing equally before and behind, tended at last to force their way into the body of the root, thus favoring the internal play of the vowels as modifying elements. To this, he adds, the original divisibility of the root lent its influence. We would suggest that the relations between the formal appendages and the internal structure of the word are as follows: — The greater freedom in the location of these appendages in the Semitic words is a secondary influence, due to the independent existence assigned to each radical of the triliteral root, so that not the whole body, but the individual members decide the place of the external additions. Hence, while in the Aryan languages the influence of analogy would of itself be sufficient to cause these appendages to appear uniformly at the place first chosen, namely at the end, the same tendency could not be equally felt in the Semitic vocables; for each letter would assert its autonomy, and claim its rightful share of the tributary elements. Naturally the force of the middle radical was kept in abeyance by the two others, one on each border. But that this was due merely to the exigencies of its position, and not to its own quiescence, may be inferred from the fact that in the most highly developed of the Semitic tongues — Arabic and Ethiopic — this letter assumed a powerful modifying activity, and actually instituted a new and complex system of internal inflection — the so-called broken plurals.

sources, we must only fall back upon the hope of establishing an ante-grammatical affinity.

We have now to inquire whether there is anything in the syntactical features of the two forms of speech to justify us in holding to a radical affinity between them. This task seems even less promising than the one just attempted. The general aspect of the Semitic mode of expression seems to have nothing whatever in common with the typical character of an Aryan sentence. They are as divergent as the mental characteristics of the two families of which they are the expression. The thought in any given case seems to be cast in entirely different moulds.¹ In the Semitic period we are struck with the absence of qualifying and subordinate clauses ; its parts are simply co-ordinated. There is nothing complex in its structure ; all is simple and direct, both in the construction of the members of the sentence and in the arrangement of its words. The specific distinctions of importance are, the relative positions assigned in each to the subject and the predicate, the modes in which the sentences are united, and the ways in which they express the relation of dependent words. Now, the same difficulty meets us in this comparison as that which we encountered in considering the structure of verbal forms : as far back as we are able to trace the two idioms we find that they have preserved essentially the same modes of expression. Thus it is characteristic of the Semitic syntax, throughout its history, that in the ordinary, direct, simple sentence the verb precedes and the subject follows ; while in the Aryan languages the reverse order is as prevailingly the rule. It may be surmised that the actual order in the Semitic idiom was not the original one, and that there, as in the Aryan sentence, the subject, as being the leading word, was in earliest times placed first. But this is incapable of proof. Ewald institutes a subtle parallel² between supposed changes in the

¹ The cardinal distinctions are delicately discriminated by Renan, *Histoire générale*, etc., p. 19 ff.

² *Zweite sprachw. Abhandlung*, p. 57 ; comp. p. 28 f.

verbal and in the syntactical structure of the Semitic language. He believes, as we have seen, that the formative elements in Semitic words were originally placed at the end, and that the principle of prefixing them was of later origin. He then affirms that in conformity with this process there was an early but gradual change in the order of the parts in the sentence, so that what seems to us to be the natural arrangement was inverted.¹

The same ill-success seems inevitable in examining another leading distinction. The mode in which a dependent is joined to a governing noun in the Semitic, and which is found in all its dialects, bears no analogy to anything known in pure Aryan grammar.² That the first of the nouns should be modified, instead of the limiting one, is a principle essentially Semitic. Whatever may have been the origin of this construction; whether or not the vowel termination of the construct state, which is universal in Ethiopic, and has survived besides in archaic forms in Hebrew,³ was the original bond of union between the words so related, the impossibility still remains of bridging over the linguistic interval between this and the Aryan usage, according to which, the second or limiting noun must undergo inflection, or be governed by a preposition.

With regard to the third leading distinction in the sphere of the syntax, we think that the simple co-ordinated structure of the Semitic sentence with the prevailing use of merely copulative particles, is not so radical or so inherent in the system as to furnish even the external conditions of linguistic comparison. It is due, as it appears to us, almost entirely

¹ That the Indo-European order is the most natural may be inferred from such primitive types of language as the Chinese. See Max Müller, *Science of Language*, i. p. 118.

² The employment of a similar construction in modern Persian, and in Armenian, being a usage borrowed from the Semitic, is no exception to this rule, any more than is the tendency to separate the letters of a word by the insertion of a vowel, which is shown sometimes in the first-named language, and has the same source.

³ For opinions as to the origin of this termination, see Green, *Heb. Gram.* § 198 *a*; Ewald, *Ausf. hebr. Spl.* § 211 *a*.

to the intellectual character of the people at the formative periods of their language. The Semites, as a race, have not been given to habits of reflection or to logical reasoning, delighting rather in the contemplation of the external features of the objects of sense and the more lively emotions of the soul. Hence the absence of inferences, of close definitions, and of special qualifications. The discursive faculty was but little employed, and required no special instrument for its expression.¹ But the comparison of the two idioms in this sphere would soon lead us from the study of the language to the study of the races themselves, and take us beyond our province.

Having thus attempted to outline a system of structural comparison between the two families of speech, it remains for us to sum up the meagre, yet instructive, results of our inquiry.

1. The two families are conspicuous among the languages of the world, through the possession of fully developed inflectional systems, as distinguished from the idioms called agglutinative and isolating.

¹ The early inversion of the natural order of the elements of the simple sentence may have contributed its influence to the formation of Semitic style, as Ewald maintains (*Zweite sprachw. Abh.*, p. 59), but probably only to a slight degree. Pott seems to be in error when, in criticizing Ewald, he says (*Anti-Kaulen*, p. 281), that the brevity and uniformity of the Semitic sentence are due to the paucity of adaptable conjunctions, and of moods and tenses, which would subserve a like end. For, if we look merely at Ethiopic, a Semitic dialect which *does* possess a marvellous capacity for the expression of logical and connected thought, we see that it possesses those grammatical elements to the requisite amount. The inference is then near at hand, that, at the time of its growth into a distinct language, these parts of speech were evolved from its quickened resources, in order to serve the purposes of an exceptionally active intellectual life among the people; there being also no doubt that much mental activity did once exist. See Dillmann, *Aethiop. Gramm.*, p. 6 f.; Ewald, *Ausf. hebr. Sprachlehre*, p. 34 f. This conclusion, as confirmed to a certain extent by the history of the Arabic, would go to show that the Semitic type of expression was conditioned by the mental antecedents of the race, and not by an inherent inadequacy of the language. Of course, when the cruder dialects became old and fixed, they lost the capacity of development, and when employed for unaccustomed purposes, had to borrow the necessary expressions from foreign idioms, as is proved from the history of Aramaic and Talmudic Hebrew.

2. Without considering the question whether what are ordinarily called roots in the Semitic dialects are really ultimate significant elements, it is plain that the bases of verbal forms in the two families are essentially distinct in their structural principles. This dissimilarity is marked not simply in the phenomenon that in the Semitic idiom they are generally composed of three consonants, but more fundamentally, in the independent activity assigned to each of these letters.

3. With regard to the formative elements of living words, we saw that there was some reason to believe that in the most essential, and presumably the most primitive, of inflected forms, they were attached at the end of the roots, as in the Aryan languages. This, however, does not furnish, by itself, a very strong argument in favor of a grammatical affinity.

4. The syntactical peculiarities of the two systems, as would naturally be expected, do not yield more favorable results, following, as they do, upon structural principles themselves divergent.

We are thus left without any direct demonstration of relationship from this source of evidence. The question then recurs: What, if any, is the residuum of testimony, from a structural comparison, in favor of the theory of the original unity of the two systems? It is to be feared that no answer, universally satisfactory, can be given. In some minds the common possession of an inflectional system would of itself create a strong presumption of an identity of origin. And when to this fact is added what has been alluded to with regard to the intermediate position of the North African family of languages, whose inflections hardly rise to the dignity of a system, but betray, when they do exist, a marked resemblance to the Semitic, the inference seems proper that the families last named went hand in hand in the earliest stages of their history, and after their separation followed in very different degrees the structural impulses which all three idioms had received in a common home. But apart

from this, and on general linguistic considerations, it does not seem likely that two such highly and fully developed systems of speech would have originated without a strong, even though very early, bond of relationship. They represent a supremely great achievement of the human mind, something unique in the history of men; and one is led to attribute a common impulse to the beginnings of each, as in the contemplation of the worship of the synagogue and of the cathedral we are led back to the one supreme religious idea that the world has known. The theory of an original diversity in the two families appears, in fact, to raise a more formidable difficulty than those which the doctrine of their unity occasions, because the psychological phenomenon which it would imply is less credible than the assumption of a divergence from a common idiom, which, before the separation, contained the germs of a grammatical system.

Yet this kind of evidence is both too general and too subjective to command universal assent. At best it affords a presumption, and not a demonstration. Although, therefore, we think that the two families of speech were still united when the first manifestations of the inflective impulse were felt, yet, as we have very little scientific proof to present. based upon grammatical comparison, it is only left to us to see whether there is not another kind of evidence available in the inquiry.

We are thus led to compare the verbal forms possessed by the two families, and thence to determine whether analogies between separate words are obtainable in sufficient number to justify us in regarding them as something more than mere coincidences. But at the outset we are confronted by arguments urged against the admissibility of such evidence by those who hold that the two idioms are radically distinct. It will be necessary to test the validity of such objections before proceeding further.

We are first met with the general plea that, as grammatical features are the proper marks of linguistic relationship, it is unscientific as well as futile to go behind them, and to com-

pare the lexical contents of the two groups.¹ This declaration is sweeping and imperious. Against any plausible coincidences already brought forward it is always urged that they must be the result of chance or of onomatopoeia, or of some subtle intellectual analogy in the formative processes of early speech. Against those who make any systematic attempt to compare the two idioms on the basis of their respective vocabularies it is maintained that they begin at the wrong end. The failure of Bopp in his attempt to compare the Indo-European with the Caucasian and Malayo-Polynesian families of speech is paraded² as a proof of the exclusive sufficiency of the method of grammatical comparison, of which he had been the originator and expounder. Now, before considering the special difficulties raised by these theorists in the way of adventurous and irreverent investigators, we should say that these vehement protests against an alleged unscientific method are themselves not at all in the spirit of true science, inasmuch as, if universally heeded, they would stand in the way of all progress in the further comparison of languages. A stop would at once be put to all efforts to co-ordinate into special families those languages of the so-called Turanian group, which agree only in the agglutinative or combinatory character, just as the Aryan and Semitic families agree in being inflectional. And so for the the classification of other types of human speech. It may also be assumed that if the same spirit had been dominant at the beginning of the present century, those bold but happy

¹ So Renan, Friedrich Müller, Sayce, and other opponents of the theory of an original affinity.

² See Friedrich Müller, *Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft*, I. Band (Vienna, 1876), p. 58. Comp. Benfey, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft u. der orientalischen Philologie in Deutschland*. München, 1869, p. 511 ff. It is very likely that Bopp was inaccurate in many of his combinations with the above-mentioned languages; but on this general question of the admissibility of verbal comparisons, we cannot but respect very highly the judgment of the immortal founder of Comparative Philology. Here, as in his *Glossarium Sanscritum* (within the Aryan family), he was too hasty and liberal in the admission of analogies. But this was due to his method in practice, and not necessarily to the unsoundness of his theory, into whose conditions he probably saw as clearly and deeply as any dogmatic obstructionist of the present hour.

generalizations without which, perhaps, comparative grammar itself might not have been created, would have been denounced as unscientific. The great discoveries within the sphere of the Indo-European family have made it fashionable to believe that glottology has unfolded all its fundamental principles, while it is forgotten that only small districts of human speech have been explored and annexed to the domain of science. The reaction against the old lawless methods of comparison which now prevails is no doubt wholesome and just; but it is a question whether this one of its present forms ought, or is likely, to be permanent.

But, more particularly, it is alleged that we are bound to forego any attempt to assimilate the two groups, because (it is said) science has established the fact that the various types of speech now known rest upon a primitive diversity of origin — that language was developed at first from numberless dialects, and not from a common source. Now if this dictum were conceded to be indisputably true, it would not settle the question at issue; for we should next have to determine what constitutes the primitive type in any given case; in other words, whether the two inflectional families of the world's speech may not have arisen from one original dialect. Such an issue is not necessarily excluded by the conditions of the supposed fact of linguistic history. For the limits of each early type or dialect must be settled in one or both of two ways: by appealing either to the evidence of the science of language, or to that of comparative ethnology. If we refer to the former, we find this at least, that these two families are the only ones that have a fully developed grammatical system; a fact suggestive of a possible primitive bond between them. If we appeal to the latter, the evidence is decidedly unfavorable to those who maintain a diversity of origin. The Semite differs but little physically from the Aryan, and resembles the European more than the latter does a Hindoo. This is acknowledged by Renan, one of the most influential of the class of writers alluded to, who admits that the current distinction is based chiefly upon language, and

affirms that, viewed from the physical side, the Semite and the Indo-European form but one race.¹ The consideration that the two systems of speech together now occupy so much of the earth's surface does not come into conflict with the assumptions of the theory we are considering; as though the doctrine necessarily involved a certain ratio between the primitive extent of a language and the number of its present speakers. It is only maintained that the original dialects of mankind were numerous and diverse, it being an essential part of the theory that but comparatively few of the early stock now survive, the rest having been eliminated in the struggle for existence. It should also be remembered that, so far as we can judge, the primitive Aryans and Semites must have comprised only a relatively small portion of the earth's inhabitants, and that it was their inherent intellectual and moral superiority that secured their gradual progress, and their survival of the vast civilizations that preceded them.

Hence we see that no real advantage would be lost if the theory of the original multiplicity of language could be proved. Still, as it might seem to justify a presumption that each present great division of human speech had a separate beginning, it may be proper to say a few words upon the subject of its pretensions.

Those who maintain this polygenetic theory of language are usually disbelievers in the doctrine of the common origin of mankind. It may be assumed that they are influenced to a certain extent, by their views upon the latter question, formed upon other grounds than the results of linguistic research. Some eminent linguistic scholars think that the final decision of the question as to the original unity or diversity of language rests with physical science.² Others maintain that ethnology and the science of language should not be mixed up together.³ However this may be, we have

¹ *Del'origine der langage* (4th ed.). Paris, 1864, pp. 204, 208.

² E.g. Benfey, *Geschichte d. Sprachwissenschaft in Deutschland*, p. 789 f.

³ E.g. Max Müller, *Science of Language*, i. p. 326 f.

now to consider simply the worth of the linguistic proof which the advocates of the theory of a primitive diversity of dialects have to offer.¹

The argument upon which reliance is chiefly placed may be stated as follows : — Although it is natural to the human mind to seek for and to expect unity of origin in all forms of existing things, the facts of linguistic history point us to an opposite conclusion with regard to the development of language. It is a fact that widely-spread idioms owe their predominance to the influence of civilization ; that if we turn to savage tribes (among whom are certainly to be sought traces of the earliest modes of Nature's workings), we find an endless diversity of dialects, each village, sometimes, having an idiom of its own ; that if we go back to the earliest records of written speech, we see the same conditions exemplified, as in ancient compared with modern Greece ; and that a number of subordinate considerations (which we cannot here adduce) strengthen and illustrate the position thus assumed. Since, therefore, as far back as we can go in the history of language we meet the same diversity as at present, or even a greater, it is only in accordance with the methods of science to conclude that it was always so.²

But surely it is only scientific to draw like inferences from like conditions. It is surely a perilous assumption to regard the conditions of the formative periods of language as analogous to those of its historical progress in the latest ages of the earth. Apart from the peculiar physical and psychological factors that *must* have entered into the formation of early speech for a long period, there is one possible

¹ The theory is maintained elaborately by Sayce, *Principles of Comp. Philology*, chap. iii., "Idolum of primeval centres of Language"; Renan, *Orig. du Lang.* chap. viii.; *Hist. générale des langues Sémitiques*, p. 93 ff.; Pott, *Ungleichheit menschlicher Rassen vom sprachwiss. Standpunkte*, 1856. Fr. Müller, *Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft*, p. 50 ff. A neat statement of the general position is given by Schleicher, *Compendium d. vergleich. Grammtik d. indogermanischen Sprachen*, 1866, p. 2 f.

² On the origin and growth of dialectical differences in contravention of the above general theory, see Whitney, *Language and the Study of Language*, p. 177 ff.

difference of vital importance which is assumed not to have existed. It is regarded as an unquestionable fact that language *could* only have arisen when mankind had become very numerous and scattered. Passages might be cited from some of these writers¹ which imply a contradiction of this position; though it is clearly the corner-stone of their whole theory. The assumption must be either that man sprang from a vast number of beginnings, so that mankind originally constituted different varieties; or that language is not an essential faculty of man, but developed very slowly indeed. When these doctrines are *proved*, we may be compelled to accept the theory, but not until then.

Let us see, however, what is the evidence really afforded by the conditions of savage life. If we take a general survey of any large country, peopled within historical times by savage tribes, we are at once impressed by the great multiplicity of dialects. But if we regard these tribes at successive periods of their history, we do not find that their dialects diminish through the course of time, but that with the growth of population they themselves increase. Hence, if we cast our glance backward beyond historical times, we can see that there must once have been in that country only, at most, a few primordial idioms. This surely follows, unless we assume that the population of such a country was originally greater than it is at present. Now let us look at the matter from another stand-point. We see that in large districts, or even in a whole continent (as in North America²), only one single type of language has prevailed among the aborigines. But the historical diversity of dialectical expression is most easily explainable from the consideration that under such conditions of life there is always an impulse to unbounded variety, and especially that such an impulse must have been strongest with the first uncertain beginnings of speech. The inference therefore seems unavoidable, that within such a *habitat*, at least, the

¹ As when Renan (Orig. du lang. p. 182), says that each group of men formed its language upon a foundation laid "par une tradition antérieure."

² Whitney, p. 348 ff.

Babel of present dialects is reducible to one original type. We are not now attempting to show that *all* the varieties of human speech may be brought under one form; we only claim that the same conditions which could bring about the development of the American (polysynthetic) dialects from one primitive idiom might also have educed all the Aryan and Semitic (inflectional) dialects from one primordial centre. This possibility, certainly, is in no danger of disproof from a theory which would determine the conditions of the childhood of language by the regulated growth and ample scope of its vigorous youth, and can discern in the mysterious and far-distant past nothing but a copy of the familiar phenomena of the present.¹

We have now to consider the difficulties suggested by the advocates of another theory, capable, as we think of a more scientific defence. We are brought into contact with it in this way. When it is admitted that the grammatical features of the two forms of speech cannot be assimilated, and we proceed to consider the possibility of a comparison on the ground of verbal analogies, we have to assume that before the development of an inflectional system there was a more rudimentary form of speech, in which only the mere roots were employed, or, more definitely, in which there was no exemplification of the categories of root, stem, and base. The nearest approach to such a linguistic type is the Chinese language, whose vocables are capable of being used for any

¹ Many of the subordinate arguments employed by these scholars involve the same fallacy. Thus Renan (*Orig. du langage*, p. 177 ff.), lays great stress upon the fact that the terms employed by early tribes to designate their neighbors were usually derived from some notion implying the unintelligibility of their language, they being usually styled "stammerers," "dummies," or some other such unsocial designations. He cites in confirmation such words as the German *Walh* (Welsh), the Sanskrit *Mlechha* (supposed to be cognate with the former), the Greek *Aglossoi* and *Barbaroi*, the Abyssinian *Tintim*. He then proceeds to argue that language must have been *originally* divided no less impassably. On this it is obvious to remark that we do not know whether these terms in all languages did not arise after the diverging dialects had become mutually unintelligible from familiar causes. Further, many of the cases are taken from within the Aryan family; and it is now certain that there was once a time when all those who used that idiom could make themselves mutually understood. To this opinion Renan himself elsewhere (*op. cit.* p. 49 ff.), professes his adherence.

of the parts of speech, and which attains a perfectly adequate capacity of expression, merely through the relative position of the words, and the use of a small number of particles. But there are some who would forbid us to assume such a hypothetical Aryo-Semitic type of language, and who maintain strenuously that it is both improbable and unexampled; that it has no ground in linguistic philosophy, and no analogy in the history of speech. It is maintained by them that no language has ever passed from an isolating stage (as above described) into an agglutinative or combinatory, and none from either of these into an inflectional. Probably the strongest assertion of this dogma has been made by E. Renan and A. H. Sayce, in their works already cited. The question is so vitally important to our discussion, that it demands a serious, though necessarily a brief, consideration. We shall therefore present the best evidence we can in favor of the theory of the development in each of the families from a more primitive type, considering the opinions and objections of opposing theorists as they may occur to us in connection with different points in our argument.

Our theory as to the divarication of the two families rests upon the doctrine that every inflectional language must have passed through a simpler combinatory stage (of longer or shorter duration), which itself arose from an original isolating type. In our grammatical comparison of the two systems we did not think it necessary to discriminate between the first two stages, both because in these languages the combinatory period appears to have been comparatively brief, and because the structural divergences seemed so radical as to exclude the probability of a common form of speech after the process of combination had once begun.¹ The evidence for this may be gathered from what has been said of the modes in which the formative elements of full-grown words are attached in each group, as well as of the differences in their internal structure. We have to go right back to the most simple and primitive type of language,

¹ Comp. Max Müller, *Rede Lecture on the Stratification of Language*, Chips from a German Workshop (Eng. ed.), iv. p. 102.

and we think the step may be justified demonstrably by proof that each system has been developed from a more rudimentary condition. As to the psychological causes which led to the adoption of the more complex forms of expression, we admit that they are to a large extent mysterious, but claim that they are not without historical exemplification. As to the occasions which led to the perpetuation of each system, after its origin, we hold that they are easily discoverable, and are being constantly repeated in the history of human speech.

We would remark, first, that we have an exhibition of tendencies in many languages which clearly reveal the possibility of such development. It is said, however, that there is no instance of a clear transition from one state to another. Certainly there is not; nor have we any right to expect that, after the forms of a language have been hardened through the course of ages, they could be changed easily and speedily. We do not claim, however, that any language has made this decisive transition under conditions similar to those with which we are now familiar. But it is manifest that in the early state of every form of speech, the possibilities of such a serious change were immeasurably greater. In those times men were seeking after suitable forms of expression, not having at hand any that had been gradually worked up into a familiar and adequate instrument of thought. One class of them would attempt, by various devices, to perfect, without radical change, the primitive rudimentary type, a task in which they succeeded admirably, as we learn from the adaptability of the Chinese to an unlimited range of ideas. Others would adopt the expedient of combining their roots; and this idea was carried out apparently in two main directions. Among the founders of the so-called agglutinative languages, predicative roots were modified (so far as we can determine) generally by other nominal and verbal forms; while the pioneers of inflectional speech made as decided a choice of demonstrative or pronominal roots to accomplish a similar end. In the former case, since both elements of the new compound stood out

with equal prominence, they would naturally retain their former importance, and oppose persistently the inevitable tendency to phonetic corruption; while in the latter the comparative unimportance of the determinative elements would subject them to the predominance of the radical portion, their individuality would, after a time, become lost in the consciousness of the speakers, and phonetic decay having one begun, the process would soon extend itself to the whole body of the word.

So much for the general process by which these complex systems were educed from the primitive condition of simplicity. The force which operated in each system to produce uniformity of structural type throughout its whole extent must have been chiefly the powerful influence of analogy. How potent this was in early times we may infer from its power even within historical periods, as we learn from the development of verbal forms in such idioms as the Romance languages, and most conspicuously, perhaps, in the dialects of France. And we maintain that the possibility of a transition from the isolating to a combinatory stage in early ages, ought not to be more difficult of conception than the change which has actually taken place in the development of the modern analytic out of the ancient synthetic languages. We must remember that men were groping after more complete and satisfactory modes of expression. They had not yet lost the spontaneity of primeval speech, and with an inherent, almost creative, facility they could achieve without reflection that which, to us, would seem to involve a radical intellectual change. When the superior fitness of the new principle of formation was once perceived, the whole family in which the change began would assimilate its speech with equal readiness to the forms of the more deserving system. The condition of things was very different after these aggressive principles became dominant. Each family, having moulded for itself a suitable instrument of thought, then *possessed* it. It did not seek any other, since it did not feel the need of it. Hence, we do not find in the acces-

sible forms of language, the very earliest of which is much later than the period we are describing as essential to the development of each family of speech,¹ any instance of a complete transition from one type to another; nor should we expect it. The faculty of language is drawn upon only at need. It does not even furnish new words, unless these are required for the expression of new ideas; much less should we look for the creation of new grammatical categories without necessity. Yet we do find languages, some of whose features seem inexplicable on any other theory than the one we are advocating. We have such idioms as the Finnish, which are almost as much inflectional as agglutinative.² We have that most puzzling of languages, the ancient Egyptian, about which scholars hesitate to say whether it should be called isolating, agglutinative, or inflectional.³ But of more importance than these facts are the peculiarities of some of the languages classed as isolating, such as those of Thibet and Siam, which partake largely of the combinatory character, while the Chinese itself, in some of its forms, exhibits a marked tendency in the same direction. If such mutability is manifested in languages checked in growth and fixed in general type through age, tradition, and usage, what must have been the capacity of radical change inherent in the earliest forms of speech, with all their simplicity and vagueness!

Our next argument is based upon the fact that an exami-

¹ It will be seen from what has been said that we consider all languages, from isolating to inflectional, to have undergone this, so to speak, subjective process of development. We must not make the mistake of assuming that all languages have started from just such a state as that now represented by the Chinese. This language itself must have passed through important changes in modes of expression before assuming its present condition. It is not a primeval language, but only a more primitive type of language than those familiar to us. A study of its system would show that it presents the result of a considerable psychological development.

² The approximation of agglutinative to inflectional idioms is of secondary though considerable importance. The psychological interval between these conditions is not nearly so great as that between the isolating and the combinatory stages.

³ Comp. Whitney, p. 342 f.; Renan, *Histoire générale*, p. 83 ff.

nation of fully-formed words in Aryan and Semitic speech attests the doctrine that they are ultimately due to the accretion of originally independent forms. The determinative elements added to the roots have been ascertained in a vast number of cases, and shown to possess a significance of their own. The natural assumption is, that the same is true of all the original compounds. In the Semitic family, where the process of analysis is peculiarly easy, this conclusion may almost be taken for granted. But the advocates of the opposite theory prefer to consider the Aryan languages, where, confessedly, there is much more that is obscure, in the ultimate constitution of some of the more primitive forms. Even with regard to these, however, the same presumption is probable. We are told,¹ indeed, that as far back as we can trace the Aryan languages they are inflectional, and, beyond that, they must be remitted to the province of physical science, which, as we are told with great confidence, could only prove that the brain of the earliest Aryan was capable of originating no other type of language. But surely this is claiming too much. Inductive reasoning has surely something to offer on the opposite side. While explanations of forms hitherto obscure are continually being made, we feel a strong presumption that if we could only penetrate the mist through which the opening dawn of Aryan speech is faintly discernible, all that remains mysterious would yet be brought to light. If these elements are always significant, it would be certain to the ordinary mind that they were once used independently—a conclusion which would establish our theory.

Such a conclusion, it may be said, is only an inference from a partial analysis, and not a demonstration based upon the working of a universal principle. Even if this were to be conceded, there is another way of considering the general question which leads to the same result. It may be shown that the opposite theory is psychologically inconceivable. The formative elements were originally significant, or they

¹ Sayce, *op. cit.* p. 158.

were not. If they were significant, they were previously independent vocables. If they were not significant, how account for their employment as determinative symbols in the earliest attempts of the race to achieve an intelligible method of oral communication? Now, it is maintained (as by Mr. Sayce) that although (as proved) later forms in these languages arose through the attachment of significant terms, or fragments of these, yet the *example* of inflection in the earliest periods was set in the creation of forms which conveyed in one single word both the fundamental and the modifying idea, the latter being expressed by "unmeaning terminations."¹ Thereafter, as the needs of the languages demanded, the progress would be easy to the attachment of significant terms. Which of these two theories has the greater inherent probability may appear from a candid presentation of the assumptions demanded by each. According to the one theory, at the very birth of these languages, when, as we are bound to assume, men were just accomplishing the task of giving forth in sound intelligible signs for the objects of nature and the simplest qualities and actions, we are to believe that they expressed the various *relations* of these by attaching to the phonetic expression of the root-idea (which must itself have been held on precarious probation) any one of a number of mere grammatical symbols, these having no existence save in such combination. It is natural to suppose that the earliest efforts of speech were, at best, not very easily understood, and that at least the relations between various objects would at first have to be indicated by various contrivances, such as gestures or other outward signs. But to attempt to express such relations by drawing, on occasion, upon a number of arbitrary (since not significant) sounds, would have tended very much to discourage incipient vocal communication.² The other theory assumes

¹ Op. cit. p. 151. The words are evidently equivalent to "suffixes of little meaning" (p. 145, note). The use of the latter phrase may show how difficult it is to conceive of the growth of inflection by the attachment of unmeaning sounds to the root.

² The case is quite different with the formation of multiliteral, on the basis of

that at an early period, though not the earliest, of a given inflectional language, terms which had already grown familiar to the speakers, gradually came to have their various relations expressed by the combination with them of other words which were already accepted vocables ; that at first those of early origin and of most frequent usage, such as demonstrative pronouns, were employed ; that thereafter, as the circle of ideas widened, more special expressions came into use ; and that in course of time, the sense of the independence of the two elements being lost, the word became one indivisible form in the popular consciousness. The choice lies between these two hypotheses, and only these ; and hesitation between them does not, antecedently, seem possible.

But a very plausible argument is presented, to the effect that the farther back we go in the history of inflectional languages, the greater complexity of structure is to be found, while their tendency always has been, and still is, to greater simplicity, and we are therefore to assume that the primary types of expression were synthetic. Here again there is a fallacy, due to the failure to pass from the observed facts of accessible forms of language to the necessary conditions of its early development. The assertion that inflectional languages are continually becoming more analytic in their structure is based upon the phenomena of idioms that have received a literary cultivation, analysis being the necessary accompaniment of reflection, and the result of a self-conscious endeavor to attain greater simplicity and clearness of expression. Yet it may readily be conceded that back to a very remote period in the history of any such language the assumed conditions did exist. But the argument is valid only against any who might claim that throughout the progress of such an idiom a tendency to greater com-

biliteral, roots, where the object is merely to express an idea cognate with that of the more simple form. This involves simply a new application of the naming faculty already acquired. In the case before us, however, two or more utterly dissimilar ideas are to be brought into mutual relation, with one of which the symbol used to express it had no previous association. This would involve a new category of thought.

plexity prevailed. This, however, is not our position at all ; for we think that a multiplicity of complex forms is just what would be expected after the combinatory impulse began to manifest itself, in accordance with the general diversity and confusion of early linguistic efforts. Afterwards, when the language became fixed and was much employed in the expression of manifold thought, the simplifying process was equally inevitable. For the rest, we have already seen that among languages of the most primitive type the tendency unmistakably is to combination and complexity.

These observations, which are all we have space for here, will, it is hoped, show that there is no good reason for accepting without question the *dicta* of Renan,¹ that "languages issued ready made from the mould of the human mind," and that linguistic "families appear as established types once for all."²

We trust we have shown conclusively that there is nothing in the established principles of the science of language to forbid an assumption of the possibility of an ante-grammatical connection between the two forms of speech. Being now confined to the testimony that may be furnished, under strict rules of examination, by a comparison of the respective vocabularies, we shall conduct our inquiries upon the general plan indicated early in the present Article. The evidence to be presented will depend for effect upon its

¹ Orig. du langage, p. 99, and *ibid.* p. 116.

² The following instance will serve to illustrate the value of the theory as an hypothesis. Mr. Sayce says (p. 148), with relation the Aryan family, "The clear flectional growth of the verb shows only that it took place during the historic period that it was of later origin than the noun." It clearly shows that the *flection* of the verb was later than that of the noun. How is this to be accounted for? Simply on the ground that the noun was found to require inflection first. It will never do to suppose that the bright and subtle Aryans were absolutely without such an essential mental instrument as the verb, until the noun had matured its inflectional system. Further, we believe it is held by most linguistic philosophers that the verb had the prior origin, a doctrine which has support in psychology as well as in the facts of language. See L. Geiger, *Ursprung u. Eutwicklung d. menschlichen Sprache u. Vernunft*, i. p. 205. 1868-72.

collective, or rather upon its cumulative force. Our labors, however, will still be critical as well as constructive ; and we shall seek to avoid those extreme positions with regard to the present question, which, on the one side, would tend to bring linguistic science into disrepute by reason of hasty assumptions, and, on the other, would serve to retard its progress by the attempt to show that all comparison in this department is merely a waste of energy.

ARTICLE VII.

DR. HODGE'S MISREPRESENTATIONS OF PRESIDENT FINNEY'S SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.

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THE death, on the 16th of August, 1875, at the advanced age of eighty-three, of the Rev. Charles G. Finney, removed one who had long been a conspicuous actor in some phases of what is called the New School controversy. Educated for the law, he became, soon after his conversion and till his old age, a remarkable instrument in the promotion of revivals throughout the Middle and Eastern States, and to some extent in England. He was regularly inducted into the Presbyterian ministry in 1824. The extreme Calvinism of the time and region in which he began his labors, compelled him as a practical preacher to dwell with great emphasis on the obverse side of the doctrines of divine sovereignty and election, and to give a prominence to human responsibility and the freedom of the will which has led to much misapprehension regarding his real position as a moderate Calvinist. President Finney differed from many so-called "revivalists" in this, that his preaching was pre-eminently doctrinal. His presentations of "the total, moral, voluntary depravity of unregenerate man, the necessity of a radical change of heart through the truth, by the agency of the Holy Ghost ; the divinity and humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ ; his vicarious atonement, equal to the wants of all mankind ; the gift, divinity, and agency of the Holy Ghost ; repentance, faith, justification by faith, sanctification by faith," were sharp-cut and powerful.¹ "The doctrine of the justice of endless punishment, . . . and not only its justice, but the certainty that sinners will be endlessly punished if they die in their sins, was strongly held forth. On all these points the gospel was

¹ *Memoirs*, p. 134.

so presented as to give forth no uncertain sound. . . . The nature of the sinner's dependence upon divine influence was explained and enforced and made prominent. Sinners were taught that, without the divine teaching and influence, it is certain, from their depraved state, that they never would be reconciled to God."¹

His sermons were far more than the vapid exhortation with which some who promote revivals have made us too familiar. Moreover, he was in the habit of preaching long sermons. His pastor and early instructor charged him "to be sure not to speak more than half an hour at a time." But in his first ministry his "sermons generally averaged nearly or quite two hours."² In later years they were of more moderate length; though it is difficult to see how the fifty-one heads, given in the specimen taken at random from his skeletons, could be compressed into a sermon of less than an hour.³

In 1835, on his removal to Oberlin, Ohio, to fill the chair of theology in a newly-formed institution, he began a series of publications which should define his theological views.⁴ In 1852 he was elected president of

¹ *Memoirs*, p. 364.

² *Ibid.* p. 80.

³ See p. 97.

⁴ We append a list of his works: (1) *Lectures on Revivals of Religion*. pp. 438. 12mo. New York: Leavitt, Lord, and Co. 1835. There was an immediate sale of six editions of 2000 copies each of this work. A thirteenth edition was published in 1840. It was republished by two rival houses in England, one of which issued 80,000 copies. A revised edition was published in 1868, by E. J. Goodrich, Oberlin, Ohio. This work was translated into the Welsh and French languages. (2) *Lectures to Professing Christians*, first American edition probably in 1835. A third London edition, 12mo, appeared in 1839. (3) *Sermons on Important Subjects*. 8vo. pp. 277. New York: J. S. Taylor (3d ed.). 1836. (4) *Skeletons of a Course of Theological Lectures*. 8vo. pp. 248. Oberlin: James Steele. 1840. (5) *Lectures on Systematic Theology, embracing Lectures on Moral Government, together with Atonement, Moral and Physical Depravity, Regeneration, Philosophical Theories, and Evidences of Regeneration*. Vol. i. 8vo. pp. 587. Oberlin, Boston, and New York, 1846. The second volume was issued in 1847, and discussed the doctrines of Ability, Repentance, Faith, Justification, Sanctification, Election, Reprobation, Divine Sovereignty, Purposes of God, and Perseverance of the Saints. A new edition, "Revised, enlarged, and partly re-written by the author," with an Introduction by Rev. Geo. Redford, D.D., LL.D., of Worcester, England, together with an Appendix containing "An Examination by Prof. C. G. Finney, of the Review [by Dr. Hodge] of Finney's Systematic Theology, published in the *Biblical Repository*, Princeton, N. J., June, 1847;" also, "A Reply to the 'Warning Against Error,' written by the Rev. Dr. Duffield," was issued in one vol. 8vo., pp. 996. Tegg and Co., London. 1851. (6) *The Character, Claims, and practical working of Free Masonry*. 16mo. pp. 272. Cincinnati, 1869. (7) *Memoirs of Rev. Charles G. Finney*, written by himself. pp. 477. New York: A. S. Barnes and Co. 1876. President Finney was a frequent contributor to the *Oberlin Evangelist*, 1839-1861, and the *Oberlin Quarterly Review*, 1845-1849, and in later years to the "Advance" and "Independent" newspapers.

the college. Of Mr. Finney's labor as a teacher of theology, President Fairchild, the editor of his Memoirs, remarks: "His work as a theologian, a leader of thought, in the development and expression of a true Christian philosophy, and as an instructor, in quickening and forming the thought of others, has been less conspicuous [than his work as a preacher of righteousness], and in his own view, doubtless, entirely subordinate; but in the view of many, scarcely less fruitful of good to the church and the world."¹ It is not our present purpose to set forth in detail, nor to defend, either the methods by which Mr. Finney promoted revivals, or the doctrinal statements which he elaborated. But the severity with which Dr. Hodge has recently commented on that system makes it appropriate to shield it from his misrepresentations.

Dr. Hodge² begins his notice of President Finney's system by saying that it is "valuable as a warning"; he concludes his criticism of President Finney's statement of regeneration with the remark that "such a system is a *ὑπόδειγμα τῆς ἀπειθείας* [example of unbelief or disobedience]."³ Dr. Hodge's representations of President Finney are misleading in the following respects:

I. *Early Editions of Finney's Publications only are quoted.* — On the subject of Regeneration Dr. Hodge's quotations are from the edition of Finney's Systematic Theology published in 1846. On Sanctification the quotations are from the Oberlin Evangelist and the Oberlin Quarterly Review of about the same date. No reference whatever is made to the London edition of the Systematic Theology of 1851, which, in addition to having been "revised, enlarged, and partly re-written," contained also elaborate answers to the criticisms which Dr. Hodge, among others, had made upon the earlier edition.⁴

In publishing the body of divinity so long taught at Princeton, it was not necessary to give it the form of a compend and criticism of all theological literature, and to surround its ample pages with a bristling abattis of foot-notes; and even on the plan adopted it might not have been essential to give more than a passing notice of President Finney. But since the author chooses to make his erudition prominent, and to add force to his views by numerous references to a wide range of literature, the critic must judge him according to the ambitiousness of the aim. Erudition is worse than useless if it essentially fails in accuracy. A fig-tree without leaves raises no false hopes. It is bad enough if the abundant foliage invites you to a fruitless search. It is superlatively bad if the fruit that is found be positively poisonous. Inasmuch as President Finney's writings are honored by Dr. Hodge with twenty-eight references, it is a misfortune that

¹ Memoirs, p. 477.

² See Systematic Theology, by Charles Hodge, D.D., Vol. iii. pp. 8-11, 255-257. New York, 1873.

³ See Hebrews, iv. 11.

⁴ See Finney, Systematic Theology (London, 1851), Appendix, pp. 916-961.

the author was not sufficiently familiar with his subject to be able to direct his readers to the revised edition of his opponent's work. And it is still more to be lamented that even

II. *The Old Edition is grossly misrepresented.* — § 1. President Finney is represented as substituting the universe for God as the object of our allegiance. Dr. Hodge's statement reads: "Professor Finney adopts the common eudaemonistic theory which makes the happiness of being, i.e. of the universe, the chief good."¹ "The Oberlin theory . . . is founded on the following principles: first, holiness consists in disinterested benevolence, i.e. perfect willingness that God should do whatever the highest good of the universe demands."² "The Pelagian system does not [like the Oberlin] assume that disinterested benevolence, or the purpose to promote the highest good of the universe, is the sum of all virtue; i.e. it does not put the universe in the place of God, as that to which our allegiance is due."³ The nature of these misrepresentations depends on the definition of the word "universe." If Dr. Hodge means by "universe" the creation as distinct from the Creator, his charge attributes to President Finney what he explicitly, emphatically, repeatedly, and in many ways disavows. If it is designed to include the Creator himself in the universe, it might not be a serious charge; but in that case Dr. Hodge has shown a lamentable lack of familiarity with the dictionary, and unaccountable forgetfulness of even his own ordinary usage of the word. Lexicographers uniformly confine the word universe to created existency. Webster defines it, "All created things viewed as constituting one system or whole"; Worcester, "The sum of created existence"; Milton is quoted,

"How may I

Adore thee, Author of this universe?"

Prior is quoted,

"Father of heaven

Whose nod called out this universe to birth!"

So President Edwards, in his dissertation concerning God's chief end in creation, has the following expressions: "Good in view . . . that inclined him [God] to bring the universe into existence in such a manner as he created it."⁴ "Designed in the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe we behold . . ."⁵ "Such an arbiter as I have supposed would determine that the whole universe, in all its actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire series of events, should proceed with a view to *God* as the supreme and last end, that every wheel in all its rotations should move with a constant, invariable regard to him as the ultimate end of all."⁶ His essay on the Nature of Virtue has this sentence: "But God has infinitely the

¹ Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. iii. p. 11. ² *Ibid.* p. 256. ³ *Ibid.* p. 257.

⁴ *Works*, 10 vols. (New York, 1830), Vol. iii. p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 16; see also p. 24.

greatest share of existence; so that all other being, even the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the Divine Being.”¹

We have noted in the first volume of Dr. Hodge's Systematic Theology, in which the subjects are such that the word universe occurs most frequently, one hundred instances of his own use of it. Of this number eighty-two unequivocally contrast the universe with God. Of the remaining eighteen instances the larger part occur in the discussion of “Hylozoism” and “Pantheism,” in which the nature of the subject renders it difficult to give the word universe any well defined meaning. But these are heresies that neither Dr. Hodge nor any one else has ever thought of charging upon President Finney, whose theism is unquestioned and most sharply defined. The very few remaining cases in which the word is employed by Dr. Hodge are indeterminate. Of his ordinary uses of the word the following are instances:

“We are shut up to the conclusion that the universe sprang out of nothing.”² “The cause of the universe must be a personal God.”³ “We then are placed in the midst of a vast universe of which we constitute a part. . . . How did this universe originate? How is it sustained? To what does it tend?”⁴ “God is not limited to the universe, which of necessity is finite.”⁵ “He [God] was free to create or not to create, to continue the universe in existence, or to cause it to cease to be.”⁶ “To make the good of the creature the highest end . . . is to put the means for the end, to subordinate God to the universe, the Infinite to the finite. This putting the creature in the place of the Creator disturbs our moral and religious sentiments and convictions, as well as our intellectual apprehensions of God, and of his relation to the universe. . . . A universe constructed for the purpose of making God known is a far better universe than one designed for the production of happiness.”⁷ “God adopted the plan of the universe.”⁸ “The scriptural doctrine therefore is, (1) That the universe is not eternal; it began to be. (2) It was not formed out of any pre-existence or substance, but was created *ex nihilo*. (3) That creation was not necessary. It was free to God to create or not to create, to create the universe as it is, or any other order and system of things, according to the good pleasure of his will.”⁹ “We view the Creator as the cause of the universe.”¹⁰ “Pantheism merges the universe in God.”¹¹ “As the world, meaning thereby the universe of created beings, includes the world of matter and the world of mind, the doctrine of providence concerns, first, the relation of God to the external or material universe; and, secondly, his relation to the world of mind, or to his rational creatures.”¹²

¹ Works, 10 vols. (New York, 1830), Vol. iii. p. 103.

² Hodge's Systematic Theology, Vol. i. p. 211. ³ p. 233.

⁵ p. 398.

⁶ p. 403.

⁷ p. 436.

⁸ p. 540.

⁴ p. 239.

⁹ p. 553.

¹⁰ p. 555, quoted from Sir William Hamilton.

¹¹ p. 580.

¹² p. 605.

It seems clear that Dr. Hodge knows the meaning of "universe." His general use of the word is correct. There can be no doubt what he means when he charges President Finney with putting "the universe in the place of God as that to which our allegiance is due." He represents him as putting the *creature* in place of the Creator. To this charge, when made in the Princeton Repertory by Dr. Hodge, President Finney, in the appendix to the revised edition of his *Theology*, replied thus: "This writer repeatedly insinuates that I confound God with the universe, and make good-will to the universe, instead of love to God, the great thing in religion. This representation is as false as possible, as every one who reads the book reviewed will see. I hold, indeed, that love to God considered as a virtue consists in good-will; that love to God as an emotion always exists where good-will exists; but that virtuous love is a voluntary exercise; that God's well-being and interests are of infinitely greater value than those of all the universe besides; and, of course, that love to him should always be supreme."¹

To give Dr. Hodge as much advantage as possible, we will now quote from the identical edition of President Finney's *Theology* upon which the charge under consideration is based.² On page forty-three, in opening the discussion of what President Finney says "is the key to the whole subject,"³ these words were placed in italics: "*The highest well-being of God and of the universe of sentient existences is the end on which ultimate preference, choice, intention, ought to terminate. In other words, the well-being of God and of the universe is the absolute and ultimate good, and therefore it should be chosen by every moral agent.*" President Finney excused the amount of repetition in his book on the plea that his experience as a teacher had ripened the conviction that there was no other way of being understood upon the subject. Notwithstanding the repetition, he feared it was "*condensed too much to be understood by some.*"⁴ His distinguished critic must be included in that "some;" for, a sixfold reiteration, upon this strategic page, of the postulate that choice ought to terminate on the well-being of *God* and the universe," failed to catch the eye of Dr. Hodge; and President Finney is represented still as putting "the universe in the place of God as that to which our allegiance is due."

But perhaps that section is the only place in the book in which God is associated with the universe as the object of our love? On the contrary, the two words are coupled together throughout the lectures whenever there is any danger of misapprehension. On page fifty-three President Finney dwells upon the thought that the *ultimate good of God* is the *satisfaction*, the perfect and infinite *rest*, of the divine mind. Then follows this sen-

¹ *Systematic Theology* (London), p. 961.

² *Lectures on Systematic Theology*, by Charles G. Finney (ed. Oberlin, Boston, and New York, 1846).

³ *Lectures on Systematic Theology* (1846), Preface, p. v.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. iv.

tence, "The highest well-being of God and of the universe, then, or the highest good of universal being, must consist in a *state of entire satisfaction*." On page fifty-six, "*God and our neighbor*," "*God and the universe of creatures*," are called identical expressions, and are used interchangeably with "God and the universe." In the following one hundred and sixty-four pages¹ one or other of these, or of plainly synonymous, couplets, in the connection heretofore remarked upon, with *God* expressed, occurs upwards of two hundred times. At this point we ceased the labor of counting. Furthermore, emphasis is repeatedly laid on the principle that "benevolence being impartial love, of course accounts God's interests and well-being as of infinitely greater value than the aggregate of all other interests."²

It should be observed, also, that President Finney maintains as distinctly and emphatically as language will admit, that the will of God is an infallible and imperative rule of action. "The saint has made the will of God his law, and asks for no other reason to influence his decisions and actions than that such is the will of God. He has received the will of God as the unfailing index, pointing always to the path of duty. His intelligence affirms that God's will is, and ought to be, law, or perfect evidence of what law is."³ Again, "God's will is always authoritative, and imposes obligation, not in the sense of its being a foundation of obligation, but in the sense that it is an infallible declaration of the law of nature, or of the end at which, in the nature of things, moral agents ought to aim, and of the conditions or means of this end."⁴ "Observe, I expressly maintain that the command of God always imposes obligation without the knowledge of any other reason; but it does this upon the ground of an affirmation of reason that he has a good reason for the command, whether we can understand it or not."⁵

The character of Dr. Hodge's misrepresentation can be seen at a glance, by making the substitution complete in a sentence already quoted.⁶ It would then read thus: "The Pelagian system does not [like the Oberlin] . . . put 'God and the universe,' 'God and thy neighbor,' 'God and man,' in place of God, as that to which our allegiance is due." And here again is a misrepresentation in Dr. Hodge's substitution of the word allegiance for the love of good-will, which President Finney is always careful to use in this connection. We have seen that President Finney expressly maintains that supreme and unquestioning allegiance is always due to God. Does Dr. Hodge, or do the Pelagians, rule out the universe of sentient creatures from among the objects of our love or good will? Is it error to say that all duties are comprehended under these two: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself? Is it an error to use, as synonymous with this couplet, "Supreme love to God and

¹ Lectures on Systematic Theology (1846), pp. 56-220.

² Ibid. p. 218. See also pp. 98, 104, 162, 204.

⁴ Ed. (1851), p. 937.

⁵ Ibid. p. 948.

³ Ibid. p. 547.

⁶ Above, p. 384

equal love to man"? Or is it occasion of alarm that a theologian, who is at such pains as President Finney is to explain himself, sometimes, to save words, and to give incisiveness to the thought, substitutes for these couplets the single term, "being in general," or "universal being"? But even this President Finney has rarely done.

§ 2. President Finney is represented as holding that regeneration is "a simple change of purpose."¹ The misrepresentation here is in the diminutive use of the word "simple." The idea is insinuated that "change of purpose," according to President Finney, is an isolated fact connected with no vast system of prevenient grace, and involving no profound change of the moral affections, as though we should call it a slight matter to charge a traitor with simply firing on the flag of his country. To guard against the impression that regeneration was viewed as a comparatively unimportant change, President Finney had in the volume which Dr. Hodge reviews, devoted ninety-seven pages to the subject. In the volume to which Dr. Hodge does not refer, but to which he ought to refer if he says anything at all about President Finney, the doctrines of election, divine sovereignty, and the purposes of God had been treated at length from a Calvinistic point of view. Moreover, in the very pages from which Dr. Hodge quotes, the point had been guarded from misapprehension by a prolonged discussion of the comprehensive significance of the word love, or benevolence. "Benevolence is good-willing, or the choice of the highest good of God and the universe as an end. . . . To say that love is the fulfilling of the whole law, that benevolence is the whole of true religion, that the whole duty of man to God and his neighbor is expressed in one word, *love*; these statements, though true, are so comprehensive as to need with all minds much amplification and explanation."²

Thereupon President Finney, in emphatic and incisive language, explicates his conception of the state of mind into which a person is brought in regeneration, devoting seventy-six pages to that one object.

President Finney does, indeed, both on philosophical and scriptural grounds, and in common with a great number of theologians, use regeneration and conversion as interchangeable terms, relating to a phenomenon in which divine and human agency coalesce, — the regeneration being nothing effectual without the conversion, and the conversion never occurring without the prevenient influence of the Holy Spirit. No man emphasizes the dependence upon the Holy Spirit in the work of conversion more than President Finney; albeit he may not philosophize on the nature of the work so much, or after the same manner, as Dr. Hodge would like. And no writer insists more strenuously than President Finney that what he calls the "change of purpose in regeneration," carries with it corresponding radical changes in all the affections of the soul. Indeed, he is

¹ Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. iii. p. 8.

² Finney, *Systematic Theology* (1846), p. 211.

charged by many critics, with expecting too great changes to follow conversion and the indwelling of the Spirit. It is sufficient to refer the reader to the thirty-one points, enunciated and expressed in President Finney's chapters on regeneration, showing in what the regenerate differ from the unregenerate, and by what they may test the genuineness of their supposed conversion. We forbear to give further quotations. It is in place, however, to repeat that the ninety-seven pages which President Finney has given to the subject of regeneration, the two hundred to sanctification, and the ninety-seven devoted to "election" and "perseverance of the saints," are pervaded with the idea of our dependence for all our hopes upon the work of the Holy Spirit. Of this disposition on the part of President Finney to honor the work of the Holy Spirit Dr. Hodge is not unaware, since, he says,¹ that "while the Oberlin divines maintain the plenary ability of man, they give more importance to the work of the Holy Spirit [than the Pelagians do] It is generally admitted [by them] that although men have the ability to do their whole duty, yet that they will not exert it aright unless influenced by the grace of God."

§ 3. To mention but one point further, Dr. Hodge represents President Finney as holding that "to feed the poor from a feeling of benevolence, and to murder a parent from a feeling of malice, involve the same degree of guilt!"² and adds, "such a sacrifice to logic was never made by any man before. But still more wonderful if possible, is the declaration that a man may 'feel deeply malicious and revengeful feelings toward God. But sin does not consist in these feelings, nor necessarily imply them.'"

In regard to these statements we remark in order, (1) That President Finney's, as fully as any other, system affords opportunity to classify sins according to degree.³ He holds, what is common to all systems of theology, that the transient emotions of men are not decisive indications and complete exponents of character. He has no such indicative sentence as that, "to feed the poor from a feeling of benevolence, and to murder a parent from a feeling of malice, involve the same degree of guilt;" and Dr. Hodge does not give it as a quotation, but as a fair representation of numerous quotations which precede. Dr. Hodge has in this instance wrought confusion, by substituting an *indicative* for a *subjunctive* mood. President Finney, in the illustrations which he uses upon this subject, is proceeding in his argument upon an expressed hypothesis with regard to the degree of light which these persons compared may be resisting. He would affirm that we cannot certainly say that the character of two persons, as viewed by God, may not be equally bad, while their acts have a very different external appearance, e.g. a man who is plotting treason against the State may pacify his mind by many acts of benevolence, so-called. Acts may be done under the pressure of a feeling of humanity, and still the man be

¹ Hodge, Vol. iii. p. 256.

² Vol. iii. p. 11.

³ See Systematic Theology (1846), pp. 345-363.

as wicked as an uninstructed heathen who kills his parent. Thomassen, the dynamite fiend, was "generous" enough to give his clock-maker sixteen dollars more than he had agreed to give, and in society was distinguished by apparently amiable qualities. But all these count for nothing in palliation of his comprehensive plans of iniquity. Superficial emotions are not to be judged by themselves, but by their relation to a primary and predominant, or what President Finney calls ultimate, choice. The feelings are but a partial clue to that choice. The polite manners of our civilization disguise, but do not remove, the enmity of the heart to God. In the sentence under consideration, which is made to represent the views of President Finney upon this point, Dr. Hodge makes further confusion of thought, by using the phrases "feeling of *benevolence*," and "feeling of *malice*," in connections which President Finney is careful to avoid, or which he uses at all only under emphatic protest and with extended explanation.¹ Benevolence is, according to President Finney, the choice of the good of being, and so, is virtue *per se*. Sin is some form of selfishness. Malevolence is, according to him "strictly speaking, impossible."² A pirate even is not such, "from malice or a disposition to do evil for its own sake, but only to gratify himself."³ When his sentences are put together with some attention to their connection, and to their moods and tenses, it will appear that President Finney in this matter only states consistently and clearly what is the universally accepted doctrine as to the fact of the existence of degrees of guilt. In his system the degree of guilt is measured by the amount of present light resisted. His may not be the most felicitous way of expressing the idea; but the method is by no means absurd.

(2) What is there objectionable, when you scan it, about the last clause of the quotation above commented on? All that is asserted is, that a man may be a sinner, and still not be cognizant of malicious and revengeful feelings toward God. And who can deny that statement? In a world where there are so many things to divert our attention from the main issue of our life, self-deception is a most common occurrence. President Finney distinctly and emphatically asserts that the feelings are indirectly under the control of the will, and so in time will reveal what has been the state of the will. He maintains in unequivocal language, that, in a sane mind, malicious and revengeful feelings toward God, are infallible indications of sin. His statement is that there may be sin, and very great sin, without these feelings. The section from which Dr. Hodge quotes reads thus: "Disobedience to moral law does not necessarily imply feelings of enmity to God or to man. The will may be set upon self-indulgence; and yet as the sinner does not apprehend God's indignation against him, and his opposition to him on that account, he may have no hard feelings or feelings of hatred to God. Should God reveal to him his

¹ Systematic Theology (ed. 1846); see pp. 284-294.

² Ibid. p. 354.

³ Ibid. p. 355.

abhorrence of him on account of his sins, his determination to punish him for them, the holy sovereignty with which he will dispose of him; in this case the sinner might, and probably would, feel deeply malicious and revengeful feelings towards God. But sin does not consist in these feelings nor necessarily imply them."¹

Dr. Hodge styles "the system of Professor Finney," a remarkable product of relentless logic,"² and so it is. President Finney, though remarkable as an extemporaneous preacher, was capable of writing upon theology like a logician and a philosopher, and to this capacity of mind his long-continued success as a preacher is in no small degree due. But one who is familiar with President Finney's writings and with the pages in Dr. Hodge's large work, which review them, cannot resist the feeling that Dr. Hodge, even when he writes a Systematic Theology, falls into all the looseness of statement that is incident to the poorer styles of extempore preaching. President Finney, following in the wake of leading New England theologians, notably Edwards and Hopkins, unified the two commands on which Christ said all the law and the prophets hung, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself,"³ under the comprehensive term love; which is declared in Scripture to be the fulfilling of the law. The objects to be loved were sentient beings, of whom God is infinitely the greatest, and hence is worthy of supreme regard. President Finney likewise makes those distinctions between choice and feeling, which are essential to avoid confusion of thought in what is not a rhetorical, but a systematic and logical, statement of theological truth. He distinguished logically between the action of will that chooses an object, and the feeling of complacency or of displacency that supervenes necessarily upon the choice of a worthy or of an unworthy object.

At this point, we can hardly resist the temptation to speculate concerning the cause of such misrepresentations as we have here feebly attempted to review. The theory that they were consciously intended as caricatures we have studiously rejected. Regarding the particular case in hand, our conclusion, confirmed also by analogous experience in critically examining several other portions of these ponderous volumes of Dr. Hodge, is this, that their author is by nature an advocate, and that he is singularly lacking in the judicial qualities of mind, which are necessary for understanding the position of an opponent. Indeed, according to our experience, he can hardly state the argument of an antagonist without misstating it. The decade beginning with 1837, the year of the disruption of the Presbyterian church, was a period of heated controversy. There is no evidence that Dr. Hodge read anything from President Finney's pen later

¹ Finney, Systematic Theology (1846), p. 296.

² Hodge, Vol. iii. p. 8.

³ Luke x. 27.

than April, 1847, the date of his review of the first edition of Finney's *Lectures on Theology*. In preparing for such a review at such a time he could not well avoid reading "between the lines." Many sentences and parts of sentences caught his eye which have a very ugly look when standing alone, or when strung on the thread of the reviewer's prepossessions. Thus originated, as a controversial Article in the *Princeton Repertory*, Dr. Hodge's first filtrate of President Finney's system. The excitement of the times would excuse much misapprehension. It was natural in such a production that the language of the feelings should predominate. What we cannot so easily excuse is, that when, twenty years later, he was preparing a *Systematic Theology*, the author should content himself with simply distilling the filtrate, and should embody as part of a permanent work the quintessence of an advocate's plea, that had served its purpose twenty years before. We have found indications of a similar process in so many other portions of Dr. Hodge's three volumes, that we wonder if every opposing view is treated in like manner. If the instances of this manner of treatment are half as numerous as our own experience leads us to fear, we are further led to inquire whether it was worth while for Dr. Hodge to attempt to state, for the sake of confuting, the views of so many authors. Why did he not confine himself to the discussion of principles in the abstract? Would not the cause of truth have been better promoted had he written less, and taken more pains to understand what he opposed, or had he delegated the work of making summaries to a more judicial mind? It might seem that the evil results of the wholesale misrepresentations of our author would be partially neutralized by his careful references to the chapter and page from which he quotes. These do indeed make it easy for those who have access to libraries to refute Dr. Hodge, and are a sure pledge of his honesty of purpose. But we must not forget that these volumes of Dr. Hodge will be most prized by the more self-denying class of ministers and missionaries, home and foreign, who must depend for their information upon the single compend of theology which they can afford to buy. To all such, the abundant foot-notes are a snare and a delusion, unless the quotations have been made with scrupulous candor and accuracy.

In conclusion, we cannot wholly overcome the feeling that it is unfortunate for Dr. Hodge that he defends a system of theology which defines sin as "a condition or state of the mind," as well as an "activity";¹ that he says "the law . . . condemns evil dispositions or habits as well as voluntary sins." We can absolve him from intentional misrepresentation; but just how the author, who holds "that there is more in them [mankind] of the nature of sin than mere acts and exercises," would dispose of himself, we are not called upon to say.

¹ Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. ii. p. 187.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

GOD AND THE BIBLE: A Review of the Objections to "Literature and Dogma." By Matthew Arnold, D.C.L., formerly Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford, and Fellow of Oriel College. 16mo. pp. 329. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1876.

Forty years ago the churches were alarmed by the tracts and books coming from the Oxford divines, like Pusey, Newman, Keble. We could not dream, at that time, that a son of Dr. Arnold of Rugby, and a scholar who has been intimately connected with Oxford, would alarm the churches by writings exactly opposite to those of the Puseyite school. Mr. Arnold is a fine writer. We doubt not that he is a conscientious man. We think that he has adopted wrong means for what he deems a good end. He is not a profound theologian, and would have accomplished more for his race if he had confined his publications to poetry and literary essays.

NORSE MYTHOLOGY; or the Religion of our Forefathers; containing all the Myths of the Eddas, Systematized and Interpreted. With an Introduction, Vocabulary, and Index. By R. B. Anderson, A.M., Professor of the Scandinavian Languages in the University of Wisconsin; Author of "America not discovered by Columbus," "Den Norske Maalsag," etc. Second Edition. 12mo. pp. 473. Chicago: S. C. Griggs and Co. London: Trübner and Co. 1876.

We have never seen so complete a view of the religion of the Norsemen. The myths which Professor Anderson has translated for us are characterized by a wild poetry and by suggestions of strong thought. We see images of singular beauty in the landscape of ice and snow. Sparks of fire are often struck out from these verses of flint and steel.

FORTY YEARS IN THE TURKISH EMPIRE: or Memoirs of Rev. William Goodell, D.D., late Missionary of the A.B.C.F.M. at Constantinople. By his Son-in-Law, E. D. G. Prime, D.D. 12mo. pp. 489. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1876.

The genial spirit, the humor and wit, the shrewd sense, the sincere and cheerful piety of Dr. Goodell made him one of the most interesting companions, and now makes his Memoir one of the most agreeable books. A large fund of missionary intelligence may be gained from the narrative of his life. It is well known that he was an intimate friend of Rev. Daniel Temple, and the published Memoirs of these two companions in study and in missionary life may well be read in connection with each other. Per-

haps no two friends were more unlike than Goodell and Temple in temperament and manners. The biography of the one is in striking contrast with that of the other. The two associates, however, had the same spirit, and their marked differences of constitution fitted them to be good and strong yoke-fellows in the field which is the world.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS GUTHRIE, D.D., and Memoir by his Sons, Rev. David K. Guthrie and Charles J. Guthrie, M.A. 2 Vols. 12mo. Vol. II. pp. 494. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1875.

For those who have enjoyed a personal acquaintance with Dr. Guthrie, and also those who feel an interest in the hills, glens, and lakes of Scotland, the second volume of these Memoirs has a peculiar charm. The writings, the personal conversation, the gestures and tones of the man are remembered with great vividness, and are associated with all that is said respecting him in his Biography. For those, also, who have neither seen Dr. Guthrie nor the romantic land which he honored, and which honored him as a favorite son, these Memoirs have an extraordinary interest. They are especially valuable to pastors, who need to know the inner life of the man whose sermons have electrified so many hearers in Great Britain, and so many readers in America.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MRS FLETCHER; with Letters and other Family Memorials. Edited by the Survivor of her Family. 12mo. pp. 376. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1876.

This volume is one of remarkable interest. It introduces us into the highest and best circles of English society. It delights us with familiar views of Sir Walter Scott, Lord Brougham, Wordsworth, Southey, Campbell, and a score of other eminent men who had an unfeigned admiration for Mrs. Fletcher. She was a woman of rare excellence, and her writings deserve a permanent place in our literature.

EZRA STILES GANNETT, Unitarian Minister in Boston, 1824-1871. A Memoir by his Son, William C. Gannett. 12mo. pp. 572. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875.

A beautifully printed volume, beautifully written. Dr. Gannett was a truly remarkable man. His mother was the daughter of the celebrated Dr. Ezra Stiles, President of Yale College. "In belief she was the true daughter of three generations of Calvinistic ministers" (p. 12). Dr. Gannett was educated with religious strictness. Professor Hedge writes of his schoolfellow: "I well remember how his schoolmates looked upon him then [in Gannett's fifteenth year] as quite an exceptional youth. 'Stiles Gannett,' it was whispered among us, 'is very religious'; and anecdotes were current of his exceptional piety" (p. 21). For the conscientious discharge of whatever he regarded as his duty Dr. Gannett has long been held in high admiration. He was a faithful and persevering worker; a

good representative of the sedate yet spirited, the dignified yet sociable, the studious yet practical, class of ministers who have adorned the pulpits of New England. The style of the Memoir is original, suggestive, and highly pleasing.

THE FLETCHER PRIZE ESSAY: *The Christian in the World.* By Rev. D. W. Faunce. 12mo. pp. 236. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875.

Few topics need to be insisted on at the present day with more earnestness than does the theme of this book. We have read the volume, on the whole, with a good deal of satisfaction. The man who wishes to live in the world so as to do it the most good and to receive from it the least damage, may be much benefited by its perusal. In a literary point of view it is not without faults. It would seem, at times, as if the writer had lost sight of the particular subject of which he wished to treat; he enlarges upon certain topics at so much greater length than their relative importance requires; as, for example, on the character of Christ, the uses of biography, the care of the body.

THE RENT VEIL. By Horatius Bonar, D.D. 12mo. pp. 184. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1875.

This little book assumes, as its fundamental principle, that men, so long as they live, will continue to sin, and therefore will never cease to have need to enter within the veil in order to procure forgiveness. In a truly edifying manner, it sets forth Christ as the true veil, and indicates the conditions on which the believer may enter within the veil, and find a full supply for every spiritual necessity.

IN THE VINEYARD: *A Plea for Christian Work.* By Rev. E. F. Burr, D.D. 12mo. pp. 454. New York: T. G. Crowell. 1876.

This volume is designed to stimulate the activity of Christians in the work of converting the world to Christ. It is written in a practical style, well fitted for its practical design, and noticeably different from the style of "*Ecce Coelum*," "*Pater Mundi*," and other works of the same author. We have been particularly pleased with Part II. Sections XVI. "*Help your Country*"; XVII. "*By helping Foreign Countries*." The style of thought in these sections is eminently philosophical.

TOWARD THE STRAIT GATE; or *Parish Christianity for the Unconverted.* By Rev. E. F. Burr, D.D. 12mo. pp. 535. Boston: Lockwood, Brooks, and Co. 1875.

Dr. Burr is well known as the author of "*Ecce Coelum*," "*Pater Mundi*," and "*Ad Fidem*." In this volume, as in his other works, he writes in an earnest, impassioned style, employs abundant and bold imagery, and always has a good practical aim. He divides the present volume into twenty-three sections, the first of which is entitled "*Attend*"; and

after various expostulations with unconverted men, in view of their guilt, of the atonement, the rewards and penalties of eternity, he closes his work with the two sections, entitled, "The Successful Appeal," "Congratulations and Thanksgiving." We regard the fifteenth section, on "Jesus the Substitute," as the best in the volume; far preferable to the sixteenth, on "The Majesties of the Cross."

THE CHURCH AND HER CHILDREN. By William Barrows, D.D. 12mo. pp. 340. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society. 1875.

The author of this book remarks in the Introductory Note, that its main topic and the various related points have hitherto been discussed only in isolated Essays; and that, consequently, the subject of infant baptism has always been presented in a disadvantageous form. Dr. Barrows has therefore set himself to the task of remedying this evil, and of presenting in one volume, and with as much thoroughness as possible, the various arguments in support of infant baptism. The discussion is marked by three peculiarities. It distinguishes the church of God from the churches of men. It gives a historical sketch of proselyte baptism as in use at the time of John, demonstrating the close connection between it and the Christian dispensation. It gives also all passages relating to the subject in every Greek and Latin author between John and Augustine.

We, of course, cannot enter here into a critical examination of this work. The argument against infant baptism which is sometimes insisted upon with much earnestness, drawn from the alleged absence of all allusion to infant baptism, for at least a century after the death of the last apostle, is handled at much length. We would invite special attention to that portion of the work which treats of the relation of baptized children to the church. The position taken by Dr. Barrows is that they are members of the church. The reasoning in favor of such a doctrine ought to be very strong. Whether it be so or not we leave the readers of the work to judge.

TEXT-BOOK OF CHURCH HISTORY. By Dr. John Henry Kurtz, Professor of Theology in the University of Dorpat; Author of "A Manual of Sacred History," "The Bible and Astronomy," etc., etc. Revised with Corrections and Additions from the Seventh German Edition. Two Volumes in one. 12mo. Philadelphia: Smith, English, and Co. 1875.

Of these volumes the first, containing five hundred and thirty-four pages, embraces the history of the church "*to the Reformation*," and is a revised and corrected reprint of the Edinburgh edition; the second, containing four hundred and seventy pages, embraces the history "*from the Reformation*," and is a direct translation from the German. The editor of the two volumes is Dr. J. H. A. Bomberger; he revised the first volume, and, with the assistance of Rev. John Beck, A.M., translated the second. The Text-book is a very valuable one, and well fitted for use in our Theo-

logical Seminaries. Dr. Kurtz has laid not only the Lutheran, but also every other religious sect, under lasting obligation to him by his long-continued labors in the philological and historical departments of theology. It is interesting to notice that Dr. Kurtz, like many other German historians, alludes to Rev. Theodore Parker in such a style as makes an impression that he was one of the most noted theologians of the United States.

BINNEY'S THEOLOGICAL COMPEND: Containing a Synopsis of the Evidences, Doctrines, Morals, and Institutions of Christianity. Designed for Bible Classes, Theological Students, and Young Preachers. By Rev. Amos Binney and Rev. Daniel Steele, D.D. 16mo. pp. 145. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1875.

"Within thirty-five years, at least thirty-five thousand [copies of this book] have been printed in English, and used by preachers, teachers, and Bible students throughout the English-speaking world. . . . It has been translated into German, Swedish, Arabic, Chinese, and other languages" (p. 6). The statements of Christian doctrine are well guarded in this volume. Although it was prepared for the Methodists, it does not assail the tenets of the "consistent" Calvinists. For example, it asserts: "No decree of God, no chain of causation behind his will, no combination of elements in his constitution compels his [man's] moral acts" (p. 112). "The atonement is universal, and not particular; that is, it extends in its conditional efficiency to *all the sins of all mankind*, and not the sins of a few called the elect" (p. 115). To nearly all the pages of this volume there are appended questions which direct the reader's attention to the more important statements on these pages, and give to them the emphasis which they need. As a whole the work is very skilfully executed.

COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT. Vol. IV., Kings to Esther. By Rev. Milton S. Terry, A.M. D. D. Whedon, LL.D., Editor. 12mo. pp. 534. New York: Nelson and Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1875.

This Commentary is published under Methodist auspices. The name of the editor is a sufficient guarantee of its substantial merit. In the preparation of the notes, the best modern works, bearing on the subject, seem to have been made use of. The notes are clear and concise, and are of a kind to afford valuable aid towards a correct understanding of that portion of the Bible to which they relate.

PRINCIPLES OF NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION: Established and Applied to Biblical Science. By the Rev. James Scott, M.A., B.D. 12mo. pp. 169. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

This volume is devoted to a description of the formulas and forms of the quotations made by the New Testament writers from the Old; the

principles on which these quotations are to be interpreted; the manner in which the Old and New Testaments are quoted by the church fathers; the style of classical quotations; the true method of defending the Biblical style of quotation; and the doctrinal results from the principles advanced in the volume. The author is rigidly orthodox, and asserts "that the language as well as the matter of revelation is inspired. Both are given alike and at once in inspiration" (p. 141). He is generally logical in his reasonings, but he might sometimes be more perspicuous in his style. He has given us a valuable work.

THE CHALDEAN ACCOUNT OF GENESIS: Containing the Description of the Creation, the Fall of Man, the Deluge, the Tower of Babel, the Times of the Patriarchs and Nimrod; Babylonian Fables and Legends of the Gods; from the Cuneiform Inscriptions. By George Smith, of the Department of Oriental Antiquities, British Museum; Author of "History of Assurbanipal," "Assyrian Discoveries," etc., etc. With Illustrations. 8vo. pp. 319. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1876.

The typographical execution of this volume is admirable. The facts which it records are of thrilling interest. The discoveries made by Mr. Smith are not only important in themselves, but are prophetic of far greater discoveries yet to be made. We feel confident that the volumes written on the stones of ancient Babylon will give striking confirmation of the volume written by Moses and the prophets. We intend to notice this work of Mr. Smith more fully at a future time.

CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS: a Text-Book for Academical Instruction and Private Study. By J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Utrecht. Translated from the Dutch by John Watson Watson, Vicar of Newburgh, Lancashire, and Maurice J. Evans, B.A., Stratford-upon-Avon. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 388, 430. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1874.

These compact volumes form a part of the Theological and Philosophical Library; a Series of Text-Books, Original and Translated, for Colleges and Theological Seminaries, and edited by Henry B. Smith, D.D., and Philip Schaff, D.D., Professors in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. The two volumes are of great value. The discussions are elaborate and evangelical. Pastors and candidates for the pastorate will derive much instruction from them. At the end of each section the Literature of the subject is given, and also "Points of Inquiry" are suggested. These "Points of Inquiry" are admirably fitted to stimulate the reader, and to incite, if not to compel, further investigation. Dr. Van Oosterzee enters into the scientific discussion with a manly spirit. He is not afraid of metaphysics. He thus avoids that appearance of effeminacy, not to say imbecility, which impairs the usefulness of some other text-books in theology. He is well versed in the Dutch, French, and German theological

literature, but has not given much attention to the English or American. This, however, is no decisive objection to the work. Our English and American scholars need to be familiar with the forms in which the divines of Continental Europe present the truths of theology. The same doctrines may be presented in various forms. We may prefer our own methods, but different methods may give emphasis and prominence to the truths which never lose their identity amid the diversified modes of their presentation.

BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE PROVERBS OF SOLOMON. By Franz Delitzsch, D.D., Professor of Theology. Translated from the German by M. G. Easton, D.D. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 350. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

The remarkable attainments of Professor Delitzsch in Biblical and Talmudic literature qualify him eminently for writing a Commentary on the Book of Proverbs. He might have made his Commentary more interesting, but, perhaps, for Biblical students, not more profitable, if he had quoted more largely from the proverbial literature of the Talmudists and other Oriental writers. A collection of proverbs "is a sort of granary in which is garnered the ripe wisdom of ages for food and seed-grain; and whoever uses it wisely finds it both nutritive and instructive."

THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By Dr. Gust. Fr. Oehler, late Professor Ordinarius of Theology in Tübingen. Translated by Sophia Taylor. 8vo. pp. 497. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1875.

We have already expressed our high opinion of Dr. Oehler's first volume, and are happy to express an equally high opinion of his second volume, as it appears in the English translation. We often wish that his ideas were more carefully classified and more vividly expressed; but we might give utterance to the same wish with regard to the majority of the German commentators. His thoughts are worthy of being sought for, and will make abundant compensation for a diligent search. There are many examples in the second volume, as there were in the first, of great caution and temperateness in the statement of his opinions; see pp. 127, 139, 140, 141, 247, 248.—We are happy to say that the House of Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong (New York), have imported a special edition of Dr. Oehler's work for use in this country.

The same House have also imported for our countrymen two new volumes of Meyer's great Commentary on the New Testament, entitled: **CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL HAND-BOOK TO THE EPISTLES TO THE PHILIPPIANS AND COLOSSIANS.** By Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Ph.D., Ober-consistorialrath, Hannover. Translated from the fourth edition of the German, by Rev. John C. Moore, B.A. The translation revised and edited by William P. Dickson, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Glasgow. 8vo. pp. 483.

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL HAND-BOOK TO THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.

By Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Ph.D., Consistorialrath, Hannover. Translated from the fifth edition of the German. The translation revised and edited by Frederick Cromtie, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 412.

[Different parts of the last-named volume were translated by Rev. William Urwick, M.A., and Rev. W. D. Simon, Ph.D., and Rev. Edwin Johnson, M.A. Both of these volumes of Meyer, as our readers well know, are published by the enterprising Firm of T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh.]

LONGEVITY: THE MEANS OF PROLONGING LIFE AFTER MIDDLE AGE.

By John Gardner, M.D., Author of "Household Medicine," etc., etc. Third Edition, revised and enlarged. 12mo. pp. 191. Boston: William F. Gill and Co. 1875.

The author of this book is an English physician. It starts with the assumption that many of the sufferings which aged persons endure might be removed, and life itself be prolonged, by proper care and the judicious use of means which are within the reach of all; and the object of the book is to point out the way in which this principle can be reduced to practice. He avers, as the result of careful examination, that all persons who die under eighty years of age may be said to die prematurely, and that the natural age of man may safely be set down as one hundred years; the rule of calculation being that men should be expected to live five times as long as it takes to attain to their full growth. The enjoyment of long life is in every man's power. It is implied, of course, that a conviction of this truth should come to be entertained at an early period in life, and a fixed purpose be cherished to reach if possible the specified limit, and to employ faithfully the requisite means. It is understood of course, that Dr. Gardner's theory has reference to the normal course of events, and not to exceptional visitations of divine Providence.

In view of the incontrovertible fact that the average duration of human life has increased within a comparatively short period, and in consideration of the nature of the causes by which this increase has been brought about, it can hardly be regarded as an improbable supposition that the length of life may be yet further increased. Without acceding to all the doctrines advanced in this work of Dr. Gardner, we are certainly ready to recommend its general perusal, and the reduction to practice of many of its rules. The views of the writer are not extravagant nor visionary. They are such as a sober-minded physician might be expected to adopt. We hope the work will be read, and will do much in the promotion of longevity; the truth never being lost sight of that the same causes which increase the length of life increase the sum of human happiness.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

NATURAL BASIS OF OUR SPIRITUAL LANGUAGE.

BY REV. W. M. THOMSON, D.D., OF THE SYRIAN MISSION, AUTHOR OF "THE
LAND AND THE BOOK."

No. V.—PARABLES AND SIMILITUDES.

It has been said, wisely and well, that the character of a people is revealed by their proverbs. By them are reflected, as in a mirror, their manners and customs ; and in them we find garnered up and preserved the results of their common experience, reduced to verbal formulas the most compact and available. Universally true, this is eminently applicable to Oriental tribes, both ancient and modern. A careful analysis of Arab proverbs, for example, will conduct the student into the very heart of their national life. They transport us, as by enchantment, into the open and boundless desert, where we see and hear and dwell amongst the people in their sack-cloth tents, with all their belongings and surroundings,—flocks and herds, asses and camels, the latter omnipresent, in numbers numberless. Everything in fact about the camp smells of the camel, or resounds with it. The very language, in its harsh gutturals, is an echo of the camel's prodigious growl. From their proverbial maxims we know also what virtues they admired, what vices they tolerated and practised. In a word, from this one source we learn with absolute certainty that Bedouin Arabs are, and always have

been, a more than semi-barbarous race of roaming robbers, intolerable in any civilized country, and utterly wild and incorrigible everywhere.

In like manner the Proverbs of Solomon disclose the condition, moral, social, and religious, of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, as it was when the wise king reigned there, with far greater minuteness than do all the pages of contemporaneous history; and their report is perfectly reliable, for proverbs neither flatter, conceal, nor exaggerate.

It is scarcely necessary to remark that many of the so-called proverbs of Solomon are in reality parables, while some of them are expanded into allegories. On the other hand, some of the New Testament parables are merely brief proverbs. In fact, both in Hebrew and Arabic, all such similitudes — be they brief or extended — bear the common name of *emthal* (proverbs), and what by one writer is called a parable, by another is said to be a proverb. We need not hesitate, therefore, to include them all in a single group, whether found in the Old or the New Testament; and our present study of them must be restricted to biblical “proverbs,” not merely because they contribute most largely to the special theme of these Essays, but also because the general subject is much too extensive for our limited space.

That a large part of the “mysteries” of the kingdom of heaven has been revealed to man by means of parables and suggestive similitudes needs neither proof nor illustration. The Great Teacher himself, at one time in his public ministry, employed them so exclusively, that Matthew tells us that “without a parable spake he not unto them” (xiii. 34). Now it concerns the purpose of this Essay to notice at the outset, that the natural basis for each and every one of these parables already existed in this country, and in the form best adapted to the teacher’s use. Jesus found no occasion to originate new external conditions, nor to have recourse to fictitious inventions. Those things in which he saw embedded the truths to be propounded and enforced lay in rich profusion all around him, and needed only an interpreter to

render them safe and eloquent expositors of the thoughts of God concerning his kingdom, the mode of its propagation in the world, and the manifold relations between himself and his people. In his hands they are made to reveal with startling distinctness not only man's new spiritual life, its origin and growth, inward and outward, but to symbolize the Christian himself in all his attributes and relations, — as a child of God, a servant, a pilgrim, a soldier, a merchant, a husbandman, a fisher, a builder, a temple, a member of Christ's body, the church, and many other aspects of like character.

In a field so wide as that covered by the parables of our Lord we can now select for remark only a few examples; and those not chosen in order to illustrate the momentous truths taught by them, but rather to notice the verbal costume with which they are clothed. It must be left to the commentator and to the critic to develop the lessons of divine instruction which they contain. Our special study necessarily restricts us to inquiries relating to the contributions made by them to the spiritual language of God's kingdom, and the natural basis for them in this land of the Bible. This is the theme of our Article, and from it we may not turn aside. To find this basis we need only to read and study the same volume of nature that met the eye of Jesus of Nazareth at his own home. What he saw we can see, and with his interpretations to aid, can understand.

Teaching by parable, it may be said, is not peculiar to the Bible; is not only possible in all lands, but has been actually employed by all civilized people. It is merely interpreting, or spiritualizing, resemblances, analogies, relations, qualities, etc., which everywhere exist in the wide world of nature. This is of course admitted. "There are, it may be," says Paul, "so many voices in the world, and none of them are without signification" (1 Cor. xiv. 10). What his argument led the Apostle to state hypothetically, we accept as true, if not literally, at least poetically. Nature has ten thousand tongues, and "publishes to every land, the work of an almighty hand." Many of them, alas! are utterly dumb, or sadly palsied by

the confusion and ignorance that darken the moral world ; but still they are very real, and, rightly interpreted, they reveal to men realities of highest concernment. Many of them disclose and illustrate the wisdom, power, and loving-kindness of our Heavenly Father. Others embody latent prophecies of the future life, when this mortal shall have put on immortality ; and all at the bidding of the Great Interpreter become eloquent and impressive instructors in spiritual and heavenly wisdom. " For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood from the things that are made " (Rom. i. 20). This " material frame " has been compared very beautifully to an immense organ, with pipes, keys, and stops innumerable, but all silent until the Great Musician touches the wondrous instrument, and calls out the sleeping harmonies to ravish the listening ear of piety. There may be more of fancy than reality in such representations ; but this entire subject addresses the imagination rather than the intellect, at least, in the aspect of it we are now contemplating ; and man's emotional nature will not submit to the hard lines of mathematical propositions. A thousand things as real and potential as any in the universe utterly refuse to be weighed in any scales or measured by any artificial rule of man's devising. And it is just in this domain of " things that are made " that the Great Teacher found those resemblances and analogies which best reveal the deepest mysteries of his kingdom.

There is no need to dwell at large upon this topic, interesting and suggestive as it is ; but it does belong to our argument to show that although nature is many-sided everywhere, and many-voiced as well, yet is she most richly endowed with the teacher's best gifts in this home of revelation. This is most conspicuous in these parables of our Lord which we are considering, and is by them best illustrated. For instance, in nearly every country where mankind dwell, the mere agricultural act of sowing is common enough, but many of the incidents and circumstances which so enrich the parables of our Lord are found nowhere else

than in Palestine ; certainly not in such convenient association and striking combination. In icy Greenland, for example, *such* parables could not have been spoken at all. The verbal terms necessary to utter them are not, and cannot be, found in the language of the people ; and it is equally true that many of the conditions and incidents upon which depends the very essence of these spiritual lessons do not exist in, and could never have occurred to, the mind of a teacher dwelling upon the rolling prairies of America, or the bleak steppes of Southern Russia. The same holds good in reference to nearly all biblical parables. Their most perfect basis lies only in this land of the Bible ; and need we repeat that it is here not by accident, but through antecedent, providential arrangement.

Nor do the foregoing considerations cover the whole ground. It is not difficult to demonstrate that in a broad yet true sense a large part of the entire Bible is real parable for which Palestine is the underlying basis. Its formal histories and personal biographies, its sacrificial rites and ceremonies, its prophetic types, and numberless other things, revealing in many ways the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, have this element in them.

Regarded as mere isolated items of information, loosely put together, and without any connection with the divine scheme of revelation, they are comparatively insignificant. Many of them, indeed, would be trivial and insipid. It is this association that imparts value even to the technical parable. The sower, for instance, scattering seed on the roadside and the rock, among thorns and in good ground, is a very commonplace affair, witnessed continually in this country and elsewhere without suggesting one spiritual idea either to actor or observer. So also are the employment and the acts of the fisherman. One can scarcely ride along the coast between Beirût and Sidon without seeing the entire operation mentioned in the parable, — men drawing nets to the shore, separating the good into baskets and casting the worthless away. But this operation of itself conveys neither instruc-

tion nor admonition to the busy and merry workmen. Before these and similar things can become teachers of spiritual truths they must be translated by the Great Interpreter. In his hands, however, the hidden analogies come forth with startling emphasis. The seed, the sower, the soil, the way-side, the fowls, the stony places, the thorns, are all significant; and so in the associated parable, the tares, the enemy, the harvest, the reapers, — all these external things become clothed with new meanings of utmost moment. The acts and incidents were all there, witnessed continually by dwellers in Palestine; but they were dumb, as moral monitors, until the Master came and unsealed their lips. Then burst forth their many voices upon the astonished multitude, sending their searching lessons through tingling ears, to the inmost recesses of the heart. It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the fact that every clause, and nearly every word, of these Palestinian parables has been absorbed into our religious language. We are hardly aware that they are figurative at all, and wholly forget that they come to us from Palestine. Yet such is the fact. In this land were grouped together, in a manner quite peculiar, all the elements upon which depended the possibility of just *such* lessons of divine wisdom. This imparts special value to the minute study of this land. The Great Teacher himself has given "the interpretation" of a few of his own parables; and with this, as both key and warranty, we may safely search for the natural basis of all other parables and symbols in the book of divine revelation.

Does any one inquire whether or not the act of *sowing tares* by an enemy is ever witnessed at the present day? I can only reply that, after careful inquiry on the subject, I never heard of a well authenticated case of the kind, though natives will assure you that it is sometimes done. It is said to be quite common in India, nor is there anything improbable in the deed itself. The spirit of cowardly revenge which would prompt to the act is so prevalent that one is prepared in advance to admit the fact; and no doubt this deed of darkness was actually common in Christ's day, or he would not have

used it as the basis of a parable designed to teach not only that hypocrites would be found in the kingdom of heaven, but also in what way they should be dealt with. The latter lesson depends upon the fact that the resemblance of the tare to the wheat is so close that it would be hazardous to attempt their separation until the harvest. While growing in the field and until the stalk is well developed they could not be distinguished the one from the other ; and even when sufficiently advanced to reveal their true nature, the roots of the two are generally so interlaced that the tares could not be rooted up without destroying the wheat also. In such cases both must grow together until the harvest ; then it is easy enough to separate them, just as the matter is represented in the parable.

It does not belong to our task to give an exhaustive exposition of this or any of the parables ; and therefore we drop the subject of tares, merely noticing that we are indebted to the wheat-fields of Galilee for this most instructive and solemn lesson, and for the terms in which it is taught us. Had there been no tares there, or had the evil passions of the Galileans been less malignant than we know they were, both from the Gospels and from the testimony of Josephus, there is no reason to suppose that our religious literature would have embodied just such instruction and admonition as this parable contains. Our Lord, we repeat, did not *create* a world with new conditions in order to obtain the materials for his divine lessons, nor did he *invent* incidents, like modern novelists, for this purpose. All that could be needed had been gathered into Palestine by his own antecedent wisdom, and he had merely to evoke Nature's many voices that slept in silence all around him amongst "the things that are made."

This he did on many occasions. Looking upon the little sparrows, five of whom were worth only two farthings, he bade them teach the great lesson of universal providence. "Not one of them is forgotten before God. Fear not, therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows." "Consider

the ravens," said he, to the anxious and the doubtful, "that neither sow nor reap, which have neither storehouse nor barn, and God feedeth them. How much more are ye better than the fowls?"

The reason why these two species of bird should have been selected rather than any other to teach this important doctrine, may have been because they were everywhere present in Palestine all the year round, and both were despised as of no value, if not positively hated by the people as nuisances. It is as if Jesus had said: Look at these troublesome little sparrows, and these croaking, vagabond birds of ill-omen, that ever wander uneasily from place to place; even for these your Heavenly Father provides.

I have seen the trees, and even the bushes, around the head of Genessaret, near Capernaum, the home of our Lord, literally stuffed with nests of the field sparrow; and their incessant chatter swelled up like the roar of a wild-pigeon roost in the Mississippi valley. They were an intolerable nuisance to the poor peasant, settling on his wheat-fields, voracious as the locusts, and in numbers numberless. The only care of the former was how to get rid of them. But the Great Teacher, pointing perhaps to just such clouds of tiny sparrows, in this very locality, eighteen hundred years ago, assured his hearers that not one of them was forgotten before God. Generation after generation of anxious inquirers after what they should eat, and wherewithal they should be clothed, had witnessed these things without ever learning the lesson which Jesus now made them teach. And so they had seen the shores of their pretty lake, and the woods around Nazareth and Tabor, bespangled with lilies and tulips, and knew that though they neither toiled nor spun, yet Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of them. Well enough they knew all this, and had themselves cast the dry grass into their *tannurs* to bake their daily bread; but they had not so considered the matter as to draw the happy inference, that if God so clothed the grass which, to-day in the field, is to-morrow cast into the oven, how much more will he clothe you, O ye of little faith.

These are only samples of the way in which the Master moved about in his own world, and evoked from the sealed lips of birds and flowers the lessons that lay silent within them. He invented nothing new; but found his text in things the most familiar and trivial which were scattered thickly along his pathway. Let it be noted also, that not only ravens and sparrows and lilies were at hand, ready to teach, but that they were found in close connection with incidents and customs which clothed their instruction with peculiar force and beauty. Thus those who were told to consider the lilies, had seen them growing and blooming amongst the tangled foldings of the low *bellan* thorn-bush, — then, as now, their favorite haunt; and they had also seen, what I myself have often witnessed, the man who provided fuel for the bakers, with his mattock grubbing up these bushes, lilies and all, and carrying them away in great bundles for the oven. It is literally true, that to-day they are in the field, to-morrow in the oven. In a word, there is an unmistakable Palestinian air about all these teachings of our Lord. Nothing is forced or foreign; nothing wanting. He who wrote no books, needed none other than the great volume of Nature which he had made, and from every page of which he could and did read out aloud to listening crowds the lessons of divine instruction which he himself had graven there.

Our business in this Essay is with biblical similitudes; and to find them we must do as the beloved in the Song of Songs did, to gather lilies — go down into the gardens, or out into the country, to vary the search, and follow the flocks afield, and listen to the shepherd's pipe on the breezy hillside or by the shady fountain. Pastoral life in this happy clime had special charms in ancient times; and I love to linger amidst its peaceful scenes and smiling scenery. We will take David for minstrel and the twenty-third Psalm for idyl. The sweet singer of Israel was shepherd and minstrel before he was king and conqueror, and how sweetly he sings of shepherd life and the lessons he learnt therefrom.

David was perfectly familiar with all the offices and duties of a good shepherd, and in few words indicates them in this short Psalm, blending most happily the natural with the spiritual. To provide against want, to guide to pastures green and tender, to protect from enemies, and to lead to still waters, where the flock may drink and rest in safety at sultry noon,— such is the ordinary daily duty of the shepherd. Then, passing from the material to the spiritual, he sings of blessings which mere sheep do not need, and no human shepherd can bestow : “ He restoreth my soul ; he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness for his name’s sake.” The transition to human flocks, shepherd divine, heavenly food, and waters of salvation is perfectly natural ; and then comes a reference retrospective to David’s own personal experience as a persecuted fugitive : “ Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of mine enemies ; thou anointest my head with oil ; my cup runneth over.”

Let us go back and gather some of the lilies from this garden of spiritual spicery. Though an outcast, surrounded by cruel enemies, and hunted like a partridge on the mountains, he was never forsaken by his Good Shepherd, nor left to perish by the hands of cruel enemies, or from hunger and thirst in the desert. The Lord always spread a table for him in the wilderness, opened fountains in the desert, and provided oil with which to refresh and comfort both head and heart. His *cup* ran over with water or wine, or, figuratively, with all they include and represent. The mention of the *cup* reminds us of the fact that, from the days of Joseph, at least, to the current hour, Oriental emirs and other men of means carry about with them a large cup of silver or gold, elaborately chased and adorned, out of which they alone drink. No doubt David had such a cup which the Good Shepherd ever filled to overflowing, even in the thirsty desert. And no one who has ever been ready to faint from thirst, like the panting hart, will forget to name the overflowing cup as among his choicest blessings. So also, will the exhausted fugitive, ready to stumble and fall on the dark

mountains, remember with gratitude the supporting staff that "comforted" him. This staff, generally a stout stick, several feet long, is now, as anciently, the inseparable companion of every genuine Oriental shepherd; and its manifold uses keep it always in hand. Standing on some elevated rock, watching his charge, he leans upon it, and finds it a support. In times of danger from wild beasts or wilder robbers, it is a formidable weapon. The *okkaz* (shepherd's crook) is not so often used at this day. It was a long staff shod with iron, and having a hooked top, now seen most frequently, at least in pictures, as the official staff of Oriental bishops — the head shepherds, presumptively, over spiritual flocks. These are some of the similitudes, Palestinian in air and origin, which are sown thickly in this sweet idyl; but there are others still remaining to be noticed. Thus this walking through the valley of the shadow of death is equally Palestinian in costume. Why valley? What is this shadow? And what suggested the whole complex imagery? The shadow, probably, refers to that deep darkness which often precedes or accompanies the quenching of the "visual ray" in the "article of death." Many have spoken of this rayless gloom at that supreme moment. Perhaps both these similitudes, the shadow and the valley, had been impressed on the imagination of the poet by circumstances in his personal experience. David had been a shepherd in early life, and subsequently a fugitive through Southern Palestine where the country is cut up by tremendous gorges, ending in the Dead Sea, whose frowning cliffs cast oppressive shadows over the narrow pathway at the bottom. Pursued by cruel enemies, he had fled for dear life into these dark ravines, and walked in fear and trembling through their appalling defiles. It is no reflection on his manhood that his stout heart sometimes quailed in the midst of such surroundings. The writer has tried it, and does not believe it possible for any one to breathe quite freely while traversing these frightful paths. A curious sensation of doubt and vague apprehension of one knows not what, creeps into the heart and makes one weak

and nervous. Let any one who doubts this make the experiment. Try it when twilight is fast deepening into pitchy night, and mocking echoes from every footfall people the viewless void with questionable shapes and ugly fancies; where ghastly bones of victims slain by robbers bestrew the pathway, and open tombs on either side add suggestive horrors to the scene; yes, verily, he who can walk through such defiles *alone*, as all must do through death's dark vale, and yet fear no evil, must be "something more, or a little less," than average mortals are. Perhaps, also, a sense of sinking into a bottomless abyss accompanies the oncoming of this "shadow" in the hour of dissolution. At all events the complex figure is most impressive, and all the more so because vague and indefinable. Happy he who can pass fearless through this valley with David's confidence to sustain, and the Good Shepherd's rod and staff to comfort him. The experience of the Psalmist has taught millions of ransomed believers to sing triumphant over the last enemy :

"Through the valley and shadow of death though I stray,
Since thou art my guardian no evil I fear :
Thy rod shall defend me, thy staff be my stay ;
No harm can befall with my comforter near."

Our blessed Lord not only appropriates this name to himself, but largely expands its meaning and multiplies the offices and relations appertaining to shepherd life. No elaborate statement is needed to show that many beautiful thoughts, words, and phrases have been added to our religious language from this source. They constitute the staple of our sweetest infant hymns, and in numberless ways enrich our devotional literature. Notice, however, that it is not any and every kind of pastoral life that furnishes the basis of these spiritual analogies and beautiful similitudes. It is to the Oriental shepherd and his flock that we owe them. Only in a land like this, of burning sun and thirsty desert, and rough mountain and perilous precipices, and beasts of prey and lurking robbers, is found or needed the faithful shepherd, ready to lay down his life for the sheep; and here, too, are

the flocks, whose utter dependence and helplessness furnish the conditions and relations which suggest and explain the terms and ideas in question. Transfer them to England, Australia, or the United States and the analogies fail, or are too feeble and obscure to serve the purpose of thus enriching our scriptural nomenclature.

Should any one suspect that this matter is overdrawn, let him turn to the thirty-fourth chapter of Ezekiel. The prophet has not only enumerated every office and duty of the shepherd and every want of the flock in order to magnify the guilt and condemnation of the wicked shepherds who killed the fat ones, and clothed themselves with their wool, but he transferred the description bodily to the Great Shepherd, and thus spiritualized it to the minutest details. "The diseased have ye not strengthened, neither have ye healed that which was sick, neither have ye bound up that which was broken, neither have ye brought again that which was driven away, neither have ye sought that which was lost; but with force and with cruelty have ye ruled them and they became meat to all the beasts of the field. . . . My sheep wandered through all the mountains, and upon every high hill; yea, my flock was scattered upon all the face of the earth." Read the whole chapter, for it abounds throughout with allusions to the condition and wants of the flock, and the multitudinous relations, duties, and offices of the shepherd, not only interesting and instructive every way, but so peculiarly Palestinian in detail and in costume that it might have been copied of shepherd life by a close observer, on these very mountains, during the current year.

Much more we had in mind to say on this subject; not in the general, but limited to its bearing on our specific inquiry. Much ought to be added; but to do this would expand our Essay beyond all reasonable limits. We can only refer the reader to such passages as Isa. xl. 11; xlix. 9, 10; John x., and others like them, too numerous to be noted here. Pastoral life gives us such words as "sheep," "flock," "fold," "shepherd," "Lamb of God," and all terms associated with

them in sacrifice and song from Genesis to Revelation ; and the student who seeks in this field for the basis of our religious language cannot go astray, and will find more than he sought for or expected.

“Jesus my Shepherd is ;
 ’Twas he that loved my soul ;
 ’Twas he that washed me in his blood ;
 ’Twas he that made me whole ;
 ’Twas he that sought the lost,
 That found the wandering sheep ;
 ’Twas he that brought me to the fold ;
 ’Tis he that still doth keep.”

We have already briefly illustrated some of the similitudes found in the twenty-third Psalm, but there are others not less instructive and profitable in spiritual imagery. The grateful allusions of the Psalmist to water are natural and appropriate ; indeed, the absence of them in such an enumeration would have surprised an Oriental. Not so a European or American, dwelling where a superabundance of the element is a danger and a nuisance. The writer once asked the captain of a steamboat, near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, how wide the united stream might be. After a little reflection, he replied, “About thirty miles, including the overflow on either side,”—it was high flood in both rivers. Looking out over the dreary waste of muddy water, another captain exclaimed, rather profanely, “What on earth does the Almighty want of so much water !” Certainly no prophet or poet would have been inspired by the view to sing the praises of this element. But our own wanderings and experiences in this thirsty land have taught us to understand and fully appreciate the biblical phraseology derived from this source. Water is a necessary condition of life in every country ; but where there is a troublesome and even destructive superabundance of it, this fact is not so apparent. In such lands other things are considered more essential ; and clear skies, warm breezes, and bright sunshine inspire the poet’s song. In lands drenched with ceaseless rains water cannot suggest the same pleasant imagery that it does in a

country like Palestine, whose geographical position insures long summers and great heat, while the vast deserts on the south and east rob the atmosphere of much of its natural moisture. The climate is consequently exceptionally dry, and the danger is not from excess of water, but from deficiency. Hence not only the high estimate of its value, but also the many inventions and appliances to secure an adequate supply; for without this neither man nor beast can exist. It is also the visible cause of all fertility in field, orchard, and garden, and therefore justly regarded as the most precious gift of God, beautifying the earth with green pasture and gay flowers, clothing the fields with golden harvests, and loading the air with fragrant odors. In a sense semi-moral, it is the synonyme and verbal formula for purity, health, and happiness.

For all these reasons, and for others more specifically moral and spiritual, water has always been greatly prized and praised in Palestine; whether it falls quietly in soft dews of evening, or in gentle showers that refresh the fields, or descends in winter's long and copious rains; whether it be gathered into lakes, flow in brooks and rivers, burst in fountains from the rocks, or is treasured up in deep wells and artificial cisterns. Everywhere and always it is the same precious commodity, and, as was to be expected, it has been as fertile in the domain of language as in that of nature. It is the underlying basis of numberless words, names, figures, and phrases sown profusely over the entire field of divine revelation.

It deserves to be mentioned also in this connection that under the Mosaic economy, the regular and necessary supply of water, the sending of the early and latter rains, formed an integral part of the divine covenant with Israel. So long as they were loyal and faithful, this was guaranteed to them. The eyes of the Lord were to be ever upon the land, from the beginning of the year to the end of it, to give rain *in his season*. This latter clause is the very pivot of the promise in its temporal aspect, implying a constant providential in-

terference essentially supernatural. There are in Palestine several critical periods every year, when the failure of rain is ruinous ; and if then, instead of refreshing showers, there comes the hot sirocco, the hopes of the husbandman are blasted. The heaven overhead becomes brass, the earth beneath iron ; and the Lord makes the rain of the land powder and dust ; from heaven it shall come down upon thee, until thou be destroyed (Deut. xxviii. 24).

There is yet another reason why water has become the natural basis of so many phrases and significant symbols in our religious language. It was employed extensively and perpetually in the sacrificial and symbolical worship of the Hebrews. Without water it was impossible to perform aright the daily services of the sanctuary, for none could come into the presence of the Lord or offer acceptable worship in his holy temple unless he had duly observed the prescribed ablutions. We need not pause to remind every reader of the Bible that the references to these matters are simply innumerable. At the risk of being thought needlessly minute, and even tedious, we must call attention to another reason why so many religious terms have been derived from water and its various functions. With special, though not exclusive, reference to the cleansing and purifying efficacy of water, it is the material element in Christian baptism, and therefore the New Testament symbol of regeneration by the Spirit of God. Thus our Lord says to Nicodemus, " Except a man be born of *water*, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." And his last command to the apostles was, " Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations ; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Peter, in the first Christian sermon, exhorted the people to " repent and be baptized for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." And so we read, " According to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost" (Tit. iii. 5). And of the church it is said, " That he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word " (Eph. v. 26).

Nor is it in the New Testament that we first meet with this symbolical use of water. The laver for purification in the tabernacle, and the great sea made by Solomon for service in the temple, emblematically set forth the same lessons. Paul in fact teaches that all Israel were baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea (1 Cor. x. 2). And Peter speaks of the ark "wherein few, that is eight souls, were saved by water. The like figure whereunto, even baptism, doth also now save us, (not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God)" (1 Pet. iii. 20, 21). "Wash you, make you clean," urges Isaiah to the sinners of his day; and Ezekiel gives to the returned of Israel the blessed promise of the Lord, "I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean; from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you" (xxxvi. 25). And finally, Zechariah publishes the glad news that "in that day there shall be a fountain opened to the house of David and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem for sin and for uncleanness."

These and similar passages clearly indicate the natural basis of a vast number of thoughts, figures, and verbal formulas in our religious literature. Nor is this subject exhausted even yet. Remember that wonderful conversation with the woman of Samaria at the well. Listen to the words of Him who himself is the true Fountain. "Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again; but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life" (John iv. 13, 14). Or listen once more to the same Divine Teacher: "In the last day, that great day of the feast, Jesus stood and cried, saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink. He that believeth on me, as the scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. But this spake he of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive" (John vii. 37-39).

And long before that great day of the feast did Isaiah, the

prophet evangelical, lift up his voice and cry, "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters"; and the like voice is heard at the close of the Revelation of God, "The Spirit and the bride say, Come. And let him that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst come. And whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely" (Rev. xxii. 17). Alas! for the folly of man. "Be astonished, O ye heavens, at this, and be horribly afraid, be ye very desolate, saith the Lord. For my people have committed two evils; they have forsaken me the fountain of living waters, and hewed them out cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water" (Jer. ii. 12, 13).

No comment or illustration is needed to show the bearing of such passages upon the general subject of these Essays; and we now turn to examples somewhat different, but not less appropriate and suggestive. Those now to be noticed are largely topographical, and yet they are closely connected with our present theme. There are scenes and scenery and historic situations in the Bible, embodying beatific visions and spiritual allegories, which have captivated the imagination and cheered the heart of the pious in all ages. We have space for only two of these topographic scenes. The first lies in the green meadows of Shittim, beneath the mountains of Moab, with Canaan's happy land in view, while Jordan rolls between. The mind irresistibly thinks of Moses on the top of Pisgah, with "the goodly tents of Jacob, the tabernacles of Israel spread forth as the valleys, as the gardens by the river's side," and just beyond the flood the Promised Land unrolls its glorious panorama to the most distant horizon. Without prompting from me, every child can sing:

"Sweet fields beyond the swelling flood
Stand dressed in living green;
So to the Jews old Canaan stood
While Jordan rolled between.
Could we but climb where Moses stood,
And view the landscape o'er,
Not Jordan's stream nor death's cold flood
Could fright us from the shore."

Watts has rendered this scene and its symbolic thoughts

so familiar that minute illustration would be an impertinence on our part. Another poet has recently transferred the scenes and its lessons from the Hebrew camp and nation to the individual believer, blending very beautifully the historic facts with the spiritual adumbrations which they suggest. We quote so much as meets our present purpose; begging pardon of (to us) the unknown author for the liberty thus taken.

"We sat in the door of our tent, in the cool of the day,
Towards the quiet meadow, where misty shadows lay;
And over the mountains of Moab afar,
We saw the first sweet gleam of the evening star.
The great and terrible land of wilderness and drought
Lay in the shadows behind us, for the Lord had brought us out.

.
Till we pitched our tent at last, the desert done,
Where we saw the hills of the Holy Land gleam in our sinking sun.

.
And One came up through the meadow, where the mists lay dim,
Till he stood by my friend in the starlight, and spoke to him.

.
'Arise, thou shalt come to the palace to rest thee forever';
And he pointed across the dark meadow and down to the river.

.
So they two went closer down to the river-side,
And stood in the heavy shadows by the black, wild tide.
But when the feet of the Lord were come to the waters dim,
They rose to stand, on either hand, and left a path for him.
So they two passed over quickly towards the goal;
But the wistful, longing gaze of the passing soul
Grew only more wrapt and joyful as he clasped the Master's hand;
I think, or ever he was aware, they were come to the Holy Land."

Who does not breathe the prayer, that when the wilderness of life, "with its dust and its sand," has been safely passed through, he, too, may thus cross over the Jordan of death, and, "or ever aware," come to the Canaan of eternal rest.

Our second example is even more strictly topographical than the meadows of Shittim, and brings us back to the holy city and to the temple of the Lord, from under whose threshold ran out the waters of that mystical river which

Ezekiel describes in the forty-seventh chapter of his prophecies. We ask special attention to this divine allegory; for no other passage in the entire Bible illustrates and confirms more beautifully the double purpose of these Essays — to find the natural basis of our spiritual language, and to show that this basis has been laid in Palestine by divine purpose and forethought.

It is, perhaps, not possible to construct an adequate definition of this vision; but by common consent it symbolizes the river of divine love and mercy in its largest and most comprehensive character and relations. Let us contemplate it first in its fountain-head. The prophet beheld the waters *issue out* from under the threshold of the temple. But this was not the true source; that was farther back, concealed from view in the very heart of the temple mount. Recent explorations have revealed the fact, suspected long ago, and no doubt well known to Ezekiel, that the entire platform on which the temple stood is completely honeycombed with cisterns, some of them of such enormous size as to be called seas. Here was the hidden source from whence these waters issued forth. And thus it is in the spiritual river. The true fountain head is hid in the bosom of the Father, who so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life (John iii. 16). Here is the boundless sea of love from which all the streams flow out and down to man. Without pausing to contemplate this shoreless ocean, we notice next, the exact place whence these waters began to appear. They came out from under the *altar*. Why so? Because there is no other spot in the universe of God, so far as we know, from whence the river of divine mercy could flow forth to sinful man. That could not be until immutable justice was satisfied by the sacrifice of the Lamb of God upon the altar. The ocean was there, in the bosom of the Father from all eternity; but it required the expiring cry of the Son, *It is finished*, to unseal the fountain, and set free the river of life.

Notice, next, the *direction* which it took. Not towards

some fertile and happy land to repose in a pure and quiet silvery lake ; but it made direct for the desert and the Dead Sea. The prophet drew on his memory for the entire topical costume of the vision. From the "pinnacle of the temple" he had often looked down the valley of the Kedron and out upon the desert that bounds the Dead Sea, and had perhaps frequently asked whether any power on earth could render that dismal desert fertile, or heal the bitter waters of that sea of death. The natural stream that issued from the temple must of necessity take that direction, and no other. Descending into the Kedron at the fountain of Mary, thence past Siloam to the well of Job, and from that in the ever-deepening gorge of Wady en-Nar (valley of fire) until it reached the sea. The prophet had further noticed that the stream, very small as it issued from the temple, was increased at the fountain of Mary, and grew still larger at Siloam, while below the well of Job it sometimes became a noisy mill stream, and beyond that it was swollen by other contributions, after long and heavy rains, to quite a river. The writer has himself witnessed these outgushings below Bir Eyûb, and was delighted to find the banks of the brook alive with old and young, in holiday dress, rejoicing at the occurrence, as a good omen that promised a fruitful year and abundant harvests. The prophet has apparently availed himself of these physical facts and phenomena to impart verisimilitude to his allegory. This mystical river was "to the ankles" at the first thousand cubits, "to the knees" at the second, "to the loins" at the third thousand, and at the fourth "the waters were risen, waters to swim in ; a river that could not be passed over." This, of course, corresponds to and illustrates the divinely chosen method in the extension of the kingdom of grace. At first very small, it enlarges ever as time rolls on. It is so historically and universally, and it thus grows also in every individual member of the kingdom. The Master has taught this in many ways, as in the parables of the leaven and the mustard seed, and elsewhere. We need not dwell on this elemental feature of the allegory, and therefore pass

to the *effects produced* by these waters from the sanctuary. When the prophet had returned to the bank of the river, "behold there were very many trees on the one side and the other"; and again, "on this side and on that, shall grow all trees for meat, whose leaf shall not fade, neither shall the fruit thereof be consumed; it shall bring forth new fruit according to his months, because their waters they issued out of the sanctuary; and the fruit thereof shall be for meat, and the leaf thereof for medicine." John saw this river in apocalyptic vision, many hundred years after Ezekiel: "And on either side of the river was the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month; and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations." The topographical indications of Ezekiel, however, impart special interest to his description. John says nothing about the desert, and the marvellous transfiguration of it into a paradise like unto the garden of Eden. Herein we find the most suggestive phenomena in the allegory, and the most beautiful. The effects are absolutely *supernatural*. Neither the rains from heaven, nor the ordinary brooks and fountains of the land, nor the bright sunshine, nor the toil of man, had ever been able to redeem that desert from its stubborn and frightful nakedness and sterility. But wherever these waters from the sanctuary came the transformation was immediate and miraculous. Notice here another phenomena, which strikingly illustrates the outgoing and onflowing of the river of divine love and mercy. The farther it penetrated the desert, and the more it sent forth to water the trees on either side, the deeper and broader it became. This is the very opposite of all *natural* streams that *run out into the Desert*. The writer has followed more than one of these brooks from their birth in powerful fountains among the hills to where they disappear entirely in sandy plains. The farther they go, the smaller they become. Their merry music ceases to cheer; vegetation becomes less and less along the banks, until finally the feeble runlet faints and fails altogether. Not so this divine river of the allegory; it grows as it flows, gets by giving, —

the more it gives, the more it has to give. Now, who needs to be told that it is thus in the kingdom of grace and love? "Freely ye have received, freely give." "Give and it shall be given unto you, good measure, pressed down and shaken together, and running over." This is the fundamental law laid down by the Master, everywhere and always obligatory. As well attempt to break the chain that binds the universe together, and all to God, as to set aside this law of the kingdom. Its very nature and issue is love, infinite, outflowing, and overflowing; and it must ever act like this mystical river, which, in obedience to its topographical surroundings, sets out at once on its mission of life to the desert and the sea of death.

And unto the Dead Sea it came, and therein wrought miracles of healing and transformation; for "everything that liveth, which moveth, whithersoever the rivers shall come, shall live; and there shall be a very great multitude of fish, because these waters shall come thither; for they shall be healed." To understand the greatness of the miracle, remember where and what that sea is. Down yonder, in its awful chasm, it smoulders like a huge caldron of bitumen and brimstone, so bitter that nothing that hath life can abide it; nor can the Jordan and other natural streams that flow into it mitigate its deadly poison. Tremendous type of an apostate and fallen world, dead in trespasses and sins! But even this shall be healed; and, greatest moral of all, around its heretofore desolate shores, from Engedi even unto Engelaim shall fishermen stand, — where none ever stood before; and there, where no fish were ever seen since the creation, shall men spread their nets, for "their fish shall be according to their kinds, as the fish of the great sea, exceeding many."

It may safely be left to the imagination and heart of the Christian to fill out the picture of gospel growth and final triumph set forth in this grand and all comprehending symbolism. Ezekiel must have seen, in prophetic vision, the Great Master with his apostolic band of fishermen around

the lake of Tiberias. The net and the fishermen, with all that they signify and symbolize, have passed through a thousand verbal formulas, into the bosom of the universal church; and this day they represent the innumerable company of men and women that stand around the great Dead Sea of fallen humanity and fish for precious souls. With the telescope of prophecy we can see farther now than was possible for Ezekiel; and the outlook over the desert and the sea is animating and assuring in the highest degree. Ten thousand workers are busy opening new channels for these waters from the sanctuary, and, wherever they come, trees of righteousness spring up innumerable on either side; and ere long every desert shall blossom as the rose, and the day of final triumph will not be far off, when the vast host of workers shall congregate around the shores of this symbolic sea, and sweep the whole lost race into the mighty nets of gospel grace.

We have but touched and glanced along the line of this magnificent allegory, exhausting no part of it, and leaving unsaid much that thereunto belongs. And yet it is our hope that no one can rise from the contemplation of it, even thus feebly sketched, without assurance full and steadfast, that the whole is supernatural and divine. And to bring the matter within the compass of our special argument, we farther assert that the basis in nature is no less of God, and by his special providence arranged and fitted up, than is the superstructure which the inspired prophet has built upon it. No other spot on this globe of ours can be found that furnishes all the necessary conditions — physical, moral, and spiritual — for *just such* a vision as this of Ezekiel. This river comes down from the mountain of the Lord's house; and we know that he is himself both temple and altar, priest and sacrifice, fountain-head and living stream; and all the phenomena of its flow and increase and operations in the desert and the sea, are in and by and through him — unto whom be ascribed all blessing and glory and wisdom and thanksgiving, and honor and power and might, forever and ever. Amen.

ARTICLE II.

BAPTISMAL REGENERATION; AS SUPPOSED TO BE
TAUGHT IN THE WORDS OF JESUS: "BORN OF WATER
AND SPIRIT." JOHN III. 5.

BY REV. HENRY COWLES, D.D., OBERLIN, OHIO.

BAPTISMAL REGENERATION is essentially regeneration by means of the water of baptism—the water being held to be efficacious to the renewing which is expressed by “regeneration.”

The question how much this efficacy of water depends on the Spirit of God working co-ordinately with it on the human soul,—whether this dependence be much, little, or none at all,—may be considered as subordinate, and not vital to our present discussion.

The doctrine now to be considered is, that regeneration, including the forgiveness of previously committed sin and the removal of innate or inherited sinfulness, is *by water*, and not *without*; that water when consecrated for the purposes of holy baptism becomes possessed of this virtue. The divine grace either enters into the water, or connects itself with this use of it in baptism. That thus “baptismal regeneration” is irrespective of the mental or moral state of the subject, is obvious from the fact that it takes effect upon infants so young as to preclude the supposition of mental or moral activity.

This doctrine appeared in the church at a very early period. Passing the somewhat unreliable Shepherd of Hermas, the earliest witness is Justin Martyr (middle of second century), whose words are: “We then lead them [the candidates for church membership] to a place where there is water, and then they are regenerated in the same manner as we also were; for they are then washed in that water in

the name of God the Father and Lord of the universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit.”¹

Neander² speaks of the “prevailing notion of a divine power which was imparted to the water, and a sensible union brought about, by means of it, with the whole nature of Christ for the deliverance of the entire spiritual and material nature of man.” In support of this view he quotes Irenaeus thus: “As the dry wheat cannot become one mass of dough and one loaf of bread without moisture, so neither can we all become one in Christ without the water which is from heaven; for our bodies through baptism, but our souls through the Spirit, have obtained communion with the imperishable Essence.”³

Tertullian on the *effect of baptism*, speaks thus: “When the soul attains to faith, and is transformed by the regeneration of water and the power from above, the covering of the old corruption having been removed, she beholds her whole light.”⁴

Neander speaks of the early Fathers (last half of second century) as “confounding regeneration with baptism, and thus looking upon regeneration as a sort of charm, completed at a stroke, by supposing a certain magical purification and removal of all sin in the act of baptism.”⁵

Coleman⁶ quotes Irenaeus as saying “that Christ came to save all who through him should be regenerated to God by baptism”; and also, that “when Christ gave his disciples this commission of regenerating unto God, he said unto them, ‘Go teach all nations, baptizing them,’” etc. “Here,” says Coleman, “‘regenerating unto God’ is supposed to relate to the act of baptizing.” “Baptism, according to the *usus loquendi* of the age, was regeneration.” Speaking of the element for baptism, Coleman⁷ says: “Several of the Fathers very early advanced notions respecting the actual presence of the Spirit in the water, strikingly analogous to the modern doctrine of transubstantiation. It would seem

¹ Coleman’s Ancient Christianity Exemplified, p. 271. ² Neander, p. 646.

³ Ibid. p. 646. ⁴ Ibid. ⁵ Ibid. p. 647. ⁶ Coleman, p. 384. ⁷ Ibid. p. 395.

that in their opinion this water acquired a spiritual virtue, derived from the real presence of the Spirit residing in the water, or the mysterious blending of the blood of Christ. Similar sentiments were entertained by Luther, and no doubt are the foundation of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, wherever that is taught."

The Book of Common Prayer, — practically the doctrinal standard of the Episcopal church both of England and America, holds and implies this baptismal regeneration in the following several forms: (*a*) Before the baptism of infants it directs the minister to pray, "Sanctify this water to the mystical washing away of sin." (*b*) The baptism having been performed he must say: "We yield thee most hearty thanks, most merciful Father, that it hath pleased thee to regenerate this infant with thy Holy Spirit." (*c*) In the service for confirmation he must say: "Almighty and ever-living God, who hast vouchsafed to regenerate these thy servants by water and the Holy Ghost," etc. (*d*) In the service for the ministration of baptism to such as are of riper years, the minister is to read the entire discourse between Christ and Nicodemus, and make this inference: "Whereby ye may perceive the great necessity of this sacrament, where it may be had." Whether or not this regeneration must certainly fail to take place when baptism in due form cannot be had, we are left to judge. There seems to be a slight hesitation to express a positive opinion on this point.

These extracts from the Book of Prayer seem to justify the two following conclusions: (1) These standards assume that regeneration takes place by, with, and by means of baptism. (2) Scripturally, this doctrine rests on these words of Jesus to Nicodemus: "born of water and Spirit."

So far as we know, the only scripture ever claimed in its support is this: "Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." It is claimed that here water implies and means baptism; so that we have here an explicit declaration that baptism is an

essential condition of regeneration, and must be co-ordinate with the work of the Spirit; apparently of similar if not equal efficacy. Upon this passage, therefore, and more definitely still upon this construction of it, the whole fabric of baptismal regeneration is made to rest.

This construction we hold to be exegetically false. The whole system resting upon it is, therefore, without scriptural foundation.

In reference to the word "water," in the phrase "born of water and Spirit" (Gr.), we maintain, (*a*) positively; It is used as a symbol of moral cleansing, and is designed to qualify the word "Spirit"; the sense being, born by being morally cleansed through the Spirit. (*b*) negatively; That as here used, it cannot have the least reference to the rite of baptism.

The doctrines held on themes so vital in the gospel system ought to rest upon impregnable foundations. No discussion of them should satisfy any inquirer after truth unless it carries him back to the ground principles and laws of interpretation, and shows him that the conclusions reached are really built upon these principles.

Attempting humbly but honestly to walk in this path, we remark, —

All words should be interpreted in view of the circumstances, character, and relations of speaker and hearer. The words now in hand must be interpreted under the light of the fact, that they occur not in a sermon to the whole world in general, but in a private conversation with one man in particular, who came to Jesus by night and alone. This man was a somewhat serious and candid inquirer after divine truth; not a caviller, but a man favorably impressed by the miracles of Jesus, and anxious to learn more from him of God and, apparently, of salvation. It is, therefore, certain that Jesus will meet him with warm and loving spirit, and will open to him the things he most needs to learn, and in the simplest manner possible, considering who this pupil is, and what knowledge he may already have.

Yet farther, this man is a Jew; therefore Jesus will approach him and address him as a Jew. More still; he is not only a Jew, but a member of the Jewish Sanhedrin — a man venerable for his years and for his learning in his own book — the Old Testament scriptures. Yet more; he is by profession a teacher of those scriptures — “*the* teacher of Israel” are the words of Jesus (ver. 10); apparently implying some pre-eminence in rank in this respect. Let it therefore be borne carefully in mind, Jesus assumes confidently that Nicodemus ought to have found in his own book the very things himself had been saying. Art thou by life-long profession the distinguished teacher of Israel, and yet hast not found in these scriptures these things which I have said? We may therefore be very certain that Jesus has spoken to that group of ideas which he might rationally assume to lie in the mind of his pupil; and (one step farther) which Nicodemus might have learned from his own book — the Old Testament scriptures.

We are now prepared to note that Jesus began with the one great condition of citizenship in the kingdom of God; in other words, with the question, What must a man be or do to be saved?

It cannot be amiss to observe that Nicodemus has notions already about “the kingdom of God.” He had read of it in his text-book; had heard of it among his people; perhaps, as one of the masters of Israel, he had taught it. The phrase itself came bodily from the prophecies of Daniel (ii. 44; vii. 13, 14, 27); the idea of their Messiah as a king stands out in bold prominence in by far the greater part of the distinctly Messianic prophecies. The words were the text in the first preaching of John the Baptist, and of Jesus scarcely less: “Repent for the kingdom of heaven [or of God] is at hand.” The Jewish people, when on one occasion led to suppose Jesus to be their Messiah, were about to “take him by force to make him a king” (John vi. 15); and on another occasion they bore him into their city with branches of palm and shoutings of joy and triumph, pro-

claiming, "Hosanna; Blessed is the King of Israel" (John xii. 13). Hence we are quite safe in saying that Nicodemus has opinions about the kingdom of God; has been looking for it as to be set up under his nation's Messiah; and we may presume that, having found "a teacher come from God," who may, indeed, himself be the Messiah, or at least some great prophet who can tell him something new about the Messiah and his kingdom, he waits to hear on this subject.

Observe, moreover, Nicodemus had ideas as to the right of citizenship in this kingdom. Regarding it as a continuation, or perhaps an improved edition of the ancient and model reign of David, he had never questioned his right of citizenship by birth. Was he not born a Jew, of the seed of Abraham, of the same race with the great king David? Was not his name enrolled, and his right of citizenship fully honored and accredited in the genealogies of his people? Certainly he has never thought of any other condition of citizenship save birth,—to be begotten of a Jewish father; born of a Jewish mother. So Jesus shaped his phraseology and borrowed his words from this first and uppermost thought of his pupil. It admits of no question that Jesus chose the figure of birth and said "born" because he would take his pupil precisely where he was, and carry him forward to higher and better views of this truth, more vital than any or every other—the real condition of membership in this kingdom.

Not abruptly, therefore, as many seem to suppose, but by most natural connection with the living thought as well as the most vital want of Nicodemus, Jesus made his first point: "Except a man be born from above, he cannot see the kingdom of God." "From above (*ἀνωθεν*)," and not "again," is certainly the primary sense of the Master's word. Etymologically, the Greek—made up of two words one meaning *above*, the other *from*—should have no other primary sense than this. By universal New Testament usage, it can have no other primary meaning. The cases

are of this sort ; “ He that cometh *from above* is above all ” (John iii. 31). “ Thou couldest have no power against me, except it were given thee *from above* ” (John xix. 11). “ Every perfect gift is *from above*, and cometh down from the Father of lights ” (Jas. i. 17). Of the same class are Jas. iii. 15, 17. Other cases in the sense of what is higher in space or earlier in time may be seen in Matt. xxvii. 51 ; Mark xv. 38 ; Luke i. 3 ; John xix. 23 ; Acts xxvi. 5 ; Gal. iv. 9. It should be noted that not one of all these cases will bear the sense of *again* ; *from above* is the only sense admissible. Nor let it be said that Nicodemus understood Jesus to mean “ again ” — a second time ; and therefore we must give his words this sense. It is by no means certain that Nicodemus failed to see the primary sense of the word. His quick thought may have run thus : He says “ born from above ” ; that must imply a second birth ; and this, for an old man like myself, is an absurdity. How can it be ?

Taking no offence at this, whether it were an effort to cast him in an absurdity, or were the mere blunder of a dull perception, Jesus advances with equally solemn averment to a modified and explanatory form of stating the same great truth. It behooves us to note with the utmost care every important point of change in this second announcement. Observe, he does not drop the figure of *birth*, not by any means ; for it lies fundamentally in the great text-book of his pupil, and he sees no occasion to drop it. But he can define the great Agent in this birth more clearly. In his first statement he had only indicated the direction and source whence this Agent came, — “ from above,” — from heaven. Now he says, instead, “ Born of water and Spirit (ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος).” Water is here, what some English commentators (e.g. Wordsworth) call, in a good sense, a catch-word ; i.e. a suggestive term, designed to help the hearer to grasp his true idea. Jesus knew that in the great book of Nicodemus the agency of the Spirit was presented under the symbol of water. This was not only common ; but when any symbol at all was used, it was absolutely

universal. It appears in David, in Isaiah, in Joel, and in Zechariah, and, with wonderful pertinence and force, in Ezekiel. We will refer to these cases of usage again shortly. At present the point I make is this: that, throughout the text-book of Nicodemus, water standing constantly in the closest explanatory relation to the Spirit, would naturally carry his thought to those vitally important passages, and help him to grasp the true idea that Jesus sought to teach and impress.

It may be suggestive also to the reader of to-day, to allude to David: "Wash me thoroughly from my iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin. . . . Create in me a clean heart. . . . Take not thy holy spirit from me." (Psalm li. 2, 10, 11) — the same three points which we see in Jesus to Nicodemus; also to Isaiah: "I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground: I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thy offspring" (xliv. 3); or to Joel: "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh" (ii. 28, 29); the word "pour" involving the symbol of water. But passing by many passages of the same symbolic character, we call special attention to Ezek. xxxvi. 25-27: "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you: and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them." Here again are the same three leading points which re-appear in these words of Jesus to Nicodemus — water, the new heart or second birth, and the Spirit as the effective Agent. It would seem there can be not the least doubt that Jesus sought to suggest this very passage to Nicodemus. Virtually we may conceive him to have said: Hast thou not read in Ezekiel of water sprinkled and cleansing; of the new heart and the new spirit, and of the Spirit of God — in his own words, "my Spirit" — put within the souls of men, causing

them to walk in his statutes? Surely you will now understand what I mean by being “born from above”—“born of water and Spirit.”

Here, then, we come into the marrow of our argument in proof that, (1) on the positive side, “water” in our passage is a *symbol of the Spirit’s agency*; and (2) on the negative side, *it has no reference at all to the external rite of baptism*. For the usage of the Old Testament, not of the New, must interpret these words of Jesus. The reason for this is, that Jesus is speaking to a reader of the Old Testament, and not of the New; to one who ought to be familiar with the Old Testament, and certainly was not with the New—the yet unwritten New; who was familiar with water as the symbol of the Spirit’s agency, but who had not yet heard of baptism in its relations to the Holy Ghost; with one who, if Jesus really meant baptism, might have replied with unanswerable force: “Rabbi, there is nothing about baptism in my text-book, not the first word. Besides, thou hast not yet taught even thine own disciples to ‘baptize into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost’; how, then, canst thou reproach me for not understanding about baptism in its connection with the Spirit?” We are reasonably safe in assuming that Jesus never laid himself open to such a rebuke. We cannot be mistaken in assuming that he said nothing to Nicodemus about baptism; but used the word “water” only to help him to recall the more readily what his Old Testament scriptures had said of the agency of the Spirit in the new heart.

Can it be needful to enforce this argument by recalling the reader’s attention to that great law of all interpretation, “Usage gives law to language,” and by urging what may seem a mere truism,—that usage looks backward in time, not forward,—to what has been said, not to what is yet to be said,—in the present case, to the symbol of the Spirit’s agency in the Old Testament, and not to any yet undeveloped institution of the New? We should feel that we owed an apology for what might be deemed an insult to the

reader's good sense, were it not that almost every commentator of the ancient church or of the modern, of the German school or of the English, finds baptism here in the word "water," and not a mere symbol of the Spirit's agency. Therefore we must beg the indulgence of our readers for this attempt to carry back this discussion into the ground principles of all sound interpretation.

Let us advance to other points of the argument.

Jesus ascribes the new birth to *one* agent, not to *two*; to the Spirit only, not to baptism as one, and to the Spirit as another; for his first declaration is, "born from above." This, beyond all question, looks to the Spirit only and alone. Baptism is certainly left out. Yet more; his subsequent statement (ver. 6) following the words "born of water and Spirit," is explanatory, parallel in sense, and equivalent in meaning, with the words "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; that which is born of the Spirit" — observe, not water and Spirit, but of the Spirit, — "is spirit." This certainly omits baptism as a co-ordinate agent. We must therefore infer that the central statement, "born of water and Spirit," does not make baptism one of two agents in regeneration. If it does, then this second and explanatory statement gives but half the truth, i.e. cannot be correct. But we are bound to assume its absolute, perfect truth; and, it being of the nature of an explanation, we must the more assume that it gives us a complete as well as a just view of the statement which it explains. It therefore must be held to interpret the words "water and Spirit" in a way that rules out baptism as one of the agents in regeneration. It does not rule out the legitimate sense of *water*, used as a symbol of the Spirit's morally cleansing agency. The after statement, "born of the Spirit," means precisely the same as the former one, "born of water and Spirit," provided you make water merely a symbol of the cleansing power of the Spirit; for in either statement the power is that of the Spirit only.

Moreover, if "water" means baptism, and if, consequently,

baptism is one agent and the Spirit another, then baptism stands first—is put in the foreground, and certainly should not be suddenly dropped out of thought, not only in this discourse, but throughout all Christ's future discourses, never again to be named by either himself or his apostles as standing alongside of the Spirit in producing the new birth. On the interpretation supposed, this omission is totally unaccountable.

Worse yet is the avalanche of new and unanswered questions sprung upon us by interpreting "water" to mean the rite of baptism; e.g. such as these: Do "baptism" and the "Spirit" always go together? Are they naturally and necessarily inseparable? Does either one of the two always imply the presence and efficiency of the other? If not, then what is the moral status of one born by baptism and not born of the Spirit? What is the state of him who has been born of the Spirit but not born by baptism? Again, if these two agents are both requisite, neither being efficacious without the other, then what shall be said of him who has all the Spirit can do for him, but fails to receive baptism before he dies? And, again, so much depending on baptism, is it not at least very supposable that there may be vital conditions as to its mode of administration; the qualifications of the administrator; the sort of water used; the state of the subject in the act of being baptized; not to name numerous other points which perhaps might not create much anxiety if no very special importance attached to baptism, but which would at once rise into towering magnitude if Jesus has really made baptism equally essential with the Spirit in regeneration?

Now the point we make here is, that to spring such questions upon us, and then leave them utterly unexplained, is inexpressibly annoying, distressing, agonizing, to every seriously inquiring mind; and the more deeply we feel our need of following Christ to the very letter, and of fulfilling every condition of entering the kingdom of heaven, the more agonizing will be our suspense and our unrelieved darkness.

In view of this state of facts, we are surely safe in saying, the interpretation which brings out such results of darkness and of agonizing perplexity, is *suicidal*; it seals its own condemnation. For Jesus could not possibly have left Nicodemus in such darkness; could not possibly have opened the door of the kingdom of heaven in this dark, uncertain, unintelligible way; never could have given such an answer to an honest inquirer after the conditions of salvation.

Yet again: if "water" here means baptism in any sense or usage of the term, it must mean baptism in its closest possible relation to the Spirit's work. This must be obvious, and cannot need proof. But the baptism which stands thus related to the Holy Ghost — the distinctive baptism of Christ as contrasted with that of John the Baptist — I indeed baptize with water; he with the Holy Ghost (Matt. iii. 11; Luke iii. 16; Acts i. 5), was yet undeveloped. The doctrine of the Holy Ghost was not brought out in its fulness until shortly before the arrest of Jesus for trial and crucifixion (John xvi., xvii.). The grand commission to "baptize into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost" — which itself instituted and therefore dated Christian baptism — was given only after the resurrection. The baptism by the Holy Ghost predicted by Joel and by John the Baptist began on the day of Pentecost. Therefore we maintain that, according to the New Testament, the special type of baptism which stands in closest relation to the Spirit's work dates several years later than this discourse with Nicodemus. Therefore to make "water" in this passage mean baptism is to interpret far in advance of dates, — is to find the usage which shall give law to language not in what goes before, but in what follows long after, not in things known, but in things necessarily then unknown.

A word may be due to those who, making great account of the laws of the Greek language, insist that the figure known as "Hendiadys," — two words for one idea, as exhibited in the construction, the water or washing of the Spirit — lacks support, and is inadmissible, and therefore the sense put upon the word "water" in this Article is unauthorized.

In reply we fall back upon Old Testament usage, as in this special conversation naturally supreme. The use of the word "water" in its relation to the Spirit throughout the Old Testament sufficiently, yea, abundantly, accounts for the sense we have given the word here. It was the very word best adapted to recall the mind of Nicodemus to passages in his book which should teach him the great truth Jesus was laboring to present and enforce.

In view of these various considerations, some entirely decisive even if they stood alone, and all combined and massed being, as it seems to us, irresistible, we conclude that "water" in our passage is a symbol of the Spirit's agency, and has not the least reference to the rite of baptism. Consequently we maintain that the notion of baptismal regeneration assumed to lie in this discourse with Nicodemus, rests on a totally false interpretation, and is therefore utterly null and void. A doctrine based on a false interpretation has simply no basis at all. It is a structure with no bottom underneath, — a mere fancy, mighty perhaps to mislead and decoy souls to their ruin, but of no value in the realm of truth; of no bearing toward the vital things of human salvation.

ARTICLE III.

JONATHAN EDWARDS' LAST WILL, AND THE INVENTORY
OF HIS ESTATE.

[The following documents are valuable as illustrating the character of the age in which they were written, and the style of living which prevailed in that age, particularly among the clergymen. They throw light on several incidents in the biography of President Edwards. They illustrate the contrast between his outward condition in life and that of several European divines contemporary with him. Bishop Butler, for example, was consecrated Bishop of Bristol in 1738 ; and, as the revenues of his see amounted to only four hundred pounds per annum, the Deanery of St. Paul's was presented to him in 1740. He thus secured an income which enabled him to expend five thousand pounds in improving the Episcopal palace in Bristol. In 1747 the Primacy of the English church was presented to him [by King George II.], and the sum of twenty thousand pounds was offered to him by his nephew on condition that he would accept the office. He declined it, however, but in 1750 accepted the Bishopric of Durham, which was far more lucrative than that of Bristol. After a life distinguished by his generosity to the poor, he died in 1752. Nine months afterward, Jonathan Edwards made his last Will. It is explained by the Inventory accompanying it. Both the documents illustrate the difference between the external privileges of the sage of Stockbridge and those of the sage of Durham. The documents are copied *verbatim et literatim* from the Records in the Probate Office at Northampton. The orthography and punctuation are, of course, not those of President Edwards, but of the clerk who penned or transcribed the documents.

It may be here stated that, of the three sons named in this Will [Judge] Timothy Edwards was in his fifteenth year when the Will was written ; [Dr.] Jonathan Edwards was in

his seventh year; and Pierrepont was in his third year. The "daughter Burr" was the mother of Colonel Aaron Burr, and the "daughter Dwight" was the mother of President Timothy Dwight.

Rev. George Allen of Worcester, Massachusetts, who has been very enterprising and successful in his antiquarian researches, and Hon. George W. Hubbard of Northampton, Massachusetts, who is noted for his accuracy in attending to historical documents, deserve the thanks of our readers for the publication of the following Will and Inventory. It would not have been attempted without their aid. — E. A. P.]

In the Name of God Amen. the fourteenth day of March 1753.

I Jonathan Edwards of Stockbridge, in the Province of the Massachusetts Bay in New-England, being in my usual State of Health of Body, and in the perfect Exercise of my Understanding & Memory, through the Goodness of God; but considering the Frailty and Mortality of Mankind, and having much in the Infirmary of my Constitution to put me in Mind of Death, and make me sensible of the great Uncertainty of my Life, do make and ordain this my last Will and Testament.

And first of all, I give and commend my Soul into the Hands of God that gave it, and to the Lord Jesus Christ it's glorious, al-sufficient, faithful, & chosen Redeemer, relying alone on the free and infinite Mercy & Grace of God through his worthiness & mediation, for its eternal salvation; And my Body I commend to the Earth, to be committed to the Dust in decent Christian Burial, at the Discretion of my Executrix hereafter named; hoping, through the Grace, Faithfulness, and almighty Power of my everlasting Redeemer, to receive the same again, at the last day, made like unto his glorious Body.

And as touching such worldly Estate as it hath pleased God to give me, I give, demise and dispose of the same in the following Manner & Form.

Imprimis, I will, and hereby order that all my just & law-

ful Debts be paid and answered, and the Charges of my Funeral born by my Executrix.

Item, I give to each of my three sons, Timothy, Jonathan & Pierpont, Six hundred and thirty eight ounces of Silver, to be paid out of my Estate by my Executrix. So much of this sum as is necessary to be expended for the bringing Them up to Learning, or to some Trade, if my Executrix shall think fit that They should be so brought up; It being my Will that it should be left to her Discretion whether They, or either of Them, should be brought up to Learning, or to some Trade, or what business They should be brought up to. And if They, or any or either of Them should be brought up to Learning, or some Trade, then the Expence of the foresaid Legacy for their Education to begin from the Time They enter the College (if brought up to Learning) or when They have spent two years in an Apprenticeship, if brought up to any Trade. Excepting, that in Case any, or either of Them should be put as Apprentices to a Physician without going to College, then the Expence of the foresaid Legacy to begin with their Apprenticeship. In like manner if any, or either of Them should be put to the study of the Law, without going to College, then the Expence of the foresaid Legacy to begin from the Time of their going from Home on that Study. The Remainder of this Legacy to my sons (if any thing shall remain) to be paid Them after their taking their first Degree at College, or as soon as their Apprenticeship is finished. But if They, or any, or either of Them should not be sent abroad, either to Learning or an Apprenticeship, then the whole of the foremention'd Legacy to be paid Him or Them when arrived at the age of twenty one years.

Item, I give to such of my sons as shall be brought up to Learning (if any of Them shall be so brought up) my whole Library (excepting such Part as is hereafter mention'd, as given to my Executrix) to be given into their Possession, as soon as They have taken their first Degree: This over & above the foremention'd Six hundred thirty eight ounces of Silver.

Item, I give to my Daughter Elizabeth, Six hundred thirty by eight ounces of Silver, to be paid to her out of my Estate my Executrix, when she comes to be eighteen years of age.

Item, I give to my Daughters Lucy, Susannah & Eunice, each of Them, three hundred nineteen ounces of Silver, to be paid to Them out of my Estate, by my Executrix, when They marry, if They or either of Them should marry before They come to be eighteen years of age, or if otherwise as soon as They arrive to that age.

Item, I give to my Daughter Burr, two hundred seventy nine ounces of Silver in Addition to the Forty ounces which she has already had of her Portion, to be paid to her or her Heirs on Demand.

As to my Daughter Parsons & Daughter Dwight, They having already received their full Portion, of three hundred nineteen ounces of Silver, I make no Addition thereto in this my last Will and Testament.

Item, I will that my Children that are unmarried should be supplied by my Executrix with what she sees to be necessary beyond the Produce of their own Industry, for their Subsistence, Support & Education, until the Times Specified as above, for their receiving, or beginning to receive the fore-mention'd Legacies bequeath'd to Them.

Item, I give to my beloved Wife (whom I hereby constitute make and ordain the Sole Executrix of this my last Will and Testament) all my Manuscripts, and as many of my printed Books as comes to ten Pounds in lawful money of this Province, such as she shall chuse: and to Her I give no more of my Library, in Case one or more of my sons are brought up to Learning, & take a Degree at College: But in Case none of Them should be brought up to Learning, then I will that all my Library should be Her's. Also I give to Her, my said Executrix (with the abovesaid Limitations respecting my Library) my whole Estate, real & personal, both what is now in my Possession, and also the Portion of my Father's Estate which shall fall to me or my Heirs, to be hers, her Heirs & assigns forever, she paying

out of it the foremention'd Legacies in the manner & Time specified as above, and paying my Debts, & defraying the Charge of my Funeral, and taking the Care and Charge of the Maintenance & Education of my Children as abovesaid.

And if any of my Children should die before the Times specified as above, for their receiving the Legacy herein bequeath'd to them, then 'tis my Will that what should otherwise have been paid to them by my Executrix, shall be hers & her Heirs.

And I do hereby ratify and confirm this, and this only to be my last Will and Testament, utterly revoking, disallowing and disannulling all, and every other former Testaments, Wills, Legacies & Bequests & Executors by me in any wise before named, will'd & bequested ;

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand & Seal this fourteenth Day of March 1753.

JONATHAN EDWARDS.



Signed Seal'd, published & declared by the said Jonathan Edwards, as his last Will & Testament, in the Presence of us the Subscribers.

TIMOTHY WOODBRIDGE

SAM^L BROWN

STEPHEN NASH

May 13th 1758 All the witnesses to this Will were Sworn in Comon Form Cor^m TIMOTHY DWIGHT Jud: Prob^t

Hampshire ss May 13th 1758 The foregoing Will was presented for probate by the Executrix therein named and Timothy Woodbridge Esq Lt Samuel Brown & Mr Stephen Nash the Witnesses to the Same all personally Appearing made oath that they Saw the rev^d Jonathan Edwards late of Stockbridge in the County aforesaid Dec^d Sign & Seal & heard him pronounce & declare the Same to be his last Will & Testament and that he was of Sound mind & memory when he did it & that they all Signed as witnesses to the

Same at the Same time in presence of Said Testator & of each other wherefore at a Court of probate holden at Northampton within & for the County of Hampshire afores^d on the Second Tuesday of June being the 13th day of Said Month An Dom 1758 P Timothy Dwight Esq Judge of S^d Court The foregoing Will is ratified Approved & confirmed as the last Will & Testament of Said Deceased

P TIMOTHY DWIGHT

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

HAMPSHIRE, ss. *Probate Office.*

I, Luke Lyman, Register of the Probate Court for said County of Hampshire, having by law the custody of the Seal, and all the Records, Books, Documents and Papers of or appertaining to said Court, hereby certify the Paper hereto annexed to be a true copy of a Paper appertaining to said Court, and on file and of Record in the Office of said Court, the same being the last Will and Testament of Jonathan Edwards, late "of Stockbridge, in the province of the Massachusetts Bay in New England."

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and the Seal of said Court, this fifteenth day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five.

Attest,

LUKE LYMAN, *Register.*



An Inventory of the Estate of the Rev'd Mr. Jonathan Edwards late of Stockbridge, deceased appraised by Mess. Jos. Woodbridge, Sm^l Brown, & Josiah Jones.

Cash	£ 11 17 11½	Old D°	£ 0 10 0
Best Beever Hat	1 10 0	Black Coat	1 15 0
One D° poorer	15 0	Two poorer D°	16 0
Best Wigg	2 0 0	Morning Gown	10 0
One D° poorer	10 0	Silk Vest	8 0
Great Coat	3 0 0	Callimanco D°	15 0
		Leather D°	12 0

Cloth D°	£ 9	7	0	12	Damask Napkins at 2s	£ 1	4	0
Camlet D°		3	0	4	Damask Napkins		8	0
pr of Leather Breeches	12	0			One D°		1	6
pr Cloth D°	10	0		8	Tea Napkins at 6d		4	0
Flannel Vest	2	0		2	pr of Sheets and	3	17	6
4 Shirts at 12s	2	8	0	2	pr of Pillow Cases			
3 D° at 5s.	15	0			One Sheet		14	0
2 prs of Collars and Sleeves	8	0			pr of Sheets		3	0
6 Cravats 2 Stocks 12					One pr D°		9	3
Bands	16	0			One pr D°		8	3
4 Caps at 9d	3	0			One pr D°		7	6
4 pr of Gloves at 1s	4	0			One Sheet		11	6
2 pr of Mittens	£ 0	2	6		One pr Pillow Cases		3	0
2 pr of Knee buckles	1	4			One pr D°		3	6
Pocket Compas		8			One pr D°		5	0
pr of small Scales	10	0			One pr D°		3	0
Lancet	1	0			One pr D°		6	0
pr Spectickles	5	3			Two pr D° at 3s		6	0
pr D°		9			One pr D°		2	6
8 pr Stockings	12	0			One pr D°		1	6
pr Boots	14	0			White Counterpain		18	0
Staff	8	0			Bed, bed covering,	}		
Belt	2	0			Sheets &c in West		6	0
					Room	}		
					D° with Curtains		6	13
					&c in East Room	}		
					D° compleat		13	17
					One old D°		5	15
					One D°		3	2
					One small D°		18	0
					Silver Tankard		12	0
					One Can and Por-	}		
					ringer D°		9	10
					Dish D°		3	0
					Server D°		4	0
					9 Spoons D° at 13s		5	17
					7 Tea Spoons D°		1	0
					pr Tea-tongs D°		14	0
					Pepper Box D°		1	6
					Burnt China furni-	}		
					ture, Bowl & 12 Plates		6	0
					Pewter Tea Pot,		4	6
					One small D°		3	0
					One D°		0	9
					Earthen D°		2	0
					Small D°		1	6
					2 Earthen Bowls		2	3
					2 White stone Sauce Boats		2	3
					China Bowl		10	0
					Small D°		4	0
					One D°		2	0
					Sugar Dish China		3	0
					Cream Cups D°		2	0
					4 China Plates		8	0
					12 China Tea Cups & Plates		15	0

Household Furniture

2 pr of Sheets and	}	3	0	0
4 pr of Pillow Cases				
20 yds of Sheeting at 2s		2	0	0
9 $\frac{1}{2}$ of Irish Linen		1	11	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
1 $\frac{3}{8}$ of Bag Holland		11	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Damask Table Cloth		18	0	
Diaper D°		12	0	
One D°		3	6	
Damask D°		2	0	
3 Diaper D° at 10s		1	10	0
One D°		8	0	
One D°		0	10	0
One D°		7	0	
One D°		8	0	
2 D° at 5s		10	0	
2 D° at 4s		8	0	
One D°		12	0	
One D°		2	6	
One D°		3	0	
Plain D°		1	0	
21 $\frac{1}{2}$ yds of Diaper at 2s 4d		2	10	2
6 Diaper Towels		7	6	
2 D° at 2s 2d		4	4	
2 D° at 6d		1	0	
4 D° at 9d		3	0	
3 D° at 1s		3	0	
3 D° at 1s		3	0	
3 D° at 10d		2	6	

White Stone Tea } £ 0 2 0	4 Trammels	£ 0 16 0
Cups &c }	Chopping Knife	0 9
12 White Stone Plates 12 0	4 Smoothing Irons	8 0
2 Glass Cups 2 0	4 Pails	6 0
3 Tumblers D° 3 0	4 Butter Tubs	5 0
One D° at 6d Four } wine Glasses } 5 0	A Small Pail	0 9
4 Salts at 9d a Crewet 6 8	2 Cheese Presses	6 0
One Glass Bottle 0 9	Bowls Tubs & Trais	2 11 0
6 Pewter Plates 10 0	Barrels	11 0
12 D° 1 1 0	One Bar ^l Churn	5 0
8 D° for Soop 8 0	Frying Pan	6 6
8 D° for — — 8 0	2 Foot Wheels	12 0
Old Pewter 10 0 ³ / ₄	Great Wheel	1 0
8 Pewter Basons 6 0	pr of Cards	4 0
2 Pewter Cups 3 9	Tea Chest	9 0
Large Bason D° 1 6	7 Best Chairs	0 16 4
11 Pewter Platters 3 2 10 ¹ / ₂	7 D°	9 4
12 Cake Pans 2 0	Arm Chair	2 0
6 Patte Pans 1 6	6 Plain Chairs	8 0
One Tunnel 0 3	Gun	1 0 0
6 Tin Pepper Box & Cups 0 8	2 Powder horns	1 2
Cullander & Candle } Molds }	Hone	3 0
3 Tin Pans 3 6	3 Raisors 3s Gimblets 6d	3 6
Brass Candle Stick 6 0	Lead 1s Couch Bead 14s	15 0
D° 5 0	Desk and Book Case	2 0 0
3 D° 12 0	Small Book Case	1 0 0
pr of Snuffers w ^t Stand D° 4 0	Book Table	6 0
2 Iron Candle Sticks 6 0	Writing Table	6 0
2 D° and Snuffers 2 0	Looking Glass	4 0 0
Long Candle Stick 6 0	Messr ^a Collman and } Cooper in Metz }	6 0
pr of Hand Irons w ^t } Brass Plates }	Silk Fringe	12 0
One pr D° 5 0	One Blanket	2 0
2 pr D° 11 0	One D°	9 0
3 pr of Tongs & Fire } Shovels }	One D°	10 0
One Fire Shovel 2 8	Bed Coverlet	1 2 0
One Trivet 1 3	One D°	15 0
pr of Steel yards 3 0	Two blankets	4 0
Large Tea Kettle 1 1 0	Bed Coverlet	5 0
Small D° 12 0	One D°	1 6
Copper Sauce Pan 9 0	Looking Glass	1 4 0
D° 6 0	Table	10 0
Brass Skillet 3 0	small D°	4 0
Brass Kettle 3 0	Chest	4 0
D° 1 0 0	First Trunk	14 0
D° 1 15 0	Second D°	5 6
Warming Pan 4 0	Third D°	1 0
Iron Pot 12 0	Fourth D°	8 0
D° 5 0	Fifth D°	1 0
Kettle D° 4 0	Sixth D°	4 0
2 Brass Skimmers 0 7	Meal Chests &c	13 6
Gridiron 0 4	Two bed steads	6 0

6 Bags at 2s	£ 0 12 0	Quick Stock	
Looking Glass	4 0	A Negro Boy named	} £ 30 0 0
D°	1 10 0	Titus	
D°	2 0	Horse	3 6 8
Two Chests of Drawers	1 10 0	Yoke of Oxen	11 0 0
Table	3 0	Yoke of Steers	6 10 0
D°	3 0	Two Cows at £3,—	6 0 0
Tea Cannister	8 0	Four D° at 50s	10 0 0
Small Pictures	2 0	Two Heiffers at 30s	3 0 0
42 Glass Bottles	17 6	One Calf	16 0
4 Stone Juggs	8 0	Six Hogs	3 12 0
18 Knives and Forks	14 0		
3 Cussions	5 0	Library	
Hair broom	2 0	Of Folios 38 Volls	26 3 0
Hand brush	1 0	Quartos 34 Volls	8 11 9
Cloth D°	0 6	Octavos 99 V°	26 16 6
White Stone Mugg	0 9	Duodecimos 130 V°	8 15 3
4 Earthen Cups	1 0	Books published by the	} 4 16 7
Dial	0 6	Owner lately deccased,	
2 Baskets	1 0	25 V°	} 4 13 0
Chafing Dish	6 0	Pamphlets 536	
House and Barn Stores		Manuscripts	
Tow and Linen Yarn	1 2 0	Folios 15 V°	} 6 0 0
Wool D°	10 9	Quartos 15 V°	
8 lb of Cotton Wool	14 0	Sermons 1074 V°	
60 lb of Cheese	1 5 0		
40 lb of Beef	6 8	Maps	
Turnips & Potatoes	10 6	Four at 6s	1 4 0
Leather unwrought	14 0	Seven at 1s	7 0
One Raw hide	6 8	One at 6s	6 0
Hay	8 0 0		
Oates	2 5 0	Lands and Real Estate	
Indian Corn	3 0 0	Eight Ac° lying in	} 21 15 0
Buck Wheat	2 6 0	Stockbridge near	
Flax	4 0	Dea° Browns	} 160 0 0
Husbandry Utensils		House Barn &c and lot	
Cart and Horse gearing	4 0 0	on which they stand	} 36 0 0
Two Chains	1 10 0	in Stockbridge	
Yoke & Irons	4 0	Lot of 12 Ac° near M°	} 62 10 0
Beagle and Wedges	4 0	Jo° Woodbridge's	
Old Sithes	5 8	24 Ac° lying on the	} 30 0 0
Hay Knife and Hook	4 0	Hill in Sd Town	
Plow and Irons	15 0	between Land of	} 12 0 0
Harrow	10 0	Messr° Jones & Dix-	
Hatchets	11 0	ley's	} 30 0 0
Saddebags	7 0	5 Ac° in the Meadow	
Bridle	2 0	between the House	} 12 0 0
Tow Axes	9 0	and the River	
Hammer & Pinchers	1 0	About 3 Ac° on the	} 12 0 0
Old Iron	3 6	Plain so called in sd	
Hand Saw and Chissels	3 0	Town	
Break and Hay Fork	1 6		

480 Ac ^s on the Road leading from sd Town to Poontoo- suck in the Ministers Grant	£144 0 0	One Right & an Half of Land in Marlbor- ough Township	£ 10 0 0
$\frac{3}{4}$ of an Ac ^r in the com- mon Meadow on the south of the River	1 10 0	Land at Windsor to be in the Possession of Mr ^s Easter Ed- wards during her life Time	1 0 0
Land in Pelham — Ac ^s at 4s 6d p ^r Ac	— — —	A Right in the Sus- quehannah Purchase	2 14 0
Right of Land in Win- chester Township	40 0 0		

T. DWIGHT Jun^r }
TIM^o EDWARDS } Ex^t of the Ex^t of sd Dec^d.

JOSEPH WOODBRIDGE }
SAM^l BROWN } Apprizers
JOSIAH JONES }

July 25th 1759. Sworn to by both Exs

HAMPSHIRE ss July 25 1759. Timothy Dwight Jun^r & Timothy Edwards Executors of the last Will & Testament of M^{rs} Sarah Edwards Deed who was Executrix of the Will and Testament of the revd Jonathan Edwards late of Stockbridge in the County aforesaid Deed presenting the foregoing Inventory of the Estate of the said Jonathan Deed made oath that it is a True & perfect Inventory of Said Estate as far as has already come to their knowledge & that if more of said Estate hereafter appear they will readily make Discovery of the Same to the Judge of probate for Sd County or his Successors in the office from time to time.

Jurat Cor Jud Att T DWIGHT JUN. Reg.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

HAMPSHIRE, ss. *Probate Office.*

I, Luke Lyman, Register of the Probate Court for said County of Hampshire, having by law, the custody of the Seal, and all the Records, Books, Documents and Papers of or appertaining to said Court, hereby certify the Paper hereto annexed to be a true copy of a Paper appertaining to said Court, and on file and of Record in the Office of said Court, the same being the Inventory of the Estate of Rev'd Jonathan Edwards, late of Stockbridge, deceased.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and the Seal of said Court, this twenty-third day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five.

Attest,

LUKE LYMAN, *Register.*



ARTICLE IV.

RECENT WORKS BEARING ON THE RELATION OF
SCIENCE TO RELIGION.

BY REV. GEORGE F. WRIGHT, ANDOVER, MASS.

NO. II.—THE DIVINE METHOD OF PRODUCING LIVING SPECIES.

IN preparing our remarks on the subject named above, we have consulted the following works. We specify the editions to which we have particularly referred. We do not pretend that we include in our list all the works which have been published on the subject, but mention those only which we have examined.

Agassiz. 1. Principles of Zoölogy; touching the Structure, Development, Distribution, and Natural Arrangement of the Races of Animals, Living and Extinct. By Louis Agassiz and A. A. Gould. Revised edition. pp. 248. Boston. 1855.

2. Contributions to the Natural History of the United States of America [Essay on Classification]. Vol. i. pp. 232. Boston. 1857. Reviewed by Dana in American Journal of Science for March 1858. pp. 202-216; April, pp. 321-341.

3. Methods of Study in Natural History. pp. 313. Boston. 1871.

Argyll. 1. The Reign of Law. By the Duke of Argyll. First American from fifth London edition. pp. 462, xxvii. New York. 1868.

2. Primeval Man. An Examination of some Recent Speculations. pp. 200. New York. 1869.

3. Article in Contemporary Review, Vol. xxvi. pp. 352-376.

Chadbourne. Final Cause of Varieties. By P. A. Chadbourne, Professor in [now President] Williams College. Bib. Sac., Vol. xxi. pp. 348-362.

Chapman. Evolution of Life. Philadelphia. 1873.

Cope. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. xiii. (1869). The Hypothesis of Evolution in Lippincott's Magazine. See also University Series, No. 4.

Dana. 1. Manual of Geology: Treating of the Principles of the Science; with special reference to American Geological History. By James D. Dana. Silliman Professor of Geology and Mineralogy in Yale College. 2d ed. pp. 828. New York. 1875.

2. Articles in Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xiii. pp. 80, 631; Vol. xiv. pp. 388, 461, 854. New Englander, Vol. xxii. pp. 283, 495. American Journal of Science for March 1858, pp. 202-216; April, pp. 321-341.

Darwin. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. By Charles Darwin, M.A., F.R.S., etc. 6th ed. pp. xxi, 458. London. 1873.

2. The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication. 2 Vols. pp. 494, 568. New York: Orange Judd and Co.

3. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. New edition, revised and augmented. Complete in one volume. pp. 688. New York. 1875.

4. The Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals. pp. 374. London. 1872.

Dawson. 1. The Story of the Earth and Man. By J. W. Dawson, LL.D. pp. 493. New York. 1874.

2. Nature and the Bible. pp. 257. New York. 1875.

Foster, Rev. Randolph S., D.D., LL.D., President of the Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J. The Ingham Lectures. pp. 1-106. Cleveland, O. 1873.

Gray. 1. Natural Selection not inconsistent with Natural Theology. A Free Examination of Darwin's Treatise on the Origin of Species, and of its American Reviewers. By Asa Gray, M.D., Fisher Professor of Natural History in Harvard University. Reprinted from the Atlantic Monthly for July, August, and October, 1860. pp. 55. London. 1861.

2. Articles in the American Journal of Science and Arts for March 1860, pp. 153-184; Sept. 1860, pp. 226-239.

3. Articles in The Nation (New York), Vol. xviii. pp. 44-46 and 348-351.

4. An Address of Professor Asa Gray, President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Delivered at the Meeting held at Dubuque, Iowa, Aug. 1872.

5. Memoirs of American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Vol. vi. pp. 377-452. Boston. 1859.

Haeckel. 1. Generelle Morphologie der Organismen. Allgemeine Grundzüge der organischen Formen-Wissenschaft, mechanisch begründet durch die von Charles Darwin, reformirte Descendenz-Theorie, von Dr. Ernst Haeckel, Professor an der Universität Jena. Zwei Bände, pp. 574, 462. Berlin. 1866.

2. Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte, etc. pp. 568. Berlin. 1868. A translation of this work has been published in two volumes by Appleton and Co.

Henslow. The Theory of Evolution of Living Things, and the Application of the Principles of Evolution to Religion, considered as Illustrative of the Wisdom and Beneficence of the Almighty. By the Rev. George Henslow, M.A., F.L.S., F.G.S. pp. 220. London. 1873.

Hodge. 1. Systematic Theology. By Charles Hodge, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. 3 Vols. pp. 648, 732, 880. New York. 1872, 1873.

2. What is Darwinism? pp. 178. New York. 1874.

Huxley. 1. On the Origin of Species; or, The Causes of the Phenomena of Organic Nature. A Course of Six Lectures to Working Men. By Thomas H. Huxley, F.R.S., F.L.S. pp. 150. New York. 1872.

2. Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews, etc. pp. 344. London. 1872.

3. Critiques and Addresses. pp. 350. London. 1873.

Hooker. Flora of Tasmania. Introductory Essay, American Journal of Science (1860), Vol. xxix. pp. 1 ff., and 305 ff.

Hyatt (Professor Alpheus). Memoirs of the Boston Society of Natural History, Vol. i., part 2d (1867); American Naturalist, Vol. iv. pp. 230-277 (June 1870).

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Rev. C. L. Brace. Vol. CXI. 282-311, Vol. CXIII. pp. 63-103, Vol. CXV. pp. 1-31, Vol. CXVI. pp. 245-310. These last four were by Chauncey Wright, of Cambridge, Mass. They are a defense of Darwinism against the attacks of Mivart; and were so much valued by Mr. Darwin that the first of the series was republished by him in pamphlet form.

North British Review. Vol. XXXII. pp. 455-487, Vol. XLVI. (June 1867) pp. 277-318. This last is anonymous, but is one of the ablest arguments against Darwinism that has appeared.

Princeton Review. Vol. XXXII. pp. 577-608, Vol. XXXIV. pp. 435-464, Vol. XLI. pp. 5-33, Vol. XLII. pp. 55-86.

It is neither necessary nor desirable for the understanding of the subject to peruse all the works here mentioned. A word of advice will doubtless be acceptable to those who have not unlimited time to spend upon the literature of the subject. The following books are indispensable to a just appreciation of the state of progress in Evolutionary Theories: Darwin's *Origin of Species*, 6th ed.; *Descent of Man*, 2d ed.; *Animals and Plants under Domestication*; Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, 10th or 11th ed.; Dana's *Manual of Geology*, 2d ed.; Agassiz on *Classification, or Methods of Study in Natural History*; Owen's *Palaeontology*, and chap. 40 in *Anatomy of the Vertebrates*; Wallace on *Natural Selection*; Whewell, Mill, and Jevons on *Inductive Logic*.

Of the shorter treatises the articles of Prof. Gray, in the order named, should have the first place. They are marked equally by scientific accuracy, philosophical insight, metaphysical discrimination, and religious reverence. It is greatly to be regretted that they are not collected and published in a single volume. Huxley, Henslow, Schmidt, St. Clair, and Winchell give tolerably complete summaries of the arguments for the Darwinian Theory. Schmidt and Haeckel are too ready to reason upon the subject from *a priori* principles, and are offensively dogmatic. The weightiest objections to Darwinism are found best stated, first, in his own works, then in those of Agassiz, Argyll, Dawson, Mivart, Owen, and Wallace. Cope, Gray, Henslow, Hyatt, Mivart, Owen, St. Clair, Wallace, and Winchell are Evolutionists, without being altogether Darwinians. Hodge has so many misrepresentations that he furnishes much ground for the little esteem with which theological criticisms of scientific subjects are regarded by scientific men.¹

¹ In confirmation of this assertion, which is not made recklessly, the reader is referred to the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xxxi. pp. 788, 789, for one glaring instance of misapprehension. For a second, let the reader compare what Huxley really said with what Dr. Hodge, on page 16 of the 2d Vol. of his *Theology* makes him say. Huxley is made to say that he from the first regarded Darwin's "*Origin of Species*" as "*the death-blow of teleology, i.e. of the doctrine of design and purpose in nature.*" We have no fondness for Professor Huxley,

Twenty-five years ago naturalists and theologians were in a heated discussion over the "Unity of the Human Race." The doctrine of the immutability of species was pushed by some to such an extreme, that they declared it incredible that the different races of men should have descended from a single pair. Professor Agassiz was an advocate of this view; and his name was, on that account, a terror to orthodox interpreters of the Bible. Even in 1872 Dr. Hodge makes the assertion that the unity of the human race is denied by "a large and increasing class of scientific men."¹ It would gratify a good deal of curiosity if the learned doctor had informed us from what ranks this "large class of scientific men," who disbelieve in the unity of the human race, is receiving so many recruits. For it seems to appear on the face of almost all recent works scientifically treating the subject of vegetable or animal life, that the question of the day is not whether the human races are of common origin, but

and should despair of success in any attempt to reconcile with one another, all of his crude and heated utterances; but even he should have his due. Professor Huxley did indeed write that "teleology, *as commonly understood*, had received its death-blow at Mr. Darwin's hands." Dr. Hodge, when he quotes Huxley on page eighty of his book on Darwinism, inserts the omitted phrase which we have italicized, but does not seem to see that it in any degree removes the curse from Professor Huxley, nor does he appear to have noticed the following significant sentences which occur in the very paragraph from which his quotation is drawn. "We [Huxley] should say that, apart from his [Darwin's] merits as a naturalist, he has rendered a most remarkable service to philosophical thought by enabling the student of nature to recognize, to their fullest extent, those adaptations to purpose which are so striking in the organic world, and which teleology has done good service in keeping before our minds, without being false to the fundamental principles of a scientific conception of the universe. The apparently diverging teachings of the teleologist and the morphologist are reconciled by the Darwinian hypothesis." — Lay Sermons (4th ed.), pp. 303, 304. London, 1872. Compare further, Dr. Hodge's quotation from, and comments upon, Professor Huxley's Article in the Academy (1869), with the full statement of Professor Huxley (republished in Critiques and Addresses, pp. 305-308), in which he says, p. 307, "The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, . . . the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe."

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. ii. p. 77.

whether the whole animal kingdom may not have descended in unbroken chain from one progenitor.

I. OUTLINE.¹

This question we propose to discuss in the following order:

(1) We will present, as fully as our limits will allow, the argument in favor of the evolutionary origin of species.

(2) Give a summary of the objections to which these arguments are open, together with the rejoinders of those who advocate the origin of species through evolution.

(3) Treat of the analogies between Calvinism and the modern bent of scientific men.

(4) Make a provisional adjustment of evolutionary theories to the true doctrine of final cause or design in nature.

(5) Discuss more particularly the attitude of the Bible toward scientific discovery.

The present paper will be devoted to a statement of the argument in favor of the Origin of Species by Evolution.

II. REASONS FOR ENTERING THIS FIELD OF DISCUSSION.

There is constant danger that misunderstanding should

¹ We beg leave to emphasize in the outset every term in the title of this Article. For we never mean to lose sight of these two postulates, both of which we shall defend at a later stage of the discussion. 1st. That scientific men deal only with the method that appears in the sequences of secondary causes. Even when treating of the origin of species, they do not, if they speak as scientific men, refer to the first and true causal origin. This is a problem of theology. But in scientific treatises reference is had solely to the order under which actual forces are seen or inferred to operate. 2d. Whatever the method may be, God is the author of it. God both makes the machine and operates it. The writer begs still farther leave to warn his readers that he must not be held to personal responsibility for the theories here discussed, and the arguments presented. This, and the succeeding paper in the series, are summaries of the arguments of others. It is best also here to emphasize the fact that if the theory of natural selection should be established in its general conclusions, it would not necessarily comprehend the essential characteristics of man in the scope of its operations. And on the other hand, the miraculous creation of man might no more disprove the general theory of natural selection than an ordinary miracle of Christ would disprove the general reign of natural law. The exception may even prove the rule. There would be no miracle if uniformity did not ordinarily prevail. There is, doubtless, miraculous interference with uniformities of nature when there is sufficient reason for it, and only then.

arise between the students of nature and the interpreters of the Bible. They who should dwell together in peace are too often at war with one another. It is our purpose to mediate between these parties, to show how asperities may be avoided, to reveal the body of truth which both hold in common, and more definitely to mark out the provinces in which each may have undisputed sway.

Dr. Whewell,¹ in his chapter on the "Relation of Tradition to Palaetiology," has with great wisdom and candor discussed the relations that ought to subsist between theologians and men of science. He shows, in the first place, how the promulgators of religious truth are compelled to avoid reference to the more recondite matters of science, for fear of calling attention away from the weightier matters of the spiritual life that more personally concern men. He points out that the flexibility of the scriptures in adapting their teaching to scientific discoveries arises chiefly from this excellence, that their language is "adapted to the common state of man's intellectual development, in which he is supposed not to be possessed of science."² But from these facts there must arise trials of faith.

"The moral and providential relations of man's condition are so much more important to him than mere natural relations, that at first we may well suppose he will accept the sacred narrative, as not only unquestionable in its true import, but also as a guide in his views even of mere natural relations. He will try to modify the conceptions which he entertains of objects and their properties, so that the sacred narrative of the supernatural condition shall retain the first meaning which he had put upon it in virtue of his own habits in the usage of language."³

In the same chapter it is very well remarked that physical science can tell us nothing of the origin of things.

"The thread of induction respecting the natural course of the world snaps in our fingers when we try to ascertain where its beginning is. Since, then, science can teach us nothing positive respecting the beginning of things, she can neither contradict nor confirm what is taught by scripture on that subject. . . . The providential history of the world has its own beginning and its own evidence."⁴

¹ The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Vol. ii. pp. 137-157.

² Ibid. p. 143.

³ Ibid. pp. 141, 142.

⁴ Ibid. p. 145.

Another fact of great interest is noticed by the same author.

“Scientific views, when familiar, do not disturb the authority of scripture. . . . When the language of scripture, invested with its new meaning, has become familiar to men, it is found that the ideas which it calls up are quite as reconcilable as the former ones were with the most entire acceptance of the providential dispensation. And when this has been found to be the case, all cultivated persons look back with surprise at the mistake of those who thought that the essence of the revelation was involved in their own arbitrary version of some collateral circumstance in the revealed narrative. At the present day we can hardly conceive how reasonable men could ever have imagined that religious reflections on the stability of the earth, and the beauty and use of the luminaries which revolve around it, would be interfered with by an acknowledgment that this rest and motion are apparent only. And thus the authority of revelation is not shaken by any changes introduced by the progress of science in the mode of interpreting expressions which describe physical objects and occurrences ; provided the new interpretation is admitted at a proper season, and in a proper spirit ; so as to soften, as much as possible, both the public controversies and the private scruples which almost inevitably accompany such an alteration.”¹

The question is then raised as to the proper time and spirit in which the “religious and enlightened commentator” is to make such changes in the current interpretation of sacred scripture as shall adjust it to new scientific theories. We may sum up his views in two or three easily remembered sentences. (1) Do not make scientific difficulties for the sake of adjusting scripture to them. The conservatism of religious feeling is of so much value that it is a crime to disturb it wantonly, or before there is a tolerably clear case of necessity. (2) Face the difficulties manfully when they appear, and show the same candor in your treatment of scientific men that you ask them to exhibit to you. Both theologians and men of science should remember, as Kepler says, that “it is for their common advantage to conciliate the finger and the tongue of God—his works and his word.”² There is great loss in unreasonably delaying the concessions

¹ The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Vol. ii. pp. 146, 147. See also, History of Inductive Science, Vol. i. p. 286.

² Quoted by Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Vol. ii. p. 153.

which biblical interpreters must from time to time make to science.

In endeavoring to state and measure the scientific argument with which our discussion has to do, it may seem unfortunate that this is not a scientific periodical, and that the writer is not recognized as authority on any scientific subject. This, however, has its advantages. Unless a scientific theory is of such a nature, and is so far developed and established, that its leading points can be both apprehended and stated by the average religious teacher, the time has not arrived for religious teachers to pay much attention to it. Furthermore, we who make a special study of historical records and monuments can pass intelligent judgment on the credibility of witnesses who report scientific observations, and upon the bearing of their established facts upon a theory of causation. For scientific observers do not pretend to see the bond of secondary causation which unites similar things together. The existence of such a bond is, in any case, an inference. It is visible only to thought, and is discoverable only by the exercise of reason.

We must remember also, that the discussions upon which we are entering belong to the inductive sciences, in which it is unfair to demand demonstration. In this realm we must be satisfied with the highest attainable degree of probability. We must not overlook the distinction between a *theory* and a *theorem*. The first is of induction; the second of deduction. One is provisional; the other is absolute.

As religious teachers, dealing with the proofs of an external revelation, we are to be classed with inductive philosophers. The providential dispensation known as Christianity, is established by a rigorous application of the principles of induction. We are confident that the present bent of the scientific mind is favorable to that style of reasoning by which the credibility and authority of the Bible have been established. In the present endeavor to account for the origin of species, science is taking a higher aim than has heretofore been seriously entertained by any large number

of her votaries. Scientific men aim now to do far more than observe and classify. They are seeking the deeper meaning of the facts which they observe. They are endeavoring to trace out the bond of order which all believe to reign supreme in nature. This kind of intellectual endeavor is congenial to the theological mind. Because this work is both important and appropriate for us, we make bold to enter the arena.

III. DEFINITION OF SPECIES.

It is necessary at the outset to ask the question, What is a species? Indeed our whole discussion will have regard to the true meaning of that word. With the limited space at our command, it would not be best to plunge into the deep mysteries of nominalism and realism. These mysteries, however, are more closely related to our subject than might at first be supposed. The definition of species given by Prof. Dana is sufficiently realistic.¹ "A species among living things, then, as well as inorganic, is based on *a specific amount or condition of concentrated force defined in the act or law of creation*," i.e. a species is a real unfolding of a real force, and by whatever act or law of creation defined, is the realization of a well-defined divine idea. But even this definition, distinct as it is in recognizing the creative act which is the initiatory cause of the species, does not determine the mode through which the creative impulse reaches its realization in natural forms. For anything given in this definition, we may suppose that the forces which became at last concentrated in the conditions of specific forms of life, may have run in devious and independent channels during all the time preceding their intersection and consequent production of what we call the species.

A prominent question involved in the study of natural history is, What part does inheritance play in giving to individuals that degree of likeness which constitutes them one species? The ordinary answer has been that the points of

¹ See Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xiv. p. 861.

likeness which characterize a species are the result of the law of inheritance ; while the variations which constitute varieties and sub-varieties, are the result of the action of the diverse conditions of existence.

According to Linnaeus,¹ “Species tot sunt, quot diversas formas ab initio produxit Infinitum Ens ; quae formae, secundum generationis inditas leges, produxere plures, at sibi semper similes.” In the words of Professor Oliver, “All individual plants which resemble each other so nearly that it is consistent with experience to suppose that they may all have sprung from one parent stock, are regarded as belonging to the same species.”² Agassiz insists that to bring in descent from one parent stock, as an element in the definition of species, is an entire begging of the question, and only serves to add perplexity to the subject ;³ for no one has ever preserved the genealogy of plant or animal. If the individuals of a species have a common pedigree, how is that to be proved ? It is evident that aside from inferential proof, there is none. “*Individual plants [or animals] which resemble each other so nearly that it is consistent with experience to suppose that they may all have sprung from one parent stock,*” are inferred to have a common ancestry. And for this reason ; that inheritance is, in the case of plants and animals, a known cause of resemblance in operation around us on the most extended scale ; and furthermore, it is the only known cause of such resemblance. It is by no false analogy that inheritance is brought in as the bond of unity in the constitution of a species. The bond, however, is usually inferential ; and naturalists experience a vast amount of perplexity in determining how great a degree of unlikeness is compatible with descent from a common ancestry. The practical difficulty encountered in limiting species may be seen in a statement of Dr. Gray.

¹ Philosophia Botanica (1770), §157, p. 99. Quoted in Jevon's Principles of Science, Vol. ii. p. 415.

² Lessons in Elementary Botany. By David Oliver, F.R.S., F.L.S., etc. (3d ed., London, 1870), p. 122.

³ See Essay on Classification, p. 163 ff.

"In a flora so small as the British, one hundred and eighty-two plants generally reckoned as varieties have been ranked by some botanists as species. Selecting the British genera which include the most polymorphous forms, it appears that Babington's Flora gives them two hundred and fifty-one species, Bentham's only one hundred and twelve; a difference of one hundred and thirty-nine doubtful forms. . . . Illustrations of this kind may be multiplied to a great extent."¹

Commenting upon these facts, the distinguished botanist from whom we quote farther remarks :

"They make it plain that whether species in nature are aboriginal and definite or not, our practical conclusions about them, as embodied in systematic works, are not *facts* but *judgments*, and largely fallible judgments. . . . We are constrained by our experience to admit the strong likelihood, in botany, that varieties, on the one hand, and what are called closely-related species, on the other, do not differ except in degree. Whenever the wider difference separating the latter can be spanned by intermediate forms, as it sometimes is, no botanist long resists the inevitable conclusion. . . . Whether we should continue to regard the forms in question as distinct species, depends upon what meaning we shall finally attach to that term; and that depends upon how far the doctrine of derivation can be carried back, and how well it can be supported."

But this question runs insensibly into others of a kindred nature. The foregoing and the two following sections are one problem in three forms of statement.

IV. IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY OF CLASSIFICATION.

It is not optional with the scientific man whether he classify the facts of nature. He must classify or retire from the field. Unless he group things according to their prominent resemblances, disregarding, meanwhile, their minor differences, the man of science will be put to utter confusion by the interminable number of objects that come to his attention. Even as it is, the progress of science in enumerating so-called species is rapidly outstripping the power of retention which a single finite mind may possess. For example, botanists enumerate more than one hundred thousand species of phaenogamous plants; zoölogists, more than three hundred and fifty thousand species of animals. There are three hundred thousand species of the class articulata, and

¹ Silliman's Journal of Science, March, 1860, p. 168 f.

twenty-one thousand of vertebrata.¹ The elder De Candolle spent a long life on a descriptive catalogue of phaenogamous plants. His son took up the work, but has recently abandoned it in despair. It is estimated that nearly four hundred years would be required for one man to arrange and systematically describe them.² Between four and five hundred closely-printed octavo pages are required for their enumeration of the species of the Leguminous family,³ and between sixteen and seventeen hundred for those of the great family of Compositae. Were it not for the fact that there is method in the relation of this vast multitude of species to one another, naturalists might well cease from the work of classification, and limit themselves to the contemplation of the individuals. But species do not have a hap-hazard existence; they fall into a hierarchy of orders:

“It is a truly wonderful fact, the wonder of which we are apt to overlook from familiarity, that all animals and all plants throughout all time and space, should be related to each other in natural groups, subordinate to groups, in the manner which we everywhere behold, namely, varieties of the same species most closely related together; species of the same genus less closely and unequally related together, forming sections and sub-genera; species of distinct genera much less closely related; and genera related in different degrees, forming sub-families, families, orders, sub-classes, and classes. The several subordinate groups in any class cannot be ranked in a single file, but seem rather to be clustered round points, and these round other points, and so on in almost endless cycles.”⁴

“According to the laws of botanical nomenclature adopted by the International Botanical Congress, held at Paris, August, 1867, no less than twenty-one names of classes[i.e. grades of relationship], are recognized, viz. Kingdom, Division, Sub-division, Class, Sub-class, Cohort, Sub-cohort, Order, Sub-order, Tribe, Sub-tribe, Genus, Sub-genus, Section, Sub-section, Species, Sub-species, Variety, Sub-variety, Variation, Sub-variation.”⁵

V. DOES A SPECIES HAVE MORE THAN ONE CENTRE OF DISPERSION ?

It will be well at this point to consider more attentively

¹ See Dana's *Manual of Geology* (1st ed.), p. 575.

² See *Popular Science Monthly*, April, 1874. Also, *Nation*, Vol. xviii. p. 42.

³ *Lindley's Ladies' Botany*, Vol. i. p. 122.

⁴ *Darwin's Origin of Species*, pp. 135, 136.

⁵ *Jevon's Principles of Science*, Vol. i. p. 417.

how a scientific man undertakes to solve the problem of an abnormal distribution of a species. When, for example, the same, or apparently the same species of animal or plant is found distributed over both England and the Continent, the question at once arises, how was this distribution effected? There are few intellectual operations more interesting than to observe the method of a naturalist as he attacks some of the more difficult of these problems concerning the distribution of the members of a single species. The law of parsimony, or of the continuity of nature, is of the highest importance in the inductive sciences. Hugh Miller thus emphasizes the necessity of insisting that members of the same species must have originated in the same centre.

“If members of the same species may exist through *de novo* production, without hereditary relationship, so thoroughly, in consequence, does the fabric of geological reasoning fall to the ground, that we find ourselves incapacitated from regarding even the bed of common cockle or mussel shells, which we find lying a few feet from the surface on our raised beaches, as of the existing creation at all. Nay, even the human remains of our moors may have belonged, if our principle of relationship in each species be not a true one, to some former creation, cut off from that to which we ourselves belong, by a wide period of death. All palaeontological reasoning is at an end forever, if identical species can originate in independent centres, widely separated from each other by periods of time; and if they fail to originate in periods separated by time, how or why in centres separated by space?”¹

Thus also Dr. Gray.

“The ordinary and generally-received view assumes the independent, specific creation of each kind of plant and animal in a primitive stock, which reproduces its like from generation to generation, and so continues the species. . . . Whenever two reputed species are found to blend in nature, through a series of intermediate forms, community of origin is inferred, and all the forms, however diverse, are held to belong to one species. . . . The orthodox conception of species is that of lineal descent: all the descendants of a common parent, and no other, constitute a species; they have a certain identity, because of their descent, by which they are supposed to be recognizable. So naturalists had a distinct idea of what they meant by the term species, and a practical rule, which was hardly the less useful because difficult to apply in many cases, and because its application was indirect, that is, the community of origin had to be inferred

¹ Footprints of the Creator, p. 255.

from the likeness ; that degree of similarity, and that only, being held to be conspecific which could be shown or reasonably inferred to be compatible with a common origin.”¹

In accounting for the distribution of a species over both England and the Continent, it is readily seen to be no violent supposition that the island was formerly a part of the continent. But the following problem, to which Prof. Asa Gray² applied himself a few years ago, is far more intricate ; yet it is extremely difficult, not to say impossible, for one to follow the steps of the reasoning and not assent to the conclusion. The facts are these : there is a remarkable degree of identity between the species of animals and plants in Japan and those of the Atlantic basin of the United States, though climatic and oceanic barriers now absolutely forbid migration. And still further, the flora of the Eastern United States much more nearly resembles that in Japan than either of those resembles the flora of Oregon and California. A threefold combination is required in the key that unlocks the problem ; and this he produces. First comes the geological evidence of the existence of a warm climate, and of these species, or their representatives, in the lands that during the tertiary period clustered about the north pole. Secondly, there is the evidence of a succeeding glacial period which drove before it southward these inhabitants and their temperate climate, till at length all occupied corresponding lower latitudes on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. Thus we have the distribution and the similarity accounted for. Thirdly, there is the wide sweep of forces which produces similarity of climate on the eastern sides of the continents and a contrast between that of the eastern shores and that of the western. In these forces we have the sieve which sorts the species, and preserves similar species in Japan and on the Atlantic coast, while allowing a different class to maintain its foothold upon the Pacific slope of America.

It should be noted, however, that Professor Agassiz, as

¹ American Journal of Science, March, 1860, pp. 155, 157.

² See Memoirs of American Academy (1859), Vol. vi. pp. 377-452. Also, Dubuque Address.

Dr. Gray observes,¹ diverges from the ordinary views respecting species in exactly the opposite direction from Darwin.

"Agassiz discards the idea of a common descent as the real bond of union among the individuals of a species, and also the idea of a local origin; supposing, instead, that each species originated simultaneously, generally speaking, over the whole geographical area it now occupies or has occupied, and in, perhaps, as many individuals as it numbered at any subsequent period. Mr. Darwin, on the other hand, holds the orthodox view of the descent of all the individuals of a species, not only from a local birth-place, but from a single ancestor or pair; and that each species has extended and established itself, through natural agencies, whenever it could; so that the actual geographical distribution of any species is by no means a primordial arrangement, but a natural result. He goes farther, and this volume [*Origin of Species*] is a protracted argument intended to prove that the species we recognize have not been independently created, as such, but have descended, like varieties, from other species. Varieties, on this view, are incipient or possible species. Species are varieties of a larger growth and a wider and earlier divergence from the parent stock; the difference is one of degree, not of kind. . . . The theory of Agassiz, referring as it does the phenomena both of origin and distribution directly to the divine will, . . . may be said to be theistic to excess."

In pursuing the direct line of our argument, we take for granted, that there is an organic connection between members of the same species, however widely they may be separated either by time or space.² Until recently a specific

¹ Silliman's *Journal of Science* (March, 1860), pp. 155, 156.

² Agassiz, however, writes (*Cont. to Nat. History, etc.*, Vol. i. pp. 39, 40). See also pp. 165, 166. "It was a great progress in our science, when the more extensive and precise knowledge of the geographical distribution of organized beings forced upon its cultivators the conviction, that neither animals nor plants could have originated upon one and the same spot upon the surface of the earth, and hence have spread more and more widely until the whole globe became inhabited. . . . All animals and plants have occupied, from the beginning, those natural boundaries within which they stand to one another in such harmonious relations. Pines have originated in forests, heaths in heathers, grasses in prairies, bees in hives, herrings in schools, buffaloes in herds, men in nations! I see a striking proof that this must have been the case in the circumstance that representative species, which as distinct species, must have had from the beginning a different and distinct geographical range, frequently occupy sections of areas, which are simultaneously inhabited by the representatives of other species which are perfectly identical over the whole area. . . . Facts lead, step by step, to the inference that such birds as the Mallard and the Scaup originated simultaneously and separately in Europe and in America; and that all animals

difference was regarded by scientific men as necessitating separate original creation; the species of a genus being always regarded as of independent origin. The genus, and all higher orders, were supposed to be altogether ideal, with no connecting bond of physical causation between their subordinate members.

We come now to the facts which seem to force upon us the higher problem of accounting, by natural means, for the origin and dispersion of allied species and genera.

VI. DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIES IN SPACE.

In studying the distribution of living animals and plants, we are impressed with the existence of natural barriers which prevent the present intermingling of species. The rule is, that in proportion as the barriers which separate provinces are impassable, the contrasts are greater throughout the whole range of organic life. For example, the larger part of the dry land of the globe lies in the northern hemisphere, and is nearly contiguous in the arctic zone. Furthermore, geological evidence is abundant, that during the tertiary period a warm climate extended far up towards the pole. Fossil animals and plants are found in Greenland and adjacent lands like those which now cannot endure anything colder than a warm temperate climate. Thus it is plain that during a recent geological period the insuperable barriers which now prevent the migration of plants and animals from Europe and temperate Asia to America were not in existence.

originated in vast numbers; indeed, in the average number characteristic of their species, over the whole of their geographical area, whether its surface be continuous or disconnected by sea, lakes, or rivers, or by differences of level above the sea, etc. The details of the geographical distribution of animals exhibit, indeed, too much discrimination to admit for a moment that it could be the result of accident, that is, the result of the accidental migrations of the animals or of the accidental dispersion of the seeds of plants. The greater the uniformity of structure of these widely distributed organized beings, the less probable does their accidental distribution appear. I confess that nothing has ever surprised me so much as to see the perfect identity of the most delicate microscopic structures of animals and plants from the remotest parts of the world."

This fact is significant when viewed in connection with the close similarity of the faunas throughout the temperate regions of the northern hemisphere.

"The fauna of Europe is very closely related to that of the United States proper. . . . Notwithstanding the immense extent of country embraced, the same stamp [of animal life] is everywhere exhibited. Generally the same families, frequently the same genera, represented by different species are found."¹

On the other hand, as we proceed on either continent through the torrid and south temperate zones, where the oceanic and climatic barriers are, and doubtless for a long time have been, vastly greater ;

"Instead of that general resemblance, that family likeness which we have noticed between all the faunas of the temperate zone of the northern hemisphere, we find here the most complete contrasts. Each of the three continental peninsulas which jut out southerly into the ocean represents, in some sense a separate world. The animals of South America, beyond the tropic of Capricorn, are in all respects different from those of the southern extremity of Africa."²

But this dissimilarity of native animals and plants does not arise solely from dissimilarity in the physical conditions in those regions ; for foreign plants when introduced have often flourished in a remarkable degree. For example, in New Zealand the Norwegian rat has extirpated the native rat, and is to be found everywhere. The progeny of the pigs which Captain Cook and other navigators left with the natives run wild in such a way that it is impossible to destroy them. There are large tracts of country where they reign supreme. In South America the horse has with equal facility increased in a wild state. Among plants we may mention the Scotch thistle, briar, rose, plantains, and docks, which have all become noxious weeds in South Africa and Australia.³

Lyell pertinently remarks, that if we reject the generally received doctrine of specific centres of creation and natural barriers to distribution,

¹ Principles of Zoölogy, by Agassiz and Gould, pp. 200, 203.

² Buffon, quoted in Lyell's Principles of Geology, Vol. ii. pp. 329, 332.

³ See Hooker, in Popular Science Review (London), Vol. vi. p. 131 ff. Republished in The Eclectic Magazine (New York), for July, 1867.

“The fact that not a single native quadruped is common to Australia, the Cape of Good Hope, and South America, can in no way be explained by adverting to the wide extent of ocean, or to the sterile deserts, or the great heat or cold of the climates, through which each species must have passed, before it could migrate from one of those distant regions to another. It might fairly be asked of one who talked of impassable barriers, why the same kangaroos, rhinoceroses, or llamas should not have been created simultaneously in Australia, Africa, and South America? The horse, the ox, and the dog, although foreign to these countries until introduced by man, are now able to support themselves there in a wild state; and we can scarcely doubt that many of the quadrupeds at present peculiar to Australia, Africa, and South America might have continued in like manner to inhabit all the three continents, had they been indigenous in each, or could they once have got a footing there as new colonists.”¹

VII. SPECIES ARRANGED IN CLUSTERS.

Notwithstanding the great dissimilarity between the products of life on the southern extremities of the three continents, there is a striking similarity between the species inhabiting these several peninsulas and those found upon the islands adjacent to each. The islands are, in their forms of life, the satellites of the nearest continents. One of the most striking illustrations of this principle is found in the relation of the fauna and flora of the Galapagos Archipelago to those of South America. These islands lie nearly on the equator, five hundred miles west of the main land. They are of volcanic origin, and in their soil, elevation, and climate differ greatly from the neighboring coast. In these natural respects they very much resemble the Cape de Verde Islands, which are situated in the same latitude, and about the same distance to the west of Africa that the Galapagos are west of South America. The environment, or the conditions of life, are very much alike on the Galapagos and on the Cape de Verde Archipelago; while the conditions of life on each of these Archipelagos are in great contrast to those which surround the faunas and floras of their adjacent continents. The species of birds, reptiles, and plants found on the Galapagos are, for the most part, such as exist nowhere else in the

¹ Lyell, *Principles of Geology*, Vol. ii. p. 333.

world. On the ordinary view, naturalists would say they must have been created there. But according to Mr. Darwin,¹ — and it was this fact which turned his mind into the channel of speculation which has made him so justly famous, —

“Nearly all [these species] bore an American stamp. In the song of the mocking-thrush, in the harsh cry of the carrion-hawk, in the great candlestick-like opuntias, I clearly perceived the neighborhood of America, though the islands were separated by so many miles of ocean from the main land, and differed much from it in their geological constitution and climate. Still more surprising was the fact that most of the inhabitants of each separate island in this small Archipelago were specifically different, though most closely related to each other.”

The animals and plants on the Cape de Verde Islands have a corresponding affinity to those of Africa. The problem is to find, if possible, the bond of secondary causation which shall join together these complex phenomena. It must account for the similarity under diverse conditions, and the diversity under similar conditions. Mr. Darwin believes that it is idle for us to search here for a “final cause.” So far as there is truth in his remark it is, in our opinion, partially owing to the inadequate views now current regarding the doctrine of final causes. Mr. Darwin supposes he has found a natural mode of accounting for the similarities and the difference of representative species, in the effect of diversity of condition acting on the descendants of a common ancestry. According to him, the facts delineated with regard to the relationship between the forms of life on the islands and those on the adjoining continental areas, point to community of descent in comparatively recent time. No one can deny that there is great plausibility in this explanation.

In further illustration similar facts may be adduced regarding the island of Madagascar, where all the species of animals but one, and nearly all the genera, are different from those on the continent of Africa.² Yet these genera

¹ “Animals and Plants under Domestication,” Vol. i. p. 21. See also “Origin of Species,” pp. 353–356.

² Lyell’s *Principles of Geology*, Vol. ii. p. 347.

and species resemble those in Africa more than they do those of any other province.

The direction and character of the boundary line between the fauna of Australia and that of Asia is still more impressive. The Philippine Islands, with Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, are in a sea that is nowhere more than six hundred feet deep. So that with an elevation of the Malay Archipelago to that amount, the continent of Asia would extend as far southeast as the island of Java, or twelve degrees of latitude beyond the Malay peninsula. Beyond a line drawn from the southeast end of Java, to the southernmost of the Philippine Islands, the depth of the ocean is more than six hundred feet. According to Mr. Wallace,¹ the line of soundings of six hundred feet, marking the termination of shallow seas, between the Indo-Malayan and the Austro-Malayan regions, is also the boundary between Australian and Asiatic genera of plants and animals, though in one instance the islands of these different zoölogical provinces are within sight of each other. The animals and plants of Asia are supposed to have migrated to the farthest islands in the shallow seas of the Malay Archipelago when they were continuously connected by land now moderately submerged; while the Marsupials of Australia maintained their ground on the islands that are now, and probably have been from a very remote period, surrounded by deep water. The principle is pretty well established that, with little regard to natural conditions, the fauna of islands is more nearly allied to that of the nearest continent than to that of any other region, and that the deeper the sea between them the more diverse is the fauna.

This class of facts receives explanation on the supposition that the Creator has given to the life-principle a power co-ordinate with that of the conditions of existence. The changes in the forms of life follow a long way behind the changes in the physical conditions. The islands surrounded

¹ See "The Malay Archipelago," pp. 20-31. Also Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, Vol. ii. pp. 349, 350.

by deep water are supposed to have retained the earlier forms of life because they have been longer isolated, and the conditions have there been more uniform, and there has been less room for competition between varieties.

Darwin¹ makes good use also of the fact that there are "no [native] Batrachians and terrestrial Mammals on oceanic islands."² There are only bats, whose presence can be accounted for by their power of flight. But the absence of frogs and Mammals is not due to lack of adaptations to the conditions; for often, when introduced, they thrive in a remarkable manner. Frogs have become a nuisance in Madeira and the Azores.³ The full bearing of these facts cannot be seen till they are joined with two or three other co-ordinate series of phenomena. We proceed, therefore, to speak

VIII. OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIES IN TIME.

As long ago as 1844, Professor Owen enunciated the law "that with extinct as with existing Mammalia, particular forms were assigned to particular provinces, and that the same forms were restricted to the same provinces at a former geological period as they are at the present day."⁴ In 1861, he adds :

"That period was the more recent Tertiary one. In carrying back the retrospective comparison of existing and extinct Mammals to those of the Eocene and Oölitic strata, in relation to their local distribution, we obtain indications of extensive changes in the relative position of sea and land during these epochs, in the degree of incongruity between the generic forms of the Mammalia which then existed in Europe and any that actually exist on the great natural continent of which Europe now forms part. It would seem, indeed, that the further we penetrate into time for the recovery of extinct Mammalia, the further we must go [from Europe] into space to find their existing analogies. To match the Eocene Palaeo-

¹ Origin of Species, p. 351.

² Origin of Species, p. 350. See also Lyell's Principles of Geology, Vol. ii. pp. 406-436.

³ Ibid. p. 416.

⁴ Quoted from Transactions of the British Association, 1844, in Owen's Palaeontology, p. 433.

theres and Lophiodons we fetch Tapirs from Sumatra or South America, and we must travel to the antipodes for Myrmecobians, the nearest living analogues to the Amphitheres of our Oölite strata."

The law of the distribution of species in time and space has been stated by Professor Dana thus :¹

"The Orient has always been the continent of progress. From the close of the Palaeozoic its species of animal life have been three times as numerous as those of North America, and more varied in genera. In the early Tertiary its flora in the European portion had an Australian type, and there were Marsupials and Edentates there. In the middle and later Tertiary it represented recent North America in its flora. But from this condition it emerged to a higher grade. In the Post-tertiary it became the land of the Carnivores, while North America was the continent as distinctly of Herbivores — an inferior type; South America of Edentates — still lower; Australia of the lowest of quadrupeds — the Marsupials. In the closing creations Australia remained Marsupial, though with dwindled forms; South America was still the land of Edentates, but of smaller species, and with inferior Carnivores and the inferior type of monkeys, or Quadrumana; North America of Herbivores, also small compared with the Post-tertiary; while the Orient, besides its new Carnivores, received the highest of Quadrumana. Thus the Orient has successively passed through the Australian and American stages, and, leaving the other continents behind, it stood in the forefront of progress."²

Dawson emphasizes the same point :

"It thus appears that the Miocene flora of Europe resembles that of America at present, while the Eocene flora of Europe resembles that of Australia, and the Eocene [Pliocene?] flora of America, as well as the modern, resembles the Miocene of Europe. In other words, the changes of the flora have been more rapid in Europe than in America, and probably slowest of all in Australia. The eastern continent has taken the lead in rapidity of change in the tertiary period, and it has done so in animals as well as in plants."³

IX. CONNECTING LINKS BETWEEN SPECIES.

The argument in favor of the affinity of species cannot be adequately set forth, until attention has been called to the general unities of anatomical structure which pervade the species, genera, and orders of each of the four departments

¹ Manual of Geology (1st ed., Philadelphia, 1863), p. 585.

² See also Principles of Zoölogy, by Agassiz and Gould, p. 235.

³ Story of the Earth and Man, pp. 259, 260.

of the animal kingdom, and which serve as the basis upon which they are grouped together in classes. We will attend to these deeper unities a little later; restricting ourselves in this section to what may more properly be called intermediate links between species that are now reckoned as distinct.

It is a fact, commented on at length by Dana and Agassiz, that the species which appear earlier in the history of the globe are of a more comprehensive type than those which appear later. The earlier forms are not so specialized in their structure as the later. The earlier types are spoken of as prophetic. Their structure contains intimations of what the peculiarities of future species are to be. All palaeontologists admit that as the present is approached there is progress in the geological record of life. The grade of life indicated in a geological formation is, in a general way, intermediate between that of the formation above and that below. Numerous transitional forms are found between the various classes and genera of vertebrate animals. Reptiles are anatomically intermediate between fishes and birds. The passage from the water-breathing class of Vertebrates to an air-breathing class, is "by close transitional steps."¹ The affinities of reptiles while they are close, in vertebral structure, with the ganoid fishes, are equally close with birds and mammals. The archaeopteryx was half reptile and half bird. It had the vertebrate tail of the reptile, which was, at the same time, supplied with the true feathers of the bird. Its foot had no characteristics that would distinguish the class to which it would belong. Professor Marsh² has found in the Cretaceous strata of Nebraska birds possessing teeth. In the Dinosauria the reptile class is allied more closely to the mammals. The Marsupials are midway between the oviparous Vertebrates and the placental Mammalia. Between the mastodon and the elephant there are many transitional species.³

¹ See Owen, *Palaeontology*, p. 320.

² See *American Journal of Science* for October, 1872, and January, 1873; also *American Naturalist* for October, 1875.

³ Owen's *Palaeontology*, p. 376.

There are numerous intermediate forms joining together the rhinoceros and the horse, the bear and the wolf, the hyena and the civet, and even forms so diverse as the hog and the camel.¹

Professor Owen remarks² that when the transmutation theories of the early part of the century were under discussion by Cuvier, with whom he was then studying, in opposition to these theories reliance was chiefly placed on the absence of intermediate species, especially the lack of intermediate forms between the *Palaeotherium* of the early Eocene and the hoofed quadrupeds of the present age. But adds :

"The progress of Palaeontology since 1830 has brought to light many missing links unknown to the founder of the science. . . . The discovery of the remains of the *Hipparion* supplied one of the links, required by Cuvier, between the *Palaeotherium* and the horse of the present day; and it is still more significant of the fact of filiation of species that the remains of such three-toed horses are found only in deposits of that Tertiary period which intervene between the older palaeotherian one and the newer strata in which the modern horse first appears to have lost its lateral hooflets. . . . Other missing links of this series of species have been supplied; as, e.g. by the *Paloplotherium* of the newer Eocene of Hordwell, Hants; by the *Palaeotherium aurelianense* from the 'molasse marine' of Orleans, and by the *Palaeotherium hippoides* of the lacustrine calcareous beds of Sansan, all which deposits are Miocene, or are transitional between Eocene and Miocene." In the two last examples, "the whole foot is longer and more slender, with a longer and thicker middle toe, than in the older Eocene type-genus, whence the generic name *Anchitherium*, applied to them by von Meyer."

Prof. Marsh has since found a very complete gradation of fossil horses in America, some with three hoofs on each foot, others with a main hoof and two hooflets, and others in which the fingers are all rudimental, except the middle one which bears the hoof.³ The general law, that intermediate geological formations contain intermediate species, was thus announced by Prof. Agassiz :

"Each formation contains remains peculiar to itself, which do not extend into the neighboring deposits above or below it. Still there is a

¹ See Wallace, *Con. Theory. Nat. Selec.*, pp. 299, 300.

² *Anatomy of the Vertebrates*, Vol. iii. pp. 789-792. See also Dana, *Manual of Geology* (2d edition), pp. 503-520.

³ *American Journal of Science* (March, 1874), pp. 247-258. See also Dana, *Manual of Geology*, p. 505.

connection between the different formations more strong in proportion to their proximity to each other. Thus the animal remains of the Chalk, while they differ from those of all other formations, are, nevertheless, much more nearly related to those of the Oölitic formation, which immediately precedes, than to those of the Carboniferous formation, which is much more ancient; and, in the same manner, the fossils of the Carboniferous group approach more nearly to those of the Silurian formation than to those of the Tertiary.”¹

Thus it must be admitted that the broken lines of life upon which we stumble in the geological record are not parallel; but they lie in directions radiating from a well-defined centre. There is more interlacing of these lines than we have been accustomed to admit. Life is a web.

X. HOMOLOGOUS AND RUDIMENTAL STRUCTURES.

Vertebrate animals are all variations of one type of structure. A significant unity pervades the whole department. Even generic distinctions are founded upon “minor peculiarities of anatomical structure, such as the number, disposition, or proportions of the teeth, claws, fins, etc. . . . Thus the lion, tiger, leopard, and cat are put into the same genus because they agree in the structure of their feet, claws, and teeth;” while the dog, fox, jackal, and wolf have another and different peculiarity of these parts of their bodies.² The species is formed upon less important distinctions, such as color, size, proportions, sculpture, etc.

The persistent and fundamental unity of structure throughout the vertebrata is extremely remarkable. For example, in the class of mammals the cervical vertebrae are constant in their number throughout all genera. The long neck of the giraffe has the same number of vertebrae with the short neck of the whale or the elephant. For all practical purposes the whale or elephant might as well have but one bone each in their necks; but each has seven, so small, and crowded so closely together, that they are in effect but one.

Limbs that are used for very different purposes have

¹ Principles of Zoölogy, p. 221.

² See Principles of Zoölogy, by Agassiz and Gould, p. 18.

frequently a structure that is anatomically the same. The bones of the human arm and hand have their homologues in the legs and feet of all quadrupeds, in the wings of all birds, and in the pectoral fin of the fish, and the flipper of the seal. The hoof of the horse is on his middle finger; the other phalanges are rudimental, though all present. The carpal and metacarpal bones are also partially represented in the legs of the horse; so also is the radius, though these bones are now rudimentary and useless.

Among other rudimentary structures may be mentioned the foetal teeth of whales and of the front part of the jaw of ruminant quadrupeds.

"These foetal structures are minute in size, and never cut the gum; but are reabsorbed without ever coming into use, while no other teeth succeed them or represent them in the adult condition of those animals. The mammary glands of all male beasts constitute another example, as also does the wing of the apteryx, — a New Zealand bird utterly incapable of flight, and with the wing in a quite rudimentary condition (whence the name of the animal). Yet this rudimentary wing contains bones which are miniature representatives of the ordinary wing-bones of birds of flight."¹

Is there in all this any meaning which the human mind can interpret? Do these facts have any natural correlation to those innate tendencies of the mind on which beliefs are based? Is their glimmer of light in any degree trustworthy, and if so, to what degree? Or are they altogether like Will-o'the Wisps going before us but to deceive? Mr. Darwin's comparison has the merit of being clear, if not cogent.

"Rudimentary organs may be compared with the letters in a word, still retained in the spelling, but become useless in the pronunciation, but which serve as a clue for its derivation. On the view of descent with modification, we may conclude that the existence of organs in a rudimentary, imperfect, and useless condition, or quite aborted, far from presenting a strange difficulty, as they avowedly do on the old doctrine of creation, might even have been anticipated in accordance with the views here explained."²

¹ See Mivart, *Genesis of Species*, pp. 7, 155-187.

² *Origin of Species*, p. 402.

XI. EMBRYOLOGY.

Another class of facts presenting peculiar difficulties to the ordinary hypothesis of special creation, relates to the process of development through which the young animal passes in its embryonic condition. We quote again from the elementary work on Zoölogy by Professor Agassiz.

“As a general result of the observations which have been made up to this time [1855] on the embryology of the various classes of the animal kingdom, especially of the Vertebrates, it may be said, that the organs of the body are successively formed in the order of their organic importance, the most essential being always the earliest to appear. In accordance with this law, the organs of vegetative life, the intestines and their appurtenances, make their appearance subsequently to those of animal life, such as the nervous system, the skeleton, etc.; and these, in turn, are preceded by the more general phenomena belonging to the animal as such. . . Hence the embryos of different animals resemble each other more strongly when examined in the earlier stages of their growth. We have already stated that, during almost the whole period of embryonic life, the young fish and the young frog scarcely differ at all; so it is also with the young snake compared with the embryo bird.”¹

“This similarity of members of the same great class, in their embryonic condition, — the embryo, for instance, of a mammal, bird, reptile, and fish being barely distinguishable,” is pronounced by Darwin “the most wonderful fact in the whole round of natural history.”² That the embryos of the higher vertebrates should in their development pass through all the stages of the lower orders of their class, taking upon them at successive stages the peculiarities that characterize the order, the family, the genus, the species, and the individual; that this order coincides with the distribution of species in time; and that rudimentary organs are often developed at particular stages of the growth, and then partially or wholly re-absorbed, are certainly coincidences which it is hard to accept as accidental or meaningless. But on the theory of a common descent with modifications, all these facts come in harmoniously, this element of descent

¹ Principles of Zoölogy, p. 153.

² Animals and Plants under Domestication, Vol. i. p. 24.

being the hidden bond of connection which naturalists, in their efforts at classification, have been seeking, under the term of the natural system.¹

XII. ANALOGOUS VARIATION.

An argument is also drawn from the facts of analogous variation. For instance, distinct breeds, like those of the domestic pigeon, which are now very unlike, tend to vary in a similar manner, resembling one wild species from which they are supposed to have descended. The slaty-blue color and the black bars across the wings of the original rock pigeon are occasionally assumed by individuals of all the varieties, though when kept pure they usually breed true and have no trace of those colors. When, however, different breeds are crossed, the tendency of these black bars and this blue color to appear is greatly increased, and the peculiarities of the crossed birds disappear.

Similar facts afford proof of the affinity of the horse and the ass to the zebra. By a wide induction, Darwin has shown that the appearance of the stripes which characterize the zebra are sometimes seen on every variety both of the horse and of the ass. And furthermore, that the mule, which is a cross between the horse and the ass, is much more likely than either to display those characteristic stripes, especially when young. Upon this Darwin remarks: ²

“He who believes that each equine species was independently created, will, I presume, assert that each species has been created with a tendency to vary, both under nature and under domestication, in this particular manner, so as often to become striped like other species of the genus; and that each has been created with a strong tendency, when crossed with species inhabiting distant quarters of the world, to produce hybrids resembling in their stripes, not their own parents, but other species of the genus. To admit this view is, as it seems to me, to reject a real for an unreal, or at least for an unknown, cause. It makes the works of God a mere mockery and deception. I would almost as soon believe with the old and ignorant cosmologists that fossil shells had never lived, but had been created in stone, so as to mock the shells living on the sea-shore.”

¹ See *Origin of Species*, pp. 381, 396 and 403. ² *Origin of Species*, p. 130.

XIII. SUMMARY OF FACTS.

Before proceeding to an explanation of these phenomena, we will briefly recapitulate. If in the animal kingdom we take one of the departments, Vertebrata, for instance, we find that all the individuals are characterized by certain fundamental likenesses, and are distinguished by varying degrees of unlikeness. Upon the bond of the similarity characterizing the grand division, the differences are superimposed which designate the more specific stages of our advancement in classification. There is a natural order of classification, so that starting along certain lines of divergence, and passing through more and more restricted clusters of likenesses, we reach a system of species and varieties and individuals, branching off from a common point, in which there is no intermingling and little ground for confusion.

Theories of evolution have in their favor the analogies of the known mode of the production of individuals. So far as we know, individuals are born and developed; not produced by a direct act of creation, or by spontaneous generation. "Every life is from an egg." So constant is this law that the supposed production of a living thing without a cell for its origin is strong proof either of the incompetence of the observer's method or of the imperfection of his instruments.

The natural system of classification corresponds in general with the embryonic development of each individual. The more generic characters of the animal appear first in the developing embryo. The specific characters are superinduced from time to time, as the period of birth approaches, or, indeed, long afterwards, in the post-natal development.

In the distribution of animals in time the same order of development is observable. The earlier forms of life that are studied in fossil remains are, as a rule, more generalized in their structure than the later forms. Classes of animals, like birds, reptiles, and fishes, were not so clearly distinguishable in the early Tertiary and in the Mesozoic times as now.

Again, in space animals and plants are separated by natural

barriers. The farther you recede from the continental hemisphere of the earth the more diverse the existing forms of life are from each other, and the nearer they resemble the more generalized forms of past time. Also the forms of life on islands are, as a rule, conformed not so much to the existing conditions of soil and climate as to the type of animal life on the nearest continental area.

XIV. PROPER TO SPECULATE UPON THE PROBLEM.

The foregoing are the more important of the facts that press upon us for an explanation. It is not in accordance with what we specially value in the modern habits of thought to cut the Gordian knot with the assertion, "so God has made it," and set that up as the Ultima Thule of our investigation. Such a course would be suicidal to all scientific thought, and would endanger the rational foundation upon which our proof even of revelation rests. It is superstition, and not reverence, that leads us to avoid the questions concerning the order and mode of divine operations.

It is a principle never to be forgotten in any department of study that we are to press known secondary causes as far as they will go in explanation of facts. We are not to resort to an unknown cause for explanation of phenomena till the power of known causes has been exhausted. If we cease to observe this rule there is an end to all science and all sound sense.

In viewing the complicated movements of the heavenly bodies, it would relieve us from much labor, if we should simply register the phenomena, and attribute them directly to the divine activity. Newton, however, was not satisfied till he had interpreted the laws under which these movements proceed. He believed that in the peculiarities of planetary movements God permitted us to read the method of his operations. By a most successful application of the law of parsimony all that variety of movement in cycle and epicycle was traced to the effects of two forces, centripetal and centrifugal; the one constant, the other varying as the square of the distance between the attracting objects.

Through a generalization of this nature Mr. Darwin has, with greater success than any previous naturalist, approached the exceedingly complex phenomena exhibited in the organization of living forms. As Newton left the nature of the centrifugal and centripetal forces with the mysteries of the creation, so Darwin can leave where they belong the forces that have moved and directed the development of life upon the earth. Human pride may not boast too confidently of having sounded any of the deep things of God. The genuine man of science does not use the word 'explanation' with reference to the final solution of the problems of nature. In this respect Mr. Darwin is much more cautious than some of his followers. In the main he contents himself with viewing the unknown in the light of the known, and refrains from speculating upon the nature of the ultimate facts of observation. It should be remembered that, in the highest sense, it is no adequate explanation of the movements of the moon to show that it is to be classed with those of an apple as it falls from a tree. To any thoughtful mind the absolute mystery is rather increased than explained by such classification. And it may well be said that scientific explanation, such as it is, intensifies rather than diminishes our admiration of divine power. If the undevout astronomer be mad, it would in still greater degree be true that the irreverent disciple of Darwin is mad.

XV. DARWIN'S METHOD OF SOLUTION.

Darwin starts with two or three principles derived from our observation of living individuals and varieties of species, and tries to see how far there are indications that these principles have had sway in past times. The lamp by which he guides his feet among the scattered fragments of the creation is the fundamental axiom of all science, that similarity of effect indicates similarity of cause.

It is a matter of common observation that while it is true, in a loose sense, that "like begets like," — that plant and animal beget after their kind, — this law is co-ordinated by

another, just as centrifugal is co-ordinated with centripetal force. The progeny is never just like the parent. There is no dead level of uniformity in organic beings. Not even two peas are exactly alike. The law of heredity in animals and plants is a resultant of two tendencies; the one to likeness, the other to variation. The tendency to variation revolves around the tendency to uniformity. One force is centripetal, the other centrifugal. This is a general truth about which there is no dispute. It remains for the more accurate and extended observation of scientific men to determine the orbit of this revolution and the limits of this oscillation.

Is there such degree of plasticity in species that the orbit of one may break into that of another? This question we cannot hope to settle by direct observation. But we are permitted to determine very few things by direct observation. We never see the curve of the orbit of a star. We see it at different points of its orbit, and supply the rest of the curve on the ground of our confidence in intuitive principles. We go beyond observation whenever we try to prove anything. We believe that Biela's comet was drawn out of its orbit by the force of the attraction of the planet Jupiter. The proof of it is an exercise of mind far nobler than that of watching a vaporous disk in the glass of a telescope. The conformity of certain facts to principles established by broader observation and more intricate calculations may involve the veracity of God as absolutely as the agreement of a signature with a business man's known hand-writing may connect the two together, and prove the genuineness of the document. In this light let us try to answer the question, Are species transmuted into other species?

XVI. ELASTICITY OF SPECIES.

That species are in some degree plastic is evident to all, in the fact that varieties exist and that individuals are distinguishable from one another. Under the guidance of man, both animals and plants vary to a remarkable extent. Such

variations are produced in the vegetable world, that botanists are much averse to pronouncing upon the species of a domestic plant. Plants may be made to vary in almost any part of their structure.

There are several hundred varieties of our American grapes, with fruit ranging from the small acrid berry that grows wild on our river banks, to the luscious Catawba that would not ripen in Northern New England out of a conservatory. Yet they all range under three or four species.¹

The strawberry was confined a hundred years ago to a very small number of varieties. While now, principally through the skill of gardeners within the last sixty years, the varieties are innumerable.² Potatoes, cabbages, apples, roses, and numerous other cultivated plants, are synonymes for variability in different parts of their organism.

In the animal creation too, every one is familiar with facts indicating a great amount of variability in domestic breeds. Indeed, the word breed indicates the fact: Horses have probably all descended from what would be called one species. Yet what a contrast between a dray-horse and an English race-horse! Or between Black-hawk and a Canadian pony! Whatever might be said about the original diversity of the wild varieties of the cow and the sheep, which have been domesticated, there is no doubt that the skill of breeders has produced additional and most important changes.

It is almost demonstrable that domestic pigeons are descended from one parent species, — the rock-pigeon. But now they have been transformed by fanciers to the strange forms of the pouter, fantail, carrier, barb, tumbler, and a hundred other varieties that breed true and have been named. These are made to differ in various points of anatomical structure more than is often required to establish a difference of species, or even of genus.³

The changes in domestic animals and plants take place under the directing agency of man. Man does not produce

¹ See Darwin, *Animals and Plants under Domestication*, Vol. i. p. 400 f., which, however, chiefly relates to European varieties.

² *Ibid.* p. 423.

³ *Ibid.*

the variation. He only uses it when for some unknown reason it appears. The tendency to variation has its origin in a cause that is mysterious ; though change of circumstances increases the tendency. The agency of man is confined to accumulating by selection the variations that appear in a certain line. Without his interference, the tendencies to vary in opposite directions would, where communication was unrestricted between individuals, counteract each other, and keep the species uniform. Hence, it might occur that when a skilful breeder passed away, the breed would pass away with him, from lack of his skill in selecting the animals from which to propagate the variety. How far this process of variation may proceed in a particular line is still undetermined. Indeed, that is the question under consideration. With pigeons it has gone so far that the varieties if found in a wild state would be called species. The difficulties of classification are evidence of a great plasticity in species. It repeatedly occurs that what have been classed as distinct species are, by the subsequent discovery of intermediate forms grouped together as varieties of a single species. In such cases the divergence of the varieties from the type of the species measures the known degree of the elasticity of the species.

The changes which man secures in animals and plants by systematically selecting for propagation the individuals that possess qualities subservient to human want or caprice, are in one sense superficial, since they are made blindly. A variety is chosen for propagation because of peculiarities that can be seen, in ignorance of their correlated relation to profounder anatomical or physiological changes that simultaneously occur. Still farther, man protects his animals from the effect of deficient food or shelter, and so may preserve a peculiarity of structure which would be fatal to the existence of the animal if in a natural state.

If we go beyond the reach of the directing agency of man it would seem that there could be no analogous force able to enlarge indefinitely the orbit of individual variability.

XVII. NATURAL SELECTION.

But Mr. Darwin must have the credit of presenting in a new light, if not of discovering, a natural power of selection which is marvellous in its possibilities and probabilities. In the first place, the physical agencies that produce the succession of the seasons and the distribution of heat and moisture, and which so powerfully influence the animal and vegetable world, are in a state of unstable equilibrium. The seasons vary in periods that are of unequal duration, and that are dependent on far-reaching causes. If we extend our observation through the long ages of geologic record, we have brought to view alternations from temperate to frigid, and from frigid to torrid, climates, that are as extensive as the globe. In the alternate contraction and expansion of the continental areas, through the elevation and depression of the land, there are brought to light other important changes in the conditions to which animal and vegetable life have been subjected. At one time Europe is an archipelago of scattered islands. At another time England is joined to Ireland and to the continent by a continuous belt of land. During these periods of contraction, and at those times when drouth or winter was creeping over the world, there must have been a struggle for existence between the various individuals that were living at the time, in which the weakest would die first. At one time the survival would depend on the nature of the instinct, at another on the fleetness or size, at another on the ability to withstand extremes of heat and cold. In some of these conditions increase of size would be an advantage to the individual, in others it would be a disadvantage. In time of scarcity of food increase of size would make more food necessary, and perhaps bring more food within reach.

It is evident that these extraordinary trials would sift out those least fitted to the conditions, and leave behind those best fitted. "Animals, like men, are tried in the fire of affliction. The hay, wood, and stubble are burned, and the gold is left." In Darwin's system, however, "gold" does not mean necessarily a higher organism, but those peculiarities of the

organism that protect one from present physical evils, whether it be peculiarities that indicate progression or retrogression. Indeed, the very opposite qualities might secure immunity from destruction. A large dog might jump over a fence where a small one would go through, and only the medium sized be kept in by it. A nervous animal might live where a stupid one would die, and vice versa.

XVIII. THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE.

In enumerating these changes in external nature, we have brought before us only one of the known agencies which serve as a crucible in which to test the tenacity of the life of any organic form. Whatever may be the ultimate explanation of it, it is a fact that the "whole creation groaneth and travaileth together in pain until now." There is a constant state of warfare in the organic world. The grub is trying to kill the tree, and the woodpecker is seeking, with exquisite instruments, to take the life of the grub; the parasite is worrying the life of the woodpecker, and so on through the whole story of the house that Jack built.

The Malthusian law of the tendency of all living things to increase through reproduction in geometrical ratio, while the stores from which they feed and the houses in which they live are limited by definite measurements, becomes in Darwin's hands a mighty power. If slow breeding man were not limited by many unavoidable evils from increasing and multiplying according to his natural instincts, there would in a few thousand years be so many people in the world that standing-room could not be found for them. If a plant should produce two seedlings a year, and its two produce each two more, and so on, there would in twenty years be a million plants. Mr. Darwin says:¹ "The elephant is reckoned to be the slowest breeder of all known animals, and I have taken some pains to calculate its probable minimum rate of natural increase; it will be under the mark to assume that it breeds when thirty years old, and goes on breeding till ninety years

¹ *Origin of Species* (5th ed.), p. 51.

old, bringing forth three pairs of young in this interval ; if this be so, at the end of the fifth century there would be alive fifteen million elephants, descended from the first pair." When now we come to consider the rapidity with which innumerable other organisms tend to increase, we shall have before us a faint idea of the power that is here brought into the equation. We may safely assume that plants produce every year a million times as many seeds fitted for growth, as ever come to perfection. So that the ground of a forest is year by year literally covered with seedlings that are destined to die from lack of room and want of access to the elements necessary to their growth. Of the smaller plants we know that the ground is full of their seeds. Turn up the ground where you will, and it will be found that there are germs of life in it, or that they will lodge on it, and cover it very speedily with a rank vegetation. A few rank weeds, like the burdock or the thistle, delight to lord it over their weaker brethren. Infanticide and oppression are, in a figure, practised to an alarming extent throughout the vegetable kingdom. "Plants do not grow where they like best, but where other plants will let them."

Animals have feeling, which plants have not. But of compassion the animal kingdom is utterly devoid. The equilibrium of the animal world is maintained not merely by preparation for war, but by actual and unceasing conflict. Almost every species of animal is pressing beyond the limits of its means of subsistence. There are low forms of animals that produce millions of young every season. Yet the number of progeny which survive may not be at all in proportion to that which comes into existence. The mishaps that befall a young trout are far more numerous than those to which a whale is liable. "The condor lays a couple of eggs, and the ostrich a score ; and yet in the same country the condor may be the more numerous of the two. The fulmar petrel lays but one egg, yet it is believed to be the most numerous bird in the world." It is plain that the number of individuals of a species that are found in existence is not at all

in proportion to their natural tendency to increase, but is rather dependent on their ability to contend against forces, both organic and inorganic, which oppose them after they are brought into existence. The great difficulty to be overcome in the continual existence of a species is that of adjusting itself to the other forms of life that crowd in upon it.

There is a constant oscillation in the comparative numbers of different classes of animals. As the food of herbivorous animals for any cause increases, the law of geometrical increase soon fills the enlarged possibility of subsistence, and individuals of this order are in competition again with each other. But the increase of Herbivora is soon followed by that of the Carnivora who feed upon them till these two orders are again in sharp competition, and the Carnivora contend with a diminishing relative supply of food.

When the animals are superabundant upon which the Carnivora feed, the weakest and most clumsy of that order could supply himself with food, and it would be the most helpless of the Herbivora that would be devoured. But when the balance was restored and the competition commenced again, the fleetest or strongest of the Herbivora, or those that had some other advantage, would be preserved; only the more favored of the Carnivora could then take or overcome them. The unfortunate of both orders would perish, and the more favored ones of both survive. Somewhat thus must be the internal contest among the animals which are food one for the other. When the struggle is in the same family with lessening amount of food, either absolute or relative, or with changing climate, analogous results must follow. In both cases, those variations from the type of the species that occur in every individual are the centrifugal force tending to divergence, counteracted, when nothing else interferes to augment it, by the law of inheritance and by the inter-crossing of individuals with opposite variations.

The external power in nature which supplies the place of man's agency as seen in domesticating animals, is the varying conditions of life which arise from changes in climate,

in temperature, in the extent of territory open for the range of the species, together with the encroachment of other species upon their domain. In this complicated environment we have a power which Darwin personifies as "Natural Selection." He speaks, we suppose, of power in the secondary sense, as when we use similar language regarding the force of gravity. He proceeds to trace the action of this secondary cause with reference to the production of species, as geologists would try to account for the features of a river valley by the erosive action of flowing water; or as the mathematician verifies the law of gravitation by the solutions it affords to the complicated observations of the astronomer. Or yet again, the problem is similar to that of the historian who sits in judgment on the documents before him, and pronounces them true or false according as they conform or not, to the known action of the human mind under the stress of given motives.

It should be remembered in this connection that the limits which we have set to the liberty of variation inherent in species is altogether arbitrary. It is perfectly proper for any person to proceed according to the law of parsimony from what is actually known of the variability of species and of the power of "Natural Selection," and see how far these factors will account for all the changes that are apparent. To the theologian the question regards the mode of the divine operations in nature. Darwin's law of "Natural Selection" only furnishes a natural bond for what Agassiz calls the ideas of God that were realized in innumerable special creations, and during countless periods of past time.

The theologian stands in no more need of miracles for the production of species than he does for that of the planets and their movements. Direct providential interposition is not for the irrational creation, but for the rational. So we may divest ourselves of theological prepossessions of any kind in reference to the material machinery by which the diversity of animal and vegetable life has been produced. But of these points we will speak farther on.

XIX. TIME AS A FACTOR IN THE EQUATION.

The rate at which changes may proceed through "natural selection" is an indeterminate quantity. If natural selection be the secondary cause that has determined the development of species, then its speed must have been inversely as the time in which it has operated. If time has been short, natural selection must either have been incompetent for the results, or have worked the faster. We do not know that any clue has been given as to the rapidity with which, in favorable circumstances, changes may proceed in species. Mr. Darwin insists, too strenuously perhaps, upon a very slow rate of variation. By a singular misnomer the school in geology led by Lyell, and of which Darwin's is the complement in natural history, was called uniformitarian, whereas both these distinguished authors emphasize not so much the uniformity of the past as the instability of the present. Time can easily be eliminated when cause and effect are brought into line. It must be admitted that geological measures of time are very indefinite and unsatisfactory.

Without dispute, however, geology opens up an expanse of time through which plants and animals have lived that is ample enough for almost any purpose. The geological succession of the earth's strata extends the present order of things back to a point that is far out of sight. Darwin may with confidence claim one hundred million years, and without much fear of contradiction, five times that period, as a field in which his law may have operated. As near as we can ascertain, we are in the middle of duration, and God has been no more pressed for time in which to do his work in the past than he is to be for the future. God is as prodigal of time as of space, and to appearance has shown himself as little concerned about the fate of the mere forms of life that have in succession inhabited the world, as about the quantity of dirt it has required to make the world; though doubtless, before divine omniscience, every hair of each minutest insect has its place in the general scheme of organic development, and every grain of sand on the surface has been weighed.

As a single illustration of the demands which geology makes upon us for time, it is enough to refer to the great gorge of the Colorado.¹ “This Cañon is three hundred miles long, and has walls of rock three thousand to six thousand feet high. The walls are sections of nearly horizontal strata, ranging for the principal part of their extent from the granite to the top of the carboniferous, and higher up the stream to the top of the cretaceous; and the whole bears undoubted evidence, according to Newberry, that it was made by running water. The granite has been excavated in some places to a depth of nearly one thousand feet; above this there are two thousand to two thousand five hundred feet of Palaeozoic sandstones, shales, and limestones, one thousand feet of probably subcarboniferous limestone, and one thousand two hundred feet of Carboniferous sandstones and limestones.” This enormous gorge must have been principally worn out since the beginning of the Tertiary period, for very little progress could have been made before the elevation of the mountains of that region which bear upon their shoulders the Cretaceous formation. If we suppose the erosion to have proceeded at the rate of one inch a year, it would place the beginning of the Tertiary period more than twenty million years ago. That is, this period would have elapsed since there are known to have existed a number of species of animals (Palaeothere, Lophiodon) closely allied to the horse and the hog (Hieracothere, Chaeropotamus), also those that partook of characteristics between the Pachyderms and the stag among Ruminants (as the Anoplothere and Dichobune). “There were also monkeys, bats, deer, and opossums in England and France, although in the present age there are no opossums out of America, and monkeys are confined to the tropical zones.” It is evident that the rate of change required to pass during such a period from the Palaeotherium to the horse and from Chaeropotamus to the hog might be very slow. Reflection on the vastness of these pre-historic ages does much to smooth the way for the acceptance of such a

¹ Dana's Manual of Geology (1st ed.), p. 569. The account is not materially different in the 2d edition.

theory as that of Darwin. Time is one factor; change is another. To produce a given result each would vary inversely as the other. As we pass into the period preceding the Tertiary the vistas of time recede in increasing ratio to the beginning of organic existence. During this period positive evidence concerning the plasticity of the existing species diminishes, while there is a corresponding increase of the unknown element of time and physical change. The more cautious scientific men pause before venturing far into the mazes of primordial time.

XX. CONSPECTUS.

Setting out from that period when the Creator first breathed life into one, or, more probably, four or five, distinct forms, Mr. Darwin supposes the development to have been something as follows:

A vast, extremely complicated, and inscrutable environment of physical forces has furnished both material and limits to the development of organic life. The generic thread of life has been continuous from its introduction to the present day. Species in every part of their organism were endowed with an indefinite and imperfectly understood power of variability. Those variations which were best fitted to the changing conditions of their existence have of course survived. The conditions favoring the existence of a divergence from the type may continue so long that new species shall result. The qualities required to give a new variety the advantage in the struggle for life are as varied as the whole range of organic functions, of animal impulse, and of social instinct. "Utility" has as broad a meaning in Darwin's law of natural selection as "desire" has in systems of ethics or political economy. Desire ranges from the brutal instincts of the savage to the loftiest aspiration of the philosopher or the Christian martyr. The conclusions of the science of political economy are as indefinite as its basis of desire is broad. In like manner the superstructure of Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis must be as indeterminate as its base of utility is comprehensive. The preservation of a divergent

variety may depend on its own absolute completeness for the struggle, or on the comparative weakness of its competitors. It may depend on gigantic stature or diminutive littleness, on endurance or alertness, on boldness or timidity, on acuteness or stupidity. The range of social and sexual instinct is also exceedingly wide. We give the logical chain according to Wallace,¹ Organisms tend to a rapid increase, while the total number of individuals is stationary : this induces a struggle for existence, which combined with "heredity and variation," results in the "survival of the fittest"; this, combined with "unceasing change of external conditions," secures changes of organic forms, of such degree and permanency that they are called specific ; thus *Species* may originate.

On the supposition of a preponderance of land during an early period in the Southern hemisphere, analogous to that which now exists in the Northern, many of the anomalous facts of the distribution of species, and the retention of old forms of life in the isolated centres of the South, will approach solution.

Through the discovery of connecting links, and fresh investigation of the facts bearing upon the distribution, gradation, and variability of species, much presumptive proof of the evolution of species has accumulated. What was required, and what "natural selection" has to some extent supplied, was not so much additional positive arguments, as the production of a theory which should not in its mode of operation do violence to the facts pointing so strongly in an opposite direction. A secondary cause, known to operate within certain limits, and which may have operated through the whole extent of organic life, and bound all species of an order into a united whole is brought to light. It is endeavored thus to put the advocates of the independent creation of species on the defence, and to throw the burden of proof upon those who deny the organic unity of the animal and vegetable creation. Of the defences put forth for the old-time view of the manner of the production of species we will speak in a succeeding Article.

¹ Con. Theory Nat. Selec., p. 302.

ARTICLE V.

A PROFESSORSHIP OF MISSIONARY INSTRUCTION IN OUR
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES.

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MISSIONS IN CANTON, CHINA, FOR MORE THAN A QUARTER OF A CENTURY.

It is generally admitted that there is no more important duty laid upon the church than that of preaching the gospel in all the world. In order to qualify men for preaching the gospel to people at home it is considered necessary that the preacher should be well educated. As new activity has been manifested in behalf of infidelity and science and philosophy, "falsely so called," special provision has been made for meeting the new phases of error. At first the subject of pastoral theology received but little attention in our Theological Seminaries; but when attention was called to the importance of special training in this part of ministerial duty, arrangements were made in some of our Seminaries that instruction in pastoral theology should engage the special attention of a professor. The young men who enter our Seminaries have had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the philosophy, science, and literature which are current in *western lands*, yet with all their opportunities of forming a general knowledge of these things, the theological student is thoroughly instructed in them by professors who have devoted special attention to these studies.

Very different, however, is the case of those who contemplate the service of *foreign* missionaries. They are called to go forth into lands widely separated from our own. The climate, soil, productions, and industries of those lands are very diverse from those of our own. The people of these lands have systems of philosophy, cosmogony, metaphysics, government, education, and religion the very opposite of

those in our own land, and also different from all the nations of the West, of ancient and modern times, with which systems the course of study in our colleges gives the students more or less acquaintance. The experience of former missionaries has showed that different methods of labor have been successful in different parts of the mission field, according to the character and circumstances of the people among whom the labor has been performed. This experience has been gained at the expense of much time and labor ; and the results of such experience are very difficult to gather up and render useful. But so far as facilities are afforded in our Theological Seminaries to those students who would wish to acquire the knowledge of the above designated subjects, which is so important to him in his contemplated work among the heathen, *there are simply none*. It appears most wonderful and strange that it is so. It will appear almost unaccountable to every one who comes to consider it, that it should be so. This is a probable explanation of the fact : In 1812, when the first American missionaries were sent forth to the heathen in foreign lands, there was, of course, no capability of giving any such instruction. These lands were all unknown. The missionaries went forth to gain that knowledge, by years of patient study and pains-taking inquiry and investigation. The men who went forth in that heroic age of missions were men of such earnest purpose and deep consecration of heart, that by their untiring perseverance they conquered success. Hence it has become a settled and an unhesitating conviction of many minds that what was enough and sufficient for those early missionaries is sufficient and suitable for all their successors. It might as well be said that, because there were many able and successful ministers before the days of Theological Seminaries, therefore Seminaries are unnecessary to train ministers. But as it concerns foreign missionaries, is it a wise economy of time and means to send them abroad to learn those things which they can better learn before they go,—as the knowledge of the religion, the

philosophy, metaphysics, government, and history of the nations in which they are to labor, and the knowledge of which has been acquired by the labors and toils of their predecessors? And now, when there is a wide and varied experience as to the results of different modes of labor, is it wise and economical to send our missionaries forth to gain this knowledge and experience by their own laborious, and in many cases futile and abortive, experiments and labors? We think not. It is certainly not necessary to stop in this discussion to show that the knowledge of all these things is not only desirable and useful, but necessary, to those who would be successful in making known the gospel in heathen lands. The people of India, China, Japan, Siam, Persia, and Syria are not rude and unlettered nations; they each have a philosophy, as marked as the systems of philosophy that prevail in western lands, which the missionaries combat. The inhabitants of some of these lands are remarkable for their dialectic skill. Each land has a religion and superstitions, which extend their baleful influence over all the relations and business of life and society. Those who would seek to labor among these people without some knowledge of their philosophy and religion, are very much like a physician who would prescribe for a patient without any knowledge of the particular habit and constitution of the patient.

The transcendent success of the German army in the late terrible war with France is generally ascribed to the fact that all the German officers had accurate and reliable maps of all parts of the country through which their armies had to march. On the said maps were marked all the natural obstacles and difficulties in the way, all the strategic points of the country, the forts and fortifications which had to be attacked. They were also furnished with full and detailed directions as to how these difficulties were to be overcome and the fortifications were to be attacked. In a word, they were furnished with all the knowledge of what they had to do, and how best to do it, that could be obtained beforehand, instead of being left to find out these things by scouts

and otherwise at the time. This knowledge had been obtained by pains-taking care and labor in previous years; and it had been so systematized and arranged by General Moltke, that every German officer was prepared to do his duty in every emergency. A great portion of the heathen world has been carefully explored by former missionaries. A vast amount of knowledge on all the subjects which it is desirable and necessary for the missionary to know has been obtained. It has not, however, been systematized and arranged. It is scattered through numerous volumes of monthly publications and annual reports of missionary societies, and books of history and travels, journals, and disquisitions on the religions and philosophy of the various lands.

The question, therefore, for the church now to consider, is virtually this: Shall we have a Professor who will systematize and arrange this knowledge, as far as practicable, and furnish it to the students who are expecting to go as foreign missionaries, so that in a measure they may go forth to their work fully prepared, in this respect, as the officers of the German army were? Or shall they be left to go forth as the French officers did, without any local and practical knowledge of the fields where the battles were to be fought, and hence meet with disgraceful defeat?

If the United States Government had anticipated such an event as the recent rebellion of the Southern States, and, in preparation therefor, had made accurate military surveys of various parts of the country which were the localities of the most terrible conflicts, how many sad disasters to the army would have been prevented. How greatly it would have shortened the conflict, and how many precious lives would it have saved! Let us suppose that, in connection with our National Military Academy at West Point, where our government has provided for the education of her military officers, it was known that a certain number of the cadets were expecting to serve abroad in countries where the habits of the people were entirely different from our own, the modes and instruments of war were very diverse, their forts and for-

tifications were constructed of different materials, and on different principles, and defended by guns of different calibre and range from those used at home ; but, at the same time, the modes of their warfare, the nature of all their arms defensive and offensive, together with their tactics, were all known to the government. If, under these circumstances, the government neglected to have the said cadets instructed in all that was important for them to know of the kind of warfare they were to be engaged in beforehand, and left them to learn it by sad losses and reverses on the field of battle, would not the government be held inexcusable for such remissness in their plans of instruction ? And would not the government also be held responsible for the reverses to the army, and the loss of life that might be the result of such ignorance on the part of the officers ? It is a matter of history that Braddock, the British general, who had a European reputation as a commander in civilized warfare, owed his defeat, at the place near to Pittsburgh, where his name and his defeat are perpetuated in the name of Braddock Fields, to his being unacquainted with, and unskilled in, the mode of warfare practised by his savage enemies. It is also a well-known fact, that the American militia were a much more successful force against the Indians than European drilled soldiers were, because they were used to the secret and irregular mode of attack and retreat adopted by the Indians.

But the imparting of such instruction in preparation for missionary labor is not a new idea, nor is it a mere matter of theory. The General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland has established such a professorship ; and the Rev. A. Duff, D.D., long the able and devoted missionary in India, fills the chair. The missionary societies of the Church of England, and of the English Baptists and Independents, have long had provision for giving special instruction to those who were preparing to go as missionaries to heathen lands. This has also long been the usage of the various missionary societies among the Protestants of the various states of Europe. It has also the still longer sanction of the Roman hierarchy,

— which is unequalled in the skill, with which its prepares and trains men for its work among the nations of the earth. The error in the system of the various societies, in my opinion, is this: They educate their missionaries in separate schools from those in which the great body of the ministers of their respective communions are educated, and with a special and less thorough course of education. I would, therefore, seek to perfect our system of preparing our missionaries, by making arrangements to afford them, in addition to their present course, that special instruction which they need to fit them for the work in the particular fields to which they are to go.

The plan of a Missionary Lectureship would do very well as an adjunct, or supplement, to a professorship, by which returned missionaries could supplement the general and comprehensive lectures of the professor, by special statements and information in reference to their several fields, as derived from their own observation and experience in the particular land where each one had labored. But, as most of our missionaries return home to recruit impaired health and energies, and as their time and attention are very fully occupied in visiting friends and the churches in their respective home localities, and as they are without the facilities for study, how can we expect to find, from year to year, returned missionaries who could prepare a course of lectures adapted to accomplish the desired end? The fact is, that even now the several professors deem it almost impossible to compress into their allotted time what they wish to say on their assigned and appropriate departments of instruction. One of the most successful of our professors has told me several times, that he wished to incorporate in his lectures some suggestions which would be valuable and useful to those who were expecting to be foreign missionaries, but that he had found it incompatible with the general plan of his lectures.

It is my judgment, and I think this will be the judgment of all who will make the matter a subject of consideration

enough to give a well-founded opinion, that nothing but the establishment of a professorship, the duty of the incumbent of which shall be, to systematize the whole subject of missionary instruction, and give to the students the well-digested knowledge which they require, will adequately meet the great and urgent need which now exists.

The range of duties which should be assigned to such a professor would be the following :

1. To present a clear and full statement of the greatness and richness of that inheritance which has been given to Christ in covenant, and which the church has to recover for him from its present usurping possessor. "Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." The heathen nations occupy a vast portion of the earth still, and constitute a vast majority of its population. Many of their lands are the fairest portions of the earth. What glorious lands they would all be if they were christianized and elevated by the gospel !

2. It would be suitable to give a full notice of each several country in which the missions of our churches are located, comprehending the geography, climate, productions, population, language, government, manners and customs, philosophy and religion of each land, with a statement of the facilities for missionary labor, the progress, the present state, and the prospects of such labor, the nature of the work yet to be done, and the facilities for prosecuting it.

3. To collect and render useful the results of the experience of missionaries for the last seventy years in all lands, as to the modes of labor, and the necessity and advantage of different kinds of labor in different fields. This would, of course, necessitate the expenditure of a great amount of time and research in perusing the records of the various missionary societies, and a wide correspondence with missionaries now in the field. But the success would amply repay the toil.

4. In connection with the above, there would be also the

duty of noting the hinderances to the success of missionary labors in different lands, and the best mode of removing and overcoming them, as made known by the experience of former laborers in the field.

5. Careful and judicious discussions of the requisites to usefulness and success as missionaries ; with a statement of the characteristics of mind and intellect suited to labor among the different peoples, and of the physical constitution adapted to different climates.

6. Pastoral or practical instruction as to the best manner of approaching the heathen, and of discharging all of the various duties of a minister of Christ among a heathen people.

This incomplete sketch of the subjects that might be assigned to a professor of missionary instruction, shows that they are of varied interest and importance ; and that, without encroaching on the departments assigned to any existing professorships, they are such as would demand all the time and the highest efforts of the most gifted and well-informed mind. This chair would need a special library, in order that the professor should be able fully to investigate and prepare his lectures on all the subjects assigned to him. A duplicate of the library now in the Mission House in New York, and also that in the Mission House in Boston, would be a very desirable nucleus for it. But, in addition to that, works on the history, language, government, philosophy, and religion of all the countries of Japan, China, Siam, India, Persia, Syria, Africa, and Brazil would be needed ; and so likewise complete sets of the publications of the various American and English Missionary Societies, from the commencement ; and all the works published by missionaries and others relating to missionary work in these lands. It will also be evident to all, from these remarks, that the lectures of such a professor would require no ordinary amount of study and research. Lectures on the subjects would not only be interesting and useful to the students who contemplate laboring in the foreign field, but they would be interesting to all intelligent and inquiring minds. They

would also be of direct and special use and benefit to all who remain at home as pastors and teachers. It is the settled and wise policy of the Presbyterian church to employ no *special* agents to instruct and awaken an interest among the churches in the foreign work. It is considered to be the proper work of the pastor to do this. But pastors cannot be expected to do it effectually, unless they have such a view of the vast extent and preciousness of the inheritance of Christ as will cause their whole souls to be aglow with a desire to see it recovered to its rightful possessor. Unless pastors become more fully acquainted with the condition and needs of the various nations, how can they awaken an earnest purpose in the minds of their people to send them the blessings of the gospel?

Hence these lectures will be, to those who are to occupy the home field, as direct and essential a preparation for discharging this very important part of pastoral duty, as the other parts of their Seminary course to fit them for other parts of their work. But, of course, the more special and direct advantage from these lectures will be to those who contemplate giving themselves to the work in heathen lands. After attending such a course of lectures, covering the whole range of the subjects, young men will come to the consideration of their personal duty with a better preparation to decide the question rightly than they can have in any other way. Each one will be able to consider intelligently where his labors are most needed, to which country and climate his physical constitution is best adapted, and amongst what people his natural and acquired capabilities fit him to labor. All would be able to have some just conception of the nature and difficulties of the work to be done, and to derive benefit from the experience and observations of those who have gone before them. The consideration of the subject of personal duty, with such advantages, by conscientious and prayerful men, could not fail to secure an increased number of well-qualified men for the work. Heretofore it has happened that sincere and pious men have made mistakes as to their duty in this

matter, for want of a proper knowledge of the field and of the work to be done. Many have found, when they have arrived on the field, that the work was very different from what they expected it to be, and some such have very soon retired from the work. This action on their part has been less costly to the Boards than that of the others who have remained in the field, engaging in a routine of work for which they have had but little adaptation. It is not strange, however, that such mistakes should occur; neither is it to be expected that they can be entirely prevented; for at home, where the people themselves make the choice of a pastor, and the ministers have themselves some opportunity of judging of the people among whom they are called to labor, it often happens that experience shows that this or that minister is not adapted to the congregation to which he has been called. But there is every reasonable probability to suppose that, if the young brethren who contemplate such labor, were in possession of more full and accurate information in regard to the fields themselves, the nature of the work and of the difficulties and hinderances to be encountered and overcome, the mistakes would be much fewer.

It would be no small incidental advantage, that the students would have one who was so well qualified to give them privately such special suggestions and advice, as from his personal knowledge of them he might judge to be useful to them. For, from his observations on the field, and his full understanding of the work, he would be able to give the students who might individually seek for it such particular suggestions and information, adapted to their individual cases, as would be of the greatest use to them in arriving at a wise decision. The Boards would also naturally look to such a professor for information as to the capability and adaptedness of those who applied to them for appointment as missionaries. The opinion that prevails widely, that any young man of sincere piety and exemplary life will do to be a missionary, has led to many persons being recommended to the Boards of Foreign Missions who have no other quali-

fications than those for the service. It is, of course, true that sincere piety is an essential requisite in every one who would be a missionary. But it by no means follows that every one who has sincere piety is qualified to be a missionary. It is just as requisite, in order to success in missionary labor, that there should be the proper and necessary qualifications for it as there is in any other calling in life. The expected and necessary assistance of divine grace does not supersede the necessity of natural endowment and acquired preparation; and as, in the nature of the circumstances, the cost of the voyage of missionaries to foreign countries, and their support during the several years they are acquiring the language of the country, involve a heavy expenditure, as compared with the home work, it is only a wise and proper economy that not only well-adapted persons should be selected, but that they should receive a *most thorough and suitable* training.

But not only is it very desirable and important that a suitable education should be imparted to those who go, but it is necessary that a *greatly increased number* of suitable missionaries should be raised up to go, into the foreign field; for just as the church has not yet begun to appreciate the greatness and richness of the inheritance which she is called upon to take possession of for her risen Lord, so neither has she come to rightly estimate the extent of the work, or of the number of men who are needed to enter upon the possession thereof. Judging from the past history of the church, these views are not likely to prevail extensively in the church until the pastors and teachers are generally and deeply impressed therewith, so that they shall seek to awaken deep and all-pervading convictions in the minds of their hearers, of their personal obligations and responsibility to consecrate all their efforts to effect this great work. If the whole Protestant church were only aroused to such a consecration and loyalty to Christ, and the glory of his kingdom, as was awakened in the mediæval church by the preaching of Peter the Hermit to recover the land of Palestine, and especially

the holy sepulchre of our Lord, from the pollution of Moham-
medan possession, half the cost of life and treasure that
were wasted in those useless crusades to recover the Holy
Land would enable the church to take possession of the
whole earth for Christ. Every lover of his race deploras
the terrible sacrifice of human life that was endured during
the eight successive crusades from Europe, during the
eleventh and twelfth centuries, to Palestine. Yet who does
not feel a glow of ardor pervade his mind as he reads of
that feeling of loyalty which then pervaded so many hearts,
and which led many of the noblest princes and rulers, as
well as tens of thousands of all classes and conditions of
men, to engage in these self-sacrificing efforts to recover the
Holy Land to Christian possession. But alas for the apathy
and worldliness of the Christian church! that when Christ,
her adored head, as Lord over all, has opened up the fairest
and most populous kingdoms of the world to the evangel-
izing efforts of his church, there is no enthusiasm of con-
secration aroused, nor any wide-spread feeling of loyalty
evoked, leading his people to take the adequate measures
to go up and possess the land for its rightful Lord!

In the year 1819, when the whole heathen world was
closed to any efforts of Christians to diffuse the gospel, the
deepest feeling and interest were awakened throughout all
parts of the United States by the news that was published
that the Sandwich Islands, in the Pacific Ocean, having
some three hundred thousand inhabitants, had thrown away
their idols; and very earnest and continuous efforts were
immediately put forth to send them the blessings of the
gospel. The wonderful providence of God in opening up
the great and wide kingdoms of India, China, Siam, and
Japan, with their six hundred millions of inhabitants, scarcely
arouses as much interest, or calls forth as earnest and self-
denying efforts now to send them the gospel, as did the
opening of the Sandwich Islands at that time. And in
many ways and places the church is actually guilty of "a
penny-wise and pound foolish" policy, because, while she

acknowledges the duty to disseminate the gospel, and sends some few missionaries to the heathen, yet she sends too few to be efficient in effecting the desired object. The glorious and blessed results which were experienced at the Sandwich Islands are due, under the divine blessing, to the fact that the instrumentality used was, in some measure, adequate to the object to be accomplished. At one time there was a missionary to nearly every *three thousand* of the population ; and the whole church has rejoiced and given praise for this gracious result. Such also has been the fact in the South Sea Islands, where such blessed results of missionary labor have been experienced. In India, to which the church has been sending missionaries for seventy years, and where there is every facility of laboring for the evangelization of the people, there is now, after the lapse of two generations of men, one missionary to every *four hundred thousand* of the people. In China, which, in answer to the prayers of the church of God, which were continued for nearly forty years, God in his providence opened to missionary efforts, there are now, after a lapse of thirty years, or nearly one generation of men, perhaps one hundred and fifty missionaries, or one to every *two million* of the inhabitants. The most wonderful revolution in the government and policy of a nation, that ever occurred in the history of the world, has been, in the providence of God, accomplished in Japan, opening that most secluded of all lands to evangelistic efforts. This call of Providence has been before the church for some fifteen years, and there are now some fifteen missionaries there, or one to every *two and one-third million* of the population, as given by the government itself ; that is, fifteen missionaries among a population nearly equal to the population of the United States.

While reading the statement of such facts, what Christian does not feel his face blush with shame ? We profess to serve the Lord Christ, and that *all* which we have and are is his, and to be used to his service. His last command to his disciples is, “ Go ye into all the world, and preach the

gospel to every creature." And it is estimated that there are from four to five hundred millions of the earth's population which have never heard of the name of Jesus, "the only name given under heaven whereby men can be saved." And this not for want of opportunity or facility of communication or access to the people, nor for want of means or of men; but because the people of God do not set themselves, with earnest devotedness of heart, to carry out the command of their ascended Lord. Is it any wonder that, in such a time of ease-loving and pleasure-seeking, infidelity and worldliness everywhere increase in nominally Christian lands? And is it any wonder that when men of the world now travel over the globe, and see the treasure and labor and men that are given to carry out worldly enterprises, and the manifest results thereof, they scoff at and ridicule the few results of missionary labor? In view of the facts above stated, will not the church arouse itself to the fact, that if it would accomplish the work which she has been commanded to do, she must send forth an instrumentality in some degree adequate to the work to be accomplished? And has she not the promise of infinite truth that, if she "will bring all the tithes into the storehouse," by giving of her sons and daughters as laborers in the work, and her wealth to carry on the needed agencies, he will pour out a blessing upon Zion, "until there shall not be room to receive it." Is not the God of providence also the God of grace? and when he has so miraculously prepared the way for the gospel, will he not also, in answer to the prayers of the church, in connection with the use of the appointed means, pour out his Spirit upon all flesh until "the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the whole earth"? "The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them; and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose." "And the ransomed of the Lord shall return and come to Zion, with songs and everlasting joy upon their heads: they shall obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away." Will not the love of Christ in the heart of his blood-bought followers excite them to a spirit

of consecration and devotedness to his service, such as characterizes the world in carrying forward its enterprises? Notwithstanding all the past apathy and remissness of the church, I believe she will yet arise and give herself to this work, with a zeal and devotedness that will put the world to shame, and that, as the result thereof, "the kingdoms of this world will become the kingdoms of our Lord Christ."

But with many there has been no difficulty in seeing the importance and need of such a professorship; but they do not see how it can be established at this present time. With me, however, there is no insuperable difficulty in its establishment, if only the need and importance of it is felt by those who are interested in the cause of foreign missions. A plan which has been suggested to me appears quite practicable for a trial measure, subject to subsequent modifications. For the present, let the professorship not be connected with any one of the Seminaries. Let the arrangements be made by which the professor will deliver his course of lectures at each of the Theological Seminaries once in two or three years, as may be considered desirable. The subjects of the lectures are such that the whole three classes in each Seminary could hear them at the same time, and be equally profited thereby; because it would not be necessary for the Junior Class to have attended upon any of the Seminary course as a prerequisite for attending them. And the students of the Junior Class may as properly consider the question of their own personal duty to the heathen at an early period of their Seminary course as at a later period.

It may be proper to present an answer to some of the objections that may be made to the establishment of such a professorship. By some it will be objected that it will take away a man from the place where he is very useful now to fill this new chair. This is, indeed, true. And the very best man for the situation ought to be sought. But if the necessity and importance of the professorship are as great and urgent as they are represented to be, then it will be a wise and proper position for the most useful and gifted

man ; for it is a received axiom in such cases, that the man who trains others for greater usefulness in the ministry is doing more for his Saviour and his fellow-men than he could do by his own personal labor in the ministry.

The expense of the endowment of another professorship will be to some an objection. But to me this appears a very small matter. The endowments of all our seminaries together must amount to several millions of dollars. But not one dollar of this amount is with direct and specific reference to the foreign work of the church. When it is considered that this foreign work is regarded as of the very first importance, and that it is the most difficult ; and when a single religious denomination aims to expend four, five, or six hundred thousand dollars annually in the cause of foreign missions, can it be considered an unwise expenditure to use some three thousand dollars in paying the salary of a professor to give suitable and specific instruction to those who go forth to carry on the work ? I would consider it a most wise and judicious expenditure ; and so would it be considered in every well-conducted worldly enterprise. But besides this, it has not unfrequently happened that great expenses have been incurred by men being sent to a field for which they were not adapted. In some cases the physical constitution of the missionary has been entirely incapable of enduring the climate ; in other cases the mental endowments and acquirements were not suited to the character of the people ; and hence these parties have very soon retired from the field. Very many of such mistakes would be obviated if the young men had the requisite information before making up their minds as to their field of future labor.

By some it will be objected, that the time of the students in their theological course is so fully occupied already, that it is difficult to see how or when time can be secured for attendance on a new course of lectures. [This and some other objections will be answered in a future Article on a subject of the same nature with the preceding].

ARTICLE VI.

AN EXPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF GENESIS
I. AND II.

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§ 1. CREATING.

THE Genesis of the material universe has long been a sealed book. Modern science has broken its seals, and revealed to us some of its primary lessons, such as these :

The entire matter which constitutes the present cosmos was originally in a gaseous state. By process of natural causes, involving immense time, this primal mass was separated into individual masses ; and these masses were gradually consolidated into those worlds and families of worlds which now, without speech or language or voice, declare the glory of God.

These and kindred matters are announced to us, not as the results of profound thinking merely, but as facts ; as facts grasped by dint of laborious research and exhaustive calculations ; as facts attested by the most eminent masters in the different schools of astronomy, physics, chemistry, and geology. Consequently, the several results, supported by such testimony, are rightly accepted as above controversy and beyond doubt.

There is another book of Genesis, written by the Hebrew prince who delivered his people from bondage ; written in his vernacular, now an unspoken language for more than two thousand years. This book also sets forth a history of a creation. The wise and the good of many generations have cherished it with devout reverence ; and Christian sages of the present age study it the more eagerly and the more profoundly, because of the new Genesis which science has brought to light.

As these two revelations are continually brought into comparison, it is proper that we distinctly define our own position with reference to each, before entering upon our attempt to expound the venerable document before us. We therefore give the following statements as covering the whole ground from which we make our survey. We do not give them as axioms, or as the results of demonstrations; but as simple points which may fairly be assumed and conceded by all.

Postulate 1. — The cosmogonic doctrine of modern science, as stated above, is true.

Postulate 2. — The Mosaic account of creating is consistent with itself, and with all other statements bearing upon the same theme which occur in the Hebrew scriptures.

Postulate 3. — The language of the Mosaic narrative, whether shaped under divine supervision or not, is to be interpreted according to the known and universal laws of human language. In other words, as a writer, the Hebrew narrator stands on the same level with other writers, and is to be judged by the same rules.

With these simple points constantly in mind, and with a tremulous conviction that the health and thrift and moral power of the Church, the religious interests of the world, and inspiring views of God, are critically involved with right and wrong in the reading of the Bible's first leaf, we proceed at once to our investigation of its original text, and shall endeavor honestly and strictly to evolve the true force of its several parts. We shall aim also to give *our reasons* (such as they may be) for every expository step; never allowing ourselves to rest upon any mere conjecture, however plausible.

"In the beginning." There is no such thing as a "beginning" *absolute*. In all languages, the word is a *relative* term. Like the words "end," "middle," "whole," "part," "surface," "centre," and many others, it *must*, Hebraically speaking, be in the "construct state." It can never be written without a genitive after it, expressed or implied. In Deut. xxxiii. 21, its genitive is implied, and is to be found

by reference to the historical fact (Num. xxxii. 1-5, 33-36), that Gad "provided" for himself "the beginning of" the allotments of the several tribes. In Isa. xlvi. 10, the genitive is also implied: "declaring from the beginning of" — everything — "the end of" everything. In the case before us, the genitive is expressed by "the heaven and the earth." "In the beginning of" them (i.e. "in their beginning") God did create the heaven and the earth."

The word "create" (בָּרָא) requires our careful examination, with an eye particularly to the dictum of schoolmen, that "its true idea is that of creation, out of nothing, of matter in an unformed state." Our only proper authority for appeal is Hebrew usage.

After carefully examining every single case in which this word occurs, and observing its several contextual relations, it seems to us very clear that it denotes uniformly the forming of matter after and beyond its mere being. In our view, it seems to stand always avowing, by its relative positions, its own definition without ambiguity, and without equivocation: "To produce something by operating upon some object, or objects, already existing." More laconically: "To produce something new out of something older." We refrain from citing each text in which it occurs, only because it would be a tedious and thankless task. And yet, even if this our conclusion be conceded, it does not prove that בָּרָא "to create," means in Gen. i. 1 the same which it means elsewhere.

We therefore take another step. Our writer uses the two words, בָּרָא "to create" and עָשָׂה "to make," to express the same divine acts. We give examples: God purposed "to make" man. (Gen. i. 26). What he did, was "creating" him (i. 27). If, now, the two words have different meanings, then did God purpose one thing and do another! But if they mean the same, then, with God, "creating" was the same as "making." "God *created* man in his [own] image" (i. 27). But also: "In the likeness of God, he *made* him" (v. 1); "in the *image* of God he *made* him" (ix. 6). "God created the heaven and the earth" (i. 1). "God made

the earth and the heaven" (ii. 4). "I will do [עָשֶׂה] make] marvels such as have not been created [בָּרָא, English version 'done'] in all the earth" (Ex. xxxiv. 10). Thus these two words are used interchangeably and indifferently, by the same writer, to express the *self-same* divine acts. Therefore, in his mind, each word when applied to the Divine Being, had the same meaning.

To the mere English reader, the expression (Gen. ii. 3) "which God created *and* made," and more especially the marginal reading, "which God created to make," seems to indicate a difference of meaning. Each phrase seems to represent making as a product of creating. But neither phrase is a translation of the Hebrew. The proper translation, we think, is this: "which God created even unto completeness," or "perfection"; and this does not affect the point now in hand,—that the two words had the same meaning in the mind of the writer when applied to God.¹ Therefore, in our view, when Moses wrote in God's name (Ex. xx. 11), "*in six days* the Lord did *make* the heaven, the earth," he meant just what he meant when he wrote "God *created* the heaven and the earth."

The point which we make is this: If the creating of the

¹ We are bound to justify our translation. The phrase "created *and* made" is inaccurate, because in the Hebrew there is *no copulative*; because there is *a preposition*; and because the latter verb is in the *infinitive* mood. The phrase "created to make" preserves the infinitive, but *omits* the preposition. We have here a Hebrew phrase which is purely idiomatic; which cannot be translated *literally* except thus: "which God created *unto* to make." This is dark. The Hebrew gives us the infinitive of עָשֶׂה "to make" with the preposition לְ "to" or "unto" prefixed. In this peculiar position the infinitive has the force of a *gerund*, for which it is indebted to the preposition (Gesenius, לְ c.); while the latter has here, indicated by the connection, the signification of "even unto" (Ibid. A. 2). Again: the verb עָשֶׂה "to make" seems here to *require* its occasionally *emphatic* signification "to effect," "to accomplish," "to complete" (Ibid. עָשֶׂה, I. 2. l.). The verb, with this definition, when used of Jehovah, included, of course, the idea of accomplishing unto *perfection*. We therefore, render thus: "His work which God created even unto completing"; by implication, "even unto *perfecting*." This rendering is grammatical, clear, pertinent, in perfect harmony with the other instances in which the writer so evidently uses these two words as having a common signification. — See Noldius, Concordance of Hebrew Particles, pp. 413, 414.

heaven and the earth extended over six days, then “to create out of nothing” is not the meaning of the word בָּרָא in *this* place : Because — and it is self-evident — there could be no lapse of time between “is not” and “is”; between “no matter” and “matter.” Because there never was a supposable point of the great past when there was something in a state of transition from nothing — something which partly was, and partly was not; because whenever, if ever, the potential will evoked universal matter, at that instant *nothing* ceased; *something* was. Moreover, at that instant “creating” ceased, in the philosophic sense; and if the creating of the heaven and the earth was, in *this* sense, a creating, it did not extend over six days. No matter whether it was a creation of molecular matter, or of a garnished world, or of a quick congregation of worlds. The creating described by Moses was, therefore, *not* a creating from nothing; for it was not *one* divine act, but a succession of divine acts. Far from beginning when it ended and ending when it began, it was a work of *six days*. Therefore, we iterate, — having followed another clew, — when Moses wrote “God created,” he did not mean “God created out of nothing.”

But we turn to yet other testimony. “Thus saith Jehovah who created the heaven, God himself who formed the earth and made it; ‘He hath established it. *Not* a desolation (בְּצָלָה) did he create it. He formed it to be inhabited’” (Isa. xlv. 18). It was “*not* a desolation” which was wrought out when God “created the earth.” On the contrary, his *creating* it was his “forming it to be inhabited”; literally and grammatically, “even unto an inhabiting.” (The same Hebrew idiom as in Gen. ii. 3, *ante*). Moses states that “the earth was a *desolation*” (בְּצָלָה) the very word given by Isaiah. He says that such was its condition *before* God said “Let light be”; that is, before the six days began, or before its creating began. At that point, God’s word “created” (as by Isaiah) was not applicable to it. It was an uncreated (בְּצָלָה) desolation. This pre-existing “desolation,” this *not* nothing, he took in hand as his material.

He “created *it*.” How? By so forming it — the then “*not* created desolation” — that it was a habitable thing, adapted to living beings. By forming out of it a habitation; by forming out of it inhabitants; in short, by forming it “*even unto* an inhabiting.” We are, therefore, constrained reverently to believe that the creating specified in the first line of the Bible was the very creating which the Creator, by Isaiah, has defined — the creating of the six days, which began with light and ended with man.

Instead, therefore, of the earth having been first created and then made (we now use these words in the cosmico-theologic sense), it was first made (constructed) and then created. Instead of having been created out of nothing, it was created out of “a desolation.” Our testimony may be sifted in all honesty and honorableness, and our logic too, if there be any. But it can hardly be charged, we think, either in honor or in honesty, that our opinion is hypothetical.

§ 2. THE CREATIVE “HEAVEN” TERRESTRIAL.

The Hebrew word rendered “heaven” in the first sentence of this narrative is found only in a plural form. Sometimes in the scriptures it has a plural signification, sometimes a singular. Whether, in any given case, it has the one or the other, must be determined by the connection in which it is used; just as we must determine, in any given case, the grammatical number of our word “sheep.”¹

In conventional phrase, “the heaven and the earth,” or

¹ It would be a severe task to examine all the texts in which שָׁמַיִם occurs, hoping to find a rule by which, in all cases, its singular or plural signification might be determined. We have, however, made such examination pretty largely; and it has made us quite confident of two things; (1) That the English version *very* often gives a plural where it ought to give a singular form; and (2) That we should *always* receive the word in its singular sense when not coupled, *by itself*, with a plural verb, or when some other and equally cogent reason is not present. Throughout this narrative it has never, by itself, *any* verb; for in ii. 14 it only *shares* a verb. But (as we expect to show) it always stands here as a synonyme of “the firmament” or expanse, which was *one*; and this fact is “a cogent and present reason” for taking it, all along, in its singular sense.

"the heavens and the earth," means the universe. Is that its meaning here?

We will first turn our attention to the word "heaven." When he wrote it here, in this first sentence, did the writer mean to designate the cosmos, — excepting this world, of course, — or did he not? Unless he fails to explain himself on this point, we have nothing to do with outside usage. If he does explain himself, he is sufficient and decisive authority; and all other is intrusive, and not properly admissible.

We look along a little way, and we find it written "and God called the firmament, heaven." One would naturally suppose that we have here a decisive definition of the word; and that we only need to inquire what is meant precisely by "the firmament." But it is said by some that "the heaven" of the first verse is *other* than the "heaven" of the eighth verse. Therefore, before inquiring what "the firmament" was, we wish to test this saying.

1. If, indeed, the saying be true, the fact asserted is unaccountable. For instance, it is unaccountable that a writer of only common parts even, in the same account, and that account so brief, should use a word of so great relative importance in different senses, and yet give us no advisement of his change of meaning! Here is a description of different creations. One of them is called "heaven," or "heavens." In a few lines we have the same word again, but meaning *another* creation, or class of creations. Well, then, the writer, writing to enlighten, is writing to bewilder; in other words, is using his own pen to defeat his own purpose! And we say that such a use of the pen by a man of common parts is something for which we cannot account.

Again, the writer furnishes a definition of the word. With the definition, it is the firmament. But just before the definition, it is no firmament at all! To what purpose and of what use the definition? If it does not belong to the word throughout the story, it is, in plain terms, a mockery; in *such* a document, a mysterious one!

Once more, assuming that the pen of the writer was

under divine guidance, and supposing that "heaven" is slyly used in two senses, we run squarely upon what seems too much like divine *duplicity*! We shrink from this? Very well. But how otherwise can we account for the fact that a divine dictation should be so framed, definition and all, that under the counter-whirling of two important words the reader must grow dizzy? A matter-of-fact revelation which *confuses* is a revelation which falsifies its own name! We cannot account for the brand upon its forehead.

For these reasons we are shy of the *dictum* which evokes them. And until we can find reasons for it, evolved honestly and fairly from *the text itself*, these unaccountables must still have the aspect of imperative rigidity; and, under their pressure, we must take the divine definition to be of rightful force throughout.

2. So long as such a change of meaning is not made obvious and undeniable, so long we must suppose one of two things,—either that a word so important *has* the same meaning throughout, or that the writer is incoherent, and therefore unreliable. As yet the change has *not* been made obvious and undeniable; and the latter supposition is preposterous, inasmuch as the writer is coherent in all else, and proves his own competence by his very careful and precise definitions. Only the former supposition, therefore, remains,—that the word "heaven" has but *one* meaning throughout the narrative; the meaning expressed by its definition.

3. If we allow ourselves, in one instance, to interpret this writing in so loose a way, where shall we stop? and upon what can we rely? "Heaven" defined meaning other than its definition; the difference not indicated! In this account it occurs fourteen times. If used to denote two different things, how do we know that it does not denote fourteen different things, notwithstanding its definition? If "heaven" expresses one thing here and another there, how are we to determine that some other word is not as protean as this? For example, "God," or "earth," or "day," or "waters," or "man."

If, in a pure statement of facts, we admit such unadvised change of meaning, why may we not admit a like change — to suit our fancy or our philosophy, or even our depravity — in other parts of the scriptures which are less simple, and laden with higher and more subtile discourse? If here, where an important word is particularly defined, we affix to it another meaning, why may we not indulge in like license elsewhere in the Bible where terms are *not* contextually defined? If we may thus set aside a textual definition, what exegetical principle can guide us in any part of the sacred text? If we start by reading the oracles *so*, we can, consistently with ourselves, evolve from them *any* doctrine, whether of him who is the true or of him who is the liar. All this is plain. Therefore we ought to have an eye to the end, when taking our start “in the beginning.”

4. We notice another textual peculiarity bearing upon this point. From the close of the first sentence through the entire *consecutive* narrative of the six days, whenever any one thing (creation) is first mentioned, the word expressing it appears without the Hebrew article. On the other hand, in almost every instance, the article appears when the same word next occurs, and afterwards. We have searched the text with some care, and if our eye has not been in fault, the article is wanting as stated, except before the one word rendered “whales.” This word does not appear the second time, and has the article. For this exception we do not presume to give or to conjecture a reason. In the second verse, to be sure, the word “waters” appears for the first time, and *has* the article. But, holding it, as we do (for reasons to be given hereafter), to be but another word for “deep,” which has not the article, we regard this as no exception.

Now it is very evident that when any such word *recurs*, the force of its article is definitive; designating that very thing which had been so nominated before. That is to say, it points backward to its own particular word, to *the* “darkness,” “light,” “firmament,” “luminary,” or “man,” as the case may be.

We turn now to the first sentence. Two creations are here mentioned; the one expressed by the word "heaven," the other by the word "earth." These words have no antecedents;¹ that is, they appear in the narrative for the first time. But, contrary to the writer's usage in first cases, they appear *with* the article. Is it here redundant? Is it nugatory? Rarely, if ever, can a narrative composition be found so remarkable for its intense conciseness. Rarely, if ever, one of which we may say with so much certainty, that no iota can be taken from it without damage. But if these particular articles before these particular words are neither redundant nor nugatory, then they mean something. But if they mean something, then they have their own proper force as definitives. They point to some definite "heaven," and to some definite "earth." In this case, *the* heaven and *the* earth are not to be found by looking back. From the very pressure of the case, therefore, they must be sought for onward. And they must mean, 'the heaven and the earth about to be written of.' The very fact that these cases are so peculiarly exceptional is intensive. It thrusts us the more imperiously upon the succeeding context, to find precisely what "heaven" and what "earth" the writer thus designates. There were three heavens in the Hebrew vocabulary. Therefore, the article before this word means nothing at all, unless (taking the word in the plural sense) it means *all three*, which no one supposes. But if not all three, which? The article cannot help us to an answer, unless we follow its index-force to the next written "heaven." Therefore we do so, obediently and cheerfully. We identify the "heaven" of the first sentence with that thing (creation) which, as afterwards stated, God had called heaven.²

¹ Chronologically, they had appeared before, as incorporated in the narrative, verses 8, 10; but *here* without the articles and as proper names.

² The considerations which we have now urged showing why, in all exegetical honesty, we should affix a uniform meaning to the writer's use of the word "heaven," apply with equal force to his use of the word "earth." To avoid repetition, we withhold these four several suggestions when remarking on the word "earth" p. 529, trusting to the reader to supply them there.

If, now, there be no flaw in our exegetical premises, we must wrench the writing boldly and terribly, to deny that the first "heaven" is the same as the second. And if we are right in this our reasoning, then does it follow, that throughout the narrative, consecutive and supplementary, the word "heaven" is used *in one sense only*; and that it is an unjustifiable liberty so to translate it as to suggest to the reader any other sense.

Corollary.—If the first "heaven" is the same as the second, then the first and the succeeding verses, by this very word, are *clamped*; and there cannot be a chronological chasm between them.

The question is now fairly before us; in what sense is this word "heaven" here used? But let us first look out from our present stand-point, and ascertain, if we can, what it does *not* mean.

If "heaven" is used in one sense only, and if that one sense be the sidereal host, then does the writer, so very concise, most strangely repeat himself, and very soon; for at first he says, "in the beginning God created the sidereal host;" and then tells us *again* that "God did make them." This reads strangely. But if, on the other hand, by "heaven" first mentioned he did *not* mean the sidereal host, it seems no longer strange, but natural and fit, that he mentions them just as he does.

If "heaven" is used in one sense only, and if that one sense be the sidereal host, then the cosmic galaxy was called into being on the second of the six days, and was then astronomically arranged; and, moreover, the *sidereal host* did "divide between waters and waters." A most unintelligible statement.¹

Again, if "heaven" is used in only one sense, and if that sense be the sidereal host, then (verse 14), God said,

¹ But if the heaven did not *exist* until the second day, then from a new stand-point do we even find that it is *absurd* to suppose a historical hiatus between the creating stated in the first verse and the first creating of the six days. The first verse is only the indicator of the theme about to be unfolded.

“let luminaries be *in* the sidereal host,” and (verse 16) did set them in themselves.

We therefore conclude that whatever may be the true meaning of “heaven,” it does *not* mean the visible universe minus the earth; and to this conclusion we are forced by exegetical consistency and decency.

We return to our question: In what sense *is* the word used? This opens to us another: What does the word “firmament” mean, which God called heaven?

In the Hebrew word *rakia* (רָקִיעַ) we find no resemblance to the word *firm-a-ment*, by which it is rendered. So far from denoting something *firm*, compact, solid, it denotes something expanded, spread abroad, far-reaching. It means an *expanse*, or expansion; not, however, of space, but of some *thing*. The verb, of which this is a derivative, sometimes expresses the act of smiting or beating *out*. But the noun expresses only a state or condition, without indicating any *process* of expansion.

Carefully excluding the idea of mere space or vacuity, and retaining that of matter, we have, then, the true idea set forth by the definition; “And God called *the expanse* Heaven.” But definitely, *what* expanse? *what* expanded thing? The writer does not leave us in doubt; but, as if anticipating all questions which might be raised, even by the most captious, he considerably gives us *illustrative* definitions of his *verbal* definition.

“And God said, Let there be an expanse between¹ the waters; and let it be separating² waters from waters. Thus did God make the expanse, and did separate between the waters which are under the expanse and between the waters which are above the expanse.” Thus we are informed that “the heaven” is that expanse, that expanded, subtile, attenuated material which continually has waters under it and

¹ The same as רָקִיעַ. See Gesenius; word רָקִיעַ 1. b.

² That is, “let it *continue* to separate.” “When,” as here “the verb of existence is added to the participle, an imperfect sense descriptive of continued action, or condition, is designated.” — Gesenius.

waters above (Heb. "upon") it. The waters under it are those which God called seas. Immediately above the seas is what he called heaven. Above this heaven, or rather "upon" it (i.e. supported by it), are all the waters, pertaining to this world, which are not of the seas. Now what expanded, wide-reaching, subtile material has its place above the seas, and has upon itself — any portion of itself — all our other waters? Resting and floating upon it, watery clouds; beneath and supporting it, watery seas? Of nothing else can these facts be predicated but the *atmospheric* expanse.

But we have in the text yet another phenomenal and illustrative definition of what God called heaven. "And God said: Let the waters produce abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth in the open expanse — the heaven." What is the wide-reaching, attenuated form of matter in which the fowl (the Hebrew word means *all* winged creatures)¹ find their range when on the wing? The *atmospheric* expanse, to be sure!

The two illustrative definitions correspond. That in which the fowl fly, is that which is between the waters and the waters — the aerial expanse. A created form of matter so "expanded" that, although we live in it and by it, yet we can neither taste nor smell nor see it, nor when it is in repose can we feel or hear it. We can only breathe it. Above the seas; beneath the clouds; just where we are; in which the fowl fly. Consequently we have in our version, repeatedly, the honest but enforced rendering "fowl of the *air*"; the same word elsewhere rendered "heaven" and "heavens."

The use which the writer makes of the word "heaven" stands independently. No other and different use beclouds its meaning here; and no other and like illumines its meaning here. The writer was competent to give his own defi-

¹ It is of no small importance that we keep in mind the large scope of the Hebrew word rendered "fowl." In its collective sense, it embraces every winged tribe, from the largest to the *most minute*.

nition ; and this definition, so varied and clear, is sufficient and final.

The atmospheric *heave-en* is the original definition of the Hebrew word שָׁמַיִם. Perhaps we should say, the atmospheric *expanse* is that to which the word was first applied, and by God himself. In this verse it is the root ; all other applications of it are but its offshoots. The same is true, of course, of its synonyme רָקִיעַ, translated “firmament” ; the same, also, of their representative English word “heave-en.” From this primary meaning naturally arose a secondary — the seeming vault ;¹ a second heaved-up, in which are “set” the sun and moon and stars. From the secondary meaning arose, as naturally, the idea of a third upheave-al — the supposed residence of God and of his high angels. But the true and primitive meaning of the word, although yet paramount, has become practically almost obsolete. This has happened partly because of the misnomer *firm-ament*, popularly understood to be the seemingly solid vault above us, and partly because of the word “heavens,” popularly understood to be the brilliant cosmos which studs the vault. Consequently, to common readers and to uncommon, the narrative is seriously deficient. They read of the successive divine acts by which the world was fitted for life, but do not perceive how it was furnished with its atmosphere, without which no form of life could be sustained ; than which, no part of the world’s furniture is more beautiful (though invisible), more wonderful, more important, or more magnificent.

Then let the Hebrew text be legitimately and honestly rendered into our vernacular ; that so *this* great and wondrous furnishing of the Creator shall appear in full relief, as God intended it should.

For the sake of perspicuity, and to forestall, if possible, any misapprehension, we will try to express our understanding of the Hebrew *rakia* (רָקִיעַ) “expanse” with more exactness, even if it be at the expense of some repetition.

¹ “Who stretchest out the heaven like a curtain,” Ps. civ. 2. English version, “heavens ;” a single case among many in which the plural form of translation is evidently wrong.

So far from denoting firmness, compactness, density, or solidity, it denotes simply and solely an expanded something which may, or may not, be attenuated ; excluding any measurement of a body from one *surface* to its opposite surface. That is, excluding all idea of its thickness or its thinness. It is, indeed, applied to solid bodies, to thick and to thin, — alike to a gold-foil and to the thick and solid earth ; or, rather, the verb, of which this word is a derivative, is thus diversely applied.

As a superficies has neither thickness nor thinness, but only *reach* ; and as a line has neither thickness nor thinness, but only *reach*, so a *rakia* has neither thickness nor thinness, but only *reach*. In other words, it is only *wide extent*, either of space or of body. In the case before us, it is only wide extent of *body* ; for only the creating of matter is the subject of discourse, not the privative creating of space.

As, therefore, *pure expansion* is the only proper signification of the word, it may be alike and with equal propriety applied to *all* bodies ; that is, to all forms of matter — to solid, to fluid, to vaporous, to ethereal. And although it does not express the idea of rarefaction, nor strictly speaking, the idea of rarity or subtileness, still we cannot see why *rakia*, an expanse, may not as properly designate that which *is* rarefied or subtle, as that which is more dense, or even solid.

But waiving all nicety about words, and even supposing that the Hebrew word does primarily express the expansion of a *solid* to thinness, and not to rarity or to fluidity, yet, as in this case, it is *not* matter firm or solid which intervenes between the cloud-waters and the land-waters ; and as it is *not* matter firm or solid in which winged creatures fly, the writer's own application of the word compels us to say that he uses it (exceptionally, if one choose) to express *expansion* of matter only ; that is, its *out-reaching*, *wide-reaching* *rarity*. In short, it seems to us that the writer *could not* have had the conception of a thin firmness, or of a solid thinness ; and more, that his divine dictator could not have signified such a

conception. We feel compelled, therefore, to reject the *στερεώμα* of the Septuagint and the *firmamentum* of the Vulgate.

Let us now trace in review and group together the several points of the route by which we have come to our present position.

1. We have found *four* cogent exegetical reasons for concluding that the word "heaven" is used, throughout the narrative, in *only one sense*.

2. We have found *three* cogent exegetical reasons for concluding that the word "heaven" cannot mean the sidereal host; the reasons being three textual absurdities which would otherwise be involved.

3. Having thus found what the word does *not* mean, and also that it always has the same meaning, a third conclusion has been *forced* upon us by our respect for the text itself; viz. that the only use which it makes of the word is to designate that expanse which God *called* "heaven," which the writer shows to have been the world's atmosphere, and which our version recognizes by the word "air" no less than five times in the course of the narrative (i. 26, 28, 30; ii. 19, 20).

The only possible ground on which this ultimate conclusion can be challenged, is the gratuitous position that in the first instance this important word designates the starry cosmos, but *afterwards*, the aerial expanse. And yet, so far as we know, *not a single textual reason has ever been given* for the position. We venture to add, such a reason *never can* be given.

For our own contrary conclusion we *have* given textual reasons; reasons which, we think, are simple, clear, and invulnerable. Whether an interpretation without such reasons, or an interpretation with such, is most worthy to be received, is a question open to all.

§ 3. THE CREATIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH.

A process of interpretation which is clear and satisfactory to one mind may be obscure and unsatisfactory to another,

even when the two are truly and equally gifted and equally honest. Consequently, an exegetical result which may be final to one may be nugatory to the other. And yet to the latter the same result may possibly commend itself if wrought out by a different process, while its only effect upon the former will be an assurance of his assurance.

For the present, therefore, we will utterly ignore our previous examination of the creative heaven and the conclusion at which we have arrived. We will take up *anew* the question: What were the two creations which Moses calls "the heaven and the earth"? We will so far simplify the question as to withdraw the phrase from its textual relations as scrupulously and as completely as, in our last section, we withdrew it from all its philosophic, theologic, and traditional relations. We will take it up by itself, and purely as a *Hebraic* phrase; confining our inquiry wholly to the signification of each Hebrew word.

1. What is the meaning of the Hebrew word which we express by our word "heaven"? With this very precise question in hand, we are of course bound not to be influenced at all by any usage, either popular or technical, of our corresponding English word. If in our vernacular we ever use it to designate the galaxy which constitutes the cosmos, we have no right to assume that the Hebrew word for which it stands has the same sense. Not only would this be untrue, but it would be so far from true that we should use it in plain violation of Hebrew usage, which makes, in this very chapter, a clear and pointed *distinction* between the heaven and the luminaries of the heaven. Even in English we speak improperly, though it be popularly, when we speak of the stars of heaven, and yet speak of the heaven as the stars. The stars of heaven can with no more propriety be called heaven than the fowls of heaven can be, or the dew of heaven, or the rain of heaven. Our English use of the word, and especially our inaccurate use of it, must be left wholly out of view, while we now inquire into the meaning of the Hebrew word.

It is a derivative from an obsolete root (רָאָה) which sig-

nifies *to be high*. The derivative always retains the root-sense. As we have before stated, it appears only in a plural form, though almost always (notwithstanding its renderings in our version) it has, as in this instance, a singular signification. Its literal meaning is, an *elevated region*, or *elevated regions*, as the case may be. Hence, the literal aptness of our own word "heaven," "that which is heaved, thrown up, or elevated."

In the Hebrew scriptures it is applied to three different elevated regions or localities; that is, to three different regions elevated above our own plane — the surface of our own world. More exactly, it is applied to three different regions which are *beyond* the surface of our own world; to these three, and to *nothing else*.

The first is, that supremely elevated region represented as the peculiar abode of the Most High God: "the high and holy place"; "the heaven of heavens"; or the region above the others — the height of heights. The second is that elevated region in which the cosmos is, "the sun and the moon and the stars, even all the hosts of *the heaven*" (Deut. iv. 19). "The stars of the heaven and the constellations thereof" (Isa. xiii. 10). The third is, that elevated region which pertains immediately to our own world, and which is the home of all winged creatures, of "dews," of "winds," of "frosts," of "clouds," of "showers," of "a multitude of waters."

From the mere grammatical form of the word in the case before us, it is impossible to tell whether one particular heaven is meant in any given case, or all the heavens. Still, our problem must be wrought out: Whether in this case the word is intended to designate the *three* heavens, which would be all regions of the universe above the earth, or whether it is used to designate some one of them, and if so, which. We may not appeal to the context, for we have precluded it from our present inquiry. We must take the Hebrew word in its plural form, and *just and only as it stands in this sentence*. Now observe, whether the word here means a heaven, or the

heavens, it or they had a beginning and a creating. This is clear. Very well, we have now a stand-point which is a starting-point, and which may prove a clew.

God's heaven, or dwelling-place, must have been coeval with himself. If so, it has had no "beginning," and, consequently, no "creating." Therefore, the word here cannot designate "the heaven of heavens."

But again, the elevated region or heaven which is the dwelling-place of sun and moon and stars and constellations (Isa. xiii. 10) is that high space, or "nothing," upon which they are "hung," and which they occupy in common with our world (Job xxvi. 7). But space, or nothing, has had no "beginning," and consequently no "creating." Therefore, the word here cannot designate the heaven of the cosmos.

Hence, it follows that this word in this text cannot have been used to designate the *three* heavens; that is, the three regions elevated above the earth; that it could only have been used to designate one of them; and that *the* one designated must be the only other heaven which the Hebrew language recognizes — the world-heaven, the heaven of clouds, and dews, and winged creatures; the heaven which *had* a "beginning," and *was* "created"; the only one of the three which conforms to the text-setting of the word.¹

If we insist upon its plural signification, we make it incongruous with its immediate predicates. But this will not do, for we are compelled *by* these predicates to make our election of one from the three, and to elect the *aerial* heaven.

Thus, by another route than our former one we are brought to the same result; by a route simple and rigid as the first brief sentence of the narrative; by a route irrespective of any relations, real or hypothetical, of the word itself.

¹ It is self-evident that space (the middle "heaven") was not created or made. Therefore when we find it written (Ps. xxxiii. 6), "By the word of the Lord were (plural verb) the heavens *made*," we are *obliged* to recognize the figure of speech by which the container is put for the thing or things contained. (Compare Isa. i. 2). Thus: "All things contained in all the heavens were made," etc. Indeed, the next member of the sentence, being epexegetical, verifies this construction: "The heavens were made; *that is*, all the host of them." For this explanatory sense of the particle, see Gesen. Lex. ¶ 1. c. Noldius, Concordance of Hebrew Particles ¶ No. 27, p. 290. Nordheimer, § 1093. 1. a.

We think that we may now urge with respectable emphasis, and yet with all modesty, that our previous conclusions are confirmed; our conclusion that the heaven which the writer says was created was that elevated region which we call our atmosphere; and also our conclusion that this is the only heaven of which he writes throughout his creative discourse.

Having thus developed by an independent examination of the writing itself, the domestic sense in which our historian uniformly uses the word heaven, we turn to our next inquiry.

2. What *was* the original and divine sense of this word הָאָרֶץ "the earth," which the Hebrew writer reverently adopted? ¹ The writer himself tells us, by quoting its divine use as an original nominative: "God called [named] *the dry*, earth." We, therefore, need only to ascertain accurately what "the dry" was.

The word רָבָץ "the dry," occurs but fourteen times in the Bible. In every instance it stands in immediate contradistinction to "water" or to "sea" *as a fluid*.² The form in which it here appears is intensive or emphatic.³ Thus it specially calls our attention to itself. Its precise force, therefore, is to present prominently the *matter*-difference between itself and that other matter to which it uniformly stands in contrast. This matter-difference is simple and obvious. The waters were matter-fluid. The רָבָץ "dry," or the אֲרֶץ "earth," was matter-not-fluid, or matter-solid.⁴ So that the writer, taking the word "earth" from the lip of God, and using it in the God-sense, presents to us a *solid* in this first

¹ For evidence that the writer uses it in *only one* sense, in that which was its original and divine sense, we refer to grave considerations which we have before briefly stated, pp. 516, 517, 518.

² How, then, could it have been *possible* for Moses so to have perverted the synonyme "earth" as to use it to signify a gaseous *fluid*?

³ Gesenius, word רָבָץ.

⁴ So potent and imperative is this in some cases, that our version *translates* "the dry" by "the land"; that is, translates the Hebrew רָבָץ just as if it were הָאָרֶץ. Ex. iv. 9 *bis*; xiv. 16, 29; xv. 19; Neh. ix. 11; Ps. lxvi. 6; xcv. 5; Isa. xlv. 3; Dan. ii. 10; Jonah i. 9, 13; ii. 11. Compare Webster, words "Earth," No. 2, and "Land," No. 1.

verse, and the *same individual* solid to which God in the beginning had applied the word "earth" when the dry "showed itself" above the waters. Such is the pure Hebraic sense of the word. Completely *antagonistic* to the cosmogonic interpretation — "primordial cosmic material," and by no means agreeing with the astronomic earth — our *terrestrial globe*. As used in the Hebrew scriptures it does not mean the world, which is part fluid and part solid, but only our *terrene* world, — the solid part, *the land* of our astronomic earth.

Throughout this account, therefore, "the earth" does not mean our entire globe, but only a particular part of it. The Genesis "earth" was not part water, or part air (fluids), or part semi-fluid fire, or part any other fluid or semi-fluid. It was only such part of this present world as was then "solid"; whether before or since a gaseous fluid, or an igneous fluid, or a watery fluid, or never a fluid; whether then a solid sphere, or a hollow sphere, or a plane. To this definition we are tied. We have no right to expand it, no right to contract it. However, and how often soever, the word may be otherwise used, in common parlance or uncommon, it would be impertinent to cite such usage as applicable or as explanatory here.¹

So far as we know, theological writers and theologico-Hebrew lexicons, without exception, give "the universe" as the proper meaning of the creative phrase "the heaven and the earth"; slyly altered to "the *heavens* and the earth." If admitted, this definition imposes upon us the *necessity* of a cosmogonic interpretation of the creative story as starting from the initial point of matter unformed and motionless. In view of this exegetical tradition, let us make a brief excursion beyond the limit to which we restricted ourselves at the opening of this section.

¹ In a vast number of cases in our version, this Hebrew word is rendered "land." We think it should have been so rendered uniformly, excepting some few cases, in the poetical books, of evident synecdoche. In a great many cases, the rendering "earth" conveys wrong ideas, and has given occasion to a vast amount of wrong interpretation.

If we call upon the sacred writers for some recognition of *the cosmos*, in no one case do they answer by the word "heaven," but always by "the stars of heaven," or by "the hosts of heaven," or, more explicitly, by "the sun and moon and the stars, even all the host of heaven" (Deut. iv. 19; xvii. 3). And when we call upon them for some recognition of *the universe*, they do not answer by the debatable phrase "the heaven and the earth," but in terms very explicit and unmistakable. For example: "I have made *the earth*. . . . have stretched out *the heavens*, and all *their host* have I commanded" (Isa. xlv. 12). Again: "The day cometh . . . to lay *the land* desolate; . . . for the *stars of heaven* and the *constellations* thereof, and the *sun* and the *moon* shall not give their light" (Isa. xiii. 9, 10). And again: "Give thanks to him who made *the heavens* . . . who stretched out *the earth* above the *waters* . . . who made *great lights* . . . the *sun* . . . the *moon* and *stars*" (Ps. cxxxvi. 5-9). Once more, "Thou hast made *the heaven* [the earth-heaven]; the *heaven of heavens* [thine own], with all *their host* [the cosmos and the angels]; the *earth*, and all *things* which are upon it; the *seas*, and all which is in them" (Neh. ix. 6). Other like texts might be cited.

And thus, in all this large variety of language, the Hebrew scriptures do tell us, very distinctly, that the cosmos is *not* one of *their* "heavens," and that *their* "heaven-and-earth" does not mean *the universe*.

If, now, what we have written be not read uncarefully or scornfully, it may, perhaps, be conceded by courtesy at least, that we have respectable reason for saying that we do—grammatically, exegetically, legitimately, Mosaically, and finally—identify "the heaven" of this first sentence with the very atmospheric expanse which God did create on the second genesistic day, and which he did then name "heaven." The same sort of evidence we have produced to show that "the earth" in the same clause was the very solid which God named "earth," and no other thing, nor gas, nor terraqueous sphere. In short, the heaven created in the beginning was

for the earth, and on the earth, and over the earth, and embracing the earth,—they twain one; by God's ordinance joined together and never put asunder.

Therefore, when we ask in the name of honest exegesis, what means the phrase "the heaven and the earth," we should be recreant to our interpretative trust, and recreant to our convictions and to our manhood, did we not answer at once, and decisively, *our aerial heaven and our solid land*. By this our answer, we do frankly, biblically, and religiously decline the rash assumption and hoary tradition that "the heaven and the earth" is a Bible way of saying "the material universe."

"In their beginning God did create the aerial heaven and the solid land." Such, we conceive, is the clear and simple announcement of what is about to be unfolded.

In view of all which we have stated, we think ourselves under an exegetical necessity — a necessity inflexible and *very* potent — of considering this narrative as embracing only the narrow limits of our own land-world, with its sea and its atmosphere. Before the narrative opens its outline or dramatic bourne is carefully and sharply defined.

It may be hard for us to give up the popular, traditional, venerable opinion upon this point. It may seem irreverent to the names of the great and the good and the learned. But what says and what means our record? This is the only proper question. As we answer it, so, rightly or wrongly, shall we read the words which follow. They will be simple or mystic, clear or cloudy, cheering or perplexing, as we expect the tale of a cosmos or the episode of a planet.

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE VII.

HORAE SAMARITANAE; OR, A COLLECTION OF VARIOUS READINGS OF THE SAMARITAN PENTATEUCH COMPARED WITH THE HEBREW AND OTHER ANCIENT VERSIONS.

BY REV. B. PICK, ROCHESTER, N. Y.

EXODUS.

CHAP. I.

- 2 Simeon, Levi — Sam. and Simeon and Levi.
 3 Issachar, Zebulon — Sam. and Issachar and Zebulon.
 18 מלך מצרים and the king of Egypt — Sam. פרעה and Pharaoh.
 22 that is born — Sam. הילד לעבריים that is born to the Hebrews;
 Sept. ὁ ἐν τεχθῇ τοῖς Ἑβραίοις; Chaldee (Targum Onkelos)
 דאחילי דילחורארי.

CHAP. II.

- 3 she took for him — Sam. וחתקה לי אמו his mother took for him;
 Sept. αὐτῇ ἣ μῆτηρ αὐτοῦ.
 6 and she had compassion — Sam. and the daughter of Pharaoh
 בת פרעה had compassion; Sept. ἣ θυγάτηρ Φαραώ.
 10 and the child — Sam. הנער and the lad.
 21 his daughter to Moses — Sam. his daughter to Moses to wife
 לאשה; Sept. Μωϋσῆς γυναικα; Syr. אנתחא.
 24 with Isaac — Sam. ואח יצחק and with Isaac.

CHAP. III.

- 4 יהוה the Lord — Sam. אלהים God.
 5 נעליך thy shoes — Sam. נעלך thy shoe; Sept. τὸ ὑπόδημα; Vulg.
calceamentum; Chald. סינד.
 מגל רגליך from thy feet — Sam. מגל רגלך from thy foot.
 6 אביך of thy father — Sam. אבתיך of thy fathers.
 the God of Isaac — Sam. ואלהי יצחק and the God of Isaac;
 Sept. καὶ θεός (id. v. 15).
 7 מכאבוי their sorrows — Sam. מכאבוי their sorrow; Sept. ἐν
 δόλυνον αὐτῶν; Vulg. *dolorem ejus*.
 8 and the Hittites — Sam. the Hittites (id. v. 17).

- 8 Perizzites and the Hivites — Sam. Perizzites and the Girgashites and the Hivites; Sept. καὶ Φερεζαίων καὶ Γεργεσαίων καὶ Εἰδαίων.
- 16 elders of Israel — Sam. זקני בני ישראל elders of the children of Israel; Sept. γερονσίαν τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραήλ.
of Isaac — Sam. and of Isaac; Sept. καί.
- 17 and the Perizzites and the Hivites — Sam. the Perizzites and the Girgashites, the Hivites; Sept. Φερεζαίων καὶ Γεργεσαίων καὶ Εἰδαίων.
- 18 has met with us; and now let us go נקרה עלינו ועתה — Sam. is called upon us, let us go נקרא עלינו; Sept. προσκέκληται ἡμᾶς; Vulg. *vocavit nos*.
- 22 but every woman shall borrow of her neighbor — Sam. איש מאת
but every man shall borrow of his friend, and every woman of her friend, of her neighbor. רעהו ואשה מאת רעהו משכנתה

CHAP. IV.

- 5 the God of Isaac — Sam. and the God of Isaac; Sept. καί.
- 6 and when he took it out — Sam. and when he took it out from his bosom מחיקו; Sept. ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου αὐτοῦ.
- 18 to Jether — Sam. to Jethro.
- 26 so he let him go — Sam. וירק ממנה so he let her go.

CHAP. V.

- 3 a three days' journey into the desert — Sam. חמדרה ררך שלשת ימים into the desert a three days' journey.
- 4 disturb — Sam. תפרידו separate.
- 5 the people of the land now are many —
Sam. רבים עתה מעם הארץ they are already more numerous than the people of the country [the Egyptians]. הן רבים עתה עם הארץ
- 9 that they may labor therein — Sam. וישעו בה and let them think of it; Sept. καὶ μεριμνάτωσαν ταῦτα; Chald. ויתעסקון בה; Syr. ינרנן בה; Sam. vers. ויענין בה.
- 11 they spake — Sam. וירברו they said.
- 13 hastened them — Sam. אצוים בעם hastened the people.
there was straw — Sam. נתן להם straw given to you; Sept. τὸ ἄχυρον ἐδίδοδο ὑμῖν; Vulg. *dabantur vobis*; Chald. כר מחיב.
- 17 let us sacrifice — Sam. ונזבחה and let us sacrifice.
- 19 ye shall not diminish — Sam. it shall not be diminished יגרע.

- 3 and the magicians did so — Sam. [7] and the magicians of Egypt did so הרטמי מצרים; Sept. οἱ ἐπαοιδοὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων.
- 5 and thy houses — Sam. [9] ומבתריך ומעבדריך ומעמך and from thy houses and from thy servants and from thy people.
- 6 to thy word — Sam. [10] כדברריך to thy words.
- 9 out of the villages — Sam. [13] and out of the villages.
- 12 נטה את ירך במטך stretch out thy rod — Sam. [16] נטה את ירך במטך stretch out thy hand with thy rod; Sept. ἔκτεινον τῇ χειρὶ τῇ ῥάβδον σου.
- 19 At the end of this verse the Samaritan [23] repeats what has already been said in vs. 16–19 [Sam. 20–23]: ויבא משה ואהרן אל פרעה ויאמרו אליו כה אמר יהוה שלח את עמי ויעבדני etc. And Moses and Aaron came in unto Pharaoh, and said to him, Thus saith the Lord, Let my people go, that they may serve me, etc.
- 20 a grievous swarm כבר — Sam. [24] a very grievous swarm כבר מאד.
- וככל and into all — Sam. בכל into all.
- והשחת הארץ the land was devastated — Sam. והשחת הארץ and the land was devastated; Sept. καὶ ἐξωλοθρεύθη.
- 25 from his servants — Sam. [29] and from his servants (id. vs. 27–31).

CHAP. IX.

- 3 upon the asses, upon the camels — Sam. and upon the asses and upon the camels; Sept. καὶ . . . καί, and Syr.
- 5 At the end of this verse the Samaritan repeats what has been said in the previous verses of this chapter: ויבא משה ואהרן אל פרעה ויאמרו אליו כה אמר יהוה שלח את עמי ויעבדני etc. And Moses and Aaron came in unto Pharaoh, and said to him, Thus saith the Lord, Let my people go, that they may, etc. (1–5).
- 7 ישראל of the Israelites — Sam. בני ישראל of the children of Israel; Sept. τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραήλ; Syr. רביית אישׂראיל.
- 9 and upon — Sam. upon
- 19 At the end of this verse the Samaritan repeats what has been said in vs. 14–19, introducing it with the usual words: And Moses and Aaron came in unto Pharaoh, and said to him, Thus saith the Lord, Let my people go, that they may serve me; for I will at this time send, etc.
- 24 in all the land of Egypt — Sam. in the land of Egypt; Sept. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ.
- 25 all the land — Sam. the land.

29 and the thunder — Sam. the thunder.

34 the rain and the hail — Sam. the hail and the rain.

CHAP. X.

2 and that — Sam. that.

the Lord — Sam. יהיה אלהיכם: ואמרת אל פרעה כה אמר יהיה אלהי העברים עד מתי מאנת לענות מפני שלח את עמי ויעבדני: כי אם מאן אתה לשלח את עמי הנני מביא מחר ארבה בגבילך: וכסה את עין הארץ ולא יכל לראות את הארץ ואכל את יתר הפלטה הנשארת לכם מן הברד ואכל את כל עשב הארץ ואת כל פרי העץ הצמח לכם מן השדה: ומלאו בתיך ובתי כל עבדיך ובתי כל מצרים אשר לא ראו אבתיך the Lord your God. And thou shalt say unto Pharaoh, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, How long wilt thou refuse to humble thyself before me? Let my people go, that they may serve me; else, if thou refuse to let my people go, behold, to-morrow will I bring the locust into thy coast; and they shall cover the face of the earth, that one cannot be able to see the earth; and they shall eat the residue of that which is escaped, which remaineth unto you from the hail, and shall eat every herb of the earth, and all the fruits of the tree which groweth for you out of the field; and they shall fill thy houses, and the houses of all thy servants, and the houses of all the Egyptians; which neither thy fathers nor thy fathers' fathers have seen, since the day that they were upon the earth unto this day.

5 ואכל את כל עשב and shall eat every tree — Sam. and shall eat every herb of the earth and all the fruits of the tree.

11 לא כן not so — Sam. לכן therefore.

and they were driven — Sam. ויגרשו and they drove them; Sept. ἐξέβαλον.

12 all that the hail — Sam. ואת כל פרי העץ אשר and all the fruits of the tree that the hail; Sept. καὶ πάντα τὸν καρπὸν τῶν ξυλῶν; Vulg. *devoret omnem herbam, quae.*

13 משה his rod — Sam. את ידו his hand.

17 and intreat — Sam. intreat.

24 אל משה unto Moses — Sam. למשה ולאחריו unto Moses and Aaron; Sept. Μωϋσῆν καὶ Ἀαρών.

CHAP. XI.

1 afterwards — Sam. and afterwards.

2 speak now — Sam. דברי speak ye now.

2 articles of gold — Sam. articles of gold and raiments; Sept. χρυσᾶ καὶ ἱματισμόν.

3 ונתתי את חן העב בעיני מצרים and the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians — Sam. ונתתי את חן העב בעיני מצרים והשאלים and I will give the favor of this people in the sight of the Egyptians, and they will give them freely.

Between the words of the Hebrew מצרים and גם the Samaritan inserts the following words, which are found in the Hebrew from verses 4-7: וכחצית הלילה אני יצא בתוך ארץ מצרים: ומת: כל בכיר בארץ מצרים מבכור פרעה הישב על כסאו ועד בכור השפחה אשר אחר הדרם ועד בכיר כל בחמה: והיתה צעקת גדלה במצרים אשר כמוה לא נחיתה וכמיה לא חסך: ילכל בני ישראל לא יחרץ כלב לשני למאיש ועד בחמה למען הדע אשר יפלא יהיה בין מצרים ובין ישראל: and about midnight I will go out into the midst of the land of Egypt. And all the first-born in the land of Egypt shall die, from the first-born of Pharaoh that sitteth upon his throne, and even unto the first-born of the maid-servant that is behind the mill, and the first-born of every beast. And there shall be a great cry throughout Egypt, such as there was none like it, nor shall be like it any more. But against any of the children of Israel shall not a dog move his tongue, against man or beast; that thou mayest know how that the Lord doth put a difference between the Egyptians and Israel.

גם moreover — Sam. וגם and moreover. Between the end of this second clause of the third verse in the Hebrew, ending with העם, and the beginning of the fourth verse, the Samaritan inserts the following words: ויאמר משה אל פרעה כה אמר יהוה: בני בכרי ישראל ואמר אליך שלח את בני ייעבדני ותמאן לשלחי הנח And Moses said unto Pharaoh, Thus saith the Lord, Israel is my first-born son, and I say to thee, Let my son go, that he may serve me; and if thou refusest to let him go, behold Jehovah will slay thy first-born son. (Found in iv. 22, 23.)

4 into the midst of Egypt — Sam. ארץ מצרים into the midst of the land of Egypt.

5 עד even — Sam. ועד and even.

and all the first-born of beasts — Sam. בחמה כל בכיר and the first-born of every beast; Sept. καὶ ὥς πρωτοτόκου παντὸς τετρά-
vous.

6 throughout all the land of Egypt — Sam. throughout all Egypt
במצרים.

7 *למען תדעו* that ye may know — Sam. *למען תדע* that thou mayest
know; Sept. *ὅπως εἰδῆς*.

CHAP. XII.

3 speak ye unto all the congregation of Israel — Sam. *דברי נא אל*
כל עדת בני ישראל speak ye now unto all the congregation of
the children of Israel; Sept. *λάλησον πρὸς πᾶσαν συναγωγὴν*
υἱῶν Ἰσραήλ; Vulg. *ad universum coetum filiorum Israel*; Syr.
לכלה בנושחא דברי (id. v. 6).

11 your staff in your hand — Sam. your staves in your hand; Sept.
αἱ βακτηρίαι ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν; Vulg., Syr., Chald.

15 until the seventh day — Sam. and until the seventh day.

17 *המציה* the feast of unleavened bread — Sam. *המציה* the com-
mand; Sept. *τὴν ἐντολήν*.

and ye shall observe this day — Sam. *ושמרתם ועשיתם אח היום*
הזה and ye shall observe and do this day.

20 all leavened — Sam. and all leavened *וכל*.

21 and take you — Sam. *קחי* take you

25 this service — Sam. *בהרש הזה* this service in this month.

39 *גרשו ממצרים* they were thrust out of Egypt — Sam. *גרשו*
המצרים the Egyptians thrust them out; Sept. *ἐξέβαλον γὰρ αὐτοὺς*
οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι.

40 of the children of Israel — Sam. of the children of Israel, and
of their fathers *ואבותם*; Sept. (Cod. A) *καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν*.
who dwelt in Egypt — Sam. who dwelt in the land of Canaan
and in the land of Egypt; Sept. *ἐν γῇ Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν γῇ*
Χαναάν.

46 *לא תוציא* thou shalt not carry forth — Sam. *לא תוציא* ye shall
not carry forth; Sept. *ἐξοίσετε*; Vulg. *nec efferetis*; Chald.
ולא תפקין; Syr. *תפקין*.

48 *אתך* with thee — Sam. with you; Sept. *πρὸς ὑμᾶς*; Syr. *עמכון*.

CHAP. XIII.

3 *זכור* remember — Sam. *זכרו* remember ye; Sept. *μνημονεύετε*;
Vulg. *mementote*.

ye came out from Egypt — Sam. ye came out from the land
of Egypt; Sept. *ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου*; Syr. *מן ארצא רמצרין*.

5 when the Lord *יהוה* — Sam. *יהוה אלהיך* the Lord thy God;
Sept. *κύριος ὁ θεός* (id. v. 11).

- 5 between Amorites and Hivites the Samaritan inserts the Perizites and the Gargashites ; Sept. *Περγεσαίων καὶ Φερεζαίων*.
 6 seven days — Sam. ששה ימים six days ; Sept. *ἕξ ἡμέρας*.
 7 and there shall not ולא — Sam. there shall not לא.
 9 והיה and it shall be — Sam. יהיו and they shall be.
 upon thine hand — Sam. upon thine hands' (v. 16).
 15 בכור בן first-born of my children — Sam. בכור אדם בבני the first-born of men among my children.
 16 it shall be — Sam. it shall be unto thee לך.
 the Lord brought us — Sam. the Lord brought thee הוציאך ;
 Sept. *ἐξήγαγέ σε*.
 18 יהושע harnessed — Sam. וחמישים in the fifth generation ; Sept. *πέμπτην δὲ γενεᾶν*.
 19 he had sworn — Sam. Joseph had sworn ; Sept. (Codd. AEFX) *ᾠρκισε Ἰωσήφ*.
 20 in the edge — Sam. which is in the edge.

CHAP. XIV.

- 9 his army — Sam. his armies.
 10 their eyes, and behold — Sam. their eyes, and saw, and behold ויראו והנה ; Sept. *ὁρῶσιν καὶ*.
 13 כי אשר ראיתם את מצרים for the Egyptians whom ye have seen — Sam. for as ye see the Egyptians כי כאשר ; Sept. *ὅν τρόπον γάρ* ; Chald. כמא דכוותון.
 18 and the Egyptians — Sam. and all the Egyptians ; Sept. *πάντες οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι*.
 upon Pharaoh, upon his chariots — Sam. upon Pharaoh, upon his whole army, upon his chariots.

CHAP. XV.

- 1 אנשי I will sing — Sam. אנשיו we will sing ; Sept. *αἰσωμεν* ; Vulg. *cantemus*.
 גאה גאה כי גאה גאה for he is gloriously exalted — Sam. גוי גאה for a proud people (id. v. 4).
 2 עזי וזמרה יה the Lord is my strength and song — Sam. עזי וזמרה my praise and my song, or as ten mss. read עזי וזמרתתי ; Sept. *βοηθὸς καὶ σκεπαστής*.
 3 איש מלחמה a man of war — Sam. גבור במלחמה a hero in war ; Sept. *συντρίβων πολέμους*.
 4 his host — Sam. his hosts.
 7 of thine excellency — Sam. of thine excellencies.

- 14 they will be afraid — Sam. and they will be afraid.
 16 by the greatness — Sam. and by the greatness.
 17 אֲדֹנָי O Lord — Sam. יְהוָה of God.
 thy hands — Sam. thy hand.
 22 וַיֵּצְאוּ and they went out — Sam. וַיֵּצְאוּ and he brought them
 forth ; Sept. καὶ ἤγαγεν αὐτούς.
 went three days — Sam. went a journey of three days יִילְכִי דֶרֶךְ.
 25 he cried — Sam. וַיִּצְעַק מֹשֶׁה and Moses cried ; Sept. ἐβόησε δὲ
 Μωϋσῆς.
 27 Elim, where were twelve — Sam. Elim, and in Elim were twelve
 רִבְעֵלִים.

CHAP. XVI.

- 29 on the seventh day — Sam. בְּיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת on the Sabbath-day.
 32 fill — Sam. מִלֵּא fill ye.

CHAP. XVII.

- 2 wherefore do ye — and wherefore do ye.
 3 and said — Sam. וַיֹּאמְרוּ and they said ; Sept. λέγοντες.
 wherefore is this that thou hast לָמָּה זֶה — Sam. wherefore hast
 thou לָמָּה.
 5 קַח take — Sam. קַח shalt thou take.
 10 Aaron — Sam. and Aaron.
 אֶשׁ to the top — Sam. אֶל רֹאשׁ upon the top ; Sept. ἐπὶ τῇ
 κορυφῇ.
 11 his hand — Sam. his hands ; Sept. τὰς χεῖρας.
 13 עַם וִיכָם לְפִי חֶרֶב people with the edge — Sam. עַם וִיכָם לְפִי חֶרֶב peo-
 ple, and killed them with the edge.
 16 כִּי יָד עַל כֶּסֶּה because the Lord hath sworn — Sam. כִּי יָד
 עַל כֶּסֶּה because the hand was upon the throne.

CHAP. XVIII.

- 7 and did obeisance — Sam. וַיִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶי לְמֹשֶׁה and did obeisance unto
 Moses.
 12 and all the elders — Sam. וּמִזְקְנֵי and of the elders.
 13 until evening — Sam. and until evening וְעַד (id. v. 15).
 20 way wherein — Sam. way which.
 21 provide — Sam. לְךָ תַּחֲזִיחַ provide for thee ; Sept. σεαυτῷ.
 rulers of hundreds — Sam. and rulers of hundreds.
 24 At the end of the twenty-fourth verse the Samaritan has the
 following, which is found in Deut. i. 9-14: וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל הָעָם

לא אוכל אנכי לבדי שאת אתכם : יהיה' אלהיכם הרבה אתכם והנכם
היום ככיכבי השמים לרב : יהיה אלהי אבותיכם יסֶה עליכם ככס אלה
פעמים ויברך אתכם כאשר דבר לכם : איכה אשא לבדי מרחכם משאכם
יריבכם : הבו לכם אנשים חכמים ונבינים וירדעים לשבטיכם ואנשים
בראשיתם : ויענו ויאמרו טוב הרבה אשר דברת לעשות :

- 25 Instead of this verse, the Samaritan goes on with the narrative,
Deut. i. 15–18: ויקח את ראשי שבטיהם אנשים חכמים וירדעים ויהי:
אתם ראשים עליהם שרי אלפים ושרי מאות שרי חמשים ושרי עשרות
ושטרים לשבטיהם : ויצא את שפטיהם לאמר שמעו בן אחיכם ושפטיהם
צדק בן איש ובין אחיו ובן גרו : לא תכירו פנים במשפט כקטן כגדול
תשמעון לא הגורו מפני איש כי המשפט לאלהים הוא והרבר אשר יקטח
מכם הקריבון אלי ושמעתי : ויצא אתם את כל הרברים אשר ידעו:
And Moses spake unto the people, I am not able to bear you
myself alone. The Lord your God hath multiplied you, and
behold, ye are this day as the stars of heaven for multitude.
The Lord God of your fathers make you a thousand times as
many more as ye are, and bless you, as he hath promised you.
How can I myself alone bear your cumbrance, and your bur-
den, and your strife? Take you wise men, and understanding,
and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers
over you. And ye answered me, and said, The thing which
thou hast spoken is good for us to do. So he took the chief
of their tribes, wise men, and known, and made them heads
over them, captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds,
captains over fifties, and captains over tens, and officers among
their tribes. And he charged their judges, saying, Hear the
causes between your brethren, and judge righteously between
every one and his brother, and the stranger that is with him.
Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear
the small as well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face
of man; for the judgment is God's; and the cause that is too
hard for you bring it unto me, and I will hear it. And he
commanded them at that time all the things which they should
do.

- 26 and they judged — Sam. וישפטי and they shall judge.
הקשה את הרבר הגדל — Sam. hard causes — great causes.

CHAP. XIX.

- 12 unto the people round about, saying — Sam. את ההר סביב ואל
הזם האמר unto the mount round about, and unto the people
thou shalt say.

- 25 went down unto the people — Sam. מן ההר אל העם went down from the mount unto the people.

CHAP. XX.

- 5 unto the third — Sam. and unto the third.
 8 זכור remember — Sam. ולשמר keep.
 10 thou shalt do — Sam. תעשה בו in it thou shalt do ; Sept. ποιήσεις ἐν αὐτῷ.
 nor thy cattle — Sam. thy cattle.
 17 thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house — Sam. and thou shalt not, etc.

thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbor's — Sam. and thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, his field, his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, his ox, nor his ass, etc. ; Sept. τὸν ἀγρὸν αὐτοῦ.

At the end of this verse the Samaritan adds the following verses from Deut. xxvii. 2-7 ; xi. 30 : ותיה כי יביאך יהיה אלהיך אל ארץ : הכנעני אשר אתה בא שמה לרשתה והקמת לך אבנים גדולות ושדה אתם בשיר : וכתבת על האבנים את כל דברי התורה הזאת : ותיה בעברכם את הירדן הקימו את האבנים האלה אשר אנכי מצוה אתכם היום בהר גריזים : ובנית שם מזבח ליהוה אלהיך מזבח אבנים לארתנית עליהם ברזל : אבנים שלמית הבנה את מזבח יהוה אלהיך והעלית עליו עלות ליהוה אלהיך : וזבחת שלמים ואכלת שם ושמתה לפני יהוה אלהיך : ההר ההוא בעבר הירדן אחרי ררך מביא השמש בארץ הכנעני היושב בערבה מול הגלגל אצל אלון מירא מול שכם : And it shall be when the Lord thy God bringeth thee into the land of Canaan, whither thou goest to possess it, that thou shalt set thee up great stones, and plaster them with plaster. And thou shalt write upon the stones all the words of this law. And it shall be when ye be gone over Jordan, that ye shall set up these stones, which I command you this day, in mount Gerizim. And there shalt thou build an altar unto the Lord thy God, an altar of stones ; thou shalt not lift up any iron tool upon them. Thou shalt build the altar of the Lord thy God of whole stones ; and thou shalt offer burnt-offerings thereon unto the Lord thy God. And thou shalt offer peace-offerings, and shalt eat there, and rejoice before the Lord thy God. This mountain is on the other side Jordan, by the way where the sun goeth down, in the land of the Canaanites, which dwell in

the champaign over against Gilgal, beside the plains of Moreh, over against Sichem.

- 18 and all the people saw the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking; and when the people saw it — Sam. שמע את הקולות ואת קול השופר וראים את הפידים ואת ההר ענן ויראו כל thunderings and the noise of the trumpet, and saw the thunderings and the mountain smoking; and all the people were afraid.

- 19 Between the words “and they said unto Moses” and “speak thou with us” the Samaritan inserts: הן הראנו יהוה אלהינו את כבודו: את גדלו ואת קולו שמענו מתוך האש היום הזה ראינו כי ידבר אלהים את האדם וחי: ועתה למה נמות כי תאכלנו האש הגדלה הזאת אם יספים אנחנו לשמע את קול יהוה אלהינו עיר ומתנו: כי מי כל בשר אשר שמע קול אלהים היום מדבר מתוך האש כמנו יחי: קרב אתה ושמע Behold the Lord our God hath showed us his glory and his greatness, and we have heard his voice out of the midst of the fire; we have seen this day that God doth talk with man, and he liveth. Now therefore why should we die? for this great fire will consume us; if we hear the voice of the Lord our God any more, then we shall die. For who is there of all flesh, that hath heard the voice of the living God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as we have, and lived? Go thou near, and hear all that the Lord our God shall say (Deut. v. 21–24).

speak thou with us — Sam. ואחרי הדבר אלינו את כל אשר ידבר ואתה ואלהינו and speak thou unto us, all that the Lord our God shall speak.

and we will hear it — Sam. ונשמע and we will hear and do it.

- 21 At the end of this verse the Samaritan adds the following words from Deut. v. 25, 26; xviii. 18–22; v. 27–28:

וידבר יהוה אל משה לאמר שמעתי את קול דברי העם הזה אשר דברו אליך הטיבו כל אשר דברו: מי יתן יהוה לבבם זה להם ליראה אתי ולשמר את מצותי כל הימים למען יושב להם ולבניהם לעלם: נביא אקים להם מקרב אחיהם כמך ונתתי דברי בפיו וידבר אליהם את כל אשר אצינו: ויהיה האיש אשר לא ישמע אל דברי אשר ידבר בשמי אנכי אדרש מעמו: אך הנביא אשר יויד לדבר דבר בשמי את אשר לא צויתיו לדבר ואשר ידבר בשם אלהים אחרים ומת הנביא ההוא: וכי תאמר בלבבך איכה נדע את הדבר אשר לא דברו יהוה: אשר ידבר הנביא בשם יהוה לא יהיה הדבר ולא יבוא הוא הדבר אשר לא דברו יהוה

בזירון דברו הנביא לא תגור ממני : לך אמר להם שובו לכם לאהליכם :
 ואתה פת עמר עמר ואדברה אליך את כל המצוה חתקים וחמשפטים
 ואתה תלמדם ועשו בארץ אשר אנכי נתן להם לרשתה And the Lord
 spake unto Moses, saying : I have heard the voice of the words
 of this people, which they have spoken unto thee : they have
 well said all that they have spoken. Oh that there were such
 an heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my
 commandments always, that it might be well with them, and
 with their children for ever ! I will raise them up a prophet
 from among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my
 words in his mouth ; and he shall speak unto them all that I
 shall command him. And it shall come to pass, that whoso-
 ever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in
 my name, I will require it of him. But the prophet which
 shall presume to speak a word in my name, which I have not
 commanded him to speak, or that shall speak in the name of
 other gods, even that prophet shall die. And if thou say in
 thine heart, How shall we know the word which the Lord hath
 not spoken ? When a prophet speaketh in the name of the
 Lord, (if) the thing follows not, and comes not to pass, that is
 the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet hath
 spoken it presumptuously : thou shalt not be afraid of him.
 Go say to them, Get you into your tents again. But as for
 thee, stand thou here by me, and I will speak unto thee all the
 commandment, the statutes, and the judgments which thou shalt
 teach them, that they may do them in the land which I give
 them to possess it.

- 22 and the Lord said unto Moses, thus thou shalt say — Sam. וידבר
 יהוה אל משה לאמר דבר and the Lord spake unto Moses, saying,
 speak.
- 24 thy sheep, and thine oxen : in all places where I record my name
 I will come — Sam. from thy sheep and thine oxen : in the place
 where I shall record my name, there will I come ; Sept. οὐ ἐὰν
 ἐπινομάσω τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐκεῖ.
- 25 tool upon it, thou hast polluted it — Sam. tool upon them, thou
 hast polluted them עליו ורחללתי.

CHAP. XXI.

- 2 ויעבד he shall serve — Sam. ויעבד he shall serve thee ; Sept.
 δουλεύσει σοι ; Vulg. *serviet tibi* ; Syr. ונפלהך.
- 5 ואם and if — Sam. אם if.

- 10 if — Sam. ואם and if.
- 15 and he that smiteth — Sam. he that smiteth; Sept. ὃς τύπτει;
Vulg. *qui percusserit*.
- 18 באבן או באגרה with a stone or with a fist — Sam. omitted.
- 20 בשבט with a rod — Sam. omitted.
נָקַם יָנֻקָּם he shall surely be punished — Sam. מוֹת יוֹמָת he shall surely die.
- 21 יָנֻקָּם punished — Sam. יוֹמָת die.
- 25 burning for burning — Sam. מַכּוּה חַחַת מַכּוּה wound for wound.
- 28 וכי יגח שור את איש if an ox gore a man — Sam. וכי נכה שור את איש
כל בהמה את איש and if an ox or any animal hurt a man.
the ox shall be stoned — Sam. the animal, etc. (id. v. 29).
הבעל הבהמה ובעל הבהמה the owner of the animal.
- 29 if the ox is goring — Sam. בהמה מכה if the animal is injuring.
- 31 גored a son, or have gored a daughter —
Sam. אי בן יכה או בת יגח injured a son or a daughter.
- 32 the ox push — Sam. תכה הבהמה the animal injures.
the ox shall be stoned — Sam. the animal shall be stoned.
- 33 or an ass — Sam. or an ass or any animal אי כל בהמה.
- 35 one man's ox — Sam. שור איש או כל בהמתו one man's
ox or any of his animals.
אוי hurt another's — Sam. אוי hurt another's or any of his animals
אוי כל בהמתו.
- החיה שור the live ox — Sam. החיה the live.
- 36 the ox was goring — Sam. כי בהמה מכה חיה the animal was
injuring.
ox for ox — Sam. animal for animal.
- 37 With this verse the Samaritan commences the twenty-second chapter. The figures in brackets indicate the verses in the Samaritan text.
- 37 if a man — Sam. [1] and if a man.

CHAP. XXII.

- 3 or sheep — Sam. [4] or sheep or any kind of animal ער כל בהמה.
- 4 if a man — Sam. [5] and if (id. 6 [7], 9 [10]).
another man's field — Sam. כל שְׁלֹם מִשְׁדְּרוֹ כְּתוּבָאֲתָהּ וְאִם כָּל שְׁלֹם יִשְׁלַם מִשְׁדְּרוֹ
שְׂרָה יִבְעֶה another man's field, he shall pay from his field according to its produce; and if it has devastated the whole field;

- Sept. ἀποτίσει ἐκ τοῦ ἀγροῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸ γέννημα αὐτοῦ. ἐὰν δὲ πάντα τὸν ἀγρὸν καταβοσκήσῃ κ. τ. λ.
- 7 when — Sam. [8] and when (id. 16 [17]).
- 8 before the judges — Sam. [9] עַד יְהוָה before God.
- 14 בָּא it came — Sam. [15] וּבָא and it came.
- 19 לְאֱלֹהִים unto any god — Sam. [20] לְאֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים unto strange gods; Sept. (Codd. AFX) θεοῖς ἑτέροις; Chald. לְטִנּוֹת עַמְמַיָּא to the idols of the nations.
- save to the Lord only — Sam. omitted.
- 20 thou shalt not vex — Sam. [22] לֹא תַעֲנִי ye shall not vex; Sept. οὐ κακώσετε.
- 22 אִם עָנָה תַעֲנִי if thou afflict — Sam. [23] כִּי אִם עָנָה תַעֲנִי but if you afflict; Sept. ἐὰν δὲ κακώσῃτε.
- 24 כֹּנֶסֶת usurer — Sam. [25] כִּנְשִׂיא prince.
- 29 with thy sheep — Sam. [30] and with thy sheep.
- on the eighth day — Sam. but on the eighth day וּבַיּוֹם; Sept. τῇ δὲ ὀγδόῃ.
- 30 הַשְׁלִיךְ ye shall cast it to the dogs — Sam. [31] הַשְׁלִיךְ אֹתוֹ cast it utterly away.

CHAP. XXIII.

- 4 his ass — Sam. his ass or any of his cattle אִי כָל בְּהֵמָתִי.
- 7 I will not justify — Sam. לֹא תַצְדִּיק thou shalt not justify; Sept. οὐ δικαιοῦσαις.
- 8 blindeth the wise — Sam. עִינֵי פִקְחִים blindeth the eyes of the wise; Sept. ὀφθαλμοὺς βλεπόντων.
- 9 thou shalt not oppress — Sam. לֹא תַלְחֹצִי ye shall not oppress; Sept. οὐ θλίψετε.
- 11 with thy olive-yard — Sam. and with thy olive-yard; Sept. καὶ τὸν ἐλαιῶνά σου.
- 12 thine ox and thine ass may rest, and the son of the handmaid — Sam. וְכָל בְּהֵמָתְךָ עִבְדְּךָ וְאִמְתְּךָ כַּמִּיךָ thy manservant and thy maidservant may rest like thyself, and all thy cattle.
- 13 and in all things — Sam. and all things וְכָל.
- it shall not be heard — Sam. וְלֹא יִשְׁמָעִי and they shall not be heard.
- 17 before the Lord God — Sam. before the ark of the Lord פְּנֵי יְהוָה.
- 19 At the end of this verse the Samaritan text has an exceedingly difficult and un-Hebrew passage: כִּי עָשָׂה זֹאת כּוֹבֶת שֶׁכַּת וְעֵבֶרָה

הוא לאחרי יצקב, which perhaps may be translated, "for he that makes this a sacrifice forgets (viz. the command of God), and sinneth against the God of Jacob."

- 20 an angel — Sam. מלאכי my angel; Sept. τὸν ἀγγελόν μου; Vulg. *angelum meum*.
- 22 but if thou shalt indeed obey his voice, and do all that — Sam. חשמעו בקולם ועשיתם אח but if ye shall indeed obey my voice, and do all what; Sept. ἀκούσῃτε τῆς ἐμῆς φωνῆς καὶ ποιήσῃς πάντα ὅσα.
- 23 the Amorites, and the Hittites, and the Perizzites, and the Canaanites, the Hivites — Sam. unto the Canaanites, and the Amorites and the Hittites, and the Gergashites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites; Sept. Γεργεσαίον.
- 26 there shall not — Sam. and there shall not ילא.
- 28 the Hivite, the Canaanite, and the Hittite — Sam. the Canaanite, and the Amorite, and the Hittite, and the Gergashite, and the Perizzite, and the Hivite, and the Jebusite.
- 31 thou shalt drive them — Sam. and I will drive them; Sept. καὶ ἐκβαλῶ αὐτούς; Vulg. *et ejiciam eos*.
- 33 it will be — Sam. יהיו they will be; Sept. ἔσονται; Chald. יהון.

CHAP. XXIV.

- 1 Abihu — Sam. Abihu, Eleazar, and Ithamar (id. vs. 9).
- 4 pillars — Sam. אבנים stones; Sept. λίθους.
- 5 bullocks — Sam. פרים בני בקר young bullocks.
- 7 will we do, and be obedient — Sam. נשמע ונעשה we will be obedient and do.
- 12 tables of stone and the law — Sam. לוחות האבנים החרות tables of stones, the law; Sept. τὰ λίθινα, τὸν νόμον; Vulg. *tabulas lapideas*.
- 14 and behold — Sam. behold.

CHAP. XXV.

- 3 and silver — Sam. כסף silver.
- 4 and blue — Sam. תכלה blue.
- 6 oil for the light, spices — Sam. and oil for the light, and spices.
- 7 onyx stones — Sam. ואבני and onyx stones.
- 9 I show thee — Sam. I show thee in the mount בהר; Sept. ἐν τῷ ὄρει.
- shall ye make it — Sam. תעשה shalt thou make it; Sept. ποιήσεις.

- 10 and they shall make — Sam. וַעֲשֶׂה and thou shalt make; Sept. καὶ ποιήσεις.
- 11 upon it — Sam. לִי for it; Sept. αὐτῇ; Syr. לָהּ.
- 19 and make — Sam. יַעֲשֶׂה there shall be made; Sept. ποιηθήσονται.
- shall you make — Sam. תַּעֲשֶׂה shalt thou make; Sept. ποιήσεις.
- 21 that I shall give thee — Sam. omitted.
- 27 for places — Sam. בָּרִים places.
- 28 that may be borne — Sam. וְנָשְׂאוּ that they may bear.
- 31 תַּעֲשֶׂה shall be made — Sam. תַּעֲשֶׂה thou shalt make; Sept. ποιήσεις. Whether it should be read תַּעֲשֶׂה, as the Samaritan reads, and was followed by the Sept., or תַּיַּעֲשֶׂה, as the Hebrew reads, is difficult to say. The fact is, that Kennicott quotes more than a hundred and fifty mss. which have the *scriptio defectiva*, and read as the Samaritan does, although Ibn Ezra saw manuscripts of the Pentateuch which had been carefully revised three times by scholars of Tiberias, and which had the reading תַּיַּעֲשֶׂה, although in French and Spanish copies he found this word as *scriptio defectiva* without a י. (Comp. de Rossi, *variae lect.* i. p. 71.)
- his shaft and his branches — Sam. his shafts, his branches.
- 33 so in the six branches — Sam. so shalt thou make to the six branches כֵּן תַּעֲשֶׂה.
- 37 and they shall light — Sam. וְהַעֲלִית and thou shalt light; Sept. καὶ φανοῦσιν.
- 39 shall he make it, with all — Sam. תַּעֲשֶׂה אֹהֶל וְאֵת shall thou make it, and with all; Sept. ποιήσεις.

CHAP. XXVI.

- 1 and blue — Sam. blue.
- 3 the five — Sam. וְחָמֵשׁ and five.
and five — Sam. and five shall be.
- 8 וְחָמֵשִׁים לִלְאוֹת תַּעֲשֶׂה and fifty loops — Sam. וְחָמֵשִׁים לִלְאוֹת תַּעֲשֶׂה and fifty loops shalt thou make; Sept. ποιήσεις (id. vs. 10).
- 16 of a board — Sam. הַקֶּרֶשׁ הָאֶחָד of one board; Sept. τὸν στυλὸν τὸν ἓνα.
- וְאֵמָה and a cubit — Sam. אֵמָה a cubit.
- 20 צִפּוֹן north side — Sam. צִפּוֹנָה תַּעֲשֶׂה north side shalt thou make.
- 24 וְיַחְדָּו and at the same time — Sam. יַחְדָּו at the same time.
- 25 two sockets under one board, and two sockets under another

board — Sam. לקרש האחר שני ארנים two pairs of sockets to one board.

31 יעשה shall it be made — Sam. יעשו shall they make it.

35 At the end of this verse the Samaritan text inserts the description of the altar of incense, from xxx. 1-10, and omits it in this latter place. The whole corresponds with the Hebrew, excepting the sixth verse, the reading of which we will give in its proper place.

37 זהב with gold — Sam. זהב טהור with pure gold.

CHAP. XXVII.

7 יהיבא shall be put — Sam. והבאת and thou shalt put; Sept. *καὶ εἰσάξεις*; Vulg. *et induces*.

8 so shall — Sam. יכן and so shall.

10 ויי העמודים the hooks of the pillars — Sam. וייהם their hooks; Sept. *καὶ οἱ κρίκοι αὐτῶν*.

11 ועמודי and his pillars — Sam. עמודיהם and their pillars; Sept. *καὶ οἱ στύλοι αὐτῶν*.

hooks of the pillars — Sam. hooks (pillars omitted).

12 ten sockets — Sam. עשרה נחשת ten sockets of brass.

14 and fifteen — Sam. fifteen.

three sockets — Sam. three sockets of brass.

15 fifteen — Sam. חמש עשרה fifteen cubits.

16 their pillars — Sam. ועמודיהם and their pillars.

four sockets — Sam. four sockets of brass.

18 חמשים בחמשים fifty everywhere — Sam. חמשים באמה fifty cubits.

19 לכל כלי all the vessels — Sam. ועשית את כל כלי and thou shalt make all the vessels.

and all the pins — Sam. יבכל יתרתיו and in all the pins.

At the end of the verse the Samaritan adds ויעשית בגדי הכלת ויחלצת שני לשרת בהם בקדש and thou shalt make garments of blue and purple and scarlet to minister in them in the holy.

21 לדרתם unto their generations — Sam. לדרתיכם for your generations; Sept. *εἰς τὰς γενεὰς ὑμῶν*.

CHAP. XXVIII.

3 unto all that are wise-hearted — Sam. אל כל חכם unto every wise-hearted.

4 and a brodered coat — Sam. a brodered coat.

6 of scarlet — Sam. and of scarlet.

- 7 אל שני קצותיו וחבר at the two edges, and it shall be joined —
 Sam. על שני קצותיו וחבר upon the two edges it shall be joined.
- 12 אבני זכרון הנה לבני stones of memorial unto — Sam. אבני זכרון הנה לבני stones of memorial are they unto.
- 17 טורים אבן rows of stones — Sam. טורים rows.
- 20 and an onyx — Sam. שחם an onyx.
- זב מִסְכַּח מִשְׁבָּצִים זָהָב set in gold — Sam. מִסְכַּח מִשְׁבָּצִים זָהָב set in ouches of gold.
- 23 שתי טבעות זָהָב שתי two rings of gold — Sam. שתי טבעות זָהָב שתי two ouches of gold and two rings of gold.
- שתי הטבעות על שני קצות the two rings on the two ends — Sam.
- את הטבעות על קצות the rings on the ends.
- 30 ונָתַתָּ and thou shalt put in — Sam. ואת האורים ואת התמים ונָתַתָּ and thou shalt make the Urim and the Thummim, and put them upon.
- 33 and of scarlet — Sam. ושל משי ושל צִנְצִיף and of scarlet and of fine twined linen.

CHAP. XXIX.

- 2 משחים בשמן anointed with oil — Sam. omits.
- 5 את הכִּתְוֹנָה והגִּדָּה אתו אֲבִישׁ וְהַלְבַּשָׁה את the coat — Sam. את הכִּתְוֹנָה והגִּדָּה אתו אֲבִישׁ וְהַלְבַּשָׁה את the coat, and gird him with the girdle, and put upon him.
- וְהַחֲשֵׁן וְהָאֶפֶד וְהָאֵפֶד וְהָאֶפֶד וְהָאֶפֶד and the robe of the ephod, and the ephod, and the breastplate — Sam. וְהַחֲשֵׁן וְהָאֶפֶד וְהָאֵפֶד וְהָאֶפֶד את המעיל ונָתַתָּ the coat, and put upon him the ephod and the breastplate.
- 10 לִפְנֵי יְהוָה פָּתַח אֹהֶל before the tabernacle — Sam. לִפְנֵי מוֹעֵד before the Lord, at the door of the tabernacle.
- 13 and the caul that is above the liver — Sam. ואת יֶרֶךְ הַכֹּבֶד and the caul of the liver.
- 21 This whole verse is omitted here in the Samaritan, but is inserted, with some slight alterations, at the end of the twenty-eighth verse.
- 22 and the rump — Sam. the rump.
- 25 and burn — Sam. וְהִקְטַרְתָּ אֹחַם and burn them.
- לִפְנֵי יְהוָה מִשְׁכַּח מִשְׁבָּצִים זָהָב set in gold — Sam. מִסְכַּח מִשְׁבָּצִים זָהָב set in ouches of gold.
- 28 At the end of this verse the Samaritan adds the twenty-first verse, in the following manner: "And thou shalt take of the anointing oil and of the blood that is upon the altar, and sprinkle it upon Aaron and upon his garments, and upon his

sons and upon the garments of his sons with him; and thou shalt sanctify him (יְקַדְּשֵׁהוּ) and his garments, and his sons and the garments of his sons with him.

33 לְמַלֵּא to consecrate — Sam. לְמַלֵּא בָם to consecrate therewith.

38 לְיוֹם הַמִּיד עֹלָה הַמִּיד day by day continually — Sam. לְיוֹם הַמִּיד day by day continually, a continual offering; Sept. *κάρπωμα ἐνδελεχισμῶν*.

41 לְרִיחַ for a sweet — Sam. רִיחַ a sweet.

43 וְיִנְדַּעְתִּי and I will meet — Sam. וְיִנְדַּעְתִּי and I will be met, or sought.

it shall be sanctified — Sam. וְיִקְדְּשׁוּ they shall be sanctified.

CHAP. XXX.

1-10 comp. xxvi. 35 sq.

6 לְפָנֵי הַכִּפְתָּר אֲשֶׁר עַל הַזֵּדָה before the mercy-seat that is over the testimony, is omitted in the Samaritan in loc.

13 the shekel of the sanctuary (a shekel is twenty gerahs); an half shekel shall be the offering of the Lord — Sam. בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ the shekel of the sanctuary, and a shekel of the sanctuary is twenty gerahs, this shekel shall be the offering of the Lord.

14 shall give — Sam. יִתְּנוּ they shall give; Sept. *δώσουσι*.

21 וְיִרְחֲצוּ and they shall wash — Sam. יִרְחֲצוּ let them wash.

27 and the table — Sam. the table.

and the candlestick and his vessels, and the altar — Sam. the candlestick and all his vessels, the altar.

28 and the laver — Sam. the laver.

32 it shall be holy — Sam. וְקֹדֶשׁ and it shall be holy.

34 said unto Moses — Sam. וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֶל מֹשֶׁה לֵאמֹר spake to Moses, saying.

37 לְךָ unto thee — Sam. לָכֶם unto you; Sept. *ἐμῖν*.

CHAP. XXXI.

2 of Uri — Sam. חֲוִירִי of Huri.

4 to devise — Sam. וְלִחְשֹׁב and to devise.

7 and the mercy-seat — Sam. the mercy-seat.

8 and the table and his furniture — Sam. the table and all his furniture; Sept. *καὶ πάντα*.

and the candlestick — Sam. the candlestick.

and the altar — Sam. the altar.

9 and the laver — Sam. the laver.

- 10 and the cloths of the service — Sam. the cloths of the service.
 11 and the oil — Sam. the oil.
 18 tables of stone — Sam. לוחות אבנים tables of stones ; Sept. *πλάκας λιθίνας*.

CHAP. XXXII.

- 7 said unto Moses — Sam. said unto Moses, saying ; Sept. *λέγων*.
 10 At the end of this verse the Samaritan text adds what is found Deut. ix. 20 : ובאחרון ההאנק יהיה מאד להשמירו ויחפלו משה בער and the Lord was very angry with Aaron to have destroyed him, and Moses prayed for Aaron.
 11 of the land of Egypt — Sam. of Egypt.
 with a mighty hand — Sam. ויבוריע נטויה with a stretched out arm ; Sept. *ἐν τῷ βραχίονί σου τῷ ὑψηλῷ*.
 13 and Israel — Sam. וליעקב and Jacob ; Sept. *καὶ Ἰακώβ*.
 ארבה I will multiply — Sam. הרבה ארבה I will exceedingly multiply ; Sept. *πολυπλαθυσῶ*.
 20 and burnt — Sam. וישרפהו and burnt it ; Sept. *αὐτόν*.
 and ground — Sam. ויטחנהו and ground it ; Sept. *αὐτόν*.
 22 כי ברע הוא it is set on mischief — Sam. כי פרוע הוא it is unrestrained.
 27 go in — Sam. ועברו and go in.
 31 oh — Sam. הנה behold.
 32 their sin — Sam. their sin forgive שׂא ; Sept. *ἄφες*.
 I pray thee נא — Sam. omitted.
 34 behold — Sam. והנה and behold.
 וביום פקדי and on the day when I visit — Sam. וביום פקירי and on the day of my visitation ; Vulg. *in die ultionis* ; Chald. וביום אסערותי.

CHAP. XXXIII.

- 1 unto Moses — Sam. unto Moses, saying.
 2 the Amorite, and the Hittite, and the Perizzite — Sam. and the Amorite, and the Hittite, and the Gergashite, and the Perizzite ; Sept. *Γεργεσαίων*.
 7 that every one which sought — Sam. וחיו כל מבקשי that all who were seeking.
 13 thy way — Sam. דרכיך thy ways.
 15 אל תעלני אל תעלני bring us not — Sam. אל תעלני bring me not ; Sept. *μή με ἀναγάγῃς*.

CHAP. XXXIV.

- 4 and he hewed — Sam. and Moses hewed.
and Moses rose up — Sam. and he rose up.
- 7 unto the third — Sam. and unto the third יַעַל.
- 11 the Amorite, and the Canaanite, and the Hittite, and the Perizzite — Sam. the Canaanite, and the Amorite, and the Hittite, and the Gergashite, and the Perizzite.
- 18 for in the month of Abib — Sam. כִּי בִי for in it.
- 20 לֹא תַפְדֶּה if thou redeem not — Sam. לֹא תַפְדֵּנִי if thou redeem him not.
the first-born of my sons — Sam. בְּבִרְיָךְ אֶרֶם בְּכֹרִי the first-born male among thy sons.
- 23 פְּנֵי יְהוָה before the Lord God — Sam. פְּנֵי הָאֲרֹן יְהוָה before the ark of the Lord.
- 24 nations — Sam. גִּיִּים רַבִּים many nations.
- 28 עִם יְהוָה with the Lord — Sam. before the Lord; Sept. ἐναντὶ κυρίου.
- 29 in Moses' hand — Sam. בְּיָדִי in his hand.
- 32 נִגְשָׁה came nigh — Sam. נִגְשָׁה אֵלַי came nigh to him; Sept. πρὸς αὐτόν; Vulg. ad eum.
- 34 which he was commanded — Sam. כָּל אֲשֶׁר אֵת all that which he was commanded.
- 35 and Moses put — Sam. and he put.

CHAP. XXXV.

- 5 and silver — Sam. silver.
- 6 and blue — Sam. blue.
- 11 his tent — Sam. and his tent.
his taches — Sam. and his taches.
his bars, his pillars — Sam. and his bars and his pillars.
- 12 the mercy-seat — Sam. and the mercy-seat.
- 14 and the candlestick — Sam. the candlestick.
and his vessels — Sam. and all his vessels; Sept. καὶ πάντα τὰ σκεύη.
his lamps — Sam. omitted.
- 15 and the altar — Sam. the altar.
- 16 his staves — Sam. and his staves.
- 17 his pillars — Sam. and his pillars.
- 19 the cloths of service — Sam. and the cloths of service.
the holy garments — Sam. and the holy garments.

- 22 and rings — Sam. טבעת עגיל rings, ear-rings.
 24 every one — Sam. and every one (id. v. 29).
 for any work — Sam. for the work.
 28 and spice — Sam. and spices ; Sept. καὶ τὰς συνθέσεις.
 30 Uri — Sam. Huri.
 31 in wisdom — Sam. and in wisdom.
 35 all manner — Sam. בכל מלאכה in all manner.
 in scarlet — Sam. and in scarlet.

CHAP. XXXVI.

- 5 and they spake — Sam. וידברו and they said.
 8 every wise-hearted man — Sam. כל חכמי all wise-hearted men.
 and blue — Sam. blue.
 11 from the edge — Sam. בקצה at the edge.
 likewise — Sam. וכן and likewise.
 17 of the curtain — Sam. היריעה האחת of the one curtain.
 21 length of a board — Sam. הקרש האחד length of one
 board.
 and a cubit — Sam. ואמה a cubit.
 29 and at the same time — Sam. ויחדו at the same time.
 31 and he made — Sam. and they made.
 32 לקרשי צלע for the boards of the tabernacle — Sam. לקרשי
 המשכן for the boards of the other side of the tabernacle.
 38 and the pillars — Sam. את עמודיו the pillars.

CHAP. XXXVII.

- 5 to bear the ark — Sam. לשאת את הארון בהם to bear the ark
 therewith ; Sept. ἐν αὐτοῖς.
 13 cast for it — Sam. ויצק cast.
 17 his shaft and his branch — Sam. his shafts, his branches.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

- 1 the length thereof — Sam. the length.
 the breadth thereof — Sam. the breadth.
 foursquare — Sam. omitted.
 10 of brass — Sam. omitted.
 17 the hooks of the pillars and their fillets of silver — Sam. וייהם
 כסף their hooks of silver.
 22 Uri — Sam. Huri.
 25 and seventy-five — Sam. seventy-five (id. v. 28).
 after the shekel of the sanctuary — Sam. omitted.
 30 אשר לי for it — Sam. למזבח אשר for the altar.

CHAP. XXXIX.

- 2 and he made — Sam. and they made; Syr. ויעברו.
- 4 they made — Sam. he made.
- 7 and he put them — Sam. וישמי and they put them.
- 8 and he made — Sam. ויעשו and they made; Sept. ἐποίησαν; Syr. ויעברו.
- 9 they made — Sam. he made.
doubled — Sam. omitted.
- 21 At the end of this verse the Samaritan text has these words:
ויעשו את האורים ואת החמים כאשר ציה יהוה את משה and they made the Urim and Thummim as the Lord commanded Moses.
- 22 and he made the robe of the ephod — Sam. and they made the robe.
- 24 twisted — Sam. ויש משור and twisted linen.
- 25 bells between the pomegranates — Sam. the bells.
- 26 a bell ... a bell — Sam. פעמון זהב ... פעמון זהב a bell of gold ... a bell of gold.
- 29 and blue — Sam. blue.
- 32 ככל אשר according to all that — Sam. כאשר as.
- 33 and his pillars — Sam. his pillars.
- 36 all — Sam. ואת כל and all.
- 37 his lamps — Sam. ואת נרותיה with his lamps.
and the oil — Sam. the oil.
- 39 his staves — Sam. and his staves.
- 40 his pillars — Sam. and his pillars.
- 41 the holy garments — Sam. and the holy garments.

CHAP. XL.

- 3 the vail — Sam. הכפרת the mercy-seat.
- 17 in the second year — Sam. בשנה השנית לצאתם ממצרים in the second year of their departure from Egypt; Sept. τῷ δευτέρῳ ἔτει, ἐκπορευομένων αὐτῶν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου.
- 27 incense thereon, as the Lord — Sam. קטרת סמים לפני יהוה כאשר incense thereon before the Lord, as the Lord.
- 29 by the door — Sam. לפני פתח before the door.
- 31 and Aaron — Sam. Aaron.
- 33 the work — Sam. כל המלאכה all the work; Sept. πάντα τὰ ἔργα.

[קצין מאתים : קצין הזה ספר השני : קצין הזה this is the second book (with) two hundred Kazzin (or paragraphs).]

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE VIII.

MINISTERIAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE
METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH.

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No interest of any church is greater than that involved in the proper education and training of its ministers. All earnest churches give great attention to this subject; and it is not an unfavorable omen of the future of Christianity that at the present time the best methods of ministerial preparation are the subject of mutual investigation on the part of different Christian denominations.

In the belief that so far as such investigations may be conducted in a fraternal spirit they can hardly fail to be advantageous, the present Article has been written. It is but just to the writer to say that it was not volunteered, but produced in answer to specific inquiries from a highly respected source.

Those inquiries assumed that the successes wrought out by the Methodist Episcopal Church during the comparatively brief period since its organization in December 1784, were in no small degree due to the efficient character of its ministers. They further indicated that many ministers and people of sister churches were desirous of understanding the nature and requirements of the system of ministerial preparation recognized by the church referred to, and also the nature and extent of any modifications of the system found desirable within recent years. The effort to respond satisfactorily to such inquiries makes it necessary to present a brief summary of facts which will illustrate in historic order the origin, development, and modifications of the system in question.

The idea seems to be more or less prevalent that very

decided, if not radical, changes have recently taken place in that system; whereas facts will show that the recent adoption of institutional instruction for ministers is but a realization of the full plan of ministerial preparation originally proposed by Mr. Wesley, and in perfect harmony with the system of training or field discipline which he and his followers were led to adopt as a providentially dictated necessity of their initial work.

The Methodist Episcopal Church owes its origin under God to what is known as the great Wesleyan revival of the eighteenth century. Two distinguishing characteristics of that revival were, first, a prominent recognition of the divine call as a necessary prerequisite for every true minister of the gospel; and, secondly, the practice of enlisting lay co-operation as a direct auxiliary of evangelistic effort. It cannot be claimed that either of these features of his subsequent ecclesiastical system was originated by Mr. Wesley. The first he believed to be required by the word of God. The second was taught him by the providence of God, contrary to his early and churchly prejudices. Nevertheless, both were, in due time, heartily received by him and his early coadjutors, and have been cherished with equal cordiality by his successors to the present day. In reference to the second, the process of persuasion was gradual and instructive. Among the earliest fruits of the preaching of Wesley and Whitefield were converted men of the common people who were impressed with the duty of warning sinners to "flee from the wrath to come." Corresponding to this important fact, the necessities of the work of grace in which those great evangelists were engaged were so pressing that they felt compelled to welcome sincere and promising co-operation by whomsoever offered. From ministers of the Church of England, with a few exceptions, they encountered either cold indifference or bitter opposition. Hence, from the first they encouraged good and competent laymen as "helpers," to read and explain the scriptures and to exhort wherever they could find listeners.

But even this policy, especially in the mind of Wesley, was far from that of sanctioning lay preaching. To the latter he was brought unexpectedly to himself. The story, though often told, has still its significance. In the year 1741 Wesley, on going from London to the north and west of England, had left Thomas Maxfield in the Foundery Society to read the scriptures, pray with the people, and give them suitable religious advice. This man, who was one of his earliest converts, and who had accompanied Charles Wesley in his travels for a year or more, was insensibly led from praying to preaching. Wesley received a letter at Bristol informing him of the fact. His prejudices for "church order" were still strong, and he hastened back to London, with no little alarm, to check the new irregularity. But his mother, a woman of extraordinary capacity, and herself the widow of a clergyman, was at hand to influence his conclusions. "She perceived on his arrival that his countenance expressed dissatisfaction and anxiety, and inquired the cause. 'Thomas Maxfield, he replied, with unusual abruptness, 'has turned preacher, I find.' She reminded him of her own sentiments against lay preaching, and that he could not suspect her of favoring anything of the kind without cause. But 'take care,' she added, 'what you do respecting that young man; he is as surely called of God to preach as you are.' She counselled him to examine what had been the fruits of Maxfield's preaching, and to hear him himself. He heard him. 'It is the Lord, let him do what seemeth to him good,' was all he could further say."¹ From that time lay preaching, under the regulations which will be explained further along, became a feature of the Wesleyan economy. Nor was a long period required to demonstrate its inestimable value as an agency for bringing men to the knowledge of the truth. After only four year's experience with his lay preachers, whose number continually increased, Wesley vindicated them and their office fully in his celebrated "Appeal to

¹ See Stevens's *History of Methodism*, Vol. i. Chap. v.

Men of Reason and Religion.”¹ After having repeatedly and patiently replied to objections against lay preaching and lay preachers, he became more severe, if not more convincing, in his replies. In one instance, when a clergyman had reproached him for his manifest “breach upon the order of the church,” he closed his explanations with this emphatic declaration: “Soul-damning clergymen lay me under more difficulties than soul-saving laymen.”

The rapid extension of the work in connection with the efforts of Mr. Wesley and his coadjutors soon rendered formal consultations necessary. Hence, the origin of Conferences. The first Conference was held in London in the year 1744; and there were present, besides Mr. Wesley, five clergymen of the Church of England, and four lay preachers, including Thomas Maxfield. At that initial Methodist Conference, the question of ministerial education was formally considered, and the conclusion reached was indicated by the following record:

“Q. Can we have a seminary for laborers?”

“A. If God spare us till another Conference.”

At the ensuing Conference the question was repeated in this form:

“Q. Can we have a seminary for laborers yet?”

“A. Not till God gives us a proper tutor.”

Thus it appears that an institution for ministerial education was at that early day proposed by the founders of Methodism, although its realization was delayed for a long period by providential hinderances. Chief among the hinderances was the pressure for all available help to occupy, without delay, the fields of ministerial service which opened before them in so many directions, and with such urgent calls.

In these facts may be seen a striking illustration of the principle that “Man proposes, but God disposes.” So far, however, from interpreting providential hinderances as reasons for inactive waiting, or for any pause in his work, Wesley rather felt quickened by them to greater activity in

¹ Wesley's Works (Am. ed.), Vol. v. pp. 156-160.

making use of such means of ministerial cultivation as were possible, aside from institutional advantages. It is affirmed by Wesleyan authorities that he never abandoned the design and hope of "a seminary for laborers"; but in his intense desire to work while his day lasted, and to do what his hand found to do, he was led to devise a system of *ministerial training*, or education *in the ministry for the ministry*. Nevertheless, he was ever on the alert to realize, as far as possible, his original idea of what was desirable as a means of thoroughly preparing ministerial laborers for their work. On one occasion he actually collected together at Kingswood "seventeen of his preachers, whom he divided into two classes, for the purpose of reading lectures to them every day during Lent, as he had formerly done to his pupils at Oxford."¹ Before one class he read and discussed Pearson on the Creed, and before the other Aldrich's Logic. To both he gave "Rules for Action and Utterance." It is not recorded whether the entire period of Lent was thus employed; but Tyerman records the opinion that about a month was devoted to this form of ministerial training. That author adds, "Who were Wesley's favored pupils? This is a question we cannot answer; but from the books selected we learn that Wesley's object was, (1) to teach theology; (2) the science of reasoning; (3) the art of elocution. Leisure hours were occupied in making preparations for the Christian Library, and in preaching in the surrounding neighborhood."

While Mr. Wesley and his associates freely encouraged unordained men to preach, whom they believed to be divinely called, yet they by no means allowed men to enter upon that work at will, or upon their own impulses. They permitted no one in connection with their organizations to preach without a license, annually renewed; and no license was granted unless, in addition to the candidate's profession of a personal belief that he was moved by the Holy Ghost to preach, the following questions could be answered affirmatively by an official council of his brethren:

¹ See Tyerman's *Life of Wesley*, Vol. ii. p. 34.

(1) Do they know God as a pardoning God ? Have they the love of God abiding in them ? Do they desire and seek nothing but God ? Are they holy in all manner of conversation ? (2) Have they gifts as well as grace for the work ? Have they in some tolerable degree a clear, sound understanding ? Have they a right judgment in the things of God ? Have they a just conception of salvation by faith ? And has God given them any degree of utterance ? Do they speak justly, readily, clearly ? (3) Have they fruit ? Are any truly convinced of sin, and converted to God by their preaching ?

So appropriate have these tests seemed, that from the day they were instituted till now, it has been the custom of all Methodist churches to inquire concerning each candidate for the initial grade of their ministry—the local preacher's office,—has he grace, has he gifts, has he fruits of his Christian labor ? No doubt, a very charitable and hopeful construction has often been put upon the gifts of men believed to be truly regenerate and sincerely desirous of doing good ; nevertheless, the principles on which the official members of the church have been required to form their judgment and base their action are stated above.

From the first, a large part of the business of each Conference related to the examination, the admission, and the instruction of helpers. The code of rules and advices drawn up at that period for the guidance of young ministers in reference to their personal, religious, and ministerial duties, has never been surpassed, if equalled, in any uninspired document. The value still set upon the precepts they contain is indicated by the fact that they are, in substance, embodied in the current official documents of every branch of Methodism throughout the world. In perusing them, one is at a loss which most to admire, their comprehensiveness or their minuteness, their scope or their detail ; but still more, to form any just conception of the degree of influence they must have exerted upon the lives and characters of the hundreds of thousands of ministers who have in successive years solemnly pledged themselves to be governed by them.

To serve as samples of their style and spirit, the following extracts are inserted.

On the Employment of Time.

“ Q. What are the rules of a helper ? ”

“ A. (1) Be diligent. Never be unemployed a moment. Never be triflingly employed. Never while away the time ; neither spend any more time at any place than is strictly necessary.”

“ Q. What general method of employing our time would you advise us to ? ”

“ A. We advise, (1) As often as possible to rise at four ; (2) From four to five in the morning, and from five to six in the evening, to meditate, pray, and read, partly the Scripture with the notes, partly the closely practical parts of what we have published ; (3) From six in the morning till twelve (allowing an hour for breakfast) to read in order with much prayer, first, ‘ The Christian Library,’ and the other books which we have published in prose and verse, and then those which we recommended in our rules of Kingswood school.

“ Read the most useful books, and that regularly and constantly. Steadily spend all the morning in this employ, or at least five hours in twenty-four.”

The Christian Library referred to in the extract, was a series of fifty volumes, duodecimo, which Mr. Wesley published in 1749, for the purpose of making more accessible the best portions of the then existing religious literature of the English language. While those fifty volumes formed a theological library of themselves, yet the series as a whole was only one (the forty-first in order) of one hundred and four different publications written or edited by Mr. Wesley during his lifetime. Thus it may be seen, that however unlearned any lay-preacher may have been at the beginning of his career, by devoting five hours a day, according to the rules to which he was pledged, to reading and study, he could hardly fail to secure in the course of a few years a very creditable education, even though his reading did not extend beyond the Bible and the books which Mr. Wesley himself published. His education, too, would be all the more serviceable from the necessity of its daily application in the instruction of others.

But we are not left to mere theory in judging of the efficiency of Wesley’s system of ministerial training. Nothing has been better attested by facts. Its influence soon

became known and felt in every part of Great Britain, by the results it produced in arousing the public mind to the consideration of religious truth, in the actual awakening and conversion of multitudes, and in its increasing and permanent influence upon the religious character of the nation. Nor were the results of the system limited to the United Kingdom. They spread beyond the Atlantic on the tide of emigration. As early as 1766 they began to appear in New York and Baltimore, from which places, chiefly, through the agency of volunteer lay-preaching, they radiated in various directions. At this stage, Mr. Wesley, on application, sent out as missionaries the first of his itinerant ministers who visited America — Asbury and Whatcoat. In 1773, about eight years subsequent to the first sermon of the lay-preacher Philip Embury in New York, a Conference of preachers was held in Philadelphia. After organization, those present proceeded to recognize “the doctrine and discipline of the Methodists,” as contained in the English minutes, to be “the sole rule of their conduct.” It was thus that Mr. Wesley’s system of ministerial enlistment and drill was adopted in America.

Experience during the period of the Methodist societies, that is, from 1773 to 1784, proved it to be as well adapted to the exigencies of religious effort in the New World as it had been in the Old. Hence, in the formal organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the same system with only slight and immaterial modifications was adopted, and incorporated in the Discipline by which that church was to be governed. The practice of ordaining ministers, which in America commenced with the organization of the church, soon caused the terms “helper” and “assistant” to pass out of use, having been substituted by those of “preacher on trial,” “preachers in full connection,” and “preachers in charge”; while, as with reference to clerical orders, ministers after ordination were designated as deacons and elders.

In the order of historic progress we have now reached the period when Methodism was inaugurated in both hemispheres

in the form of organic and working churches. Did these churches modify, in any essential particular, Mr. Wesley's original methods of training young ministers, and educating them to the work of the ministry while engaged in it? On the other hand, those methods were maintained both in England and the United States with entire unanimity, and with increasing attachment, on account of the results that became apparent in ever widening spheres.

It was found that in proportion as these churches began to secure the fruits of their own action in the moral and educational elevation of the communities to which they ministered, and also in bringing within their influence a larger proportion of educated persons, there was a corresponding increase in the mental maturity and educational attainments of the men who were raised up for the work of the ministry. But not on this account was the system of training and education in the ministry abandoned or allowed to decline. On the contrary, efforts were made to improve it. Nor was any difficulty experienced from the fact that the degrees of antecedent preparation were exceedingly diverse among the candidates for the itinerancy. Some, like Dr. Coke, came from University halls, and others like Samuel Bradburn, a prince of orators, rose from the shoemaker's bench. Yet, if the brother of low degree could rejoice in that he was exalted, the brother of high degree had no occasion to grieve that he was depressed. On the other hand, a loving rivalry was promoted in the joint endeavor of both to do all they could for the glory of the common Master.

The system in question was specially adapted to develop whatever kind or degree of talent any individual might possess, and it succeeded in bringing into effective service large numbers of men of respectable, and not a few of rare, talents, while it sternly rejected those incapable of improvement.

It prominently recognized what scripture, no less than universal experience, points out — the existence of a diversity of gifts among ministers. Hence, one of its leading objects

was to cultivate and use such special talents as God had bestowed on each. As among the "gifts" demanded in any person offered for trial, it required a respectable degree of knowledge and cultivation preliminary to the special studies and studious habits that were thenceforth enjoined upon him. To be able to preach and to secure fruits as a sower of the good seed of the word of God was indeed the first great and indispensable requisition. But there were found to be various modes of successful preaching. Some were sons of thunder, and others were the sons of consolation. Some were specially gifted to awaken dead and dormant souls, others as teachers in righteousness. The policy of the itinerant system was to employ each minister where most wanted at any particular time, and thus to secure for his special gifts, not only continual cultivation, but the widest field of action.

Severe as was this system in its demands upon all who were subject to it, nevertheless it had the effect to stimulate in not a few a high degree of productive scholarship. Mr. Wesley himself not only enjoined stern precepts in reference to the redemption of time, but he illustrated them in a remarkable manner. Notwithstanding his travel on horseback of four thousand five hundred miles a year, or an equivalent of the entire circumference of the globe every six years, yet he had so disciplined himself as to maintain the custom of reading while in his saddle up to his seventieth year, when his friends insisted on his riding in a carriage. When engaged, at eighty-three years of age, in writing the life of Mr. Fletcher he maintained his studying hours from five in the morning till eight at night, and regretfully recorded, "I cannot write longer in a day without hurting my eyes."

Of a man who could form and maintain such habits it will not be thought strange that, notwithstanding his itinerancy of a quarter of a million of miles, his forty thousand preached sermons, and his more than one hundred printed books, his biographer could make this additional record: "In general scholarship and knowledge he had few superiors; whilst such was his acquaintance with the New Testament that,

when at a loss to repeat a text in the words of the authorized translation, he never was at a loss to quote it in the original Greek." The example of such a leader could not fail to exert an influence favorable to diligent study on the part of his associates and followers. Hence it is not surprising to find that among the itinerant preachers there were, even from the earliest period, scholars of high attainments. Of these, the brief career of Thomas Walsh would have been regarded extraordinary in any age or circumstances. He was at nineteen an Irish Roman Catholic lad with a fair English education and a little knowledge of Latin. Having been converted through the agency of a lay preacher, he entered the itinerancy when twenty years old. He only lived eight years longer; but during that period he became distinguished for impressive power as a preacher, for thorough diligence as a pastor, and for unusual attainments in scholarship. Mr. Wesley, who preached his funeral sermon, spoke of him as "so thoroughly acquainted with the Bible that, if he was questioned concerning any Hebrew word in the Old or any Greek word in the New Testament, he would tell, after a brief pause, not only how often the one or the other occurred in the Bible, but what it meant in every place. Such a master of biblical knowledge," Mr. Wesley added, "he never saw before, and never expected to see again."

The case of Adam Clarke, the celebrated commentator, was very similar. He was another Irish boy who commenced preaching at the age of twenty, with only the elements of a common-school education. Nevertheless, he acquired his great and varied learning, and also wrote his voluminous Commentary and other works, while discharging his duties as an itinerant minister. Jabez Bunting, the great legislator of British Methodism after Wesley; Richard Watson, the theologian; Robert Newton and Joseph Beaumont, the popular preachers and platform orators, and hosts of other truly great and useful ministers, were the subjects of a precisely similar form of training and self-development after having entered the ministry.

Great as was the influence of the Wesleyan training system upon men of extraordinary talent, like those named above, it was no less, in point of fact, upon men less distinguished, and, indeed, upon the itinerant ministers generally, whom it elevated in the face of stern difficulties to a position of ever-increasing moral and religious power. Similar results appeared in the early history of American Methodism, as may be seen not only from Bangs' and Stevens's Histories, but also from the seventh volume of Sprague's *Annals of the American Pulpit*.

In the introduction to the volume last named Dr. Sprague says: "If the mass of Methodist preachers have been less favored in respect to intellectual culture than those of most other denominations, it cannot be denied that there has been, in many instances, an offset to this in the rugged working of great natural powers, and in a spirit of heroic adventure that was schooled and developed amid the perils and hardships of the western and southwestern wilderness. I shall be much disappointed if this volume does not furnish evidence, even to those whose religious associations place them at the greatest remove from Methodism, that there have been in this communion some of the most eloquent preachers, as well as some of the most earnest and devoted propagators of Christianity, whose labors have blessed the American church." Several of the ministers sketched by Dr. Sprague, and others, their contemporaries and successors, added to the labors of their ministry the toils of successful authorship.

No adequate idea can be formed of the Wesleyan plan of training ministers in the field, aside from some just conception of the nature and demands of the itinerant system of which it was an integral part. The men who planted and organized the Methodist Episcopal Church were actuated by one controlling thought—"the spread of scriptural holiness over these lands." For this they renounced all ideas of personal comfort or advantage, all hopes of a life of ease and quietness, all prospects of literary distinction, of settled homes, or of permanent pastorates. For this, like the apos-

ties, they were "in journeyings often," "in perils of water," "in perils in the wilderness," and not seldom "in weariness and painfulness" through watchings and fastings, if not through cold and hunger. Next to direct aid from on high, the help they wanted was similar service from men of like spirit and equal devotion to this one work. Hence the primary and essential trial of any man who offered himself for the itinerant ministry related to his Christian manhood and his adaptation to the self-denying life he would be expected to lead. Tastes and capacities for scholarship were not overlooked, but they were regarded as of secondary importance; to be cultivated, indeed, but only in subordination to the more urgent demands on time and energy. In pursuing this course with their novitiates in the ministry, the Methodist fathers believed themselves to be legitimate followers of the apostles; indeed, of our Lord himself. The original twelve were called from among the common people of their day — from among the laboring, and not the learned, classes. They were chosen for their personal qualities, and not their scholastic attainments; and when chosen they were taken into immediate service as a means of practical training and instruction for future responsibilities. The same was true of the immediate associates and successors of the apostles, who, as in the cases of Timothy and Titus, while being tested as to their adaptation to the work to which they were sent, were exhorted both "to give attendance to reading" and to "study" as a means of becoming workmen needing not to be ashamed, and also by other appropriate means to make full proof of their ministry.

The prompt and ever increasing successes of the early itinerant ministers and their junior associates confirmed them in the impression that the system of ministerial induction upon which they practised was a good one, and specially adapted to their times and circumstances. Nevertheless, as soon as sufficient time had elapsed to enable them to take measures for the more complete establishment and edification of the church, they also adopted measures for increasing the

qualifications of the ministers thereafter to be associated with them. In the General Conference of 1816, following the deliberations of an able committee appointed to consider the "ways and means" of more effectually promoting "that system of itinerant preaching which, under God, has been so successful in spreading the gospel of Jesus Christ," the following resolution, in connection with others, was passed :

"Resolved, That it be the duty of the bishop or bishops, or a committee which they may appoint in each Annual Conference, to point out a course of reading and study proper to be pursued by candidates for the ministry ; and the presiding elders, whenever a person is presented as a candidate for the ministry, shall direct him to those studies which have been thus recommended ; and before any such candidate shall be received into full connection, he shall give satisfactory evidence respecting his knowledge of those particular subjects which have been recommended to his consideration."

The plan of probationary studies thus inaugurated was proved, on experiment, to be of so great utility that it has not only been retained ever since, but enlarged and improved, from time to time, by successive revisions ; while the standard of examination has also been correspondingly elevated.¹

¹ As at present in force, the following is the course of study to be pursued by candidates for the ministry in the Methodist Episcopal Church :

CANDIDATES FOR ADMISSION on trial in the travelling connection must be acquainted with, 1. The common branches of an English education ; 2. Ancient History (Rawlinson) ; 3. Scripture History, Old and New Testament (Smith) ; 4. History of the United States (Willson) ; 5. History of Methodism, abridged (Stevens) ; 6. Rhetoric (Haven) ; 7. Logic (True) ; 8. Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church. [Read (1) Wakefield's Theology ; (2) Watson's Life of Wesley ; (3) Whitney's Hand-Book of Bible Geography ; (4) Foster's Christian Purity ; (5) Student's Gibbon.]

FIRST YEAR. — 1. Theological Institutes (Watson) Part I ; 2. Plain Account of Christian Perfection (Wesley) ; 3. Church History (Waddington) ; 4. Homiletics (Kidder) ; 5. Psychology (Munsell) ; 6. Written Sermon. [Read (1) Wesley's Sermons ; (2) Stevens's History of Methodism ; (3) Townsend's Sword and Garment.]

SECOND YEAR. — 1. Statement and Scripture Proofs of Bible Doctrine ; 2. Theological Institutes (Watson) Part II ; 3. Baptism (Hibbard) ; 4. Moral Science (Wayland) ; 5. Written Sermon. [Read (1) Whedon on the Will ; (2) Emory's Defence of our Fathers ; (3) Porter's Compendium of Methodism ;

Like Mr. Wesley in England, Bishop Asbury in America made strenuous efforts to establish an institution of learning contemporaneously with the organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In this view, Cokesbury College was founded at Abingdon, Maryland, in 1787. The plan of education for that institution was published in the Discipline of the church for 1789, proposing, among other important designs, the following:

“The institution is also intended for the benefit of our young men who are called to preach, that they may receive a measure of that improvement which is highly expedient as a preparative for public service.”

Unhappily, Cokesbury College had but a brief career. It

(4) Gausson's Origin and Inspiration of the Bible; (5) Rawlinson's Historical Illustrations; (6) Shedd's Homiletics and Pastoral Theology.]

THIRD YEAR.—1. Theological Institutes (Watson) Parts III. and IV; 2. Introduction to the New Testament (Nast); 3. Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion (Butler); 4. Hand-Book of the Bible (Angus); 5. Logic (Whateley); 6. Written Sermon. [Read (1) Hagenbach's History of Doctrines; (2) Hurst's History of Rationalism; (3) D'Aubigné's History of the Reformation; (4) Wythe's Agreement of Science and Revelation.]

FOURTH YEAR.—The course of study for the fourth year is the same as now printed in the Discipline, viz. preparation for detailed examination on sixty-two comprehensive topics, classified in sections as follows: 1. Personal Religious Life and Habits; 2. The Bible, the Canon, and the Life of Christ; 3. The Doctrines of the Bible; 4. Church Organization and Government; 5. Ecclesiastical History. [Read (1) Thomson's Evidences of Revelation; (2) M'Clintock's Methodology; (3) Kidder's Christian Pastorate; (4) Conybeare and Howson's Life and Epistles of St. Paul. And also the following books of reference: Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy, Smith's Classical Dictionary, M'Clintock and Strong's Cyclopaedia, Haydn's Dictionary of Dates.]

[N. B. — All answers to the questions in the fourth year's course of study are to be submitted to the Committee of Examination, in writing.]

In addition to the above course of study for candidates for the itinerant ministry, the Discipline prescribes two other courses somewhat less full: 1. For local preachers who are candidates for deacon's orders; 2. For local preachers who are candidates for elder's orders. It also prescribes three corresponding courses of study for German preachers, travelling and local. It may here be explained that no *scholastic* examination precedes the licensure of a local preacher. Nevertheless, no one can be licensed to preach in that capacity without being first “examined in the Quarterly Conferences on the subject of Doctrines and Discipline.” Whenever any one desires to enter the itinerancy he is required, as indicated in the above course of study, to pass five successive examinations before committees of an Annual Conference.

was destroyed by fire a few years after its establishment, and, although rebuilt in the city of Baltimore, it met, in the second instance, with a similar fate. To a young and feeble church such results were so discouraging that further efforts for the founding and support of institutions of learning were suspended till about 1820. The General Conference of that year advised each of the Annual Conferences to found a seminary of learning within its boundaries. Thenceforward, academies and seminaries under the patronage of the church became common in various parts of the country. A few years later several colleges were founded, and ever since that period both classes of institutions have continued to increase, not only in number, but in strength and patronage.

Not many years passed by before the influence of the literary institutions referred to was seen in higher grades of preparation on the part of ministerial candidates who had enjoyed their advantages. But, even in the case of college graduates, no exemption was made from the rule requiring them to pass their theological examinations before the Quarterly and Annual Conferences, or committees appointed by the latter.

In England ninety years elapsed from the date of the first Methodist Conference before Mr. Wesley's original idea of "a seminary for laborers" was realized. The propriety of founding one began to be formally considered as early as 1823; but it was only after the most mature consideration that the experiment of institutional education for ministers was inaugurated, in hired premises, in 1834. Ten years later two elegant and substantial edifices had been erected and occupied as the northern and southern branches of the theological institution of the Wesleyan Methodist Church. The former was located at Didsbury, near Manchester, and the latter at Richmond, near London. From that day to the present, the education of junior ministers in schools specially established for that purpose has been regarded in England as an assured success. It was found in actual result to have so decided an influence in promoting the spirit

of foreign missionary labor and due preparation for it, that, in 1864, the institution at Richmond was set apart solely for the education of missionaries. At the same time, a third branch of the general institution was established at Headingley, near Leeds, for candidates contemplating the home work.

Respecting the general influence of theological education, as thus established and conducted in Great Britain, a venerable Wesleyan minister, in 1874, wrote as follows: "The anticipations cherished by the promoters, that the institution in its several branches would prove a nursery for the personal piety of the students, as well as a suitable and efficient means of preparing them more fully for the wise and zealous discharge of ministerial duty, have been fully realized."

Only a little later than the movement in England just described, corresponding efforts were incepted in the Methodist Episcopal Church for the promotion of theological education through the direct agency of schools. The first practical fruit of these efforts was the organization of theological departments in several literary institutions. The first separate and independent institution for theological instruction was established at Concord, N. H., in 1847. Twenty years later it was removed to Boston. In 1856, a similar institution was organized at Evanston, Illinois, near Chicago; and in that year the first formal sanction was given to theological schools by the General Conference. Since that period this class of institutions has had the approbation of the highest authorities of the church. In 1867, a third was established at Madison, New Jersey, near the city of New York. The judgment of the church now seems to be that the institutions mentioned — so advantageously located at focal points of the Eastern, Western, and Middle States — form an ample supply for a long time to come, and that it is better to make these three strong in endowments and patronage than to found additional schools, unless for specific purposes.

The theological seminaries referred to, like the oldest and best similar schools of other American churches, prescribe a course of study arranged with reference to the attainments

of college graduates, and requiring three years for its completion. They give full instruction, by means both of textbooks and lectures, in the several departments of Hebrew and Greek exegesis and literature, ecclesiastical history, systematic theology, and practical theology, including homiletics and the pastoral work. The foregoing enumeration indicates, to some extent, the order of study. Biblical interpretation has precedence, as being fundamental to the right comprehension of revealed truth, as well as the great facts of history and providence. Systematic theology exhibits scriptural truth in its appropriate relations and in logical forms; while practical theology teaches the application and uses of all forms of truth in the proclamation of the gospel and the establishment and edification of the Christian church.

In two particulars, deemed important, the regulations of the Methodist theological seminaries are peculiar. 1. They require every student, in addition to his personal profession of conviction of a divine call to the ministry, to bring an official expression of a corresponding conviction on the part of the church, either in the form of a local preacher's license or of a certificate issued by a Quarterly Conference—the body authorized to license local preachers¹—affirming the

¹ The regulations of the Methodist Episcopal Church in reference to its local or lay ministry, as distinguished from its regular or itinerant ministry, seem to be somewhat difficult of comprehension to persons of other denominations. It may therefore be explained, that in order to become a local preacher a person must first be recommended by a meeting of the leaders and stewards of the church of which he is a member, as a suitable candidate for the office in question. He must then pass a satisfactory examination on the doctrines and discipline of the church before a Quarterly or District Conference. As to the nature of the investigation expected to be made in reference to his character and religious experience, see p. 563 of this Article. At the end of the prescribed examination, and of a consultation held in the absence of the candidate, a license may be granted by a vote of the examining Conference. That license is valid for only one year, but may be renewed annually thereafter if, on due examination of his personal and official character, involving his gifts, grace, and usefulness, the person is approved as a local preacher. Local preachers are considered laymen, and are usually engaged in some kind of secular business as a means of self-support; yet they are expected to give, and in fact do give, much of their time, as well as their best efforts, freely to active co-operation with their pastors whose assistants they are, and under whose general direction they act.

judgment of its members that the young man is called to preach the gospel. 2. They encourage students to preach, to a limited extent, during their undergraduate course.

Many reasons might be given to illustrate the propriety of the last-named regulation. Among them are the following: 1. Oftentimes churches and surrounding communities within easy access need the services of young men called to the

When, therefore, a young man comes to a Methodist theological seminary as a licensed local preacher, he has certain rights and is subject to certain duties quite independent of the institution. Hence, it is not for the institution to say, unless in an advisory manner, when or how often he is to preach. His allegiance in that regard is considered due to the church, and not to the school. Moreover, the circumstances and qualifications of individuals differ so widely that the schools would find it difficult to prescribe fixed rules. Nevertheless, the prevailing sentiment of the schools is, that, unless in very particular circumstances, students should preach but little while engaged in the studies of the junior year; that during vacations they should make themselves as useful as possible in the churches and neighborhoods they may visit; that from and after entering upon the study of homiletics in the middle year, they should pay special attention to the preparation and delivery of sermons; and that during their senior year while studying pastoral theology it is very well for them to serve as pastors of small churches not too far away. This theory is in harmony with the appropriate order of theological studies, which it is not deemed best to change in view of exceptional cases. As a rule, the students who attend our theological seminaries are those who expect to enter the itinerant ministry in the manner explained on pp. 579, 580, in order to which they must first have made proof of their ministerial gifts as local preachers. Nevertheless, many persons remain permanently in the local preacher's office, while those itinerants who in good standing cease to be members of Annual Conferences, fall back into the rank of local preachers from which they started. It is to be observed, however, that superannuated and supernumerary itinerant preachers retain their membership in the Annual Conferences, as do other ministers employed in official work recognized by the Conferences. At an early period of Methodism in America, owing to the inadequate number of regular ministers in many parts of the country, a custom was established which has never prevailed in England, viz. that of ordaining certain lay ministers in order to qualify them to administer, and to assist in administering, the sacraments. Hence, rules have been instituted by which persons who have rendered four years of acceptable and consecutive service as local preachers, and also passed a satisfactory examination on a prescribed course of study, may, by election of an Annual Conference, be ordained as local deacons; following which, after four years of additional service, and a satisfactory examination on a second course of study, they may in like manner be elected and ordained as local elders. Corresponding ordinations in the travelling or itinerant ministry are secured in half the time, or in two and four years respectively, as may also be seen from the statement on pp. 579, 580.

ministry. 2. It is for the spiritual good of persons cherishing convictions of duty to preach the gospel that they exercise their gifts as they may have opportunity. 3. Talents, whether great or small, improve with use, specially the talent of public speaking. 4. The necessity of using knowledge in persuading men stimulates the zest of study, and increases the interest of students in the instructions of their teachers. 5. It is important that habits of responsible Christian action be formed at the earliest practicable period in the life of an intending minister; otherwise he will be but a novice at the end of his curriculum of study. 6. While these and other kindred advantages are gained by encouraging ministerial students to preach with more or less regularity, many are thus actually enabled to support themselves, and avoid all necessity of borrowing from church or other funds during their course.

If it be asked whether the preaching of students does not interfere with their studious habits, it may be answered, Not necessarily. It may interrupt their studies to some extent, and at the same time quicken them to better habits of redeeming their time, as it presses them with higher motives. But even though it should in some degree lower their standing in mere scholarship,—as, indeed, it sometimes does,—yet if it should also, in an equal degree, increase their skill and power to win souls, the gain is quite certain to be greater than the loss. This is specially the case when the preaching tasks undertaken are not too frequent at too early a stage of their studies. Of course, judicious teachers seek to maintain a wise control, to any extent that may be necessary, over the preaching engagements of young men while students, not only that the former be not in excess, but that there be a suitable correspondence between the qualifications of the preachers and the requirements of the fields they may visit or occupy.

It is an encouraging fact, that from the period of their origin, the theological institutions of the Methodist Episcopal Church have been regularly increasing as to their number of

students, and also growing in influence and in favor with the churches and the ministry. Although the number of their alumni is as yet very small when compared with the whole body of the itinerant ministry, yet the record their representatives are making in the various Conferences and mission-fields of the church is such as to greatly commend them to all candidates for the ministry who can possibly secure their advantages. Indeed, the fact that such institutions are freely open to proper candidates just at the period when, for the first time in the history of the church to which they belong, there is a surplus of young men offering themselves for the ministry, is in itself a providential indication of duty to which thoughtful young men cannot be indifferent. Hence it is to be expected that the number of students will continue to increase, and that the standard of admission to the Annual Conferences will be elevated from time to time, so as to make it more and more a necessity that young men aspiring to the sacred office profit by the advantages they offer.

Adaptation has from the first been acknowledged as a cardinal principle in the economy of Methodism. By it the original system of training and education in the ministry was prescribed at a period when the services of good and true men were indispensable, whether fully qualified in an educational point of view, or not. In improved circumstances, the same principle now prescribes institutional education in theology, as well as in literature and science, to the full extent to which it is available. Formerly, the young preacher was almost invariably associated with a senior minister, on whom devolved the responsibility of the pastoral charge, and from whom counsel and instruction could be readily secured. In those days, several towns and neighborhoods, requiring the services of two or more preachers, were grouped together ecclesiastically under the title of a circuit, of which a senior minister had the official charge, including that of his assistant preachers. At present, circuits are few, while stations or separate pastoral charges are the rule. Consequently, each minister should be prepared in advance to serve

as preacher in charge, or as the sole official pastor of the flock over which he is appointed. Thorough pastoral work, even in the smallest field, leaves but little time for study, beyond that essential to the preparation of sermons. Hence the necessity, by no means so great under the former system, of thorough general preparation in advance.

While this view, as a matter of theory, scarcely admits of question, it is to be regretted that many individuals are slow to measure up to its practical requirements. Lack of time or of means is the prevailing excuse under which numbers of candidates still seek admission to the ministry by a shorter and less thorough course. These excuses are usually rendered plausible to their own minds by the self-flattering supposition that they can succeed as well as the fathers did in former times. But, being subjected to very different tests, they often signally fail, and seldom or never rise to the degree of influence and usefulness they might have attained by patient perseverance in preliminary study.

In some minds, greater weight is given to the excuses named from the fact that as yet no provision is made by the discipline of the church for shortening the period of ministerial probation in consideration of time spent in theological schools. That some such provision will ere long be made is not improbable. In England the Conference itself sends young men to the theological institution, where their time counts as if they were in actual service, though in a diminished ratio. But in this country, as yet, young men have to secure admission to Annual Conferences or a membership in the itinerancy on their personal merits, even after graduation at theological schools, by the same process as other candidates who have not had similar advantages or put forth similar efforts in preparation.

The meaning of this statement is, that though a young man may have graduated honorably at a theological seminary, he will be required to serve two years on trial for the itinerant ministry before he can become a full member of an Annual Conference, and thus entitled to regular appointments as a

minister. Nor can he receive his ordination as a deacon short of those two years of probation, unless he have been previously an approved local preacher for four years. He must then, unless elected under a rule applicable only to foreign missionaries, serve as an accepted minister two years longer prior to receiving his ordination as an elder.

While to some this may seem to be a tedious delay, it must be acknowledged to be in harmony with the apostolic precept, "Lay hands suddenly on no man." Moreover, it may be seen to be advantageous in other respects. In the first place, a man who is properly prepared by previous study finds the examinations to be merely a pleasant and profitable review of theological topics in which, if his profiting appears to his brethren, he will have excellent opportunities of illustrating to others the value of the advantages he has enjoyed. In the second place, even the most thorough student finds that there are other tests of his manhood and of his capacities of public and ministerial usefulness than those to which he has been subjected in schools, and that there are many reasons for commending caution in electing persons to membership in ministerial bodies, and thus accrediting them as approved teachers and pastors in the church. Moreover, it is by a ready compliance with regulations found important to the itinerant system as a whole, that one enters into the *esprit du corps*, and becomes recognized as an acquisition to a band of workers in the vineyard of the Lord whose object is not self-seeking or personal distinction, but the edification of the church and the salvation of men.

It cannot be denied that there have been a few examples of persons who after having enjoyed the best institutional advantages have failed to succeed in the actual ministry, yet such cases have been proportionally far less frequent than failures among candidates of inadequate advantages. In point of fact, so generally and so appropriately have the graduates of the Methodist theological schools entered into the labors, the sacrifices, and the spirit of the itinerancy and of foreign mission work as to cause general admiration.

In this result, as well as in their acknowledged zeal and competency in all forms of ministerial work, the graduates of the schools referred to have effectually disappointed all fears that they would not happily affiliate with their brethren who had enjoyed inferior opportunities, or that those brethren would not welcome and appreciate the former as true yoke-fellows in the service of a common Master.

In the promotion of ministerial education by means of theological schools, the church has gradually seen the necessity of providing aid to a limited extent for approved candidates of inadequate means to pursue as students an extended course of study. Efforts for this object were at first local ; but during the year 1866, celebrated as the centenary year of American Methodism, a connectional educational fund was collected, which now aggregates over one hundred thousand dollars. In 1868 a Board of Education was organized by order of the General Conference to administer that fund and to encourage auxiliary organizations in the various Annual Conferences. Of the latter, several are in efficient operation, and securing increasing approval and support on the part of benevolent persons.

Neither the term "beneficiary" nor the idea of charitable dependence find favor in the denomination. Hence, the proceeds of the educational fund and the collections of the auxiliary organizations are usually disbursed in the form of loans, to be repaid at remote periods without interest. In this manner the self-respect of the students is preserved, while, at the same time, they are encouraged in habits both of industry and economy. No experiences have as yet arisen to call in question the propriety of thus aiding young men of a well-established religious character and of clear convictions of duty to devote their lives to the ministry of the gospel.

In review of all the facts stated and alluded to in this Article, it may be said that the original Wesleyan system of ministerial probation during a period of field-training and testing in the actual work of the ministry is yet in full force

in the Methodist Episcopal Church. Nevertheless, that system has been modified and improved in adaptation to modern circumstances, and the church is at the present time welcoming as one of the greatest improvements auxiliary to that system, institutional instruction in the higher branches of theology. It is being demonstrated that by means of well-organized "seminaries for laborers," in which large libraries are accumulated, and the great departments of theological study are manned by competent and experienced teachers, advantages of inestimable value are secured to intending ministers. Among these advantages may be mentioned the following :

1. A great saving of time by the concentration of attention and effort.

2. Greater completeness and thoroughness in study.

3. Familiarity with the original languages of the Bible, which can rarely be studied to advantage apart from skilled instruction.

4. Specific and detailed instruction in reference to the responsibilities and duties of the pastoral office.

That a young man who profits by such advantages will greatly increase his probabilities of success in the actual ministry does not admit of question; whereas one who should fail after having enjoyed them would be regarded as having obviously mistaken his calling.

As to the liability of over educating, or of educating ministers out of sympathy with the people, it is believed that all occasion for apprehension is removed, wherever true piety is the governing trait in a man's character; whereas the absence of that complete consecration which brings every motive and feeling into "subjection to the obedience of Christ" leaves the highest human attainments of no more value than "sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." In this view, great attention is, and ever ought to be given in our theological schools to the maintenance of a high standard of personal religious experience.

It is not to be denied that in such institutions, as in other

spheres of human life, occasional instances appear of a phlegmatic nature or a supercilious manner, which no education can wholly remedy. That persons of these and certain other types of character do not, however highly educated, succeed well in the ministry, is not the fault of their scholarship, which, in point of fact, is rarely ever superior.

On the other hand, young men of sterling sense and of absorbing devotion to God and his service are usually those who make the most of their opportunities of improvement, as they do of their opportunities for saving men, for Christ's sake. Their tastes may have been refined and elevated, and their love of books intensified, in the process of their education; but as they have coveted the best gifts as a means of promoting the glory of God, so their delight in consecrating all that they have attained to his service is the more intense. So far from not being able to "condescend to men of low estate," they do it most effectively and from the highest motives. Hence, while in our church no confidence is placed in learning as a substitute for piety, no reason is seen to fear the acquisition of too much knowledge, if it be duly seasoned with grace.

As to the logic of facts, it is a matter of great rejoicing that in the American Methodist theological schools, not less than in the English, the result of systematic education, so far from being prejudicial to the personal piety of the students, has been highly favorable to it. This has not only been shown by fruits following their graduation, but by numerous and sometimes extensive revivals of religion attending the ministrations of undergraduates while still engaged in their course of study. The same fact has been attested year after year by the general religious experience of the students themselves, who have found the institutions not less means of grace than helps to knowledge.

In further illustration of the fact that the Methodist Episcopal Church has committed itself to theological education through the agency of schools, it may be stated that, in addition to the three institutions referred to above, she

has established several in the Southern States for the education of freedmen, and several more in her mission-fields, e.g. in Germany, in India, in China, and in Mexico. Those last named are yet too young to have produced very mature fruit, although their beginnings are full of promise. That in Germany has had a successful career of nearly twenty years with satisfactory results. That similar and even increasingly encouraging results will follow in all our mission-fields, as well as throughout the United States, is the universal hope, if not expectation, of the church.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE. By John William Draper, M.D., LL.D. pp. 373. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1875.

There is so much manifest error in the doctrines of the Roman Catholic church, and there has been so much in her practices to be condemned, that it is very easy to pass from cool criticism of these into sweeping denunciations of everything that has the label of infallibility. Dr. Draper's book on the Conflict between Religion and Science, while justified to a great degree by the present attitude of the papacy, and by numberless instances of ecclesiastical illiberality in the past, is open to many objections, and needs to be read with a good deal of caution and scepticism.

In the first place, the author speaks with positiveness regarding too great a range of subjects to insure the confidence of his reader. The book carries you over the whole range of history, profane and sacred, of wars, of philosophy, of religion, and of science; it treats at some length of the genuineness of the Pentateuch, of the conquests of Alexander, of the influence of Tertullian and St. Cyrill, of Nestorius and Augustine, of Constantine and Torquemada, of Mohammed and Averroes; it has something to say concerning the virginity of the mother of Christ, the nature of memory, the proof of immortality, the origin and antiquity of man, the decline of the influence of the pulpit; it glorifies Stocism; it praises Mohammedanism for the attention its devotees gave to mathematics and the physical sciences; it brushes aside the orthodox doctrine of providence and prayer; it reproaches the church with having spent the Middle Ages in profitless speculations, with having repressed scientific investigations, with being, in fact, the embodiment of bigotry and intolerance, while asserting that scientific men are models of candor and toleration. Upon

these subjects, and many more, our author speaks; and he speaks not as the Scribes and Pharisees, but as one having authority. With such confidence and rapidity is the reader taken over all this ground that, the unsophisticated believer is likely to come out at the close breathless and dismayed. And well he may be breathless; for it would require more than a lifetime of leisure to verify, from original authorities, the facts and conclusions that are assumed and asserted in each single chapter. It would be entirely out of the question for us to criticise such a book as this in detail. We cannot, however, refrain from two or three remarks.

When our author satirizes the ecclesiastics for their opposition to vaccination, why does he say nothing of the obloquy that was for so many years heaped upon Jenner by his own profession? Was there less bigotry in the doctors of medicine when they cast Jenner out of their society for attempting to "beastialize" humanity than there was among the doctors of theology when they applied the epithet "diabolical" to his discovery? Analogous questions suggest themselves regarding numerous other similar points.

Professor Draper's contrast between the encouragement which science received from Mohammedanism and the repressive influences of the church, when compared with the present actual condition of Christian and Mohammedan civilizations, may well remind us of Don Quixote's sage remark to Sancho Panza regarding pedigrees. There are, it appears, two kinds of pedigrees, one beginning very large and terminating in a point, the other commencing small, but rising to large volume in its present possessor. Somehow modern science has found its true development in the soil prepared by the Christian church, and by what some are pleased to style the senseless doctrinal discussions of the Middle Ages; and the majority of its ablest investigators have been believers in the infallibility of the Bible. The truth is that, till the revival of literature and theological discussion in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, science had done scarcely anything to give it any claim to the recognition of those who were trying to regulate the general affairs of society. Even now it has only multiplied machinery; and the outcome still depends upon the question whether in our religion there is moral power enough left to control and keep in harness the giant we have awakened. Other forces besides those of material improvement have been conspiring together with them to secure our present degree of prosperity. Of these forces a well-regulated belief in the supernatural is, we are confident, the most important. It would be useless to commend to our author the perusal of certain theological writings as a means of tempering and correcting his overweening confidence in the final success of our present material civilization. But some attention to the writings of Malthus and Greg, of Ruskin and Matthew Arnold, would partially answer the same purpose, though we are by no means disciples of any of these. Their pictures of the future have, however, no greater excess of shadow than Dr. Draper's have of light. G. F. W.

THE GREAT ICE AGE, and its Relation to the Antiquity of Man. By James Geikie, F.R.S.E., F.G.S. pp. xxv and 545. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1874.

When speculating upon time-ratios, it is well nigh impossible for geologists to be properly mindful of their ignorance. They are tempted to forget that the dynamical agents of nature whose actions come under their survey are not much more limited in power than geological time is in extent. We do not begrudge them any amount of time the facts call for; but in their popular statements it would be advantageous to their reputation for them to remember that the general public is acquainted with two rules of induction. One is that a cause must not be relied on to explain phenomena till it is proved to be adequate. Secondly, even what would in itself be an adequate cause, must not be made the basis of extensive speculations, except in cases where the causes combined with it may be fully measured and eliminated from the problem.

For those who are familiar enough with the subject to discern his weak points, Mr. Geikie has produced, in the work under review, a book of great value. As a member of the party commissioned by government to make a geological survey of Scotland, he has had rare opportunities to investigate the interesting glacial phenomena of that country. So long as he confines himself to a delineation of the apparent facts of his native country, and to speculations upon their proximate and local causes, we can speak only in commendation of his work. This part of his book is of interest to the general reader, because of the great similarity in the drift phenomena of all countries. We commend also to special attention, the admirable specimen of inductive reasoning which appears in the appendix, pp. 490-498, upon the former extent of the glaciers of Northern Italy. The reader will there see to what degree, sometimes, general considerations can outweigh negative evidence.

But when our author comes into the region of higher speculation, and attempts to account for the glacial period itself, and to determine the time of its occurrence relative to the introduction of man, he is inclined to speak with a positiveness which the facts do not warrant. In these portions of his interesting book we discern the disturbing influence of an *a priori* theory. Geologists generally are somewhat shy of the mathematicians. But Mr. Geikie has accepted, almost as a first truth, the conclusions of Mr. Croll regarding the influence of the variations of the ellipticity of the earth's orbit, the precession of the equinoxes, etc., upon the climate of the earth. According to him these causes would produce extreme alternations in the climate of the different hemispheres, once in about twenty thousand years, and these changes would attain their maximum in about two hundred thousand years. Mr. Geikie, and the school to which he belongs, speak not of one glacial epoch only, but of many. When sight fails them, as it does pretty much when they get back of the marks of what we call *the* glacial epoch, they are too ready to walk by faith. That these

astronomical changes are in themselves true causes we will not deny. But there are so many other causes that are more or less likely to have counteracted them, that we require a solid body of facts to notify us of their action. For example, there are, possibly, the changes of the temperature of the solar spaces through which we travel, the action of the heat existing in the nucleus of the earth, the variations in the temperature of the sun, and, most of all, the modifications of climate likely to be caused by elevation or depression of portions of the earth's crust. Any or all of these causes, and many others of which we have some knowledge, may have intervened to outweigh the influence of this one. It is not a mere problem of pure mathematics to be worked out with logarithms and the calculus. When we look for a *posteriori* evidences of intercalated glacial epochs in the history of the earth, they are, up to this date, entirely too few to be depended upon. As our author grants (p. 480): "If we were to judge only from the general aspect presented by their organic contents, we should be forced to admit that none of these formations, from the Silurian down to the Miocene, afforded any trace whatever of cold or glacial conditions." The evidences of glacial action afforded by the conglomerate rocks, and occasional erratics that appear in the strata earlier than the Post-tertiary, are not sufficient in the face of this admission to establish a period of extended glaciation at those times, though they may indicate the existence of local glaciers.

With these cautions, we commend the book as an interesting, though not sufficiently guarded, discussion of a subject now in its infancy, but which may yet throw considerable light on questions concerning the early history of our race. We do this the more heartily because these discussions, beyond most which relate to the physical sciences, concern phenomena that in some measure, have their counterpart, in every lake basin and rounded hill and bed of gravel and striated surface of rock north of the Ohio river. Correct habits of observing these will enable one to judge understandingly concerning much of the geological evidence of man's antiquity, and may show its weakness as well as its strength. This is now one of the border lands between geology and the Bible, and it will conduce to the establishment of the final harmony of the two records if the students of the Bible observe the field intelligently.

G. F. W.

CHIPS FROM A GERMAN WORKSHOP. By F. Max Müller, M.A., Foreign Member of the French Institute, etc. Vol. IV. — Essays chiefly on the Science of Language. With Index to Vols. III. and IV. 8vo. pp. 581. London. 1875. Am. ed., New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 8vo. pp. 565.

Professors Max Müller and W. D. Whitney have engaged recently in what may be styled, in more senses than one, a war of words. Their encounter illustrates a fact that is too often overlooked, namely, that theologians have no monopoly of the controversial spirit. It shows, too,

how all sciences merge in a few fundamental questions of metaphysics. Of the book under review, chapter ix. (pp. 433-472) is a defence of the author's "Essays on Darwinism and Language," which were published in Frazer's Magazine three years ago. These Essays were sharply criticised by Professor Whitney in the North American Review. The points of this criticism were reproduced in the Contemporary Review by George H. Darwin, son of the distinguished naturalist.

Professor's Müller's position is, that the use of language forms a hard and fast line, separating, by a broad distinction, man from the mere animal. He had even spoken of it as "the true barrier" between man and the lower animals; since he was willing to admit, for the sake of argument perhaps, that the physiological grounds on which the specific differences had been based were "proved untenable by Mr. Darwin and others."¹ Professor Müller was mindful of the fact that mere linguists are much averse to the metaphysical discussions necessarily pertaining to this subject, — the *Société de Linguistique* of Paris, for example, declaring "in one of its first statutes that it will receive no communication concerning the origin of language."² Consequently, in his Essays on Darwinism and Language, he very properly left the lower walks of his special department and entered the higher realms of philosophy, in which there is more general interest. It was, as it seems to us, entirely in place for him, in such a discussion, to consider at length the views of "abstraction" and "generalization" which had been entertained by Kant, Hume, Berkeley, and Locke; for the rise of language is most intimately connected with those mental exercises. When, now, for this admirable feature in Professor Müller's method we find that our American critic describes him as "preferring to pour himself out, as it were, over his subject, in a gush of genial assertion and interesting illustration," we cannot wonder that in due time a retort of bitter words follows.

Chapter x. of the book under review is a general defense of the author himself from Professor Whitney's attacks. For the sake of our national reputation, perhaps, it is worth while to put ourselves on record as not sympathizing with Professor Whitney in either the form or the substance of his criticisms. In particular we would say, that after going over the subject carefully, we leave it with the conviction that the American Professor has very constantly magnified small errors and discrepancies, which should, and could without great difficulty, have been explained away; and that the spirit and tone of his criticisms have been offensive in the extreme, and adapted rather to throw ridicule upon the authors with whom he disagrees, than to establish the truth.

Professor Whitney affirms that he has not been personal, and perhaps, in a technical sense, he has not been; but we fail to see the difference between saying, as he repeatedly does when speaking of his opponents, "this sounds like a bathos"; and saying the author has made "a ludicrous descent

¹ See Chips (Eng. ed.), Vol. iv. p. 457.

² Ibid. p. 69.

from the elevated to the mean." A man who has attained the eminence of Professor Müller is certainly entitled to more deference than Professor Whitney has shown to him. If the expressions of so distinguished an author are at times obscure, the probability is still that he had a meaning; and, if there are apparent contradictions, it is incumbent upon us to use some effort to reconcile them. Such a man may nod even, and it might not be worth while to make much ado about it.

To speak of material points, we say, with confidence, that if Professor Whitney is to be judged as he judges, he is shown by Professor Müller to have contradicted himself,¹ to have been ill-informed respecting the relation of the Phœnician alphabet to the Egyptian characters,² to have contemptuously criticised Professor Müller's lecture on the "Fir, Oak, and Beach," when there was no ground for such criticism, since Professor Müller himself had stated clearly every objection which Professor Whitney urges.³ In contradiction of Professor Whitney's assertions, we believe, from careful examination, that Professor Müller never has denied that language was made through the instrumentality of man; that he had fully explained under what restrictions the science of language might be treated as one of the physical sciences; that Professor Müller had clearly defined the difference between hard and soft consonants, long before Professor Whitney, and that Professor Whitney has misrepresented what he wrote upon the subject;⁴ that when Professor Müller said that "z was *capable* of intonation," it was in such connection that reasonable attention to the context would have shown that he said nothing incompatible with its being "*necessarily* intonated."⁵ In this, and in several other places, we have been led to surmise that Professor Müller needs a little more indulgence from an English or American reader than one could ask who was writing in his mother tongue. Several of the infelicities of statement which Professor Whitney magnifies into philological heresies of great significance have perhaps arisen from the fact that Professor Müller composes in a foreign tongue. One such error from a similar cause appeared in Professor Whitney's writing, when he published a review both in German and English. "So far as regards the objects" was translated by "*gegenüber den Zwecken*," which Professor Müller, reading in the German, naturally enough, put back into English by "as opposed to the objects." For this he was charged with making nonsense out of Professor Whitney's production.

In conclusion, while we regret much of the severe language Professor Müller has used towards his critic, we acknowledge the provocation. We have noticed several places in Professor Müller's defense in which he has missed the point, and is manifestly in error; but these are so few in comparison of the points that are well made, that we forbear to speak of them. We hope that our distinguished German teacher will not immerse himself altogether in Sanscrit hereafter, but that he will continue from time to

¹ See Chips (Eng. ed.), Vol. iv. pp. 450, 451.

² Ibid. pp. 485, 486.

³ Ibid. pp. 518, 519.

⁴ Ibid. p. 547.

⁵ Ibid. p. 515.

time to gather up the chips from his workshop, and pass them around to the eager public which, in America, not less than in England, impatiently awaits the arrival of each installment. G. F. W.

THE RECENT ORIGIN OF MAN, as illustrated by Geology and the Modern Science of Pre-historic Archaeology. By James C. Southall. 8vo. pp. 606. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co.; London: Trübner and Co. 1875.

This volume is the result of extensive reading. Many parts of it are written with energy and spirit. It has an Index of twenty-four pages. This augments the value of the work very decidedly. The volume is divided into thirty-seven chapters, each of which is preceded by a full table of contents. Thus the vast amount of information contained in the work is made easily accessible to the reader. The foot-notes are incomplete. We often wish to know the volume and the page from which a citation is made in the text, but are often baffled because there is either no reference at all to the place of the citation, or else a very indefinite reference. Thus on page 574 we have the foot-note, "Robertson's History of America, quoted by Edwards."

The theory maintained in the volume is, that "human history commences about four thousand five hundred, or five thousand, years ago"; that the present races of mankind are related to each other, and all began life in a highly civilized state. In advocating this theory the volume notices many speculations of scientific men, and replies to some of them with much power. We read, for instance: "Let us resolve the material universe into *force*; and what does that prove? Some logician still survives to put the: And *whence* that force? No matter how far science may go, she can never call the universe from nothing, nor account for the primordial elements with which she has erected her structure" (p. 62).

Sometimes the volume seems to overrate the power of scientific men to injure the authority of the Bible, and underrate the power of the Bible to withstand the attacks of the scientists. It seems to imply that Christianity will be overthrown, if the Bible is proved to be false in any matter of mere science. Thus in describing the difficulties which environ the Old and New Testaments—difficulties arising from the fact that they have committed themselves on so many and various topics, the volume states: "Ten thousand marks are offered to geology, astronomy, archaeology, philology, ethnology, historical criticism, physiology, geography, psychology, moral science; and it is only necessary to pierce *one* of them to discredit the whole system. The philosophical thought of the world is quick to discover these marks" (p. 63). We think that such statements need some qualification; and that the Christian system will stand erect, even if some physiologist should detect a physiological inaccuracy in the Christian records.

Among the chapters which we have perused with special interest in

this volume are the fifth, on the "Fickleness of Science"; the thirty-sixth, on the "Antiquity of Man in America"; and the thirty-seventh, on the "Unity of the American Races, and their Connection with the Old World." These, and several other chapters, illustrate the remarkable industry and the literary zeal of their author.

MEMOIR OF NORMAN MACLEOD, D.D. By his Brother, the Rev. Donald Macleod, B.A., one of her Majesty's Chaplains, etc. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 362, 432. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1876.

The author of these volumes happily suggests that "*Quantum mutatus ab illo*" must be the verdict upon any attempt to give a full portraiture of Norman Macleod. The conscientiousness and the playfulness, the earnest piety and the genial humor, the scintillations of genius and the sound sense, the poetical and practical character of the man, his bravery and sensitiveness, his bold speeches and fervent prayers, all these, and more than these, traits unite in a subject which it is difficult to describe. The biographer, however, has done his work well. The engraved likeness of Dr. Macleod is very suggestive. His published letters are easy, natural, racy, many of them amusing, some powerful. The descriptions of his residence in Germany, his intercourse with Wordsworth, his ministry at Loudoun and Dalkeith, his procedures in the Disruption Controversy, form the main part of the first volume. His ministry at Glasgow, his contributions to the press, his visits to the East, his connections with the royal family of England, his labors for the poor, his missionary zeal, are well portrayed in the second volume. He was born on the third of June, 1812, and died on the sixteenth of June, 1872. The letter of the queen to his brother, and that of the archbishop of Canterbury to the moderator of the church of Scotland on the occasion of Dr. Macleod's decease, and the immense throng who attended his funeral attest the high veneration in which he was held by Englishmen and Scotchmen alike. We cannot say that we altogether approve of his course in life, but we are surprised at the degree of indignation which his course awakened at different times. Although one of the most popular men in Great Britain, we read that during his well-known controversy on the observance of the sabbath, "Ministers of the gospel passed him without recognition; one of these, more zealous than the rest, hissed him in the street" (Vol. ii. p. 190). The biography abounds with facts like the above, which are "food for thought." Principal Shairp well says of Dr. Macleod: "Brimful of imagination, sympathy, buoyancy, humor, drollery, and affectionateness, I never knew any one who contained in himself so large and varied an armful of the humanities"; and he aptly applies to Norman, a potential poet, the sentiment of Wordsworth:

"Oh, many are the poets that are sown
By nature; men endowed with highest gifts,
The vision and the faculty divine,
Yet wanting the accomplishment of verse."—Vol. i. pp. 91, 100.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS GUTHRIE, D.D., and Memoir by his Sons
 Rev. David K. Guthrie and Charles J. Guthrie, M.A. In two volumes.
 Vol. II. 12mo. pp. 494. New York : Robert Carter and Brothers. 1875.

We notice this volume at this time on account of its connection with the Memoir of Dr. Macleod. The volume gives Dr. Guthrie's views (so different from those of Dr. Macleod) in regard to the Disruption of the Church of Scotland. It contains a fine account of the "Manse Fund"; of Dr. Guthrie's remarkable labors in behalf of Ragged Schools, Temperance, and National Education; of his long and successful ministry at Edinburgh; of his domestic and social life; of his old age, his death and imposing funeral. This second volume, like the first, is full of pithy sayings. In Dr. Guthrie's speech before the Free Church Assembly on the twenty-fourth of May, 1843, six days after the Disruption, he said: "Mr. Norman Macleod complains (in the Established Church Assembly) that we have kindled a fire in the old house and left them to put it out. It is my opinion that we have taken away well-nigh all the fire along with us. And I will just say that, if there is any fire remaining, we have left plenty of cold-water engines to put it out." On the twenty-fifth of June, 1872, he wrote an affecting and an affectionate account of his attending Dr. Macleod's funeral (p. 465); and as early as 1865, Dr. Macleod wrote him a letter which gives evidence that the two controversialists had become loving friends (p. 414). Although very decided in his religious opinions, Dr. Guthrie expresses himself with great liberality. He made a speech in 1869, in which is the following expression regarding the use of a Catechism in the National Schools: "I believe that if you had shut up the late archbishop of Canterbury, the late Dr. Bunting, and the late John Angell James in one room together — if you had shut up these three heads of the Episcopalian, Wesleyan, and Independent bodies, and told them that out of that room they could not get until they prepared a Catechism for use in the schools of the country, they would have accomplished the task in five hours" (p. 303). Every clergyman may find in this volume many rich suggestions in regard to the style of the pulpit. We do not know where to begin nor how to end, in citing them. In regard to preaching *memoriter* we read: "A thing is easily remembered which is striking, and retained which is sticking; and what does not impress your own mind in these ways, and therefore is committed with difficulty, you may be sure won't tell on the minds of your hearers. An illustration or an example drawn from nature, a Bible story, or any history will, like a nail, often hang up a thing which otherwise would fall to the ground. Put such into your passage, and you will certainly mend it.

"Deal in pure, pithy Saxon. Never use a word with Greek, or Latin, or French root if you can find one with the same meaning in your mother tongue. Use as few adjectives as possible; they load and cumber the truth.

"Mind 'the three P's.' In every discourse the preacher should aim at proving, painting, and persuading; in other words, addressing the reason, the fancy, and the heart" (pp. 189, 190).

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE MADONNA DI SAN SISTO.

BY REV. J. I. MOMBERT, D.D., PHILADELPHIA, PA.

DURING a prolonged residence in the charming capital of Saxony, frequent pilgrimages to its magnificent gallery of paintings were of course attended by a constantly growing admiration and enthusiasm for the superb array of works of art which are there collected, and so judiciously arranged that the gallery may without exaggeration be described, "not only as a chief centre for the enjoyment of art, but also of instruction in it to the cultivated of the whole earth." In that exquisitely beautiful temple of art, filled with the masterpieces of the most famous painters of almost every period and every country, there is probably no painting more universally admired and more frequently visited than the Madonna di San Sisto, by Raphael Sanzio of Urbino.

It has a cabinet of its own, which is almost always crowded with visitors. The cabinet is situated in the northwestern corner of the gallery; a peculiarly soft light falls on the picture, set up in an altar-like structure, and has, on account of the priceless gem it enshrines and the exquisite perfection of its peerless conception, been called by an enthusiastic lover of art "the holy of holies" of the entire gallery. The visitor, the moment he enters, feels a mysterious spell come over him. Fascinated by the eloquent

appeal to his noblest emotions and highest aspirations, which seems to address him individually and to hold him captive, he yields himself unconsciously to the magic and subtle influence that pervades that sanctuary of art; and he, in turn, becomes one of the silent admirers that gaze intently on the Madonna, of which we propose to furnish a brief description, with such matters concerning its history as may enable those who only know the picture from copies, engravings, and photographs, to study it with increased interest.

The picture represents a window; a half-opened green curtain, fastened to a rod and gathered up at the sides, supposed to have just been opened, discloses to the spectators, imagined to stand or kneel *before* it,—that is, *inside* the room,—a celestial vision of passing sublimity. In the centre, enthroned on clouds and surrounded by a halo of innumerable angel heads, which from a tint of pale luminous white gradually gathers intenser coloring till it culminates in softest azure, appears the Virgin Mary, holding in her right arm and supporting with her left the infant Saviour. On the Virgin's right, slightly below her, also on clouds, adores, in kneeling attitude, but with uplifted face, Pope Sixtus II.; his tiara is deposited in the extreme right corner of the embrasure, the central portion of which is occupied by two beautiful cherubs in a leaning posture, their faces turned to the spectator, but their glance directed upwards, the one seemingly lost in intent contemplation, the other in rapt introspection. On the Virgin's left, half-kneeling, also on clouds, the radiant features of St. Barbara are downwards bent toward the contemplative angels. All the figures are life-size, and so grouped together as to form a pyramid.

Returning to the central figure, and retaining the idea of a heavenly vision, we behold a woman so passing beautiful, of that beauty which the French call *spirituelle*, so transcendently lovely, so perfect in everything conveyed by the allied terms beauty, goodness, grace, and loveliness, that we unhesitatingly say: "Here is the visible embodiment of the classical τὸ καλόν."

The circular shape of the seemingly moving clouds beneath her feet, suggesting the spherical form of the earth, the garments of all the figures waving under the pressure of gentle breezes, the adoring posture of St. Sixtus and St. Barbara, the background of angel hosts, and the contemplative and, as it were, interpreting cherubs in position nearest to the spectator — this striking *tout-ensemble* combines to prompt the thought that here is the Virgin mother with her Divine Son visiting the earth to carry to the human race the blessings of heaven. And then the Christ-child, clothed with every attribute of infant loveliness, that marvellously telling expression, that intense looking-forth, so utterly unlike infancy, and seeming to pierce one through and through, is altogether a unique creation, probably designed to kindle in the beholder's soul the conviction that in that innocent face shines forth the conscious Godhead — that the searching and suffering look is prophetic of the passion — that it is, in short, “the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world.” The conspicuous display of the angel-world, moreover, makes one think of the mystery which angels desire to look into.

In admirable keeping with the matchless delineation of the human face divine in the Virgin, the Christ-babe, the venerable head of the martyr-pope, and the exquisitely lovely St. Barbara, whose attribute of the tower appears immediately behind her right shoulder, are the grouping, the astonishing adjustment of space, the harmonious coloring, and the superbly chaste attire. But of such technical details as drawing and coloring we will not utter a word beyond the brief note in the gallery catalogues of 1806 and 1812, that “this painting seems to be a creation of the imagination without the brush.”

The attire of the Madonna consists of a delicate crimson *sopravesta*, embroidered with gold, and skirt of the same material, covered from the waist downwards with a blue cloak of ample folds; from over the left shoulder depends across the chest, yet so as to be half-hidden by the infant Christ, a semi-transparent scarf of soft texture, while from

the head floats an Italian veil, surrounding her left and gathered up under the child, of drab-like tint. The attitude is that of dignified majesty; yet it is difficult to say which feeling predominates in the serene calmness of that sunny face,—the innocent dignity and loving pride of the Virgin mother, or the manifest consciousness of her exaltation as a woman; the two are probably united, melting into each other. At a certain distance from the painting, and a peculiar elevation, the deep eloquence of those hazel eyes seems to address the beholder, who feels that the Virgin—who looks neither at the pope nor at St. Barbara, but sends forth her glance towards the spectator, alike heedless of the worship of venerable old age and beautiful youth—draws near as the mother in the very transport of bliss, as woman in the sublimity of virtue, and presents the incarnate God-child; while her sweet mildness, so gentle and sympathetic, and her soft look of persuasive entreaty appears to invite him to set his affection and hope on the child Jesus.

The difficulty of portraying in words the appearance of the Virgin and the Christ vanishes with respect to the other figures of the painting; for here the real and the concrete predominate; while there we have mainly to deal with the ideal and the abstract.

The pope is arrayed in his pontificals. He wears the *alba* or *sotane*, a white linen garment reaching from the neck to the feet; the *fano* or *ovale*, a silk handkerchief; the *pluviale*, of gold brocade lined with red, an upper garment of ceremony; the *stola*, also of gold-thread texture, a sort of scarf depending from the shoulders; the last, as well as the *alba*, girded by the red *cingulum*, or girdle. The retention of these liturgical garments appears to indicate Raphael's design to introduce the pope in his representative character, while the characteristic symbol of the pontificate, the *tiara*, meekly deposited on the window-sill, is a significant intimation that the symbol of power, though it be a crown, or *tiara*, must not burden us in the presence of the Godhead. Sixtus is in the attitude of kneeling; pressing his left hand against

the chest, the head raised in supplication, and pointing with his right outwards in the direction of the spectator. The venerable head is of the Peter type, expressive of unshaken trust ; his eyes are riveted on the Christ, and the outstretched right hand seems to commend to him the church. His countenance is of decided force ; it glows with fiery devotion, and the supplicatory look reveals faith.

St. Barbara, half-kneeling, looking downwards to the two cherubs, with folded hands on her bosom, is a figure of consummate grace and fascinating loveliness. She is a blonde, with Grecian forehead and nose, arched eyebrows and long lashes, and an exquisitely beautiful mouth. The whole face, oval, sits on a regal neck. Her attire consists of headbands, a variegated body of yellow, with a blue upper sleeve, a light Italian scarf with red border, and a green tunic over a dark gray skirt. The anachronism of her dress, which is that of a Roman lady at the beginning of the sixteenth century, presents no difficulty ; for it is doubtless the traditional beauty and self-sacrificing devotion of the martyred maiden which the great master intended to commemorate in the painting. The art critics consider this part of the picture least perfect ; but it is foreign to our purpose to open a question for whose discussion we lack the appropriate qualification.

After this brief analytical description of this wonderful creation of genius, we pass on to furnish some interpretations of its import which are entitled to great respect. We begin with von Quandt's, occasioned, in 1826, by Lepel's doubts concerning the genuineness of the Sistine Madonna as a work of Raphael. A sworn champion of its unity of design, he says : " It must be a painter's first aim to satisfy the sense of sight ; for his intuitions are restricted to the sphere of the visible, and the eye is the organ through which his artistic conception returns to an intellectual contemplation. This group combines the utmost diversity of figures. While the contrasts of this painting charm us and excite ever-increasing entertainment, the diversity becomes a harmonious whole,

in virtue of the two contrasts of the side-figures balancing each other, and the commanding central and chief figure not only holding them, key-stone-like together, but subduing them also as subordinate parts. The effect of this fine adjustment is that the eye is ever drawn back to the centre of the whole. Nowhere is either a vacancy or wearisome overburdening ; and as in the upper part of the painting the whole gathers solemnity and force, so in the lower the group comes to an exquisitely beautiful termination in the two genii ; for they present a delightful resting-place to the eye when the daring glance, overwhelmed with the sublimity of the scene, glides downwards.

“ If we may call the relation of the parts, as it were, the *harmony* of the picture, we may venture to denominate the beautiful transition of the contours and lines its *melody*. In this respect, also, the painting is most admirable ; the whole forms a pyramid, without a corner to offend the eye, without a profusion to cause heaviness. Just in respect of satisfying the eye, this painting seems to us one of the most splendid compositions ; for it combines the solemnity of symmetrical disposition with the diversity of a free and interwoven grouping.

“ But without lingering at an apparition so fascinating to the material eye, the penetration to the innermost centre of this work of art is like heaven opened to the spiritual eye. The differing degrees in which men consecrate themselves to the divine service, personified and robed in heavenly garments, seem to have passed before the soul of the enraptured painter ; and their reproduction on canvas was the problem he had set himself to solve — a problem which seizes and compresses into one leading thought all the separate parts of the picture. On the right we see St. Barbara, a figure of supreme loveliness — of that loveliness which joyously and without danger to itself traverses the earth like a sunbeam, smiling on flowers, yet sustaining no tarnish from poisonous exhalations. With the lovely glance of innocent complacency and the consciousness of superior bliss, the counte-

nance of Barbara beams with sunny smiles. Opposite to her appears dignity, in the venerable form of strong old age arrayed in the insignia of supreme spiritual power. Sixtus must inspire every beholder with reverence, from seeing him reverently commend the church to the protection of the exalted One.

“As female virtue is heightened by loveliness, so male character, tried and matured by the stern realities of life, is ennobled by the stamp of firmness and dignity. Just as the central figure unites the two side figures in the visible space of the picture, so the character of the Madonna unites the two contrasts of loveliness and dignity, in the invisible realm of thought. In her person loveliness rises into beauty, dignity into sublimity, and both melt together into one being. But the climax of the whole is the Christ-child, the infant God, in every respect so plastically conceived that the painter’s conception finds its only expression in forms. The two beautiful winged children, although raised above the real, — the one seemingly rapt in introspection, the other lost in reflection, may be instanced as a criterion of Raphael’s greatness.”

Kugler, also a very competent art critic, says of this picture: “The Madonna is at once the exalted, divine woman who bore the Saviour of the world, and the tender, earth-born virgin whose meekness and purity were so highly exalted. Her face contains an inconceivable something which I would fain call a timid amazement at the miracle of her own exaltation, yet withal accompanied by a sense of the noble liberty and greatness of her divine elevation. The child, reposing in childlike, not in childish, carelessness in her arms, looks with calm seriousness out into the world. No other master has attempted to portray in an equally affecting manner, as Raphael has done it in the features of this child, the loveliness of infancy blended with the solemnity and the profound thought of the divine vocation. The beholder reluctantly turns his eyes from the deep impression of these two figures to bestow fit attention on the majestic

dignity of the pope, the meek resignation of Barbara, and the friendly innocence of the child angels."

Förster, in his admirable work on Raphael (ii. 283 sq.) calls the Madonna di San Sisto the crown of the painter's lyrical creations, and eloquently advocates our view that Christ, and not the Virgin, is the chief figure (according to him, this altar-painting has respect to the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation), and thinks a glance at the picture sufficient to show that the child is most prominent, not the mother; that Raphael here represents with matchless power and perfection the great mystery of the incarnate Word. "The mien and attitude of the Virgin do not proclaim majesty; but the consciousness of her unspeakable happiness and sublime vocation of having borne the Saviour of the world is stamped with touching modesty on her brow, glows in her eyes, and is manifest in her entire bearing with respect to the child."

The same gifted writer has the following capital observations on the due appreciation of the painting: "We must imagine it in its original position, above the altar, in connection with the altar-service in its culminating point of the transubstantiation. Let us conceive the congregation in prayer before the altar, waiting for the moment of *the real presence of God the Saviour*. The curtain is as yet closed, heaven covered; the cherubs, established by the sill, in the composure of assurance, expect the arrival of the Divinity; above them St. Sixtus and St. Barbara kneel with the same intent. Now the curtain is rolled back; heaven opens; Madonna floats down with the holy child, able to dispense the treasures of heaven and earth, and to bestow on all the blessing of peace. Now Barbara looks down to the congregation to summon them to united prayer; then Sixtus, with supplicatory and commending gesture, points to the praying multitude, and looks trustfully up to the Godhead; but the angel boys calmly retain their former attitude; their expectation has been realized, and they are lost in the contemplation of the familiar, but ever reanimating spectacle."

In some respects similar to this interpretation, but with more decided concentration on Mary as the leading figure of the painting, is that of Weise, who sees in it the representation of the Roman doctrine of intercession. He also suggests a body of worshippers in front of the altar. According to him "Sixtus prays to the Virgin not for himself, but for the worshippers before the altar, perhaps with special reference to the fraternity of the *frati neri*, of which he was founder;¹ his right index-finger pointing outwards to the nave in the direction of the worshippers. The angels, in position nearest to the suppliants, look interrogatively up to Barbara, as if they desired to ascertain what may be transpiring above, and what room there may be for hope. The one, moreover, indicates the difficulty of the proffered suit; while the composure of the other seems to denote that such events, similar suits and answers, are of constant occurrence; and this last, the answer, is conveyed by Barbara to the angels, and by these to the suppliants, either in the form of promise or as a benevolent fore-assurance. Here is, therefore, a manifold and most astonishing representation of the doctrine of intercession. Christ is the Intercessor with God, Madonna with Christ, Sixtus with the Madonna. The assurance of a gracious answer is possibly conveyed by Christ to the Virgin, by her to Barbara, by Barbara to the angels, and by them to the suppliants; so that the action of the painting accomplishes a kind of never-ending circle of up and down, of prayers offered and granted, of questions asked and answers given, of fears and consolations, of doubts and affirmations; rendering the delineation, notwithstanding its seeming calmness, one of the most affecting and effective in the whole realm of art."

But we will not weary the patience of the reader with a longer array of interpretations and criticisms, which might, indeed, be indefinitely extended; for the literature on this, perhaps the greatest of Raphael's conceptions, but unquestionably the most sublime — because, probably, the last — of

¹ I have found no authority for this statement.

his Madonnas, is all but inexhaustible. The extracts given are sufficiently varied to indicate the diversity of treatment of which this matchless creation of genius is susceptible, and to justify, if justification be needed, the glowing terms in which we have, however imperfectly, attempted to express our admiration of it.

A brief account of the two historical personages represented in this painting seems now in place. Xystus, or Sixtus II., was a Grecian by birth, deacon of the Roman church under Stephen, and on the death of the latter chosen pope, in 257. His pontificate, in all probability, covered only one year. Cyprian calls him a peaceable and excellent prelate. Valerianus, acknowledged emperor after the assassination of Aemilius, at the beginning of his reign favored the Christians; but, on the authority of Eusebius, his disposition towards them was greatly changed, through the influence of the Magian Macrianus, an adherent of the Persian sect of the Magians. He was a great favorite with the emperor, who was very superstitious, so that he persuaded him that the Christians, alike hostile to magic and the gods, obstructed the effects of the sacrifices and the prosperity of the empire. Afraid of his own safety, he published his first edict against the Christians in April 257, leading to the martyrdom of pope Stephen. In the following year, when Valerian marched against the Persians, the persecution grew more fierce, and of the effects of his rescript to the senate we have the following account of Cyprian, in a circular addressed to his fellow-bishops in Africa :

“ Valerian has sent an order to the senate, importing that bishops, priests, and deacons should forthwith suffer; but that senators, persons of quality, and Roman knights should forfeit their honors, have their estates forfeited, and if they still refused to sacrifice should lose their heads; that matrons should have their goods seized, and be banished; that any of Caesar’s officers or domestics who already confessed the Christian faith, or should now confess it, should forfeit their estates to the exchequer, and be sent in chains to work on

Caesar's farms. You are to understand that Xystus suffered in a cemetery, upon the sixth day of August, 258, and with him four deacons." ¹

The four deacons are said to have been Praetextatus, Felicissimus, Agapitus, and Laurentius. The last was Cyprian's archdeacon, and seeing the bishop led forth to execution, he expostulated with him, lamenting to be left behind. "The bishop replied that he should follow him within three days by a more glorious triumph; himself being spared on account of his old age." ² The Liberian calendar states that Sixtus was beheaded in the cemetery of Calixtus. ³

The introduction of Sixtus into the painting may be found in the circumstance that the Benedictine monastery at Piacenza was consecrated to the memory of St. Sixtus, and called, after him, "Santo Sisto." The monks doubtless requested Raphael to introduce their patron saint into the picture, which, moreover, owes its name of "Madonna di San Sisto" to this particular.

The history of St. Barbara is rather legendary. The accounts are very conflicting, and it is difficult to get at the facts. According to some, she suffered martyrdom in the reign of Maximin (235-239) at Nicomedia; while Joseph Assemani decides for the statement of Metaphrastes, that she suffered at Heliopolis, in Phoenicia, in the reign of Galerius (306). According to the former, she had been converted to Christianity through the instrumentality of Origen; while the latter ascribes her reception of the Christian faith to reflection and the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost. But all the legends are tolerably unanimous in narrating that she was most beautiful, and that her father, on that account, kept her confined in a tower (hence her attribute of the tower). In it he had constructed a bath with two windows. During his absence she caused a third window to be added, and had the floor of her room

¹ S. Cyrian ep. ad Successum episc. 80; ed. Felli, 82; ed. Pamelii, and for the last sentence, Cypr. l. c. ed. Baluz.

² S. Ambros. offic. 1, 41.

³ Vide Butler's Lives of the Saints, Vol. ii. pp. 221, 222.

decorated with the cross. The father, on his return, inquired for the reason of the change; whereupon she proclaimed to him the doctrine of the Trinity, and exhorted him to receive the Christian faith. Her words, as well as her refusal to entertain any offer of marriage, are said to have so infuriated him that he himself led her to the judgment-seat of the pro-consul; and that, when the most varied and exquisite tortures were unable to shake her steadfastness, he put her to death with his own hand; in punishment for which atrocious deed he was afterwards killed by lightning. In connection with Barbara, the Romish writers report the following miracle: In the year 1448, a man called Henry Stock, of Gorkum, in Holland, had the misfortune of being almost wholly charred by fire, but, in consequence of an invocation addressed to St. Barbara, was long alive until he had received the last sacrament.

The divine visitation meted out to her unnatural father, and the miraculous prolongation of the poor Dutchman's life, are said to be the reasons why her aid is invoked for deliverance from lightning and fire, and for grace to receive the viaticum.¹ The reason for the introduction of Barbara of the tower into the picture we have not been able to learn. The circumstance that she was, or is, also a patron saint of the Benedictine monastery of the *frati neri* at Piacenza may be considered a sufficient explanation.

We now take up the accounts given of the origin of this conception of the Madonna. The legend runs that Raphael, dissatisfied with all his representations of the Virgin Mary, as falling immeasurably short of his ideal of her, could not think of anything else, and embodied the ardent longing of his soul in an earnest and oft-repeated prayer to her that she might vouchsafe him a gracious answer by appearing to him in all the plenitude of her glory, in order to enable him to honor her in a manner suitable to her exalted condition. The Virgin, touched with his ardent piety, one night when he lay locked in profound sleep appeared to him in a dream,

¹ Vide Aschbach's *K. L.* Vol. i. p. 454.

surrounded by hosts of angels, carrying in her arms the Only-begotten. This vision of the night produced so powerful an impression on the painter's mind that he forthwith sought to reproduce it on canvas. The legend claims for the Sistine Madonna inspiration, and sees additional ground for confirmation in the circumstance that it is Raphael's last Madonna; that, as art connoisseurs maintain, this Madonna was painted without preparatory sketches or studies; and that, finally, the entire filling up of the picture comports admirably with the idea that Raphael lay asleep before it when he beheld the vision which he then as faithfully delineated as it had appeared to him.

Another legend pretends to explain the introduction of the two cherubs *in dolce far niente* on the window-sill. One day, on entering his studio, Raphael found two boys gazing in rapt attention at the picture. Struck with their posture, his inventive and constructive genius forthwith took up the idea that such a group would admirably fill up the vacant space in the centre of the lower part. He urged the children to remain a short while in that attitude, while he immediately proceeded to sketch them. We do not pretend to indicate the degree of probability for the truthfulness of the legend; but it is certain that the lower space of the painting was in the first instance filled with clouds, traces of which may plainly be seen through the hair of the angels. Von Quandt, an earnest and enthusiastic advocate for the unity of the conception of this *chef d'oeuvre*, was much disconcerted by this discovery, but speedily hit upon a most extraordinary metaphysical expedient for reconciling its otherwise disturbed harmony. He called to mind Kant's "discursive cognition," i.e. a thought undergoing gradual development, or, as it might be termed, "evolution of the idea." According to him, then, the conception of the painting, although in its totality present to Raphael's mind, did undergo a discursive development. He admits that such a psychological explanation strips the painter's conception of the halo of inspiration, and renders it a reflection, but holds that in the finished

work of art the conception, successively developed and distributed over its subordinate parts, regains its original unity of intuition!

In this connection, it may be proper to notice the striking coincidence that this last of the many Madonnas which Raphael's creative genius produced represents the transfiguration of the Virgin, just as his last picture illustrative of the life of Christ depicts also his transfiguration. This fact Passavant insists upon placing beyond the pale of accident, and sees in it a beautiful indication that the aspirations of the enthusiastic artist, whom he actually calls God-inspired, were an incessant struggle for the glorification of the natural into the ideal, of the human into the divine.

The spontaneity, if we may so call it, of the Madonna-figure,—that is, its manifest production on canvas without any previous study or sketch, and for which the legend of the dream claims revelation,—however, has been differently accounted for. It is again a legend, but one of considerable interest; its burden being that the Sistine Madonna is not an ideal conception, but a veritable portrait, and the portrait of Raphael's mistress. In the Pitti palace, at Florence, may be seen the celebrated picture said to be the portrait of Raphael's mistress.¹ It exhibits so striking a resemblance with the Sistine Madonna that those who have seen both paintings are convinced that both were painted after the same model; the only difference being, as stands to reason, that the portrait in the Pitti palace is characterized by individuality, while the head of the Sistine Madonna is treated ideally; that is to say, the separate features and the whole expression of the former are ennobled and exalted to heavenly purity in the latter. Passavant (ii. 336) describes it thus:

“It represents a beautiful Roman lady, turning to the left slightly exceeding three-fourths. The parted hair, brushed

¹ Förster (Raphael, p. 234), and Clément (Michel-Ange, Leonard de Vinci, Raphael, p. 408), deny both the resemblance and the genuineness of the picture. On such themes authorities will differ, and the beholder will have to judge for himself.

behind the ears, display the entire fulness of the oval. A fiery glance from the dark eyes meets the beholder; the nose is slightly *retroussé*; the mouth is marked by playful mirth; the carnation is not very deep. A row of dark, cut stones encircles the throat; the bosom is concealed by a many-plaited garment, considerably rising above the gold-embroidered, slit bodice. The left arm is covered with a wide, slit sleeve of whitish damask; the right being wrapped in the veil which covers the back of the head, and descends on both sides. The right hand lies on the bosom; the left is only seen in part at the left corner. The ground is gray. The painting, of genuine Roman bearing, fascinates by its exquisite loveliness."

It is, doubtless, a Raphael. It was formerly in the Villa Poggio Reale, and transferred, in 1824, to the Pitti Palace. It is probably the same portrait of Raphael's mistress which first Vasari, after him Francesco Bocchi, 1591, and lastly Giovanni Cinelli,¹ declare to have been in the house of the merchants Botti, at Florence.

Now, this portrait in the Pitti palace, in its turn, bears a certain resemblance to another, which since 1642 is catalogued among the paintings of the Palace Barberini at Rome, and also claimed to be a portrait of Raphael's mistress. Passavant (i. 224) tells us that "it represents a maiden not yet wholly dressed, having recently left the bath, in an arbor of myrtle and laurel, a fresh child of nature. A yellow-striped handkerchief surrounds the head, turban-like, and imparts to the otherwise not very animated or delicate conformation of the countenance a distinguished and charming air. With her right hand she presses a transparent cloth to her bosom. A red garment covers the lap, which supports the right arm, ornamented with a gold bracelet, on which Raphael lovingly inscribed his name (RAPHAEL. VRBINAS.)." If, as one may be inclined to believe, the Barberini portrait and that in the Pitti palace depict the same person, it would follow that the companionship of Raphael wrought a mighty change in the youthful child of nature, shedding over her

¹ Belleze di Firenze, 1677, p. 173.

soul the fascinating loveliness which steals over our senses in beholding the queenly charms of the Pitti portrait.

But the question comes up: Who was Raphael's mistress? The legend says, "the Fornarina." And the particulars of that legend we will now briefly unfold. Concerning the name "La Fornarina," it may at once be premised that it cannot be traced back farther than the middle of the last century; but, as custom has given that name to Raphael's mistress, we deem it expedient to retain it. The only historic account of her is given by Vasari, who, however, conceals the name, and simply states that he was inordinately attached to a girl who lived with him to the close of his life, and that he made respectable provision for her in his testament. The bits of anecdote interspersed in his biography will follow hereafter.

The notices of Vasari, who lived nearest Raphael's own time, and was acquainted with his pupils, agree with the particulars found in a MS. biography of the painter, discovered by Riccio, and published by Angelo Comolli, at Rome, in 1790; ascribed by some to Giovanni di Casa, by others to Paolo Giovio, but doubtless written in the sixteenth century. From these it appears that Raphael had intimate relations with a Roman girl of humble origin, whose name has not come down to us.

According to Misserini, she was the daughter of a soda-maker, who lived beyond the Tiber, near St. Cecilia. The house in Street St. Dorotea, number twenty, was, according to Passavant, still shown as that of her birth. It is said formerly to have had attached to it a small garden, enclosed with a low wall, where the lovely girl spent much of her time. The story further runs that she became famed for her great beauty; that, especially, young artists frequently would raise themselves on their toes in order to catch a glimpse of her; that Raphael, also, attracted by her fame, beheld her from his concealment just while she was bathing her feet at a fountain in the garden; that he fell violently in love with her, and found no rest until she became his own. Having given her his heart, he discovered in her

qualities so noble and excellent that the fires of his love refused to be quenched, and that henceforth he would not allow her to leave him.

Another account makes the Fornarina the daughter of a baker; for Fornarina derived from *fornaio*, "a baker," would signify the baker's daughter. Near the bridge and gate leading to the Strada Balbi, in the least frequented part of the city, in an out-of-the-way street, stands a small house, of ancient structure and mean appearance, which has been used from time immemorial as a bakery, and as long distinguished by a slab over the door, with the inscription, "CASA FORNARINA."

Now, the tradition concerning the beautiful girl who exerted so wonderful an influence over Raphael which is most current on the lips of the people makes her to have been born and to have lived in that house. In the year 1508 (?), Raphael, on his way to Agostino Chigi, a wealthy merchant, and, so to say, the papal minister of finance, — the decoration of whose palace and chapel he had undertaken, — saw the Fornarina for the first time, while she was arranging little rolls (*pagnotte*) in the window of her father's bakery. The impression which her transcendent beauty made on Raphael was so overwhelming that he forgot his patron Chigi, the frescos, and sketches. From that moment his work was neglected. He shunned his friends and acquaintances, and spent the best hours of the day in the humble bakery in the company of the enchanting Fornarina. The entreaties and remonstrances of Chigi, who was impatient to have Raphael complete his work, were utterly unavailing. Having learned the cause of the inexplicable carelessness of Raphael, who until then had the reputation for great diligence and enthusiastic application, the old financier, despairing of ever getting his frescos finished, hit upon an expedient of again securing the presence of his favorite painter. He sought the acquaintance of the beautiful girl, and took great pains to prevail upon her to take up her abode in his palace. His efforts proved finally successful, and from that moment the

fair Fornarina clave to Raphael until his death.¹ Chigi's palace is the Farnesina; and it is needless to add that the frescos — report names the Galataea and Psyche groups — were speedily completed, to the unbounded admiration of all who saw them.

The magical influence which the Fornarina exerted on Raphael is said to have operated most beneficially on the development of his style. Many art-critics, indeed, date from his acquaintance with that fascinating girl the beginning of a new era in the art of painting, when he commenced to express *the ideal in the real*. It is actually asserted that the prince of painters had looked in vain for a living embodiment of the idea of an artistic representation of the Madonna and the holy women, until he found the Fornarina in the manner already narrated. She may be called the good genius of Raphael, always hovering over the creations of his imagination, and furnishing, it is maintained, the model of his most exquisite female figures; the Galataea (?), St. Catharine in the Pitti palace, St. Cecilia, and a kneeling woman in the foreground of the Transfiguration (?) being severally regarded as representing the Fornarina.

Besides the portraits already referred to above, a fresco in a garden pavilion of the Borghese palace is also claimed to be a portrait of the Fornarina. Tradition reports her to have been the veritable shadow, or rather the soul, of Raphael. She even followed him to the Vatican, and inspired the conception of his noblest productions. The holy father, however, is said to have been very indignant about Raphael's passionate attachment to her. Her constant presence in the Vatican was universally commented on; and as her relation to Raphael was a public secret, it greatly scandalized the pope, who resolved to take measures for removing her from the artist's company. "Who is that girl?" he asked Raphael, in a tone of indignation. "If your Holiness allow me to reply," said the offended painter, calmly, but very firmly, while the enthusiasm of his boundless love for its object crimsoned his

¹ Vasari, ii. 122.

cheeks, "she is my eyes." The pope understood the reply, and read volumes more in Raphael's looks; he made allowance for his feelings, and, knowing that the loss of his services would have been irreparable, said no more about the matter; and the Fornarina continued to frequent the Vatican as before.¹

The real history of the Fornarina is of the most fragmentary character. We know that Raphael presented to his pupil Baviera, in gratitude for his care of her, Marco Antonio's copper-plate engravings of his drawings, and provided for her a considerable annuity. All authentic notices of her, after Raphael's death, are wanting; but whoever and whatever she was, it is certain "that for centuries many have envied her lot in having become immortalized by the love of Raphael; that the portrait of a plebeian girl from one of the most obscure parts of Rome has become the ornament of palaces and churches, regaling the eyes of princes, edifying the clergy and the multitude of believers, and filling all lovers of art with pride and delight."

To this quotation from Schäfer we have only to add that her acquaintance with Raphael falls in the period of 1513-1517, most probably about 1517, when he executed most of his works for Chigi. The legendary date, duly noted and doubted above, is most probably wrong.

Vasari² states: "Fece (Raphael) a monaci neri di San Sisto in Piacenza la tavola dell' altare maggiore"; "He (Raphael) painted for the black monks of St. Sixtus at Piacenza a leaf for the chief altar." The words "la tavola dell' altare maggiore" have occasioned much discussion, bearing on the question whether the Sistine Madonna be a genuine Raphael. Considering that the question has been triumphantly solved in favor of the picture we only mention the matter as belonging to its history, give a few interesting particulars, and refer those desirous to enter the mazes of art criticism to the numerous works on the subject for fuller information. Vasari's use of the word *tavola* = *tabula*,

¹ Schäfer, i. 179.

² Vita di Raffaello, xxiii. 12.

and rendered "leaf," led some of the art-critics to suppose that because the Madonna di San Sisto is painted on canvas, and not on wood, the material on which almost all of Raphael's larger works are painted, it could not be that mentioned by Vasari, and must therefore be spurious. But, apart from the sharp ordeal through which every inch of this wonderful picture has passed, the reasoning based on the word *tavola* is really that of ignorance; for, no matter whether something be painted, drawn, printed, or written, on wood, canvas, paper, or metal, the Italian idiom applies to any of these surfaces the term *tavola*. The current precise terms in the sixteenth century, it cannot be denied, were *tavola* for a painting on wood, and *quadro* for one on canvas stretched over a frame. It is also true that Vasari says that Raphael "made a St. John for Cardinal Colonna on canvas"; "Fece al Cardinale Colonna un S. Giovanni in tela." On the other hand, it is equally true that Vasari used the terms *tavola* and *quadro* very loosely; for he designates the Madonna with the thistle-finch, painted on wood, a *quadro*, while he calls Titian's Ascension of Mary, painted on canvas, a *tavola*. The argument from the word *tavola*, therefore, is untenable, and proves nothing.

Another interesting question, however, attaches to this word. Vasari says that Raphael made a *tavola* for the chief altar; and in that position the painting was found, in 1753, in the Benedictine church of S. Sisto at Piacenza. Examination showed that the painting was larger than its frame, and that, in order to make it fit, the upper part, down to a line beneath the curtain-rod, had been turned in. Now, it can neither be admitted that Raphael mistook the dimensions, nor suffered a shortening of the painting, which would have marred its symmetry. The presumption, therefore, affects the accuracy of Vasari's statement that the picture was originally an altar-piece, and favors the supposition that its primary use was that of a *drappellone*, or processional banner. Now, there are several kinds of such banners, which for our present purpose may be distinguished as

serving either internal or external uses. One of the latter kind is called by the Italians *stendardo*, or *bandiera*, and used in processions outside the church. Such a purpose the Madonna di San Sisto could not have served; its dimensions, 9' 3" $\times$ 7' equal to about 65 feet square, precluded its being carried about in the open air, where even an ordinary current would have freighted it like a sail; nor is it likely that the black monks would have asked Raphael to undertake so subordinate a task as the making of a *stendardo*; nor would the scenery of the picture, an open window with a curtain before it, comport with such a use.¹

But there is no reason why it should not have been painted as a *drappellone* or banner, used in processions inside the church, and often set up, standard-like, before the altar. The *drappelloni* were mostly very valuable paintings, and surrounded by a special drapery; and the Benedictine monks may with as much propriety have asked Raphael to paint for their church a *drappellone*, to be especially used as an ornament of the chief altar on all festivals in honor of Mary, as Leo X. requested him to furnish the models for the celebrated Arazzi carpets, made by the Flemish weavers, which, after all, were *drappelloni* of a still inferior sort. This design of the picture may be the reason why Raphael painted it, contrary to his habit, on canvas. The great fame which it speedily acquired, moreover, may have induced the Benedictine monks to assign to it the permanent place of honor as altar-piece of the chief altar in their church, and Vasari afterwards seeing it there may have fallen into the error of supposing it to have been originally made for an altar-piece. Corregio, who saw it there, exclaimed, in the pride of his conscious greatness, "I also am a painter!" But it must be owned that, apart from his coloring, he has never equalled, still less excelled, the great Raphael in sublimity and spirituality of expression, in dignity and arrangement, in drawing, and many other points.²

A copy of the Madonna di San Sisto, in the abbey of the

¹ Quandt.

² Passavant, i. 302; Schäfer, i. 182.

Benedictine nuns of St. Amand at Rouen, removed to the Hôtel de Ville of that city, is claimed to have been painted by Raphael. An Article in the *Revue encyclopédique* (December 1826, No. 96) states that, "in the year 1508, the abbess of St. Amand asked and obtained of Cardinal George d'Amboise, a painting for a chapel consecrated to the Virgin. That cardinal addressed the famous painter, whose name and reputation were then, as they still are, in everybody's mouth. Raphael sent him a painting like that which he had made for the monastery of St. Sixtus." Now, since the Sistine Madonna was not painted until 1518, and the first Cardinal d'Amboise died May 25, 1510, it is clear that it could not have been made at his instance. His nephew, bearing the same name, succeeded him as archbishop of Rouen, but was not made cardinal until 1545. He may have had a copy made by a French artist, — it has been suggested by Jean de Lyon, the best pupil of Giulio Romano, who had reached the climax of his art about 1540. Passavant, however, pronounces the altar-piece at Rouen a production of the seventeenth century, as the taste and manner of that period seem to belong to it. The deviations from the original are certainly striking. The copyist has changed St. Sixtus into St. Amand by the substitution of the episcopal mitre and the pastoral staff for the tiara, and introduced cords and tassels, much used in the seventeenth century. The drawing and coloring, also, are very inferior, and the angel heads in the halo very clumsy. Besides all this, no historical data have been found showing that Raphael painted a picture for Rouen. The claim to originality, according to the most competent judges, must be wholly abandoned.

The history of the acquisition of the Sistine Madonna for the Dresden gallery remains to be told. Frederick Augustus II., as electoral prince of Saxony, had occasion, on a journey to Italy in 1711 and 1712, to visit Piacenza, and saw there in the monastic church of the Benedictines the celebrated painting which had graced its chief altar for more than two centuries. He admired it so greatly that even then he con-

ceived the idea of securing it, if possible, for the Dresden gallery. More than twenty years elapsed before an opportunity for its purchase presented itself. The electoral court of Saxony commissioned, in 1753, the painter Carlo Cesare Giovannini, at Bologna, to prepare a report on the condition of the picture. He went, accompanied by Dr. the Abbot Giovanni Battista Biamoni of Piacenza, to St. Sisto, and drew up the minutes of his examination, of which the original was deposited at Bologna, and a copy forwarded to Dresden. From these minutes, preserved in the secret archives of the court, it appears that Giovannini had the picture taken down, and immediately identified its genuineness. He discovered some slight injuries in the drapery, and several darkened spots in the body of the Christ-child, which he supposed might be the result of a too liberal application of varnish (?), made by Raphael himself; adding, however, that the picture had probably suffered more from dryness, as it had remained upwards of two hundred years in the same place, without anything having been done for its preservation. He also noticed that the upper part of the painting, with a portion of the curtain, had been tucked in, in order to adapt it to the dimensions of the frame, and took cognizance of dirt spots occasioned by the vicious habits of copyists to touch indistinct or pale portions with oil or saliva: the dust gathering on such moistened spots being very damaging to oil paintings. Giovannini was subsequently authorized to purchase the picture. But it was by no means an easy task to execute the commission; for, on the one hand, its removal had to be concealed from the people; and on the other, the clandestine traffic of the monastic officers had to remain a profound secret. Those gentlemen accordingly stipulated that a faithful copy should occupy the place of the original, as part of the bargain. The copy was well made by the Venetian painter Guiseppe Nogari; and it is said that even to this day credulous Italians are not wanting, who stoutly maintain the originality of the painting at Piacenza. When this part of the transaction had been completed to the satis-

faction of the holy fathers they received the stipulated price of forty thousand Roman scudi or twenty thousand ducats, and the Sistine Madonna was ready to be sent to Dresden.

Rumor says that, in order to prevent detection, and to allay the possible suspicions of custom-house officers, recourse was had to the expedient of covering the picture with a landscape painted in distemper. Giovannini himself took charge of the case, and safely reached the place of destination in November 1753. The king's joy at having secured this precious pearl is said to have been unbounded; and he was all impatience to have it unpacked and set up. He caused it to be taken to the coronation room of the castle. Some difficulty arising as to the most suitable place for obtaining the best light for the picture, the practised eye of the king instantly fixed upon the throne-side of the room, and, pointing out the very site of the throne as the most eligible spot, with his own hands pushed the chair away, saying: "Room for the great Raphael."

Reference has already been made to the condition of the picture at the time of its arrival at Dresden. The unsuitableness of the old gallery building, insufficient protection from the hurtful effects of heat and cold, and the equally injurious coal-smoke, had wrought visible changes in many of the gems of the gallery, and among them in the Sistine Madonna. Serious and anxious fear was entertained that, if the matter were not speedily attended to, this gem might be irretrievably lost. This led to an invitation to the famous restorer of paintings, the Italian Palmaroli, who came in 1826 to Dresden, to bestow his saving art upon some of the choicest treasures of the gallery. After a triumphal experiment on Garofalo's "Madonna surrounded by angels playing on musical instruments, below her St. Peter, Bruno, and George," it was decided that the Sistine Madonna should be confided to his skilful hands. Von Quandt affirmed that the picture had never been varnished, to the great deterioration of its coloring. The absence of varnish, moreover, had rendered the canvass so stiff and devoid of elasticity that

the paint actually threatened to crack. Palmaroli was charged to check the work of destruction, but not allowed to attempt a thorough cleansing of the accumulated dirt of three centuries. He undertook and completed the difficult task of recanvassing the picture, and, by the application of a thin coat of mastic, of imparting new life to the coloring.

After a further lapse of thirty years, the mastic had dried up, and the painting greatly suffered from coal-smoke and dampness, when, on the occasion of removing the picture to its new, and let us hope its lasting, home, inspector Schirmer was charged with the delicate and difficult task of carefully cleansing and freshening it up. The complete success of his skilful execution has astonished every competent connoisseur; and the marvellous effect of his judicious use of balsam of copaiba in the resuscitation of the strength and harmony of the coloring, is the best vindication of the masterly skill of Palmaroli's work, which at first was greatly underrated, and actually laid him open to the charge of having spoiled one of the master-pieces of the great Raphael.

The Sistine Madonna has now found an appropriate resting-place in a separate cabinet of the beautiful Dresden gallery. An altar-like structure of chaste design has been erected, and the leaf is filled by the Madonna. It is now under plate glass, deemed sufficient protection from the deleterious influences of coal-smoke and changes of temperature. The frame gives the name of the artist; and the dates, 1483 and 1520, indicate the years of his birth and death. The front of the lower part of the altar bears the following inscription: "Fece (Raphael) a monaci neri di San Sisto in Piacenza la tavola dell' altare maggiore, dentrovi la nostra Donna con S. Sisto e S. Barbara, cosa veramente rarissima e singolare"; "He (Raphael) painted for the black brothers of the monastery of St. Sixtus at Piacenza a leaf for the chief altar, displaying our Lady with St. Sixtus and St. Barbara — truly a most rare and unique work of art (Vasari, Vita di Raffaello, xxiii. 12)."

This modest summary of criticism is enthusiastically in-

dorsed by the thousands who annually throng to the cabinet where the Sistine Madonna is now set up in solitary majesty, and derive from the study and contemplation of this wonderful work of art not only delightful instruction, but also suggestions of thought and emotion touching the purest and deepest chords of our nature. If this has been accomplished, to however small an extent, the writer is abundantly satisfied, trusting that the collection of interesting details relating to the painting, scattered over many volumes not readily accessible, will be welcomed by every admirer of the famous Madonna di San Sisto.

ARTICLE II.

THE SYNTHETIC OR COSMIC PHILOSOPHY.

BY JOHN BASCOM, LL.D., PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

As the synthetic philosophy, so called by Mr. Spencer, or cosmic philosophy, as Mr. Fiske prefers to term it, has recently received a comprehensive yet compact statement by Mr. Fiske, and has been presented in full for a series of years by Mr. Spencer, it is in a position to claim and to accept thorough discussion. Its advocates are laborious, discriminating, and able; while their work is the culmination of a vigorous and continuous line of philosophic thought in England, extending through more than two centuries, and at the same time including much of the most advanced scientific sentiment of the present period.

There have been but few advocates of any system better fitted to enlarge, harmonize, compact, and present a philosophy than is Mr. Spencer. His powers of analysis and synthesis are extraordinary, and his style is clear, full, and plausible in the extreme. The breadth of the topics discussed, and his fulness of knowledge in each, enable him to frame an argument captivating in matter, and impressing the mind with more than its real strength. The scope and vigor

of Mr. Spencer's discriminating and combining powers are something to be proud of, and to be rejoiced in, on the part of all who heartily entertain the themes presented. His candor also is very noteworthy; the candor of a mind too much occupied with its own conclusions, too sure of their value, and too able to confirm them by material taken from many diverse systems, to feel any strong temptation to leave its primary constructive labor and enter on an aggressive, destructive one. He pulls down only as he is in search of space or material for a new edifice. Rarely do bitter words escape him.

Mr. Fiske is an able advocate. His thought and his method of presentation are in harmony with those of Mr. Spencer. He states the positions of the philosophy clearly, combines them well, enforces them vigorously with new and old material. It may be rightly claimed that he does something more than this, and occasionally makes a fresh and cardinal point. We do think, however, that he has a little of the zeal of a proselyte, that he bandies too freely about the adjectives *metaphysical* and *theological*, in the restricted and abusive meaning they have acquired in a limited school, and that there is an assumption, unintended perhaps, but none the less real, of superiority in his philosophical attitude, that can hardly receive a milder epithet than offensive. Of the last and more serious censure we give a few illustrations.

"This statement, I may observe in passing, is well illustrated by the abortive attempts of missionaries to civilize the lower races of manhood by converting them to Christianity."¹ "Though we may, and do, throw overboard the whole of the semi-barbaric mythology in which Christianity has hitherto been symbolized, we shall find, nevertheless, that we have kept firmly in our possession the ethical kernel for which Christianity is deeply valued even by those who retain the whole of this mythology."² "To him" — that is, to him who follows intelligently Mr. Fiske's exposition — "the most refined anthropomorphism to be met with in

¹ *Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. ii, p. 242.

² *Ibid.* p. 454.

current theological treatises will no doubt seem as unsatisfactory as the anthropomorphism of orthodox 'revivalists' must seem to Mr. Holten or Mr. Martineau."¹ It is not the thought we criticise in these passages; we are struck only with the elevation of the writer and the estimate at which he holds his fellow citizens in the realm of knowledge.

It is a reduction of our criticism on his use of the word *metaphysical* that he endeavors to define the difficulty in the method of reasoning termed metaphysical, and so takes the adjective from a general to a restricted meaning. It is sure, however, in the majority of cases, to retain its well-established use, and, in spite of definition, to remain a term of general disparagement—a fling at a class of reasoners, rather than a calm censure of a kind of reasoning. Unverifiable ideas fall exclusively to no one set of inquirers, and are to be objected to in detail and with designation, or the censure becomes not merely an unverified one, but an irritating one as well. It is to the praise of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske alike, that their method is metaphysical, in the primary meaning of the term; and we see no reason why they should unite with the strict positivists in turning the word into a term of vague, exasperating, and unjust reproach.

While both writers would feel that they possess, perhaps in an unusual degree possess, the historic sense, we nevertheless think that they rarely feel the full force of any doctrine based on intuition; that both of them are incapable, and especially Mr. Fiske, of quite apprehending the strength of the positions they assail. This is a fault we all have in common. The walls of the Jerichos we surround we expect will fall down of their own accord after a sufficient blowing of ram's horns.

The cosmic philosophy is pre-eminently one of evolution—evolution in its strict sense, without increments. The forces of the universe, convertible, but indestructible, are taken at some one stage, as early as we can reach them, and traced in their necessary unfolding through all subsequent

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 469.

stages. This is a very rigid, self-consistent idea, and is present in all reasoning to set very positive limits. Is it safe to start a philosophy with so exacting and inflexible and *a priori* an idea? Will it not of necessity leave one side some of our facts, and run down some of our data? This cosmic philosophy has settled this one primary conclusion, and remorselessly subjects all considerations and all doctrines to its necessities, heavy and imperative as they are. We doubt whether it is possible to do justice while in possession of such stern and sweeping antecedent convictions. We might as well expect the commander of an army to arrest a battle to save the life of a man, as to expect one who is pleading for such a principle to deal singly and fairly with detached, contravening facts. We are afraid of so exacting, so arbitrary a principle, planted at the very centre of immature knowledge and incipient conclusions. Most questions of interest are foreclosed before the discussion is opened. Who can admit the rout of a division when that of the whole army is incident to it?

The doctrine of evolution, in its presentation as a complete philosophy, is chiefly Mr. Spencer's; though its foundations in mental science were laid long before his labors commenced, and most of the scientific facts which sustain it have been furnished by others. He is simply the master-builder. We owe much to this philosophy. The religious spirit has been, and will yet more be, chastened and instructed by it. That grand, compact, harmonious system of divine law, known as the universe, will by virtue of it get possession of religious feeling and religious action as never before. The God of nature and of revelation will become one in quite a new sense.

This philosophy is remarkable also, and beneficent in its morality. We do not believe that its moral foundations are securely laid; but the spirit of morality it has caught, and has expanded admirably in its precepts. The intuitionist may learn much from the utilitarian. The latter, bound in self-defence to make his morality complete, and having in

his hand the real clew to inquiry, the practical results of action, has developed well in many directions the lines of duty. If we are to accept Mr. Fiske's exposition, this philosophy is not without its religious faith, including the gist of central truths. Here, however, more than in morals, the philosophy seems to us to have transcended its premises, and to be marching off with plundered wealth. Every man is welcome to take what he can of truth; there is no objection to this. We must, none the less, while conceding everything to the individual, hold systems to consistency. Mr. Fiske and Mr. Spencer are quite at liberty to believe more than they ought logically to believe, and it is hardly worth our while to note the fact; but the doctrine of evolution, now passing through their hands, is a matter of wide interest to us all. We do wish to know what this doctrine logically contains; for these contents are sure to be evolved, sooner or later, and to constitute its fruits of good and evil. We would charge nothing upon writers on this theme beyond their own statements; but the doctrine itself stands with us on another footing. We would subject it to searching inquiry, knowing that in each subsequent generation its germinant principles have issued in conclusions which those who held them in a previous one would have vigorously denied.

Because we do not accept evolution in its absolute form as the continuous, progressive metamorphoses of definite forces, we are not thereby excluded from an appropriation of many of its doctrines. From the beginning till the advent of life, a physical evolution is a sufficient and probable theory; and after that period, with such increments as the facts seem to imply, it may still remain the foundation of development. The phenomena are left to arrange themselves under established tendencies or new tendencies, as they most incline.

Our first objection to the theory of evolution is, that it gives no sufficient footing to man. By evolution we mean that strict continuity which allows no increment whatever to the forces involved. Under this view, it is impossible to

understand such a transition as that expressed in the passage from unconscious to conscious life. It is a change occurring comparatively late in the history of the world; and we have no suggestion, or hint of a suggestion, how unconscious material—material unconscious for a period of immense duration—should assume a conscious state, and so reach the germ of a new form of being—one which Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske profess themselves willing to regard as irresolvable into matter or physical force. Just in the degree in which mind and matter are accepted as separate may the advocates of evolution be called on to explain this transition, which is the condition of so profoundly new a thing. Unless mind is to be allowed to lapse into matter, we must have some hint how, in this its first essential feature, it came to spring out of matter. How did a conscious state arise out of unconscious ones? What was the nature of the transition? and what provoked it? The obscurity of the first instance is immaterial. There it was, new in reference to the past, startling in reference to the future.

But granting, for no other reason save that it is wanted, this first condition of intelligence, the passage from unconscious to conscious activity, it yet seems plain to us that no sufficient basis is found in evolution for intelligence. The advocates of this theory—or, rather, that portion of them with whom we are immediately dealing—are quite sensitive to the charge of materialism, and we have no wish to use the word for any other than purely philosophic ends. Yet it is evident that evolution cannot be maintained in a dualistic scheme. There is not merely the difficulty of a double origin, but that also of an independent efficiency in each of two lines of events. The last step of materialism is the identification of the phenomena of mind with those of matter, regarding them as the same facts looked at on different sides; though precisely what this language means we fail to understand. A first step toward materialism, and one more telling by far than any later one, is that taken by Mr. Spencer, when he identifies the laws of intellectual with those of physical facts.

If the sequence of thought is incident to a physical sequence, and controlled by it, it is comparatively a matter of indifference whether the phenomena of mind are in some way identical with those of matter, or diverse from them. Mind is as completely in subjection to matter in the one case as in the other. The manifestations and laws of facts are of more interest to us than their essence — the phenomena than the noumena; and to concede the diversity of the second, while identifying the first in essential, inherent laws, is a barren and an inconsequential concession. We may grant that no mental act takes place without an accompanying nervous act; we may concede the claim that each thought and feeling in their diversity are attended by a corresponding difference in the molecular motions that go with them; and still the inquiries remain: Do material changes exclusively initiate and determine intellectual changes? Or is the reverse true? Or are these two kinds of changes, from time to time, in reference to each other, reciprocal causes? We understand Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske to answer in the affirmative the first inquiry, and so to exclude the two remaining questions. "It is, nevertheless, unquestionable, both that every change in consciousness is conditioned by a chemical change in ganglionic tissue, and also that there is a discernible quantitative correspondence between the two parallel changes."¹ "Thus we are led to infer, as the ultimate unit of which mind is composed, a simple *psychical shock*, answering to that simple *physical pulsation* which is the ultimate unit of nervous action."²

What is far more important than any concession of its advocates, the doctrine of evolution, starting with physical forces alone, *must* put each subsequent manifestation under their control. Mental phenomena must be but accompanying symbols of the physical facts that underlie them. To make them anything more than this would be to concede to mind a new start, an increment. But intelligence, as intelligence, cannot be saved on these grounds. The mind gives attention

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 413.

² Ibid. Vol. ii. p. 131.

to a proposition in mathematics. It seems to itself to pass from conclusion to conclusion by virtue of its own insight. Its connections are its own, the interlocking of the terms of the proof as an intellectual process. All this, however, under the theory of evolution, is an error. The efficient forces are at work in ganglionic tissue, and these symbols of thought are simply the visible dial-images of a wholly different, invisible mechanism.

We are by no means prepared to concede that each diversity of mental state implies a diversity in the correlative cerebral state. It is as yet not so much as proved that any one exact molecular change is incident to any one precise thought or feeling. The mind may be conditioned in its activity to nervous expenditure, without being conditioned to a precise form of it in each instance. One may move north or south, up or down, by equivalents of muscular energy, and with a general uniformity of muscular action. But allowing this pure and extended assumption, it is still open to us to affirm that the mind, as a thinking agent, indicates and determines the ganglionic state, and so is emancipated from it as a controlling force.

We believe that the brain and the mind are reciprocal agents in reference to each other, and that if a state of brain may determine the thoughts, a state of the thoughts may equally determine the accompanying molecular changes in the brain. If the control of the brain over the mind is shown by disease, the control of the mind over the brain is shown by health. Indeed, the maintenance of this control is that in which health largely consists. Sanity is the ability to think, is the power to make thought coherent. Insanity is the inability, or the partial ability, to think—the overruling of the mind by incoherent, or wrongly coherent, impressions. If the conclusion is not incident to the premises as intellectually seen, if the action does not follow the emotion as a conscious state, if the emotion does not spring from the contemplation which seems to occasion it, then our spiritual life is unreal; its cohering forces being found not

in it, but in another region quite—that of matter. No wonder that we hear in this philosophy so often of “thought below consciousness,” for there, truly, is where all thought with it takes place; of “unconscious cerebration,” for the symbols of a formula on the black-board, as they appear under the rapid hand of the mathematician, are not more secondary to the real truth that underlies them than the conscious conclusion to the forces that occasion it.

The materialistic philosophy has now for many years been introducing its principles: That all knowledge is relative; that it is ultimately the product of the senses; that it is united by associations, physical in their nature, till the mind has come to be regarded as a congeries of results, of secondary impressions incident to the primary, the physical facts; and all real activity in the mind itself is excluded. The wall that receives the vague, floating shadows of external objects has hardly less to do with their nature, formation, and movement than the mind, the screen for the shadows of physical facts, has to do with their character and connections. This impotence of mind, this absolute exhaustion of the intellect till no substance of power is left in it, is hidden from many by the language employed. This is capable of a more spiritual meaning than that actually intended, and this meaning is given to it. “Association of ideas” seems a harmless phrase; but when it comes to denote the tendency of a nervous state or activity to repeat itself, and this tendency is made the cause, the underlying efficiency, in classification, while classification, the establishment of resemblances, is looked on as the one typical product of thought, our pleasant words have run away with the entire inheritance of the mind in its own rational processes.

Yet this philosophy of evolution admits an intelligent *act*, an *agency* in the mind, at its peril. The nexus of causes is thereby instantly cut, the equivalence of forces disappears. No feeling as a feeling can be measured; the physical energy to which it is incident is the only tangible term; and if this is lost sight of all calculations disappear; evolution is at an

end. The same is true of thought. Thought can be managed so long as it lies a symbol above the physical conditions which secure it; but recognize it as itself an efficiency, by insight and direction taking the initiative, and our power to trace its limits and measure its values is lost. Thought, pure thought, thought primary, establishing molecular changes as secondary conditions of activity, is a spontaneous, measurably independent power, and breaks through the exact equivalents of evolution. There is no compulsion in such thought—no molecular impulse settling the directions and the degrees of activity. The mind thinks toward its conclusion, and is not driven toward it; in other words, it *thinks*, and does not delude itself with incoherent images, which it mistakes for coherent premises; does not delight itself with a movement which it regards as real, though it is not so much as the shadow of the actual efficiencies.

Evolution also fails to provide for man in failing to provide for liberty. The battle for freedom is an old and wearisome one; neither do we see that Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske have altered its issues. A clear statement of each doctrine constitutes, in this field, the strength of argument, as the point is too essential to receive much aid from truths beyond itself. It is a little strange that Mr. Fiske should pass over fortuity to the defenders of liberty, and reject fatalism as falling to those who extend law in its rigid sense to human action. It would seem that nothing but clear perception and honest language were requisite to settle the logical issues of each belief.

We grant that all which constitutes the dumb show, the ostensible marks, of liberty may be present to human action under the interpretation of evolution. Motives are there; action follows upon them; the mind hesitates between them, decides between them, if you will, chooses between them; no symbol of a free action fails to appear, and to be apparently operative in its appropriate way. If, therefore, the power to use such words as "motives," "devices," "obedience," "disobedience," relieves one from the charge of

fatalism, the evolutionist is not a fatalist; but if by fatalism is meant such an inclosing of rational with physical activities, such a subordination of both to immutable laws, that only one result ever has been possible—has been contained in the forces actually operative,—then the evolutionist is, and must be, a fatalist. Let this philosophy use a phraseology saturated through and through with notions of liberty, apply the terms “motives,” “influence,” “persuasion” to the individual, and look upon him as an agent in this way to be controlled, and we feel no shock; let us measure our levels more exactly, and apply them to a broader field, and our contentment disappears. A single person can be persuaded,—formally so,—but who is to persuade him? Neither A nor B, except a force is already operative on them to that end. The persuasion cannot be furnished, the new motive brought forward, unless it and the action incident to it are both already included in the previous conditions. In one word, the universe given, but one result is possible; and human action is under the same close, stringent, settled conditions that fall to other parts of it. Mr. Fiske’s philosophy, in its entire argument, its every word and phrase, was settled from the beginning, or at that remote period which we are wont to call the beginning; and Mr. Fiske has at length simply surrendered the symbols of a process that physical forces have been for these aeons maturing. It is immaterial what name we apply to such foreclosed results; but if we withhold the word “fatalism,” we shall scarcely find another opportunity for its use. A fixed sequence is involved in evolution. Motives, feelings, thoughts, as conscious states, are only the incidents of processes which move on wholly independently of them. This philosophy, therefore, gives no place for man as a conscious, free being; since not only are his conscious states not independent elements of force, they are not even transitional terms in the real under-current of power, but lie to one side of it, attached to it in a strange, inconsequential way.

But is the doctrine of liberty one of accidents—one of

fortuity? "As I have already said, no middle ground can be taken. The denial of causation is the affirmation of chance; and between the theory of chance and the theory of law, there can be no compromise, no reciprocity, no borrowing and lending."¹ Volition is one of the ways in which the mind acts; and if we grant that the mind thinks, the mind feels, there is but little difficulty in granting that it chooses — that it can, under fitting conditions, decide between two lines of action, which it will adopt. If there is no spontaneity in thought, if it is the expenditure of a force antecedently lodged somewhere in matter, or is wholly incident to the activity of such a force, then there is in the mind no preparation for choice; if it were able to choose, it would be unable to execute its choice, since all its remaining powers would be locked fast in the ongoing of necessary causes. The question, then, is a broader one than of mere freedom, and is the inquiry whether the mind can do anything? whether it is a nodule of forces in a state of transfer, or has its own powers primarily referable to itself?

In two directions we see of how little worth the denial of the identity of physical and mental facts is in holding back Mr. Spencer from materialism. If no primary power is conceded to the mind, its derivative powers or transferred energies all come to it through the body; for this is its line of union with the fact, and mind becomes at least the product of physical forces. Again, in denying its phenomena to be identical with those of these forces, they are ruled out of all connection with the facts of the world and influence over them. There is present a certain molecular force, which, in its expenditure, is the condition of certain thoughts. This molecular energy must pass into those thoughts, and find transfer through them; or, simply as molecular energy it must pass on and work out other molecular conditions, the concomitants of subsequent thoughts. The persistence of forces binds us to one or other of these views. If the first be correct, then the thought sinks down into the physical

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 187.

series, and is a term of it ; if the second is preferred, then thought lies to one side the lines of transmission, and is without service or office in the world — is an addendum which modifies nothing. The question, then, of freedom does not stand by itself, but involves with it that of the possession of any primary powers of the mind. Conceding spontaneity to the mind in thought, the alternative — chance or law — which Mr. Fiske puts so positively, easily disappears. If the mind can think, and so be a law to itself, it can choose, and be a law to itself in choice. Both actions merely imply in it independent, primitive efficiency. It is the nature of mind to open activities, to initiate efforts ; and there is nothing in the least surprising about it, unless we institute a sharp contrast between its laws and the laws of matter, and cherish an overweening estimate of these last.

The law of causation is not universal ; that of spontaneity and liberty supplements it ; and causation and chance do not divide the field between them. In reference to second parties, the actions of men are as though they were free, whether they be free or not ; since we do not pretend to be able to trace the causes operative in them. Yet we have no difficulty in dealing with our fellow-men ; we are not involved in the confusion of chance-events. Choice lies between two things, not between an hundred ; choice is perpetually fixing for itself lines of action, and forecasting a future which we also can forecast with it ; choice, after the most spasmodic expression, quickly builds up for itself new conditions of order ; choice is not without motives, though motives are without controlling force ; choice is resolvable, all of it, into action along one line, that of conduct or character. There are only two things which present, in reference to each other, an alternative — duty and pleasure, virtue and vice. The mind is not irrational because it is free. Its freedom is exercised under, not above, its rational faculties. Between pleasure and pleasure there is no opportunity for choice, but only for an estimate ; between virtue and vice there is no room for an estimate, but only for a choice.

Evolution gives no sufficient ground to man, in failing to accord to him any real knowledge. Mind, by virtue of its union with a nervous system, is a sensitive organism, on which certain impressions can be made — impressions which are inevitably collocated in certain classes and relations, by their method of arising and their constant repetition. Hence all knowledge is relative, not absolute — relative in kind to the organs impressed, relative in connections to the connections physically secured between these impressions. It matters but little to us that this aphorism of the relativity of knowledge has a large historic following; it is, as applied to our higher knowledge, either the truism that to know is to know, or it is false.

“We accordingly say, for brevity’s sake, that we cannot know the absolute, but only the relative. And in saying so we implicitly assert two practical conclusions: First, we cannot know things as they exist independently of our intelligence, but only as they exist in relation to our intelligence. Secondly, the possibilities of thought are not identical or co-extensive with the possibilities of things.”¹

These assertions are true, and only true, on the supposition that our knowledge is all ultimately sensational. This issue made by the empirical philosophy is not its strength, but its weakness. An organ of sense, a nervous system, as an essential intervening instrument of knowledge, constitutes an element in that knowledge which we cannot exactly measure, much less eliminate. Sound is due in part to the ear, and a knowledge of sounds involves the sense of hearing — is relative to it. Others may hear not at all while we hear, or may hear differently from us, or hear more than we do under the same circumstances. Some of these differences due to our senses we detect; others, doubtless, are hidden from us; and it is plain that the hearing of no one of us exhausts the possibilities of things. When we come to intuitive truth, the case is every way diverse. That two and two make four is not a proposition dependent on any sense what-

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 10.

ever, or all the senses combined. It is as applicable to thoughts as to things. There is not the slightest divergency, nor the possibility of divergency, in men's judgment concerning it. There is no intervening organ to introduce a personal element, and no discrepancy in results to hint a latent relativity. The truths of mathematics are absolute; for the knowing in them is a pure knowing, a direct knowing, a knowing that is not sensational. There is, so far, knowledge that is absolute, knowledge to which the knowing faculty adds nothing of its own. The complete, instant uniformity of the results shows this, is a sufficient presumptive proof of it.

We do not wish to argue the point. The best possible arguments are the statements of the adverse philosophy. No one can believe that it accepts them otherwise than as results forced upon it. "Mathematics starts from simple propositions concerning quantitative relations of numbers and extension, which are verified, once for all, by a direct appeal to experience."¹ How many of the higher results of mathematics have ever had from experience even an apparent verification? In what sense is it that the proposition "Two and two make four" is verifiable in experience, in sensation? Units are known by weight, by size, by color. But in none of these respects is the assertion true; it is only true of abstract units, which lie beyond experience.

"It is quite possible that there may be worlds in which numerical limitations are not binding."² In Mr. Hall's hypothetical world, where two and two make five, the law of evolution may not hold sway."³ Why not hold sway? Unless such a conception is, as we believe it to be, absolutely absurd and disorganizing, evolution should still go on, and incorporate the principle "Two and two make five" into the basis of its organic systems and new knowledge. Nothing can heighten the difficulties of the above positions, and we leave them.

The same confusion appears, as the result of this dogma of the relativity of knowledge, in connection with the infinite

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 116.

² Ibid. p. 276.

³ Ibid. p. 275.

and the absolute. They are pronounced "utterly and forever unknowable." Yet the language is scarcely less than self-contradictory; for how can we even designate that which is utterly and forever unknowable? And how can we know that we mean what another means by the words "infinite," "absolute"? Few authors use these words more than Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske. Do they, or do they not, mean anything by them? Are the words "infinite space," "infinite time," mere blanks to them, as would be "abracadabra" space?

Again, no place is found in this philosophy for man, because there is given him no material for thought. The thinking process or power is, as we have seen, remanded to the unconscious and physical region of the nervous system. It is this which determines thought, not thought that establishes and uses these connections; the function does not make the organ, but the organ the function rather. This removal of thought as an efficient power from the mind is the more readily made, — nay, is necessary, because no material for its processes is furnished it. Sensations, perceptions, on the one hand, and intuitive ideas, on the other, are essential to thought. The sensations are to be compared, referred, inquired into in time and place; and for this purpose the ideas of resemblance, causation, time, space, must be at hand. Sensations as sensations are complete. All that the mind can do with them is, by thought under its antecedent ideas, to throw them into comprehensive categories, and draw from them serviceable conclusions. The doctrine of evolution finds no place for this work as a conscious process, since it transpires as an unconscious one, and the ideas incident to it are not plucked up from their sub-conscious depths till the work of organization has been done.

"It has already been sufficiently proved that the universality and necessity of unconditional propositions, whether relating to space-relations or to any other relations whatever, must inevitably result from absolute uniformity in the organic registration of experiences, and therefore does not involve

any *a priori* element.”¹ “For the ideas formerly called innate or intuitional are the results of nutritive tendencies in the cerebral tissue, which have been strengthened by the uniform experience of countless generations until they have become as resistless as the tendency of the dorsal line of the embryo to develop into a vertebral column.”²

Regulative ideas owe their necessity and priority in experience, then, to the fact that, as the framework of order in events, they are incorporated into that transferred order incident to an impressible, active nervous system. The words of the manuscript reappear in the letter-press. Here a sub-conscious process is made, in entire consistency with the philosophy, the equivalent of a conscious one. We are at a loss to see where this tendency to substitution is to stop. Why is not “the tendency of the dorsal line of the embryo to develop into a vertebral column” also a portion of our mental furniture. It constitutes no explanation whatever, to our mind, of regulative ideas as conscious possessions, that sensations have conformed to them. The instinctive, automatic adaptation of the young of animals to space and time relations, is no equivalent for an intellectual, conscious process; and the change of the one into the other involves the entire problem. So Mr. Spencer would seem to think; for he attempts to give the method of transfer, the steps by which an unconscious fact becomes a conscious possession. In this he seems to us signally to fail, and, at the same time, to set aside the quiet assumption, on the part of Mr. Fiske, that no explanation is needed — that a fact below consciousness is always the equivalent of one in consciousness, and may actually appear there at any moment.

There is, as is usual in the empirical philosophy, in connection with regulative ideas, a false formal element and the quiet appropriation, on the part of Mr. Fiske and Mr. Spencer, of the notions necessary to progress. We illustrate the fact in connection with causation. “Causation may, therefore, be defined as the unconditional, invariable sequence of one

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 101.

² Ibid. Vol. ii. p. 161.

event, or concurrence of events, upon another.”¹ Here we have sequence, a phenomenal fact, substituted for causation proper, an intuitional fact. But it is impossible, on such a conception, to carry forward a philosophy of evolution, whose fundamental notion is force, and whose first truths are the permanence of forces and the equivalence of forces. Overlooking wholly its own weakness, the cosmic philosophy proceeds as if all the resources of thought were at its disposal. The noumenon is spoken of as a necessary postulate, and used as such in the entire argument concerning matter and God. But this is to restore the intuitive idea of causation without a recognition; it is to acknowledge it indispensable, without assigning it to its appropriate power. Nor does this objection, taken by us, come from us alone. The positivist, from precisely the opposite quarter, draws attention to the unwarrantable conclusion. “M. Littré, the most illustrious follower of Comte, unreservedly stigmatizes as ‘metaphysical’ this very doctrine of the unknowable.”² The ground of this objection is, that the “unknowable” includes an idea not given in the phenomena, is a surreptitious introduction of an element outside of positive knowledge. Of this introduction the notion of causation is the only sufficient justification, and hence the unknowable involves this intuitive idea. But the acceptance of one intuitive idea is the overthrow of the empirical philosophy. The cosmic philosophy postulates a position unexplained and incompatible with its fundamental assertions.

The language of Mr. Fiske is both formally and profoundly in conflict with any other than an efficient causation, in spite of his definition, his theoretical position, given above. We care not for this fact; we care only for the fact that evolution, as an empirical philosophy, is untenable at this point. “It is for the same reason that the mind is compelled to believe the necessity of causation, and that the cultivated mind, which can realize all the essential conditions of the case, is compelled to believe in its universality. For what is the

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 158.

² Ibid. Vol. i. p. 262.

belief in the necessity and universality of causation? It is the belief that every event must be determined by some preceding event, and must itself determine some succeeding event. And what is an event? It is a manifestation of force."¹ Yet a few pages later an "efficient cause" is expressly rejected, as a metaphysical conception, in favor of a "phenomenal cause."

The theory of evolution every instant includes the notion of efficient forces, of stringent causation. This ever-returning contradiction is the inborn infirmity of the cosmic philosophy. "What defies suppression in thought is really the force which the motion indicates";² "Utter inability to conceive a variation in the sum-total of force"³; "What is thus proved true of matter and motion is *a fortiori* true of force, out of which our conceptions of matter and motion are built";⁴ "Every manifestation of force must be preceded and followed by an equivalent manifestation:"⁵ such are the assertions we meet with at every turn in the works of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske. To increase the confusion, we add one more extract: "And what do we mean by force? Our conception of force is nothing but a generalized abstraction from our sensations of muscular resistance."⁶ Then matter and motion and the universe, from the opening to the end, are the abstraction of a sensation.

We take our second leading objection to the cosmic philosophy, that it finds no place for God — actually, not ostensibly. Ostensibly, it rebukes the irreverence of his worshippers, and sets up his throne again, behind a new veil, at a greater remove from the gaping crowd. Having debased intelligence and volition in its conception of them, it rightfully enough denies them to God; yet it has nothing better to put in their place. Force alone remains, and, be it what it may, it must stand for God.

We again draw attention, in this connection, to the contradictions — or inconsistencies, if you choose, — of the phi-

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 147.

² Ibid. p. 282.

³ Ibid. p. 286.

⁴ Ibid. p. 288.

⁵ Ibid. p. 314.

⁶ Ibid. p. 172.

losophy with which we are dealing. It starts with the assertions, "That we are forever barred from any knowledge of the absolute, the infinite, or the uncaused"; that it is "utterly and forever unknowable"; that this being its one characteristic, it is fittingly termed "the unknowable." Yet in this word there are two latent inconsistencies. Nothing can be designated till it is in some measure defined as to its mental whereabouts, till existence, and existence of some order, is, or may be, referred to it. Nor are we at liberty to designate this unapproachable thing as the Unknown, conspicuously emphasizing it with a capital, if we are not willing to imply personality, or pre-eminence of some sort. This same Unknown is spoken of by Mr. Fiske as "Omnipresent Power," a "First Cause," "the God of the Christian," "Deity," an "Inscrutable Power" that may be "regarded as quasi-psychical," "the infinite and eternal Sustainer of the universe," "a Divine Power, that cannot be identified with the totality of phenomena," and as "the Divine Power immanent in the Cosmos." Nor is he satisfied with such ascriptions; he says: "The constant element has been, on its intellectual side, the recognition of Deity, and on its emotional side the yearning for closer union with Deity, or for a more complete spiritual life." He unites with the Psalmist in affirming that the heavens declare the glory of God; and is ready to sing, with the saints,

"Nearer, my God, to thee."²

We explicitly reject any carping at these concessions; they are all right, honorable to head and heart. They do not, however, flow from the principles of the cosmic philosophy, nor are they consistent therewith.

In this language Mr. Fiske is doing furtively and inconsistently what the Christian theist does avowedly; he is dealing with the Infinite not as the Unknowable, but as the Knowable-Unknowable. He is, as his philosophy often compels him to be, confused, when he denies intelligence and volition to God, and yet concedes that his "intimate essence

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 505.

² Ibid. p. 502.

may conceivably be identifiable with the intimate essence of what we know as mind." Even if intelligence and volition are inclosed, as Mr. Fiske supposes them to be, in force, this constitutes no reason why, in a secondary way, they are not referable to God; unless, forsooth, we are to divorce noumena from their phenomena, as a separable existence, and ascribe the first only to Deity.

To those, however, who regard intelligence and volition as primary and more than equal powers, standing side by side with physical forces, there is not only no difficulty in affirming them of God, they become the chief expression of his character. There are no words of contempt and rejection which Mr. Fiske uses more frequently than "anthropomorphism," "anthropomorphic"; though why it should be worse to be anthropomorphic than to be cosmic, or how a *man* is to be other than anthropomorphic, in some sense settling his own estimates of dignity by his own standards, I am at a loss to understand. How lame a conclusion, then, does he reach, when, drawing to the end of his work, he says: "Provided we bear in mind the symbolic character of our words, we may say that 'God is Spirit,' though we may not say, in the materialistic sense, that 'God is Force.' Such an utterance is, indeed, anthropomorphic. But we are now finding powerful confirmation of the argument elaborated in our Prolegomena, that a positive mode of philosophizing is impracticable, and that we can never get entirely rid of all traces of anthropomorphism." ¹ What a deal of travel to reach a point occupied from the beginning by his most intelligent opponents—a position not approachable by a philosophy into which the principles issuing in positivism have so wrought themselves as they have into the cosmic philosophy.

We make but two other secondary points under our second objection. "Personality and infinity are terms expressive of ideas which are mutually incompatible. The pseud-idea 'Infinite Person' is neither more nor less unthinkable than the pseud-idea, 'circular triangle.'" ² Personality involves

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 649.

² Ibid. p. 408.

intelligence and volition, that is, spontaneity in knowing, freedom in executing. Are there, necessarily, any limits to knowledge? Those who affirm that there are ought, to point them out. Are there any limits to the executive and voluntary power by which knowledge is made efficient? If there are such in the nature of the case they are not obvious. But, it may be said, if the elements of personality have no finite measurements, every manifestation of them must have. Granted; but so is each actual moment or manifestation of time finite, while we perfectly understand what is meant by infinite time. Space presents itself to us in parts, and can only be scrutinized by us in parts; yet it remains one infinite whole. What a foolish riddle do we make of the infinite, trying, in the same breath, to concede it and withhold it, to grant it and explain it, under the analogies of the finite.

“Evolution is throughout irreconcilably opposed to the doctrine of creation.”¹ Very well; the measurable forces of which the solar system is composed can neither have been going on from all eternity, nor can they go on to all eternity, unless there is an absolute conservation of them, and a circular movement in their unfolding. The evolutionist is not prepared to make either assertion probable. There is the constant radiation of heat, light into space, and so an apparent loss in the aggregate of forces. This process cannot have gone on from eternity in our system, or that system, so far as force expressing itself in a large class of motions is concerned, would have disappeared. Nor can a system, subjected to such loss, return in its evolutions again and again into itself. It cannot, therefore, under present apparent conditions, have progressed from eternity; since the forces of progress would long ago have been exhausted. That is to say, evolution is unable to suggest conditions, made probable by experience, under which eternal movement is possible, and so is unable to assert the past eternity of force.

Our third objection to the cosmic philosophy is, that it

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 376.

yields no sufficient recognition of life and of the agents involved in the unfolding of lives in the world. Life must become a function or combination of functions, and in no sense an agent, under the doctrine of evolution. Its lines of development and forms must be inclosed, directly or indirectly, in the physical forces which precede it. "The hypothesis of a 'vital principle' is now as completely discarded as the hypothesis of phlogiston in chemistry. The crystal of quartz has a shape which is the result of the mutual attractions and repulsions of its molecules; and the dog has a shape which is ultimately to be explained in the same way, save that in this case the process has been immeasurably more complex and indirect."¹ This is the out-thrust of assertion which is, by direction and indirection, to be worn down again to much the old level of thought. The crystal-line attractions are found much more manageable than the canine ones; these become so numerous and recondite that the philosophy knows not where to locate them, or how to express them, and is compelled to invoke the aid of conceptions which we should call metaphysical, in the meaning which Mr. Fiske attaches to the word.

"But it must be remembered that, in the case of an organism, the direction of these forces depends, in a way not yet explained, upon the directions in which they have been exerted by ancestral organisms. In other words, a set of definite tendencies has been acquired during the slow evolution of organic life."² "It is, at the same time, true that the ultimate mystery—the association of vital properties with the enormously-complex chemical compound known as protoplasm—remains unsolved."³ "Facts of this kind point to the conclusion that an inherent capacity for adaptive changes is possessed by all organisms. And by the phrase 'inherent capacity' I do not mean to insinuate the existence of any *occulta vis*, or metaphysical 'innate power,' of which no scientific account is to be given in terms of matter and

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 422.² Ibid. p. 430.³ Ibid. p. 434.

motion.”¹ Certainly not; yet it is a little difficult to draw a sharp line between “inherent capacity” and “innate power”; the intention of an author hardly suffices for this purpose. “In every living body there is a tendency towards secondary alterations of this nature,”² — that is, of a nature to anticipate farther external action.

Thus we have a “vital principle” formally and contemptuously discarded, and such phrases put in its place as “a set of definite tendencies,” “the association of vital properties,” “an inherent capacity for adaptive changes,” “a tendency toward secondary alterations.” This fact would be of small moment, if it were a convenience, or a slip of language; it is of great moment, when it is a forced concession to an inscrutable power which Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske can no more dispense with than their opponents, nor, no more than they, express in “terms of matter and motion.” The definition of life given by this school implies such a pervasive, shaping power. “Life, including also intelligence as the highest known manifestation of life, is the continuous establishment of relations within the organism in correspondence with relations existing or arising in the environment.”³ As the diverse parts of a complex organism in a complex environment are subjected to the most various influences, some correspondingly broad power is requisite to unite and harmonize the results. The living body must not act by portions, but in some way as a whole. The restoration of injured members, inheritance, atavism, must find reference to something beyond the general properties of molecules. The body of the living being as a combination, the transmission of its tendencies, the sudden intervention of very remote and subtle influences — these are the facts that seek for exposition; and that the scientists who reject vital power can neither evade them nor refer them with any new insight is made sufficiently plain by these “tendencies” of Mr. Fiske, by the “gemmules” of Mr. Darwin, by the “physiological units” of Mr. Spencer.

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 56.
Vol. XXXIII. No. 132.

² Ibid. p. 69.

³ Ibid. p. 67.

As to the origin and development of life, the cosmic philosophy avails itself, of course, of the labors of Mr. Darwin, carrying them to their extreme limits. This theory receives a concise summation, in its most available form, by Mr. Fiske: "The process of organic evolution may, therefore, be summarized as follows:

Equilibration	{ External	{ Direct	Adaptation.
		{ Indirect	Natural Selection.
	{ Internal	{ Direct	{ Heredity.
		{ Indirect	{ Correlation of Growth. Use and Disuse." ¹

That the activities and conditions of activity represented in this statement cover real and important truths, that they are the valuable conclusions of memorable labors, few are disposed to deny; that they are a sufficient exposition of the facts to which, under the theory of evolution, they are applied, is far from plain.

Take them in order. Adaptation is the first and the oldest and the least serviceable of them. If we mean by it known physical forces without the organism, acting on known forces within it, and so securing in an intelligible way a readjustment; if we exclude all tendencies—as of right we ought to—not expressible "in terms of matter and motion,"—we thank Mr. Fiske for the phrase,—the organic changes we can refer to adaptation will be most meagre, scarcely a sensible increment to the confirmatory facts of evolution.

Natural selection, strictly so called, only disposes of superfluous, unfortunate varieties; it explains the presence of none of them. It must be accompanied with the supplementary statement of a general tendency in organisms to vary, referable to the changing states of the environment. The theory may be entitled to this statement as a simple fact. Internal, organic forces are open to the influence of a constantly variable environment; they respond to it by slight changes in many directions, known as varieties. Decisive changes, however, in definite directions, a tendency to change

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 65.

in any direction, must have a more precise explanation than the above general statement. An incalculable liability to slight variations in all directions, external conditions that will favor a portion and repress a portion of the movement, — these, excluding any and every occult tendency, are the terms with which natural selection starts. It will explain many facts, but fails to explain many — the order, for instance, of the animal kingdom, the steady, rapid development of the vertebrates, the symmetry in which their own classes are united, and that central evolution by which they throw into subordination and harmony the inferior forms of life. Natural selection starts with a chance-force, or, in reference to any ultimate plan, a most accidental complexus of forces, and out of them eliminates order. That order is not sufficiently explained. (*a*) The chances to be run through with of disorder are too many; they are practically infinite. (*b*) The process of natural selection is not decisive and quick enough in its operation to do the work assigned it. (*c*) There is still a latent assumption — a probable, but an unexpounded term, in one of the two premises; to wit, in that which refers slight organic development to external forces. Such a fact, if it be conceded as one of universal application, has not been, and cannot be, expressed in “terms of matter and motion.” Mechanical force adds itself as mechanical force to mechanical forces; chemical forces it cannot affect in the same direct way. Here its mode of operation requires new definition. No more are we at liberty to assume that the forces of the environment will work organic, rather than inorganic, changes, without a more precise defining of their mode of operation. If it be said that they *do* work such organic development, it is possible to refer — nay, difficult not to refer — the change to a *tendency*, — an occult force, — since there are no visible forces to which such changes can be traced, no known methods of transfer. Thus we have again an agency not expressed “in terms of matter and motion.”

The third agent in vital evolution is heredity. This term

the evolutionist has no right to as a known quantity in his equation. It has not been gotten, in its methods of causation, out of the region of "unverifiable hypotheses"; it has not been expressed in "terms of matter and motion."

The same is true of the fourth agency — correlation of growth. It, like inheritance, is a fact, but an unexplained one — one not resolved into equivalents of known forces.

Use-and-disuse, brought forward as an agency to sustain evolution, is burdened in the same way. Use, in the limb of the animal, does quicken circulation, and increased circulation is attended with increased nourishment. But these facts are not mere terms, plain "terms of matter and motion." That use quickens circulation — for instance, the use of the brain — cannot be expressed in mechanical and chemical forces alone, nor the additional nutrition incident to such circulation be put in formulae of matter and motion merely. An occult term is still present. If every occult term, every assumption is excluded, the facts of evolution in the region of life almost or quite disappear. They now seem so many, because the mechanical element in a complex process is brought to the foreground, and the vital element passed by, or inadequately referred, or covered up by a new pass-word.

We think, then, that it can fairly be said that the theory of evolution, when dealing with real forces, often pushes them far beyond their just application; is signally open to the accusation of putting the part, and sometimes a very small part, for the whole. This is especially to be objected to because the theory frequently requires the proof offered in its largest range, while within the range which a sober, cautious criticism assigns it, it is of little avail. Evolution is not a theory which can dispense in part with the principles, the laws, from which it is deduced, and retain for its purposes their remaining power. To fail at one point is, for this view, complete failure. It is not the presence of evolution in the world that is under discussion, but its absolute sufficiency to account for all facts. When, therefore, its

advocates state the laws needed for its support in an unqualified form, — as in the case of “a vital principle,” — and afterward fall back in part from their first position, modifying their results to suit the stubbornness of facts, they fail of their primary purpose. Most of the principles stated by evolutionists will be accepted, within a limited field, as valuable explanations of the facts; the objections arise only when these principles are linked together as a net-work of laws sufficient to cover the whole ground; and to this result the slightest success in attack and the slightest concession in defence are fatal.

Natural selection explains readily the prevalence of one species and the extinction of another; but if it fails to make clear why such and such varieties have appeared, and these only, it ceases to do the work the evolutionist assigns it. Some of the beauty found in the vegetable kingdom may be explained as a means of attracting insects to flowers; but what purpose does this fact subserve, if the great mass of beauty in form and color remains unaccounted for? Sexual selection may cover a few phenomena in the animal kingdom; but its aesthetical facts are hardly entered on, much less exhausted, by this explanation. The theory expounds so little that, in reference to evolution, it seems rather to weaken than to strengthen it. Much the same is true of that mimicry by which insects are made to resemble inanimate objects, and so protected. From one point of view, it gives aid; under natural selection here, undoubtedly, would be a self-maintaining variation. But when we reflect on the number of points involved in such a resemblance, and the very great improbability that they should concur under purely accidental causes, we have an antagonistic consideration quite as weighty as the favorable one.

Mr. Wallace brings forward an important consideration, when, in the case of man, he carries natural selection over from the body to the mind, and so lays the foundations of intellectual development; yet this view, as a complete theory for all the facts, is evidently pressed too far. Physical

advantages, physical prowess have not even yet quite lost their value, and till the invention of gunpowder were scarcely secondary to intellectual gifts. If the first could not avail without the second, neither could the second without the first. Most plain is it that in a savage state physical qualities still remain of great importance — sufficient importance to be acted on by natural selection. It may well be doubted whether the dividing line, on the theory of evolution, can be drawn so decidedly between man and the lower animals, and natural selection be set to tasks so distinct on either side of it. The truth would seem to be, that physical and intellectual qualities must both be regarded from the beginning by natural selection, with a balance increasingly favorable to the latter.

Mr. Fiske's most valued contribution to evolution consists in pointing out the relation of infancy to increased intelligence, on the one side, and the family, on the other. Without shading, — and if the shading be well done the prominence of these transitions and the causative force of the presiding principles in each are greatly reduced, — the steps of transfer are these: The intellectual element assumes such importance in man that natural selection lays hold of it to the neglect of physical variation. This intelligence involves a slower individual development; hence prolonged infancy and more parental care; this care constructs and consolidates the family; the family leads to society and the state; and these secure civilization. There can be no doubt that the three facts, increased intelligence, prolonged infancy, and the unity of the household, are closely associated, and mutually sustain each other. It is more doubtful whether there is a linear causal succession between them in the order mentioned; and still more doubtful whether, *under evolution*, such a connection is probable. It is not evident that intelligence, if intelligence is in large part — in much the greater part — a sub-conscious cerebral development, would call for the prolonged training of infancy. It certainly does, if intelligence as a practical possession is the product of faculties called

forth by use and compacted by habit in the individual. But if this work, as Mr. Fiske is ready to affirm in other connections, can be done in the ancestor, and the most necessary convictions and processes of mind be made ready to order, the necessity of the prolonged training of infancy disappears. Thus the most sagacious insects, with this type of sub-conscious intelligence, can enter rapidly on their activities. Infancy is a necessary incident only to training which is conscious and voluntary; lose sight of these two elements, and the connection disappears.

A kindred difficulty arises in uniting infancy, as an efficient condition in the order of progress, to the family. If the intelligence which is to issue in infancy is sub-conscious, then infancy does not follow from it, but the reverse rather; and if it is conscious training, then the family must precede the intelligence, rather than the intelligence the family. It would be necessary, at least, that the three conditions should be co-ordinate, and sustain each other; that they should be parts of a new method. Infancy alone would constitute a burden and a danger, and could not well exist antecedent to the family as a means of organizing it; since natural selection would tend to repress it. A weakness and a hinderance would be put first; while the advantages to be developed from it would be remote—most of them very remote. Such an order would not be consistent with natural selection. The truth seems to us to be that enlarged intelligence, as included in and the product of voluntary activity, demands both infancy and the family to sustain it; intelligence is the final cause, rather than the efficient cause.

Organic race-growth, as giving the conditions of individual life, is justly insisted on, but at the same time pushed to a position it cannot attain. It is absolutely essential to evolution, since the individual is closely conditioned to the stock from which he springs; to divorce him in the least is to loosen him from the only laws which can control him. From this relation springs the theorem of Mr. Fiske: "The amount of intellectual progress achieved since man became human

far exceeds that which was needed to transfer him from apehood to manhood.”¹

Yet how will this assertion and the underlying dependence of the individual on the organic race-development bear the test of facts? How many individuals miss the fruits, in the most cultivated races, of this stock-force! How single individuals, as in our colored population, are made to travel very quickly a large share of the space between the lowest and the highest races! How races, as in the case of the Sandwich Islanders, are carried rapidly over considerable portions of it! How individuals in all races rise far above the race-grade! How, in a case like that of Laura Bridgeman, a singular personal development—singular in its methods of initiation and in its steps of progress, for which unconscious race-cerebration could have done little or nothing—institutes and completes itself almost at once by its own law. Let Mr. Fiske take the equivalent half,—the space between apehood and manhood—a space of organic instead of intellectual development,—and try his hand at filling in any considerable, nay, any observable, portion of it. The race-element is much, but is not what evolution must needs make it to be. The exaggeration of the estimate evinces the weakness of the theory.

We refer to one other instance in which the same undue weight is given to a real, but partial influence. The moral sense is referred to social growth; the weakening of selfishness and the strengthening of sympathy incident thereto, the “gradual supplanting of *egoism* by *altruism*.” Conscience is not the basis on which this process proceeds, but the product of it. The power does not institute the process; but the process deposits the power. It certainly would and does develop the power, and hence the difficulty in showing that it does not create it—that conscience is not a transmitted susceptibility to public opinion, speaking, correctly or otherwise, in behalf of the public weal. Here, again, we are dealing with real causes. Are they sufficient causes?

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 309.

Of what public opinion can do there are several examples. Fashion is enforced by public sentiment, and so enforced that very many would more quickly violate moral laws than its laws. Honor, in various countries and in various classes, is another instance of a very exacting public sentiment. But in neither of these cases are we in danger of mistaking the sentiment involved for one of morals. The moral sentiment, on the other hand, is constantly asserting itself as against these public enforcements, and in many instances overcomes them. Moreover, those most susceptible to public opinion are those least ruled by conscience; and the notable victories of conscience have been over communities, over conjoint, consolidated, hereditary feeling, in behalf of individual judgment. The "idiosyncratic conscience" is *the* conscience of the world, and one more or less steadily in opposition; how shall its force therefore be referable to the many? Can society give to its members, develop in them as the *esprit* of its sentiment, a higher morality than it possesses? Yet how evident is it that the individual always brings an advanced moral truth to society, and not society to the individual. Take the case of fashion,—a true, pure product of social influence,—and how exactly is the reverse true; the many constrain the one. In morals, the one constrains the many.

We pass to a second general indictment of this cosmic philosophy—that its generalizations are largely illusory; being the descriptions of results, rather than the disclosure of new laws or new forces. Spencer's definition of evolution is: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."¹

This as a definition, a more definite statement of a process, certainly has value; yet it discloses no new force, nor any fresh combination of forces; it merely puts a more exact,

¹ First Principles, p. 396.

in place of a less exact, conception of what is accomplished by the entire aggregate of physical forces in the cosmos. As a definition it pays for its generality of course by leaving each particular process to be inquired into and understood under its own features. It is the most general description of the results of the combination of all physical laws and forces ; discloses no new force, no new combination of forces, no new operation of forces ; nor does it enable us, in any particular instance, to understand any fact of evolution, otherwise than by a renewed inquiry into the precise forces there operative and their laws of operation. This formula, regarded as a law, or used as itself serving to explain anything, would merely confound and arrest inquiry. It expounds no one fact whatever. In this respect it is to be wholly distinguished from a statement of a real law, like that of gravitation. Moreover, as applied to intellectual and to social evolution, it can only express them in their incidents, not in their substance, their distinctive characteristics.

Mr. Fiske's (which is also Mr. Spencer's) definition of life already given is open to the same remarks. "Life — including also intelligence as the highest known manifestation of life — is the continuous establishment of relations within the organism in correspondence with relations existing or arising in the environment." This is the most general possible description of innumerable and most variable processes, all of which remain to be learned and separately explained as we are able. By such definitions nothing is discovered ; the law of no single process is given, but only a general feature of many processes is rendered in descriptive fashion.

The same is true when the progress of a community is defined : "A continuous establishment of inner relations in conformity to outer relations."¹ The definition owes its similarity to that of life to the figurative force of the words — to a resemblance, and not to an identity, of facts. Society and life remain alike to be studied, their activities specified and measured, as much after as previous to such a definition.

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 212.

In short, this philosophy of evolution is one of descriptive generalizations, not of valid laws, and frequently reaches its unity of formulae by consolidating figurative and literal statements. One might devise a general, descriptive formula for all machines. It would tell us nothing about any one machine — its purposes, mode of operation, or method of construction. It is an interesting fact that man's only agency in production is a transfer of material in place; but it leaves production as a branch of political economy precisely where it was before. There is no law in the statement, but an incident of many laws.

When Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske speak of certain events that must follow under these formulae, unless they make the case specific, and designate special forces as about, under given circumstances, to produce the result, — and this they do not always do, — they are securing their imperative, their necessity, from final, not from efficient causes. The formula of evolution necessitates nothing; it only states a very general order that will be followed, provided there are known forces ready to follow it, under conditions that allow them to follow it. When these gentlemen say that there *must* be this and that re-distribution of forces, they can only mean that there must be *if there is to be progress*; that is, progress, evolution, as a final cause involves it; or they must mean that they are able to designate the existing forces and conditions which, under their own laws, will work out these distributions. They do not keep in view how powerless by themselves their formulae are, and cast back upon them a necessity derived from final causes, — a supposititious necessity, — when they would seem to be speaking of one referable to efficient causes.

A third general objection which we make to the method of the cosmic philosophy is, that it not unfrequently involves explanations that fall little short of legerdemain. This arises from the identification of physical, vital, intellectual, social facts in their law, and then using words and methods of reasoning directly applicable to the first only as sufficient in the remaining

three to constitute a valid exposition. There is here a double difficulty. The real under-current of truth and imagery which sustains evolution belongs to physical forces. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske frequently express intellectual and social phenomena under their own spiritual or semi-spiritual language, when, to sustain the argument, that language must be translated into "terms of matter and motion." Many do not fully make this transfer, and hence mistake the solutions offered, are not startled as they would be if the facts were put as physical facts under physical phraseology. The opposite difficulty sometimes occurs, which we are now criticising. An explanation is given to a vital or social fact under images incident to mechanical facts and forces, and so becomes pure logodaedaly. This is a very sweeping accusation, and cannot be adequately supported by limited quotations. It, with the previous objection, if correct, greatly reduces the assumed value of the philosophy, and assigns Mr. Spencer's labors quite another position than that given them by Mr. Fiske. Simply by way of illustrating our meaning, we offer a few examples :

"That variations must occur, and that they must ever tend both directly and indirectly towards adaptive modifications, are conclusions deducible from first principles, apart from any detailed interpretation like the above. That the state of homogeneity is an unstable state we have found to be a general truth. Each species must pass from the uniform into the more or less multiform, unless the incidence of external forces is exactly the same for all its members ; which it never can be. Through the process of differentiation and integration, which of necessity brings together, or keeps together, like individuals, and separates unlike ones from them, there must nevertheless be maintained a tolerably uniform species so long as there continues a tolerably uniform set of conditions in which it may exist. Or, passing from these derivative laws to the ultimate law, we see that variation is necessitated by the persistence of force. The members of a species inhabiting any area cannot be

subject to like aggregates of forces over the whole of that area. And if in different parts of the area different kinds or amounts or combinations of forces act on them, they cannot but become different in themselves and in their progeny. To say otherwise, is to say that differences in the forces will not produce differences in the effects, which is to deny the persistence of force.”¹

This is a fair specimen of a large amount of reasoning in Spencer's works, and we must pronounce it logodaedaly — word-building. Confine attention to the last paragraph. If the proof here offered is good for anything as proof, it is absolute proof. It turns on strictly general principles; and if the conclusion is involved in those principles nothing more is required. We are at a loss to understand how any one — much less, those who base their philosophy on experience — should have the hardihood to assert the sufficiency of so purely an *a priori* demonstration. But if this proof is not demonstration, it is nothing; it is only what we have characterized it as being — a legerdemain of words. Is it involved in the persistence of force and in a changeable environment that organic products should vary and propagate their varieties? Certainly not. Prior to experience we cannot say on what terms the forces of the environment will be transmuted into those of the organism — whether they will appear in it as new organic adaptations, or as the destruction and waste of old ones, or as their enlarged exalted action in previous directions. Still less can we say whether, if these external conditions are productive of new organic combinations, the combinations will pass by inheritance. It is a thing of observation to learn what forces modify structure, and what modifications of structure are likely to be transmitted. Forces may remain persistent and variable in the environment, and express themselves, as the majority of them do, by the reduction or increase of activity in the directions already established by the organism. But the case needs no argument. If Mr. Spencer's proof were true,

¹ Principles of Biology, Vol. i. p. 271.

every organism would be in a condition of perpetual flux ; while many organisms have remained stationary, or relatively so, for the longest periods. If one may resist change, all may, so far as any such general argument is concerned. Such combinations of words are legerdemain. They are sustained in the mind by an image of mechanical forces which must combine in the way indicated, with a change of results in a definite line, and directly proportioned to the interfering agencies.

This kind of reasoning pervades Mr. Spencer's works, and Mr. Fiske's as well, and is applied unhesitatingly to vital and intellectual development. "It is a corollary from the persistence of force, 'that in the actions and reactions of force and matter, an unlikeness in either of the factors necessitates an unlikeness in the effects.' When the different portions of any homogeneous aggregate are exposed to the action of unlike forces, or to unequal intensities of the same force, they are of necessity unequally affected thereby. Between the differently exposed parts there arise structural differences, entailing differences of property and function. Such unlikeness cannot but arise ; differentiation must needs take place ; because it is impossible for all the parts of any aggregate to be similarly conditioned with reference to any incident force." ¹

The objections to this kind of reasoning are : (a) It explains no specific result. Each such result must be definitely referred to specified forces united and interacting under given conditions. (b) It overlooks the various ways in which forces may expend themselves besides the ways alleged, and that the moment we pass from mechanical force, forces are convertible, in each instance, in peculiar ways, to be learned only by the most exact observation. (c) This method would lead from observation to lines of *a priori* reasoning increasingly futile. (d) It amounts to very little more than the truism, Every event must have a cause, and these causes are somewhere in the conditions. We should

¹ Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. i. 353.

be led to explain facts in this wise. Various forces are present; they are persistent; they are in action; every action involves a second; actions and reactions establish relations; these increase in number; hence, at length, a world, a solar system, a universe.

All that Mr. Spencer does shows the futility of this method by which he pieces out the remainder — by which he completes an inductive with a deductive argument. Either the induction is not needed, or it cannot be finished by deduction, and the effort to do it is a jugglery of words. It is strange that philosophers who so inveigh against the subtilties of mediaeval logic should fall into a like method; for we must insist that this is a method quite like the mediaeval.

We have done scanty justice to our subject; but we have had scanty opportunity. Much that we have said may seem poorly supported; but it may none the less suffice to direct attention to important points.

ARTICLE III.

RECENT WORKS BEARING ON THE RELATION OF
SCIENCE TO RELIGION.

BY REV. GEORGE F. WRIGHT, ANDOVER, MASS.

III. — OBJECTIONS TO DARWINISM, AND THE REJOINDERS OF ITS
ADVOCATES.

Gray (Professor Asa, M.D.). *Darwiniana: Essays and Reviews pertaining to Darwinism.* By Asa Gray, Fisher Professor of Natural History [Botany] in Harvard University. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 12mo. pp. 394.

This is mainly a collection of Articles previously published, but with a very valuable supplementary paper on "Darwinian Teleology."

Mivart (St. George). 1. "Specific Genesis," a reply, in the *North American Review*, Vol. cxiv. pp. 450-468, to Chauncey Wright's strictures on his "Genesis of Species."

2. *Lessons from Nature as manifested in Mind and Matter.* pp. 462. New York. 1876. This is largely a recast of review articles.

Max Müller. 1. *Essays on Darwinism and Language.* *Frazer's Magazine* for May, June, and July, 1873. Republished in *Littell's Living Age*.

2. *Chips from a German Workshop.* New York. 1876. Vol. iv. pp. 417-455, being a reply to Mr. Whitney's *Essays* in the *North American* as they were reproduced in the *Contemporary Review* for November 1874, by Mr. George Darwin.

Smith (John Cotton, D.D.). *Miscellanies, Old and New.* New York. 1876.

Whitney (Professor Wm. Dwight). 1. Articles in *North American Review*, Vol. cxiv. pp. 272-308; Vol. cxviii. pp. 61-88. The first a refutation of Steinthal's theory of the Origin of Language; the second of Max Müller's *Essays on Darwinism and Language*.

2. *Language and the Study of Language.* pp. 505. New York. 1868.

3. *Oriental and Linguistic Studies* (1st Series, pp. 416; 2d Series, pp. 431). New York. 1873, 1874. These two are largely a collection of review articles.¹

THE period which has elapsed since the publication of the first edition of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, has not been un-

¹ For fuller list of books, see the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, pp. 448-453.

improved by its opponents. Of the relation of this theory to theology and the Bible we are to speak in future papers in this Journal. In the present number, we will confine ourselves to the points urged against the theory by men of science.

I. A MERE THEORY.

The comprehensive objection to the view that species have been transmuted into one another mainly through the agency of natural selection is, that it is a mere theory, supported by some vague analogies and by very few facts. It is alleged that nearly all the facts upon which the view is based had been before the world for a half-century or more, and that it is not likely that so simple a clew to the maze as Mr. Darwin proposes would have escaped the notice of preceding naturalists. The objection is well taken, when urged against the sweeping generalizations of many who have espoused the doctrine. Very likely Mr. Darwin, even, with all his caution, has not escaped altogether the danger of being the servant, rather than the master, of his theory. It should, however, be remembered that Mr. Darwin was not in haste to publish, but, after he was recognized as among the most careful of scientific observers, worked assiduously, but silently, over his problem for twenty years. Furthermore, the publication was hastened by the circumstance that another scientific observer had been led independently to a similar, or even identical, theory.

However much value this objection of novelty might have had at the beginning, the theory has now been too long under discussion, and swept too many students of nature under its influence, to be lightly or sneeringly set aside. One thing is certain; it has not proved an easy task to disprove the theory altogether. Indeed, little has been attempted by the candid opponents of natural selection, except to set metes and bounds to its operation. As to the importance of the facts adduced, they must speak for themselves. The contemporaries of Newton derided him for taking notice of the analogy between the falling of an apple

and the motion of the moon. Comte, the father of what is called the "positive philosophy," spoke with contempt of those who, from the analogy between light and heat, endeavored to correlate their laws of action. It is to be remembered that there is analogy and analogy. The word covers a great range of meaning. It would be difficult to go into a forest of gigantic trees in California, and prove, except by analogy, that these princely forms were ever mere seedlings.

II. ABRUPT APPEARANCE OF SPECIES.

The fact that geological history can be divided into periods appears to militate against a gradual development of the species of one epoch into those of another. At first thought, it would seem that, upon the theory under discussion, there ought to be such a minute and continuous gradation of species from beginning to end of the geological formations that the divisions of the strata into Palaeozoic, Maesozoic, and Cainozoic should be altogether arbitrary. Innumerable forms of transition must have existed. Why have they disappeared? Why, in fact, are the beginnings of these periods so abrupt?

Barrande, one of the most eminent of living palaeontologists has pressed this objection with great force in his work on the Trilobites of the Silurian epoch. This widely extended family of Crustaceans appears suddenly and in a highly developed form. If we except the still controverted *Eozoon Canadense*, the Trilobite is one of the oldest forms of life whose remains have yet been discovered. Yet hundreds of species swarmed in the Cambrian and Silurian seas of Europe and America, and the remarkable eyes of these animals were apparently as well developed in the earlier, as in the later, periods of the existence of the family. If these species were transmuted from previously existing and lower organisms, why are there no premonitions of their approach in the epochs which immediately preceded? But there is no direct evidence that they had any ancestry.¹

¹ See Summary of Barrande in Winchell, pp. 125-144.

Again; fishes appear with equal abruptness in the Devonian formation. Below the very uppermost divisions of the Silurian system not a single bone of any aquatic animal of the Vertebrate class has been detected. Yet in the Old Red Sandstone, immediately above the Silurian, there are found the fossil remains of more than a hundred species to which the anatomist would assign "by no means a low place in the Piscene class."¹

Again, "The transition from the Palaeozoic to the Maesozoic forms of life was strongly marked in geological history." "At the close of the Carboniferous age there was a complete extermination of all living species."² In this step upward we have passed from the age of fishes to the age of reptiles with an abruptness that is somewhat startling to any theory of transmutation, and especially to a theory one of whose fundamental principles is that this transmutation has been by minute and slowly succeeding gradations. The transition from the Palaeozoic period to the Maesozoic is not a minute nor a local step, but a passage from water-breathing animals to air-breathing animals, like the *Ichthyosaurus* and his congeners, whose "long Greek names alone give us any idea of their main features."

Still again, the Tertiary period brings in abruptly a new order of things. The Cretaceous formation is a boundary line between the Maesozoic era and the Cainozoic. "No species of the European Cretaceous is known to occur in the Tertiary formation, and none of Asia or of Eastern North America. In the Rocky Mountain region some Cretaceous species and genera continue on, if the coal series is Tertiary; and yet the number now known is less than half a dozen. The vast majority of the species and nearly all the characteristic genera disappear. The facts do not authorize the inference that extermination was so complete as is implied

¹ See Lyell, *Principles of Geology*, Vol. i. p. 151 f. Also, Hugh Miller, *Footprints of Creator*.

² Dana, *Manual of Geology* (1st ed.), p. 403, 413. The second edition is much more guarded and omits this with many other like sweeping assertions.

in the above statement, although establishing that it was remarkable for its universality and thoroughness.”¹

“With the Tertiary epoch we are introduced to animal forms which, as the age progresses, are in increasing numbers identical with species that are now living.” But in the case of man there is again a sudden leap forward; not so much, however, in the anatomical structure of his skeleton as in the size and office of his brain. “Not the first link below the level of existing man has yet been found. This is the more extraordinary, in view of the fact that, from the lowest limit in existing men there are all possible gradations up to the highest; while below that limit there is an abrupt fall to the ape level, in which the cubic capacity of the brain is one half less. If the links ever existed, their annihilation without a relic is so extremely improbable that it may be pronounced impossible. Until some are found, science cannot assert that they ever existed.”²

Such are some of the leading objections to Darwinism drawn from the apparent abruptness of the introduction of the geological eras. We will present the rejoinders in inverse order.

In the case of man it has been said, that it will not break the force of the general argument to admit that he is exceptional, and that the characteristic and higher endowments of his nature were miraculously bestowed. Those who defend the occurrence of miracles do not suppose that thereby the belief in the ordinary uniformity of nature is disturbed. Miracles are extraordinary interventions, made for sufficient reasons. The reasons for divine intervention on the occasion of transforming an animal life into, or adding to that life the impress of, the divine image, are such as cannot be shown to exist at other stages of organic history.

Another mode of reply consists in a wholesale appeal to our ignorance of what has taken place in the unexplored parts of existing continents, and on lands that are now submerged by the ocean.

¹ Dana, *Manual of Geology* (2d ed.), pp. 487, 488.

² Dana, *Manual of Geology* (2d ed.), p. 603.

As this appeal to the imperfection of the geological record is on the one hand so often made by the Darwinians, and on the other as often spoken of with derision by their opponents, it is necessary to treat it at some length.

The Cretaceous formation, which separates the Mesozoic or Secondary period from the Cainozoic or Tertiary, represents a time when the continents best known were submerged in deep seas. The Pyrenees, the Alps, the Himalayas, the Andes, the Rocky Mountains, all give evidence of the long and deep submergence of the Cretaceous era.¹ The changes, if any, which were taking place at that time in the transformation of reptiles into Mammalia, would have occurred in regions which were then existing as dry land. When these sea-bottoms of the Chalk period again emerged, the sudden appearance of a range of species altogether different from those whose remains are found in the formation below would naturally be accounted for by migration. During the progress of the Cretaceous formation, time enough may have elapsed, and physical changes sufficiently extensive and profound have occurred, to allow of such a gradual transformation of species as is supposed. On this supposition, old forms of life had succumbed to the change of circumstances, as new and better adapted varieties had gradually taken their place. Under these circumstances, the sudden appearance of new species on the re-elevation of the continent would be more apparent than real, and might be attributed to the effect of *colonization*, rather than of *new creation*. The process can be better understood, if we imagine the bed of the Indian Ocean to be elevated till it becomes dry land. The new region would be at once supplied with plants and animals from adjacent continents. If we suppose the forms of life to have been undergoing gradual changes during all the period of subsidence, the transition from the species that peopled this hypothetical continent before the submergence to those that colonized it after would appear to have been sudden, whereas it was not.

Furthermore, the amount of denudation which may have

¹ See Dana, *Manual of Geology* (2d ed.), p. 480.

taken place between two strata that are in contact, is sometimes a very large and unknown quantity. It is obvious that successive geological formations were deposited from the debris of those that were of earlier origin. The sediment of the lake or lagoon is the "wash" of the hills. The removal, by sub-aerial agencies, of the continent to the sea is only a question of time. Deposition of sediment and denudation of material are correlative facts. Known instances of the immense amount of the former are easily matched by corresponding instances of the latter. For example, there are numerous places along the Apalachian chain of mountains where "faults" exist which show that many thousands of feet of material have been removed since the fracture occurred. A fault is a crack in the crust of the earth along which the strata on one side have been upheaved or thrown down on the other. According to Lesley, one such, twenty miles in length, occurs near Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, of which the eastern side "must have stood high enough in the air to make a Hindoo Koosh [at least twenty thousand feet]; and all the materials must have been swept into the Atlantic by the denuding flood. The evidence of this is of the simplest order, and patent to every eye. Portions of the Upper Devonian wall against the lowest portions of the Lower Silurian. . . . A man can stand astride across the crevice, with one foot on Trenton limestone, and the other on Hamilton slates." ¹

Should that region be submerged, and covered with a fresh deposition of material, two leaves of the geological book as far apart as the lower Silurian and the Post Tertiary would lie in contact, with all the vast intervening record removed. Sir Charles Lyell sets in strong light these and various other evidences of the incompleteness of the geological record. They afford the Darwinian large opportunity to account for the sudden appearance of groups of species in a new formation, on the hypothesis of migration.² It is by such suppo-

¹ See Dana, *Manual of Geology* (2d ed.), pp. 399.

² See Dana, *Manual of Geology* (2d ed.), pp. 600, 601, where the weight of this counter evidence is candidly discussed.

sitions only that he can work around the obstacles presented to his theory by the apparently abrupt changes of species on the introduction of the Tertiary (Cainozoic), the Secondary (Maesozoic), and the Silurian (Palaeozoic) eras. This appeal to the incompleteness of the geological record is not made by the Darwinians for the purpose of adducing positive argument, but to break the force of the negative arguments which their opponents array against them. By this means they attempt to give a rational explanation of the gaps that appear in their chain of positive evidence. It must be remarked, however, that these asserted hard-and-fast lines of demarcation between the geological eras are gradually disappearing before the advance of scientific discoveries. There is, for example, constantly increasing evidence that birds and marsupial quadrupeds existed in great numbers as early as the middle portion of the Secondary period.¹ "The *hiatus*, which, in the idea of most geologists, intervened between the close of the Cretaceous and the beginning of the Tertiary, appears to have had no existence so far as concerns the vegetation."²

The sudden appearance of groups of highly developed species, like the Trilobite, in the lowest fossiliferous strata is confessed by Mr. Darwin to remain as yet inexplicable; and he acknowledges that it "may be truly urged as a valid argument against his views"³ At the same time, he presents an hypothesis "to show that it may hereafter receive some explanation." The reader should note carefully the character of Mr. Darwin's reasoning, as distinguished from the multitude of *a priori* evolutionists who have espoused his cause. His endeavor is to feel his way backwards from manifest present affinities along the converging lines of geological evidence, as far as they are tangible. He would claim that his positive analogies are sufficient to outweigh a large amount of merely negative evidence, and that it is only incumbent on him to show by hypothesis that the

¹ See Lyell, Principles of Geology, Vol. i. pp. 155-160.

² Count Gaston de Saporta, quoted by Gray, in Darwiniana, p. 197.

³ Origin of Species, p. 287.

obstacles opposed by negative evidence are not insuperable. Nevertheless, it is incumbent on him to proceed with more and more caution as he gets away from his base of observation.

Mr. Darwin's method may be compared to that of astronomers in establishing the unlimited operation of the law of gravitation. It is a mistake to suppose that they have proved the general prevalence of this law with anything like mathematical accuracy. The planetary bodies do not yet all come around on time. No astronomer pretends that he has measured all the disturbing forces which determine the motions of the heavenly bodies. But, after having adduced a certain amount of positive evidence, it is sufficient for his purpose to show that unexpected aberrations could be accounted for on the hypothesis of disturbing powers such as are known to exist. It cannot by any means be said that the proof of the derivative origin of species has reached so high a degree of perfection as that of the theory of gravitation. It might more properly be compared to the condition of that theory just previous to the work of Laplace, who, by explaining a great number of apparent irregularities in the solar system, as the result of gravitation acting on masses of hypothetical size and density, and situated at hypothetical distances from each other, has established the theory beyond peradventure. Astronomy was a science before Laplace. Since his day it has merited the title of an "exact science."

The science of Tidology offers a comparison more nearly in point. The tides doubtless, are an effect of gravitation. But no mathematician can deductively work out the problem of those effects for all shores, and for every bay and inlet. The tide of each locality has a law of its own. All that can be done regarding abnormal instances, such, for example, as the enormous rise in the tide in the Bay of Fundy, is to show that they are not inconsistent with the theory of their being the effect of gravitation as conditioned by the changing positions of the earth and moon and sun acting on bodies of water, which are confined by shores that are but partially

surveyed, and which rests on a bottom whose character is to a still greater degree unknown.

Or, again, those who reconstruct the original text of our sacred scriptures do not pretend that they have a copy as it came from the hands of the authors. They, however, approach the central century, in which Christ and the apostles lived, on converging lines, some shorter, some longer; a few only reaching to the second or third century. By such a process it is believed that we are even more certain that we have the substance of gospel history and apostolic doctrine than we could be if we were supposed to have the original records. For it would be a more difficult matter to prove those alleged original documents to be original than it is to prove their substance from the manuscripts we have. For when manuscripts and versions with minor variations are traced along different lines toward a centre, we may rely on the aberrations of one class to correct those of another.

We hope this may not seem a digression; for the arguments of naturalists cannot be weighed without coming back repeatedly to the foundations on which all evidence reposes. It should be put to the credit of Mr. Darwin that, in the main, he tries to adhere to the canons of proof that are generally accepted in all sciences which deal with actual things.

III. ABSENCE OF INTERMEDIATE VARIETIES.

In the preceding section we have spoken of the "sudden appearance of groups of allied species" at the beginning of the so-called geological eras. The present objection to Darwinism is closely allied to the previous one. It is alleged that, according to theory, there ought to be *in any single formation* an innumerable number of intermediate forms, shading into each other by imperceptible steps, and connecting the species which lived at the commencement with those living at the close of the period. But the links as best made out, when compared with those that must have actually existed, are few and disconnected.

The only reply that can be made is that the geological record, even in the best preserved sections, is poor and beggarly beyond description.¹ To get the force of this reply, one must conceive more fully the contingencies which attend the preservation of fossils.²

1. The "bird must be caught." The animal must die in a situation such that he shall be speedily imbedded in fine sediment. This is one contingency, and can occur only to a comparatively few individuals of a species.

2. The strata in which the fossil is deposited must be preserved from subsequent denudation.

3. "In order to get a perfect gradation between two forms in the upper and lower parts of the same formation, the deposit must have gone on continuously accumulating during a long period, sufficient for the slow process of modification; hence the deposit must be a very thick one, and the species undergoing change must have lived in the same district throughout the whole time."³

4. In order to have a record of gradations in a single formation, the life of the species must be shorter than the period in which the formation was deposited. Mr. Darwin closes his patient discussion of this objection with the remark that, "if there be some degree of truth" in the considerations he presents, "we have no right to expect to find in our geological formations an infinite number of those transitional forms which, on our theory, have connected all the past and present species of the same group into one long and branching chain of life. We ought only to look for a few links; and such, assuredly, we do find. But I do not pretend that I should ever have suspected how poor was the record in the best preserved geological sections, had not the absence of innumerable transitional links between the species which lived at the commencement and close of each formation, pressed so hardly upon my theory."⁴

¹ See *Origin of Species*, Chaps. vi. and x. Lyell's *Elements*, p. 115; *Principles*, Vol. i. p. 341 f.; Vol. ii. p. 490.

² See Dana, *Manual of Geology* (2d. ed.), p. 600.

³ *Origin of Species*, p. 277.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 282.

Professor Agassiz, in the very latest lines that fell from his pen, was proposing to show that we have a geological record which is vastly more complete than Mr. Darwin supposes ; and that, "however broken the geological record may be, there is a complete sequence in many parts of it, from which the character of the succession may be ascertained."¹ But death cut him down before he had elaborated the proposition, and there has been no one else so competent to take it up."

IV. LAPSE OF TIME INSUFFICIENT FOR THE EFFECTS.

Though we be at the middle point of duration, the world has not existed in its present condition forever. The physical philosophers have something to say about the age of the world.² The earth is kept in its present condition by the interaction of a variety of correlated physical forces. Heat, light, electricity, chemical attraction, and motion are passing from one into the other in varying degrees of rapidity. Change can only occur where there is a disturbance of the equilibrium of these forces. To one effect all these modifications are tending, viz. an equilibrium that must be lifeless. The cosmos is running down like a clock. The heat of the world is dissipating. The earth is retarding its pace. Perpetual motion is as much an absurdity in a planetary system as in a human machine. "Nature no more works without friction than we can."

"The power man can extract from a ton of coals is limited ; but perhaps not one reader in a thousand will at first admit that the power of the sun and that of the chemical affinities of bodies on the earth is equally limited." We are assured, however, on the highest authority, that "the sun will be too cold for our, or Darwin's, purposes before many millions of years — a long time, but far enough from countless ages. Quite similarly, past countless ages are inconceivable, inasmuch as the heat required by the sun to have allowed him to cool from time immemorial would be such as to turn him into mere vapor, which would extend over the whole planetary system and evaporate us entirely."³ Darwin's theory requires

¹ See *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. xxxiii. p. 101.

² See *North British Review*, Vol. xlv. pp. 294-305. ³ *Ibid.* pp. 297, 300.

countless ages during which the earth shall have been habitable. In answer, it is shown that a general physical law obtains, irreconcilable with the persistence of active change at a constant rate; in any portion of the universe, however large, only a certain capacity for change exists; so that every change which occurs renders the possibility of future change less, and, on the whole, the rapidity or violence of changes tends to diminish. Their [sun and earth] present state proves that they cannot remain forever adapted to living beings, and that living beings can have existed on the earth only for a definite time, since in distant periods the earth must have been in fusion, and the sun must have been mere hot gas, or a group of distant meteors, so as to have been incapable of fulfilling its present functions as the comparatively small centre of the system."¹

This sounds as if the way were preparing for a problem in the rule of three. And such is the case. Sir W. Thompson fixes the extreme limit in the past at which the heat of the earth's crust would have permitted the existence of life, at four hundred million years ago, and the probable limit as two hundred million years.² And now come the surmises regarding the rate of change which the theory of natural selection will allow. One says:

"We are fairly certain that a thousand years has made no very great change in plants or animals living in a state of nature. The mind cannot conceive a multiplier vast enough to convert this trifling change by accumulation into differences commensurate with those between a butterfly and an elephant, or even between a horse and a hippopotamus."³ Darwin would probably admit that a million years would be no long time to ask for the production of a species differing only slightly from the parent stock. We doubt whether a thousand times more change than we have any reason to believe has taken place in wild animals in historic times would produce a cat from a dog, or either from a common ancestor. If this be so, how preposterously inadequate are a few hundred times this unit for the action of the Darwinian theory!"⁴

Mr. Murphy states the problem more precisely. If favorable variations in one organ occur once in a thousand times, and, to secure survival, ten organs should have to vary simultaneously in given directions, the probability of the occurrence is 1 to 10^{30} , a fraction the denomination of which is equal to "a number which is about ten thousand times as

¹ See North British Review, Vol. xlv. p. 304.

² See Origin of Species, p. 286.

³ North British Review, Vol. xlv. p. 294.

⁴ Ibid. p. 301.

great as the number of waves of light that have fallen on the earth since historical time began," i.e. $(189, 216 \times 10^6)$ seconds $\times (535 \times 10^{12})$ undulations = $101, 230, 560 \times 10^{18}$.¹

This manner of statement is good for certain purposes, especially as showing there must be "a divinity shaping the ends" of organic life, let natural selection "rough hew them as it will." If there has been no appreciable progress in the development of species by natural selection since human history began, and if the limits to geological time as set by Sir W. Thompson are correct, that is an end of the matter. But the following line of rejoinder is open :

First ; It is not proved that the rate of change among all wild species is imperceptible, even within the historic period. Such an inference has been made from the fact that man and certain domestic species of animals, as drawn on the earliest Egyptian monuments, are identical in their features with their descendants of the present day. Likewise, it is conceded that well-determined species do persist even through the whole length of vast geological periods. But these facts do not conflict with the supposition that, under favoring circumstances, variations may have branched off from the parent stock, and pursued their line of march in parallel lines with their genealogical ancestors. For very good reason, the record of wild varieties is not preserved, except in those analogies by which we infer their origin. On the other hand, varieties of marked and persistent characteristics have arisen since the historical era, under the direction of human selection. The amount of this domestic variation multiplied by tens of thousands would present a very large sum. He who believes in a providential Ruler can easily grant that the Creator, through the combination of the forces which produces a natural selection, may hasten the development of a variation even more rapidly and surely than man can do by his combination of these forces. So we cannot say

¹ See *Habit and Intelligence*, Vol. i. p. 320. The necessity of a simultaneous variation of different organs to secure preservation is so nearly akin to the subjects of sections vi. to x. that we have not given it separate treatment.

what the first member of our proportion is. The rate at which, under the ordinary operation of nature, a species may change has not been determined.

Secondly; Geologists are slow to grant the validity of mathematical calculations regarding the age of the earth. Both divisor and dividend are so indeterminate that the quotient must be still more conjectural. The amount of uncertainty is illustrated in the extreme limits which Sir W. Thompson sets for the date of the first consolidation of the earth's crust. It "can hardly have occurred less than twenty, nor more than four hundred, million years ago."¹

V. EXISTING DIFFICULTIES OF CLASSIFICATION INEVITABLE UNDER ANY HYPOTHESIS.²

This is not a direct objection to Darwinism, but is aimed at one of the prominent pillars of proof on which the theory rests. In this objection it is assumed only, first, that there "are different laws," under which "all existing substances or beings of which we have any scientific knowledge exist"; secondly, that there is a limited number of elements from which combinations can be made. With these self-imposed restrictions which the Creator has put upon his work in the material world, the problem of classification is one of permutations and combinations. "The limits to the possible number of combinations become more and more restricted, as we burden these combinations with laws more and more complicated."³ For example, if it be required to find the number of words of five letters each which can be formed out of the English alphabet, and if there be no other restriction on the combinations than that there be five letters in each, we shall have the number 7,890,000. If, however, we insert the condition that no two of the combinations shall begin with the same letter, the number of possible words of five letters is reduced to twenty-six. If it be further stipulated

¹ *Origin of Species*, p. 286. See also Lyell, *Principles of Geology*, Vol. i. pp. 234, 235; also, Dana, *Manual of Geology* (1st ed.), p. 684.

² See *North British Review*, Vol. xlv. pp. 305-313.

³ *Ibid.* p. 307.

that no two of the words shall have any letter in common, the number is reduced to five.

Now, animals and plants are combinations of inorganic elements under conditions of almost inconceivable complexity. These elements are to be so arranged as to constitute an "eating, breathing, moving, feeling, self-reproducing thing."¹ How else than in a continuous series of combinations, each resembling its neighbor, could these elements be arranged under these conditions, if there were to be an indefinite number of individuals? Agassiz² seems to affirm that the possibilities of economical construction are exhausted in the four grand divisions of the animal kingdom—the Radiate, the Molluscan, the Articulate, and the Vertebrate. Mathematical laws determine that varieties, if they are made to exist, should be produced by incorporating minor changes upon these fundamental forms. The narrowness of the limits in which the creative power must move, unless the whole order of natural forces be changed, would compel such similarity in results as to create difficulties in classification. Such difficulties occur in the inorganic, as well as in the organic, world. Increase of knowledge has increased the difficulty of distinguishing metals from metalloids, and an acid from a base. In crystallography there are only a few fundamental forms; but these forms shade off into one another through insensible gradations. The patent office is a standing illustration of the difficulty of distinguishing objects which have originated in separate acts, but under similar mechanical laws, and for similar ends. For instance, there are three forms of bridges—suspension, girder, and arch. These forms are determined by mechanical laws. The girder is intermediate between the other two kinds, and innumerable varieties are possible and actual, which it is difficult to assign to their proper class. What one would call a "stiffened arch," another would denominate a "girder of a peculiar form"; "a third man calls a bridge a strengthened girder, which a fourth says differs

¹ See North British Review, Vol. xlv. p. 308.

² See Methods of Study in Natural History, p. 36.

in no practical way from a suspension-bridge.”¹ This intermingling of forms in the classification of bridges arises from the fact that “there are only certain ways in which a stream can be bridged; the extreme cases are easily perceived, and ingenuity can then only fill in an indefinite number of intermediate varieties.” Lawyers have a similar difficulty in determining whether a “particular case falls under a particular statute,” or “is ruled by this or that precedent.” In so simple a matter as that of docketing letters, or cataloguing books the same perplexities arise. “How difficult it is to devise headings, and how difficult afterwards to know under what head to place your book.”²

It must be confessed that this line of objection has great apparent force, as directed against one of the supposed positive arguments adduced in support of Darwinism. If the theory were largely dependent for its proof upon considerations of this nature, these objections would be more in point. But the Darwinian is free to say, first, that the considerations adduced above do not *disprove* his hypothesis. The gradations in the classifications of animals and plants are certainly not incompatible with the theory of their common descent. That hypothesis more *definitely* explains the gradation than any other; and the extent to which the Creator has restricted himself in the possible combinations of elementary matter is not known. Secondly, it is not the bare fact of gradation upon which reliance is had in proof of the Darwinian theory; but it is, rather, upon the method in which one group of species clusters around another group, together with the manner in which these are distributed both through time and space, and the tenacity with which organs remain as rudimentary after they have become useless.*

VI. INDIVIDUAL VARIATIONS COUNTERACTED BY INTERCROSSING.³

A single individual, where he mingled freely with the

¹ North British Review, Vol. xlv. p. 311.

² Ibid. p. 312.

³ See North British Review, Vol. xlv. pp. 286-294; Mivart's Genesis of Species, pp. 57-60; Darwin's Origin of Species, pp. 70-79.

ordinary forms of his tribe, would have small chance of transmitting his peculiarities through many generations.

“An illustration will bring this conception home. Suppose a white man to have been wrecked on an island inhabited by negroes, and to have established himself in friendly relations with a powerful tribe, whose customs he has learnt. Suppose him to possess the physical strength, energy, and ability of a dominant white race, and let the food and climate of the island suit his constitution. Grant him every advantage which we can conceive a white to possess over the native; concede that, in the struggle for existence, his chance of a long life will be much superior to that of the native chiefs; yet, for all these admissions, there does not follow the conclusion that, after a limited or unlimited number of generations, the inhabitants of the island will be white. Our shipwrecked hero would probably become king; he would kill a great many blacks in the struggle for existence; he would have a great many wives and children, while many of his subjects would live and die as bachelors; an insurance company would accept his life at perhaps one tenth of the premium which they would exact from the most favored of the negroes. Our white's qualities would certainly tend very much to preserve him to a good old age; and yet he would not suffice, in any number of generations, to turn his subjects' descendants white. In the first generation there will be some dozens of intelligent young mulattoes, much superior in average intelligence to the negroes. We might expect the throne for some generations to be occupied by a more or less yellow king; but can any one believe that the whole island will gradually acquire a white, or even a yellow, population; or that the islanders would acquire the energy, courage, ingenuity, patience, self-control, endurance, in virtue of which qualities our hero killed so many of their ancestors, and begot so many children; those qualities, in fact, which the struggle for existence would select, if it could select anything?”¹

It will appear in all similar suppositions to be impossible for any “sport or accidental variation in a single individual” to transmit its advantages, even though they be manifest, to continually increasing numbers. In case the advantage were slight, the chance of continued transmission would be still more remote. The preponderating numbers of the ordinary herd constitute an advantage to them that is insurmountable by the single individual. The “sport” will be in the second generation but a drop in the bucket, and his strain will at each removal decrease in strength by a geomet-

¹ North British Review, Vol. xli. pp. 289, 290.

rical ratio. Mr. Darwin remarks that, until reading the Article from which we have quoted, he "did not appreciate how rarely single variations, whether slight or strongly marked, could be perpetuated;"¹ and strengthens the position by an illustration of his own:

"If, for instance, a bird of some kind could procure its food more easily by having its beak curved, and if one were born with its beak strongly curved, and which consequently flourished; nevertheless, there would be a very poor chance of this one individual perpetuating its kind to the exclusion of the common form; but there can hardly be a doubt, judging by what we see taking place under domestication, that this result would follow from the preservation during many generations of a large number of individuals with more or less strongly curved beaks, and from the destruction of a still larger number with the straightest beaks."²

This admission of Darwin is thought by Mivart "almost to amount to a change of front in the face of the enemy."³ It certainly is the case that natural selection is powerless to preserve an advantage, except when a large number of individuals have simultaneously varied in the same direction. Natural selection does not originate advantages. Its office is to preserve those advantages that have arisen through the operation of the unknown cause of variation. Darwin says:

"There can be little doubt that the tendency to vary in the same manner has often been so strong that all the individuals of the same species have been similarly modified without the aid of any form of selection."⁴

To theists these concessions rob Darwinism of its sting; for large numbers of individuals do not vary at the same time and in the same direction, by chance; and the tendency to variation, which is itself the origin of the advantages (these becoming *fixed* only by natural selection), remains still among the mysteries of the Creator. In confronting that tendency we have reached the present length of our tether.

VII. NATURAL SELECTION AND SPECIFIC STABILITY INCOMPATIBLE.

While the accurate observer of nature is impressed with

¹ Origin of Species, p. 71.

² Genesis of Species, p. 60.

³ Origin of Species, p. 72.

⁴ Origin of Species, p. 72.

the variability of many species, especially of domesticated animals and of cultivated plants, his attention is equally attracted by the persistent stability of other species, or of the same species in other circumstances. Drawings upon the monuments of Assyria and Egypt prove that many of the animals and plants of these countries have remained during three or four thousand years unchanged. For example, at that early period many of the present varieties of the dog were in existence, such as the greyhound, the common hound, the mastiff, the lapdog, and the turnspit.¹ Other still more striking instances of long-continued specific stability can be adduced. Some of the species found in the early Tertiary formation are still in existence, and hence have continued unchanged for a period of probably millions of years. A still more striking instance of specific stability appears in case of the Lingulæ. *Lingula* is a genus of Mollusk, which appeared in the Palæozoic age even as early as the Cambrian epoch.

“The Lingulæ are especially interesting as examples of a type of beings continued almost from the dawn of life until now; for their shells as they exist in the Primordial are scarcely distinguishable from those of members of the genus which still live.”²

It is plain that any theory of the origin of species by derivation must be broad enough to comprehend the indisputable and striking facts concerning the extremely long duration and unchanged condition of some species. Mr. Darwin supposes his theory to be sufficiently indefinite to allow it to shelter such diverse facts under its ample wings. For his hypothesis

“Includes no fixed law of development, causing all the inhabitants of an area to change abruptly, or simultaneously, or to an equal degree. . . . Whether such variations or individual differences as may arise will be accumulated through natural selection in a greater or less degree, thus causing a greater or less amount of permanent modification, will depend on many complex contingencies — on the variations being of a beneficial nature, on the freedom of intercrossing, on the slowly changing conditions

¹ See Darwin, *Animals and Plants under Domestication*, Vol. i. p. 29 f.

² Dawson, *Story of the Earth and Man*, p. 41. See Darwin, *Origin of Species*, pp. 169, 290–293.

of the country, on the immigration of new colonists, and on the nature of the other inhabitants with which the varying species come into competition.”¹

“Darwin clearly maintains — what the facts warrant — that the mass of a species remains fixed so long as it exists at all, though it may set off a variety now and then. The variety may finally supersede the parent form, or it may coexist with it; yet it does not in the least hinder the unvaried stock from continuing true to the breed, unless it crosses with it. The common law of inheritance may be expected to keep both the original and the variety mainly true as long as they last, and none the less so because they have given rise to occasional varieties. The tailless Manx cats, like the curtailed fox in the fable, have not induced the normal breeds to dispense with their tails; nor have the dorkings (apparently known to Pliny) affected the permanence of the common sort of fowl. As to the objection that the lower forms of life ought, on Darwin’s theory, to have been long ago improved out of existence, and replaced by higher forms, the objectors forget what a vacuum that would leave below, and what a vast field there is to which a simple organization is best adapted, and where an advance would be no improvement, but the contrary. To accumulate the greatest amount of being upon a given space, and to provide as much enjoyment of life as can be under the conditions, is what Nature seems to aim at; and this is effected by diversification.”²

The “many complex contingencies” which pertain to the theory in question afford theologians opportunities of wheeling it into line with a true theistic view of nature. It is to be deplored that more have not seen this, and so closed the mouths of the atheistical and deistical interpreters, who have been so ready to volunteer their services.

VIII. NATURAL SELECTION INOPERATIVE IN THE INCIPIENT STAGES OF ADVANTAGEOUS VARIATIONS.

Closely allied to the preceding objection is that urged at such length and with so much force by Mivart, viz. that *slight* variations could not give their possessors any appreciable advantage in the struggle for existence. Darwin’s view is understood to be, that the progress of a species along a line of variation which is advantageous to it is by exceedingly minute steps, and that

“Natural selection acts only by the preservation and accumulation of

¹ Origin of Species, p. 291.

² Dr. Asa Gray, Natural Selection not Inconsistent with Natural Theology, pp. 53, 54. See Darwiniana, pp. 175, 176.

small inherited modifications, each profitable to the preserved being ; and as modern geology has almost banished such views as the excavation of a great valley by a single diluvial wave, so will natural selection banish the belief of the continued creation of new organic beings, or of any great and sudden modification in their structure."¹

"If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down."²

The writer in the North British Review already, quoted so freely, speaks of "the Darwinian theory of the gradual accumulation of infinitely minute differences of every-day occurrence and apparently fortuitous in character."³ The line of Mr. Mivart's criticism is, that variations to be of advantage must be appreciable in extent. "Minute incipient variations" of an "infinitesimal degree in any special direction," would be valueless. In case of the supposed development of the mammary gland, or breast, he asks : "Is it conceivable that the young of an animal was ever saved from destruction by accidentally sucking a drop of scarcely nutritious fluid from an accidentally hypertrophied cutaneous gland of its mother?"⁴ Is it not evident that the mammary gland must have come into existence by a variation that was distinctly marked before it could give the young of its possessor special advantage in the struggle for existence?

"The development of whalebone (baleen) in the mouth of the whale is another difficulty. When the whale feeds it takes into its mouth a great gulp of water, which it drives out again through the intervals of the horny plates of baleen, the fluid thus traversing the sieve of horny fibres, which retains the minute creatures on which these marine monsters subsist. Now, it is obvious that if this baleen had once attained such a size and development as to be at all useful, then its preservation and augmentation within serviceable limits would be promoted by natural selection alone. But how to obtain the beginning of such useful development" is the question.⁵

Similar difficulties are supposed to arise, among other examples, in the preservation through natural selection of the

¹ Origin of Species, pp. 75, 76.

² Darwin, Origin of Species, p. 146.

³ North British Review, Vol. xlv. p. 293. See Mivart, Genesis of Species, pp. 23-62.

⁴ Genesis of Species, p. 47.

⁵ Genesis of Species, pp. 40, 41.

incipient stages in the development of the eye and the ear, and of the curious habits of mimicry characteristic of some species of insects. In case of the latter, imitation of the form, color, or motion of disagreeable objects, to be protective, must be well marked. If the counterfeit is only a slight approach to the original, it will be of no advantage. The ass must keep the lion's skin well pulled over his ears, or the fraud will be detected.

To this class of strictures Mr. Darwin has both replied at length himself,¹ and has commended the rejoinder of Mr. Chauncey Wright.² Making due allowance for the imperfection of a brief summary, the answer is this: first, that Mr. Darwin does not say so much about "infinitesimal beginnings" and "infinitely minute differences," as his reviewers are accustomed to suppose. The adjectives which Mr. Darwin has chosen are "slight," "small," "extremely gradual," as opposed to "great and sudden." He thinks it almost certain that many species "have been produced by steps not greater than those separating fine varieties."³ The misunderstanding is similar to that which Sir Charles Lyell's views encountered. As already remarked⁴ his theory of geological facts was denominated "uniformitarian," because he supposed past changes in geology had been produced by agencies such as are at work now in the world, and with no greater intensity of action than characterizes them at the present time. His real work, however, was to emphasize and set in its proper light the power of the geological agencies which we see still at work, and to show that these were neither trifling nor insignificant. So the standard of variability which Darwin assumes to account for the changes which have been produced in species is that which passes under our observation.

"That species have a capacity for change will be admitted by all evolutionists; but there is no need, as it seems to me, to invoke any internal force beyond the tendency to ordinary variability, which through the aid of selection by man has given rise to many well-adapted domestic

¹ *Origin of Species* (6th ed.), pp. 176-204.

² *North American Review*, Vol. cxiii. pp. 63-103.

³ *Origin of Species*, p. 203.

⁴ See *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, p. 490.

ances, and which through the aid of natural selection would equally well give rise by graduated steps to natural races or species.¹ Every one who believes in slow and gradual evolution will, of course, admit that specific changes may have been as abrupt and as great as any single variation which we meet with under nature, or even under domestication."²

Such an amount and kind of variation as will give its subject some advantage over its competitors is necessarily assumed. Natural selection cannot, of course, preserve an advantage till the species has got it to preserve. The choice is between reasoning from such data as observation has given us concerning the variability of races, and that of supposing a much stronger tendency to variation in the past than now exists. Darwin speaks of the "canon in natural history of '*Natura non facit saltum*,' " as "somewhat exaggerated."³ Huxley thinks Mr. Darwin's position might have been even stronger than it is if he had not embarrassed himself so much with this aphorism. Mr. Huxley believes that "nature does make jumps now and then," and that a "recognition of the fact is of no small importance in disposing of many minor objections to the doctrine of transmutation."⁴

IX. INDEPENDENT SIMILARITIES OF STRUCTURE.

We are indebted, also, to Mr. Mivart⁵ for setting in order the important series of objections to Darwinism which fall under the present head. If there are any who view "variation" and "natural selection" as strictly fortuitous in their operation, they will, in the facts we are here considering, meet with a degree of improbability that is insurmountable. "The organic world supplies us with multitudes of examples of similar functional results being attained by the most diverse means." For example, birds and bats both fly; but their machinery of flight is constructed on very diverse patterns — so diverse that they must have had independent origin. In case of the bat, the bones of the hand are greatly elongated, and an expanse of naked skin forms the membrane of his wing. On the contrary, in case of the bird, the bones

¹ Origin of Species, p. 201.

² Ibid. p. 201.

³ Ibid. p. 156.

⁴ Lay Sermons, p. 297.

⁵ See Genesis of Species, pp. 63-96.

of the hand are excessively reduced, and the expanse of the wing is formed by feathers, which are an outgrowth of the skin. The "flying fish," the "flying dragon," and the pterodactyl, had each an independent and unique structure for securing aerial locomotion. A multitude of analogous instances could be cited. A mathematical calculation would, according to Mivart, show that chance variations which were not guided by some higher law than that of mere "natural selection" are entirely inadequate to such results. The probabilities are an "indefinitely great number to one against a similar series of variations occurring and being similarly preserved in any two independent instances."¹

A still more remarkable instance is to be found in the independent development of the eye in different orders of animals. It "must have been perfected in three distinct lines of descent,"² viz. among Mollusks, as in cuttle-fish; among Articulates, as in spiders, crabs, trilobites; and among Vertebrates. These all existed, and were furnished with well-developed eyes, as early as the upper Silurian period. These orders of animals are so distinct that "it would be impossible to find a common ancestor without going back to some very simple form not yet provided with even the rudiments of vision."³

Mr. Mivart does not suppose that these facts bear against all doctrines of the derivative origin of species; for he has an evolutionary hypothesis of his own, which differs from that of Darwin mainly in making more prominent the influence of outward conditions in producing changes, and in the length of the leaps which nature is supposed at some times to take. We are glad to give Professor Huxley the credit of the following exposition of Mr. Darwin's views, which we suppose the latter would accept, and with which no theist need quarrel.

"I apprehend that the foundation of the theory of natural selection is the fact that living bodies tend incessantly to vary. This variation is

¹ See *Genesis of Species*, p. 67.

² *Ibid.* p. 76.

³ Lyell, *Principles of Geology*, Vol. ii. p. 498.

neither indefinite nor fortuitous, nor does it take place in all directions, in the strict sense of these words. Accurately speaking, it is not indefinite, nor does it take place in all directions, because it is limited by the general characters of the type to which the organism exhibiting the variation belongs. A whale does not tend to vary in the direction of producing feathers, nor a bird in the direction of developing whalebone. In popular language, there is no harm in saying that the waves which break upon the sea-shore are indefinite, fortuitous, and break in all directions. In scientific language, on the contrary, such a statement would be a gross error, inasmuch as every particle of foam is the result of perfectly definite forces, operating according to no less definite laws. In like manner, every variation of a living form, however minute, however apparently accidental, is inconceivable, except as the expression of the operation of molecular forces or 'powers' resident within the organism. And as these forces certainly operate according to definite laws, their general result is doubtless in accordance with some general law which subsumes them all. If I affirm that 'species have been evolved by variation, including under this head hereditary transmission (a natural process the laws of which are for the most part unknown), aided by the subordinate action of natural selection,' it seems to me that I enunciate a proposition which constitutes the very pith and marrow of the first edition of the *Origin of Species*."¹

X. INFERTILITY OF HYBRIDS.

For the purpose of testing an hypothesis, it is customary to resort to what is called a "crucial experiment." Newton's attempted demonstration that the motion of the moon conformed to his hypothesis of gravitation was such a test. His success in the effort swept away at once a host of objections, and silenced almost all critics. Had he failed to demonstrate the conformability of his law to that crucial test, the best he could have done would be to show that the data were not such as could make it a determinate case; proving that, he then would have been at liberty to seek some other case more satisfactory.

An attempt has been made to set up the fertility of individuals with one another as the test of their community of descent. On this view, it is the manifest and oft-repeated objection to the filiation of species, that hybrids are not continuously fertile. If we concede that "the fundamental idea

¹ Critiques and Addresses, pp. 298, 299.

of species is that of a chain of which genetically-connected individuals are the links,"¹ it seems to some unscientific to infer unity of origin in any case in which a present cross is proved to be infertile. Close inter-breeding in the same variety produces sterility. The crossing of varieties with one another is favorable to fertility. On the contrary, when the divergence has become a little greater, and is such as would be called specific, intercrossing produces sterility. "He who explains the genesis of species through purely natural agencies should assign a natural cause for this remarkable result; and this Mr. Darwin has not done."² Professor Gray, however, now (June 1876) informs us that among plants there are known hybrids of unlimited fertility, and that there are almost all degrees between this and sterility; that Dr. Engelmann, in a recent memoir upon North American oaks, enumerates six unquestionable hybrids as well known to him, of which those that have been tested are fully fertile, although these plants belong to very distinct species, and that this is also true of the other probable hybrid oaks of this country.

Several methods are open by which to parry these objections; and at present not much more can be done. First, the differences separating one species from another are the same, through whatever process they may have originated. If degree of unlikeness be the cause of infertility, it would be a cause whether secured at once by direct creation, or by the accumulation of smaller and successive steps of divergence. So that the existence of the fact of infertility of crosses does not really bear on the question of community of origin. A possible test which would be of great value is suggested by Professor Gray.³ If naturalists could adduce an instance in which two varieties have diverged enough from the parent stock to bring about some sterility in the

¹ See Dr. Asa Gray's *Darwiniana*, p. 201.

² See Dr. Asa Gray's *Darwiniana*, p. 51. See also Huxley on the *Origin of Species*, pp. 140-143; also, *Lay Sermons*, etc., pp. 271-277; also Mivart, *Genesis of Species*, pp. 123-126.

³ *Darwiniana*, p. 51. See also Huxley on *Origin of Species*, p. 141.

crosses, this would be a complete and satisfactory answer to the objection. But this no one has yet done. It should be observed, however, that there is, on this point, great danger of reasoning in a circle, and naming the race "species" when the cross is sterile, and calling the species "a race" when the individuals freely interbreed. Darwin attempts to break the force of the objection by adducing a parallel case in the effect of a change of condition. Slight changes of circumstances are beneficial to both plants and animals, and increase their fertility. Extreme changes, like those involved in the confinement of wild animals, are deleterious and productive of sterility. Still further, we are in danger of forgetting that if fertility of intercrossed varieties be accepted as proof of specific unity, an important point is gained with reference to the degree of unlikeness that is acknowledged as compatible with descent from a common ancestry. In that case we should have acknowledged a genetic connection between the several varieties of the horse, as well as of the cow, the dog, the hen, the pigeon, and of the human race. Each of these names represents a group of varieties physiologically one, but morphologically so distinct that many naturalists have insisted on calling the varieties species. Agassiz, for instance, insisted that man was not of one, but of several, species.

XI. AGASSIZ ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMBRYOLOGY.

In 1863, Agassiz writes as follows :

" One important truth already assumes great significance in the history of the growth of animals ; namely, that whatever the changes may be through which an animal passes, and however different the aspect of these phases at successive periods may appear, they are always limited by the character of the type to which the animal belongs, and never pass that boundary. Thus the Radiate begins life with characters peculiar to Radiates, and ends it without assuming any feature of a higher type. The Mollusk starts with a character essentially its own, in no way related to the Radiates, and never shows the least tendency to deviate from it, either in the direction of the Articulate or the Vertebrate types. This is equally true of the Articulates ; [and] emphatically true of the Vertebrates. These results are of the highest importance at this moment, when men of authority in science are attempting to renew the

theory of a general transmutation of all animals of the higher types out of the lower ones. If such views are ever to deserve serious consideration, and be acknowledged as involving a scientific principle, it will only be when their supporters shall have shown that the fundamental plans of structure characteristic of the primary groups of the animal kingdom are transmutable, or pass into one another, and that their different modes of development may lead from one to the other. Thus far embryology has not recorded one fact on which to base such doctrines.”¹

The argument here is somewhat misstated. Darwin's principal point is to prove that each of these types or classes has developed into their various orders, genera, and species. Back to that point at which the characteristics of the class appear, the analogical argument from embryology is very strong. Previous to that stage of development Darwin would only go so far as the momentum of his analogical argument at the beginning of the classes would carry him. If, however, a naturalist has been brought by plain analogies to believe in only four distinct lines of genealogical descent, it is difficult to stop there, although there may be no further accessible facts upon which to base a positive argument, just as in the realm of astronomy we can hardly help applying our general conclusions to regions of space beyond the reach of the telescope. Unless there is counter-evidence, we may sometimes extend our generalizations a long way beyond the bare facts, and throw the burden of proof upon those who deny such extension. This is akin to the argument known in mechanics as the method of proof by gradual approach.

XII. NATURAL SELECTION INCOMPETENT TO PRODUCE BEAUTY OF FORM AND COLOR.

Nothing in nature is more striking than the beauty with which organic forms are clothed. Solomon in all his glory is not arrayed like the lily of the field. It is difficult to say which is most graceful in form and exquisite in coloring,—the humming-bird, or the flower before which he balances himself in the air, and from which he sips the nectar. No

¹ Methods of Study in Natural History, by G. L. Agassiz. pp. 302-303. Boston. 1871.

painter can equal the beauty of color and delicacy of shading that appear in the plumage of the peacock or of the bird of paradise; nor can any designer improve upon the pattern of the every-day dress in which these birds clothe themselves. Even the fish of the sea revel in gorgeous colors; and the shells of marine Molusca, both those now existing and those of past ages, are exceedingly beautiful, both in form and in surface ornament.

Mr. Darwin¹ admits that if it could be proved that "structures have been created for the sake of beauty, to delight man, or for the sake of mere variety," it would be absolutely fatal to his theory. He admits, however, as fully as any one, the extent to which beauty abounds in nature; but he remarks, (a) "That the sense of beauty obviously depends on the nature of the mind" which perceives it.² (b) That beauty existed in the early geological ages, and now exists in countless microscopical animals that are never visible to man.

"Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its fragrance on the desert air."

(c) We cannot deny to the lower animals the capacity of being attracted by the beautiful, and so, through their agency in sexual selection and in fertilizing and distributing the seeds of plants having highly colored flowers, much of the beauty in those objects may owe its origin to their instrumentality. He infers that a "nearly similar taste for beautiful colors and for musical sounds runs through a large part of the animal kingdom."³

"How the sense of beauty in its simplest form — that is, the reception of a peculiar kind of pleasure from certain colors, forms, and sounds — was first developed in the mind of man and of the lower animals is a very obscure subject. There must be some fundamental cause in the constitution of the nervous system in each species."⁴

It will be perceived here, as frequently elsewhere, that the circle is not closed so as to exclude the directing agency of

¹ Origin of Species, pp. 159, 160.

² Ibid. p. 160.

³ Origin of Species, p. 161.

⁴ Ibid. p. 162.

the Creator. Even after the machinery of nature is set going, there are abundant arrangements by which the Engineer can control its movements.¹

XIII. NATURAL SELECTION ACCOUNTS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF VARIETIES, BUT NOT FOR THEIR ORIGIN.

The thought with which we closed the preceding section will be still more prominent in this. The ultimate causes is never reached by Mr. Darwin. At the best, the naturalist does no more than grope along the periphery of an infinite circle, the centre of which is far out of his sight. The cause of the phenomena of heredity and of variation are alike inscrutable to him. The most he can propose is to catch here and there a few glimpses of the orbit along which the bodies propelled by them move. The criticism which is the subject of review in this section is neatly presented by the Duke of Argyll :²

“Natural selection can do nothing except with the materials presented to its hands. It cannot select except among the things open to selection. Natural selection can originate nothing; it can only pick out and choose among the things which are originated by some other law. Strictly speaking, therefore, Mr. Darwin's theory is not a theory on the origin of species at all, but only a theory on the causes which lead to the relative success or failure of such new forms as may be born into the world.”

It will appear, we think, that so elastic a principle as natural selection, as Mr. Darwin defines it, cannot be particularly dangerous to theism. In appreciation of its being extremely indeterminate as a cause, Darwin remarks :³

“Several writers have misapprehended or objected to the term ‘natural selection.’ Some have even imagined that natural selection induces variability, whereas it implies only the preservation of such variations as arise and are beneficial to the being under its conditions of life. . . . The variability which we almost universally meet with in our domestic productions is not directly produced, as Hooker and Asa Gray have well remarked, by man. He can neither originate varieties nor prevent their occurrence; he can only preserve and accumulate such as do occur.”

¹ See this question discussed by Argyll, *Reign of Law*, pp. 188-194. Darwin, *Descent of Man*, pp. 413, 427-443.

² *Reign of Law*, p. 219.

³ *Origin of Species*, pp. 63, 62.

A careful study of each sentence in the following extract from Darwin will serve in a measure to dispel the fears which any may have had regarding the omnipotence of natural selection.

“I have now recapitulated the facts and considerations which have thoroughly convinced me that species have been modified during a long course of descent. This has been effected chiefly through the natural selection of numerous successive, slight, favorable variations; aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts; and in an unimportant manner — that is, in relation to adaptive structures, whether past or present — by the direct action of external conditions, and by variations which seem to us, in our ignorance, to arise spontaneously. As my conclusions have lately been much misrepresented, and it has been stated that I attribute the modification of species exclusively to natural selection, I may be permitted to remark that in the first edition of this work, and subsequently, I placed in a most conspicuous position — namely, at the close of the Introduction — the following words: ‘I am convinced that natural selection has been the main, but not the exclusive, means of modification.’ ”¹

To realize how indeterminate the problem of the origin of species is, even after Mr. Darwin leaves it, we need to combine the indefinite quantities which are assumed. First, variation is produced by action of the “conditions of life” (a term as complex as all nature) upon the “individual organism” (another term of equal complexity). This raises our quantity to the second power. Secondly, we must introduce “natural selection” (a term as broad as that of both the others combined). In considering any specific result in nature, we find ourselves in the presence of an indefinitely large indetermination, raised to the fourth power. In other words, we cannot tell deductively what variations will arise, unless we know all about the constitution of the individual, and all about the outward circumstances that act upon it to produce variation; and we cannot know what variations will be perpetuated till we know how each is related to the whole system of nature. It would seem that such an hypothesis left God’s hands as free as could be desired for contrivances of whatever sort he pleased. At every point of this discus-

¹ *Origin of Species*, p. 421.

sion the conviction recurs that naturalists are no nearer than ever to obtaining "any insight into the nature of the forces by which a higher grade of organization or instinct is evolved out of a lower one, by becoming acquainted with a series of gradational forms or states, each having a close affinity to the other."¹ Still the "mystery of creation" is as great and as much beyond the domain of science as ever.

Lyell further remarks² that the real question at issue

"Is not whether we can explain the creation of species, but whether species have been introduced into the world one after the other, in the form of new varieties of antecedent organisms, and in the way of ordinary generation, or have been called into being by some other agency, such as the direct intervention of the First Cause. Was Lamarck right in supposing that the changes of the organic world may have been effected by the gradual and insensible modification of older pre-existing forms? Mr. Darwin, without absolutely proving this, has made it appear in the highest degree probable, by an appeal to many distinct and independent classes of phenomena in natural history and geology, but principally by showing the manner in which a multitude of new and competing varieties are always made to survive in the struggle for life. The tenor of his reasoning is not to be gainsaid by affirming that the causes or processes which bring about the improvement or differentiation of organs, and the general advance of the organic world from the simpler to the more complex, remain as inscrutable to us as ever. The more the idea of a slow and insensible change from lower to higher organisms, brought about in the course of millions of generations according to a preconceived plan, has become familiar to men's minds, the more conscious they have become that the amount of power, wisdom, design, or forethought required for such a gradual evolution of life, is as great as that which is implied by a multitude of separate, special, and miraculous acts of creation."

XIV. NATURAL SELECTION SUBJECT TO PECULIAR LIMITATIONS WHEN APPLIED TO MAN.

This objection might well have been treated under the second or third sections, when we were speaking upon the abrupt appearance of many species, and the absence of intermediate varieties. But it is worthy of special attention at this stage of the discussion. Wallace³ has devoted a

¹ Lyell, *Principles of Geology*, Vol. ii. pp. 496, 497. ² *Ibid.* pp. 499, 500.

³ See *Cont. Nat. Selection*, pp. 332-362.

chapter to the proof of the proposition that natural selection cannot account for the development of man. His points are,

1. That the brain of the savage man is much beyond his actual requirements in the savage state. It is a remarkable fact "that the average cranial capacity of the lowest savages is probably not less than *five sixths* of that of the highest civilized races, while the brain of the anthropoid apes scarcely amounts to *one third* that of man — in both cases taking the average."¹ The average internal capacity of the cranium in the Teutonic races and the Bushmen respectively is ninety-four and seventy-seven cubic inches, while we drop at once to thirty inches in the highest of the apes. "The savage possesses a brain capable, if cultivated and developed, of performing work of a kind and degree far beyond what he ever requires it to do."² If this be the case, natural selection could not have produced it, since that preserves only such variations as are of positive service at the time of their occurrence.

2. The absence of hair from the back of the human species could not have arisen through natural selection. For with the lower animals the hairy covering of the back is of very great service, and gives them an advantage which could not well be dispensed with. Just where hair is of special service as a covering it is absent in man. Of course a natural selection of advantages could not secure a great disadvantage.

3. The origin of the moral sense is inexplicable on natural principles. The ideas of right and wrong are independent of the utility of the action. "So those faculties which enable us to transcend time and space, and to realize the wonderful conceptions of mathematics and philosophy, or which give us an intense yearning for abstract truth, are evidently essential to the perfect development of man as a spiritual being, but are utterly inconceivable as having been produced through the action of a law which looks only, and can look only, to the immediate material welfare of the individual or

¹ See Cont. Nat. Selection, p. 338.

² Ibid. p. 340.

the race.”¹ This latter point, as it arises in connection with theories of the origin of language, has been discussed at length by Professor Max Müller.²

“No animal has ever spoken.” The step from a non-speaking animal to a speaking animal is a long one — long enough, in fact, to be called a leap. The characteristic point of distinction in man, however, is not articulate speech; for the parrot can utter almost every sound of which man is capable. The voice is but an instrument. Emotional language, such as interjections and other simple sounds which express simple feelings, man shares, also, with the brute creation. Nor can we deny that animals may have some degree or kind of conceptual thought. But man alone “realizes his conceptual thought by means of words derived from roots.” The study of comparative philology reveals the fact that in the Aryan group of languages a few hundred “roots” constitute the elements from which the diversified structure of these languages are built. These “roots” are the ultimate facts in the analysis of language. Doubtless they had their origin in the tendency to use interjectional and imitative sounds.

How the vast number of complicated concepts which man employs could have been packed away for use in the simple sounds to which he gives utterance surpasses our comprehension. The creative power of mind which has given origin to the material machinery of the nineteenth century must take a very humble place beside that of the men who first put thought and words together. The former harnessed heat and electricity; the latter made available the true Promethean fire. The question chiefly concerns a mental power. The child of the lowest savages can learn the most cultivated language, while the highest of the animals cannot learn any language.

Not to multiply words, it is sufficient to remark, that here,

¹ Cont. Nat. Selection, pp. 358, 359.

² See Essays on Darwinism and Language, in Frazer's Magazine for May, June, and July 1873, republished in Littell's Living Age. Also Chips from a German Workshop, Vol. iv. pp. 417-455. On the contrary, see Prof. W. D. Whitney in North American Review, Vol. cxiv. pp. 272-309; Vol. cxix. pp. 61-88.

as everywhere else, something certainly is added whenever there is a step taken in advance. The question under discussion does not necessarily concern the source from which the additions come, but rather the rapidity with which they accumulate. Are Nature's steps all of corresponding length? How long a step would be called a leap? This, perhaps, depends upon the magnifying power of the lens through which we look. At any rate, the same amount of power is required to raise a given amount to a given height with slow velocity, as with rapid. Doubtless the divine power is competent to move in natural operations by long strides; but he is not compelled to move in that manner. The question under consideration is to determine by evidence what relation the steps of nature sustain to human powers of reason. A closing extract from Professor Müller will show how little the naturalist, the linguist, and the theist need come in conflict with each other.

"Let us suppose, then, that myriads of years ago there was, out of myriads of animal beings, one, and one only, which made that step which in the end led to language, while the whole rest of the creation remained behind. What would follow? That one being, then, like the savage baby now, must have possessed something of his own — a germ very imperfect, it may be, yet found nowhere else; and that germ, that capacity, that disposition, — call it what you like, — is, and always will remain, the specific difference of himself and all his descendants. It makes no difference whether we say it came of itself, or it was due to environment, or it was the gift of a Being in whom we live and move. . . . Language is something; it presupposes something; and that which it presupposes, — that from which it sprang, — whatever its pre-historic, pre-mundane, pre-cosmic state may have been, must have been different from that from which it did not spring. People ask whether that germ of language was 'slowly evolved' or 'divinely implanted'; but if they would but lay a firm grip on their words and thoughts, they would see that these two expressions, which have been made the watchwords of two hostile camps, differ from each other dialectically only."¹

XV. CONCLUSION.

Of those who have taken the trouble to read the foregoing

¹ Chips from a German Workshop, Vol. iv. pp. 453, 455. Compare remarks of Sir Charles Lyell, above, p. 688.

paper, and its predecessor in the July number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, doubtless some will be disappointed that we have not mentioned the objections to a derivative origin of species which seem to them most cogent; while others will think the presentation of the argument in favor of such origin deficient in many particulars. But there are limits to all things in time and space, and especially to the pages of this *Journal* and the patience of its readers. While it would be easy to multiply objections, it would not be difficult to strengthen the argument. So far as we have gone we have endeavored to state the case fairly. An exhaustive treatment of the subject, as at present developed, would involve the reproduction of several octavo volumes. Nevertheless, an outline map may be of service where a Johnston's atlas would be cumbrous and confusing. Two or three conclusions have forced themselves upon us in this investigation.

First, that Darwin's hypothesis has attained to such a degree of probability that it deserves dignified treatment. Sneers and ridicule are no longer sufficient to overthrow it.

Secondly, protracted study of the subject in its various aspects has allayed many of the fears with which, as a practical expounder of the sacred scriptures, we approached the investigation. This may, we admit, arise from the fact that error, no less than

"Vice, is a monster of so frightful mien,
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."

The writer would not, however, put himself forward as a disciple of Mr. Darwin, or as a champion of his theory. Instead of pausing to discuss the irrelevant, and comparatively unimportant question concerning Mr. Darwin's personal attitude to theism, we have thought it more incumbent upon us to consider the logical relation of his principles to the system which without peradventure sets God on a throne of supreme authority. Our object in the preceding pages has been, by careful study of the subject, to get such a knowledge of it

that we could understandingly discuss its relation to natural and revealed theology. We have by that means been led to a well-assured conviction that there is no more reason now than at any previous time why the scientific "leopard" and the theological "kid" should not lie down together, and there is nothing in recent developments to hinder the lion from "eating straw like the ox."

There has been an exaggerated fear of the embarrassments which the establishment of a derivative origin of species was likely to bring to a theistical view of the universe, and especially to the reverent interpretation of the Bible. This has been fostered, on the one hand, by the hasty and heated attacks of some ill-informed theologians, and, on the other hand, by the crude and over-confident metaphysical speculations of some members of the scientific guild; for many of these have been more than ready to forsake the tedious processes of natural history, and to put themselves forward as authoritative interpreters of the deepest mysteries of existence.

At this stage of our discussion it is not in place to set forth in detail the position which can be occupied in common by the sober-minded naturalist and the Christian believer. Intimations of our views have already appeared at various stages in the progress of this paper. We may, however, briefly remark that, on the scientific side, deliverance can easily come from two quarters:

(1) From the expansive nature of the principle of natural selection. This is a personification of such a general nature that it necessarily leaves the whole question of ultimate causation just where it was before; and it is so indeterminate that providential interpositions for adequate reasons are in no manner excluded. As before remarked, "utility" is a word of the very broadest significance.

Regarded from a dogmatic evolutionist's point of view, Mr. Darwin's caution in stating this principle seems timidity; while to those who are unaccustomed to the methods of inductive reasoning, the hypothetical nature of much of his discussion seems an evasion of the real question. Not without

some reason has Mr. Darwin's theory (and we could speak in much the same strain concerning the theory of gravitation) been described as a series of "loopholes" and "may-bes"; since difficulties in it are explained by reference to such things as "reversion," "correlation," "use and disuse of parts," "direct action of external conditions," and "spontaneous" variation.

The believer in transmutation

"... can invent trains of ancestors of whose existence there is no evidence; he can marshal hosts of equally imaginary foes; he can call up continents, floods, and peculiar atmospheres; he can dry up oceans, split islands, and parcel out eternity at will. Surely, with these advantages, he must be a dull fellow if he cannot scheme some series of animals and circumstances explaining our assumed difficulty quite naturally."¹

(2) Moreover, as Professor Gray well remarks,² natural selection is only a directing agency. It is "the rudder which by friction, now on this side, and now on that, shapes the course" of the vessel, i.e. which acts in virtue of a movement already induced. The propelling agency is "variation," which proceeds from an unknown power within the organism itself. It is "not physical, but physiological." With these remarks, we must leave the subject for the present, hoping in due time to complete, according to our humble ability, the edifice of which we have hitherto but laid the foundation and drawn the plan.

¹ North British Review, Vol. xlv. p. 293.

² See Darwiniana, p. 386.

ARTICLE IV.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.¹

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"If a man die, shall he live again?" This is the old, old question, about which the thoughts of men have turned, with doubts, fears, or believing hopes, from the beginning. Old, it is ever new. Never fully solved, except for the conscience and the heart, always leaving the critical reason of man short of absolute conviction, it presents itself anew for practical solution to each new generation. Since, as a question of sensible fact, neither the affirmative nor the negative can be absolutely demonstrated in this life, it leaves immense room for the play of the dialectics of doubt, on the one hand, and of the powerful instincts of the heart's needs and faiths, on the other. As a practical question, rightly affecting, according to the answer given to it, the conduct of life, its importance is transcendently great. To trifle with it, or to neglect to consider it, is unnatural in the extreme.

The belief in immortality is one of the ideal possessions of mankind. It involves the belief in an entity designated by the pronoun "I," — a soul — a subject of consciousness and personality, — which, invisible for the physical organ of sight, belongs to the realities which, though "not seen," are yet "eternal." It stands in the same category with the belief in a God of love, and in a heaven where we shall see him as he is. It implies a faith that things are not altogether what they seem, even when viewed under the most powerful and tell-tale microscope; that behind and above attraction and cohesion is life, and above what are contradictorily termed blind necessity and brute or mechanical force exists intelligence, with the attributes of wisdom, truth,

¹ A University Address.

and love. It goes along with the faith that goodness, beauty, and truth are more powerful realities than gravitation or steam. The belief in human immortality is a part of the heritage of the noblest part of man,—the reason,—and shares and bears witness to the dignity of the latter.

Corresponding with this its dignity is the universality of the belief in question. The lowest in culture and the highest hold it together. A member of one of the most degraded of savage tribes, seizing the hand of a civilized visitor, and squeezing it, said: "This will die; but the life that is within you will never die."¹ Testimony to the effect that all savage tribes believe in a future life is gathered and summed up by one of remarkable judicial impartiality,—Mr. E. B. Tylor, in his recent magnificent work on *Primitive Culture*. On the other hand, the genius and the piety of the highest culture live in the same belief. Its crowning intellectual exponent, Shakespeare, dies (in the words of his last will and testament), "hoping and assuredly believing to be made partaker of life everlasting"; and to the faith of every Christian the death-bed is the scene whence he shall "languish into life." From this comparative universality of the belief in immortality among men springs the argument in its favor from the "consent of mankind,"—*consensus gentium*,—urged already in ancient times by Cicero, among others. It is true there have been, and are still, many who confidently expect death to be the "be-all and the end-all"—persons to whom, as to the recently deceased atheist, Strauss, the thought of eternal persistence, under circumstances even no less happy than those of the present life, would be fraught only with dismay. As the faith in eternal life is supported by no direct testimony of the senses, it is no marvel that, even in cultured nations those persons whose lives most revolve in the sphere of mere sensuality should disclose little capacity to grasp or believe in the idea of a life to come; and as the faith, in its purest form, is indissolubly bound up with the belief in God, and the desire to advance in the

¹ E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, i. 389 (1st English ed.).

knowledge and love of him, it is easy to comprehend that it should be more or less wanting to those who are not at once "pure at heart and sound in head." But, apart from those who from deficient mental culture or spirituality reject the hope of a future life, it is undeniable that at all times there have been many of strong intelligence and earnest, honest spirit, who have found the stone before the door of the sepulchre immovable. Nay, how many are there among us to-day who have not felt, from time to time, our misgivings? How many who, under the influence of engrossing occupations which bind the thoughts to earth, or of a science termed "positive," which concerns itself only with things seen, have not been sensible of a chilling shadow of doubt coming between them and the things which are not seen? In truth, an intelligent belief in the soul's immortality, as in all ideal things, requires for its maintenance the constant activity of the spirit. The inward eye must ever be kept opened; the reason must be always on the alert to wrestle with and overthrow the lions of scepticism which come speciously labelled with the names of "science," "positive fact," or (more meekly), "ignorance." It cannot be amiss, then, that I invite you, in the brief time which remains for this discussion, to accompany me in an attempt to refresh our sense of the grounds on which our hope of a life beyond the grave may rest, and perhaps to indicate in a measure its independence of all present or possible results of scientific research.

We need to remind ourselves at the outset that, whatever conclusion we may arrive at, it must not, and cannot if it be true, conflict with anything which science strictly demonstrates. It is a part of the beautiful harmony and unity of all truth that its parts all belong to one symmetrical, ideal structure. Of this structure the realism of material science furnishes the basis, while the idealism of faith, hope, reason, completes the superstructure. The capping-stones of a building are not to be laid side by side with the stones of the foundation. Thus placed, they will evidently not all fit into each other, will seem incongruous, and perhaps mutu-

ally contradictory. But each in its place, viewed in its relation to the whole building, will be seen equally to be justified in its existence, and to contribute to the due proportion and completeness of the whole. Thus it is with the idealistic truths of God's and the immortal soul's existence, on the one hand, and the material facts of physical constitution, on the other — all regarded as building-stones in the inviolable temple of all truth.

Again, — and this is in harmony with the spirit of the illustration just used, — in reasoning about the things which are ideal and unseen, we rightly proceed from the without to the within, from the given circle of material fact, as that which is first known to us, to the invisible centre, which is discovered only by the subsequent research of the disciplined inward eye. The circumference must have a centre. It cannot be conceived except as in relation to one. In like manner, the cycles of palpable fact necessarily imply central truths by which our conception of them is completed, by which they are accounted for. Hence from the circle of the round world we reason to the central power which created and sustains it; from the circle of facts concerning the human body and human consciousness learned in experience, to the soul which respectively animates and underlies both; and from these facts, viewed in themselves and in their relation to the order of the universe, to the immortal destiny of the soul. In so far as these conclusions are not cogently demonstrated, they are, like the theories of purely physical science (as gravitation, the undulatory theory of light, and the like), hypotheses to be accepted as having all the force of truth until supplanted by better ones.

In making these statements, I leave out of consideration all forms, real or fancied, of direct knowledge by which it may be claimed that we have an immediate experience of the great truths in question. And yet how many may there not be of the pure in heart who see God now, who know him by the life of God in the soul? And who shall term illegitimate the ecstatic fervor of conviction of those who, having such an

experience, affirm that they feel their immortality as an actual fact already begun, the future contained in the present,—their eternity, following the thought of the great German theologian,¹ included in every instant, since they have become consciously one with the infinite? True it is that many, and perhaps all whose spiritual perceptions are not too much beclouded by materialistic prepossessions, profess to detect in themselves this instinctive sense — a spiritual, yet experimental, intuition of their eternal destiny. And into the same category of experimental evidence might be introduced that general instinct of immortality which may seem to be implied in the comparative universality of the belief in it among mankind.

Lastly, there is a large class of people, and that not in other respects the least intelligent, to whom an order of phenomena termed “spiritualistic” directly confirms what perhaps the most eminent living representative of spiritualism, Alfred Russell Wallace, the naturalist, terms “the absolute reality of future existence.” Whether the phenomena here alluded to and the spiritualists’ interpretation of them are to be regarded as a survival of savage animism, and, if so, whether this fact is to be viewed as discrediting the former or accrediting the latter, I will not attempt to decide. The value of this and of all other alleged direct testimony to man’s immortality I leave for each one who doubts to settle for himself, and pass to a class of considerations coming under the head of inferential reasoning.

The considerations from which we may seek to infer the immortality of the soul are: the intrinsic nature of the soul and of the phenomena of its conscious life; the place and relations of man in the scale of existence, as far as this latter is known to us; and the capacity of man and his moral nature, with all which these imply.

The argument from the first of these considerations will of course be baseless, unless the soul itself exists. And to ascertain the fact of the soul’s existence, and appreciate fully its nature, we need not simply to investigate the physiological

¹ Schleiermacher.

conditions and natural history of mental life, but also to reach an abiding conviction as to the original nature of true being universally. There is a philosophy, which is new only in its phraseology, and in the form, not in the substance of its conceptions, which, ascribing true being to nothing but imperceptible physical atoms, affirms that "the rotation of the atom of ether about its own axis is the prototype of all phenomena."¹ On this view of the fundamental and universal nature of reality, we should be shut off beforehand from inquiring whether any facts immediately observable for us gave evidence of the being of a distinct principle to be termed soul. We should be obliged — whether we would or not, and however great the difficulty of the operation might be — to resolve thought, feeling, desire, will, i.e. all our conscious life, into a rotation of atoms, — of brain-atoms, — and, with the living author from whom I have quoted, to define the word "soul" as a collective term for all the functions of the brain. It is almost needless to say that the difficulty of such resolution is insurmountable, and to cite in support of this assertion the testimony of such "advanced" scientists as Spencer,² Tyndall, and Du Bois-Reymond,³ whose caution approaches, or even amounts to, scepticism, but who admit that the gulf between physical function and human consciousness is, in the nature of things, and must hence forever remain, impassable. But if there are phenomena which are utterly irreducible into the rotation or any other motion of physical atoms, then our conception of the nature and range of true being must be extended beyond the limits which materialism allows. A Dacian chief, "it is said, saved himself from destruction by the stratagem of cutting down a forest to the height of the human figure, and clothing the stumps of the trees in armor, which deterred the Romans from advancing to complete their victory."⁴

¹ Eduard Reich, *Der Mensch und die Seele*, p. 15. Berlin. 1873.

² See Herbert Spencer's *Psychology*.

³ Emil Du Bois-Reymond, *Die Grenzen der Natur-Erkenntniss*. Leipzig. 1872.

⁴ Merivale, *History of the Romans*, vii. 89 (Am. ed.).

The atoms of physical philosophy are the stumps, not the roots nor the branches, of the diversified forest of natural existence. Inaccessible to any sense, they are by this very fact clad in a part (the negative part) of the armor of the unseen, but not unfelt, realities which a Christian idealism affirms. But they are not formidable, nor do they become more so, when they are described as "self-moved" and "self-positing," and when there is arbitrarily ascribed to them "the promise and potency of every form and quality of life."¹ Least of all are they so, when, more consistently, their original constitution is affirmed to provide them with nothing but a rotatory motion. Any mask which materialism may throw about its atoms will not permanently impede the march of higher truth, whatever temporary fright it may produce among the faint-hearted, or among those who are only half-convinced.

The material, then, with which philosophical materialism would construct the universe, namely, revolving atoms, is obviously and confessedly insufficient for the purpose. Its method, which rests everywhere on the assumption of a blind, mechanical motion of atoms, following laws for which no lawgiver is allowed, is unconfirmed by anything but superficial observation, and is logically impossible. We must, therefore, have recourse to another principle to account for the universe as it presents itself to us. And there is no logical stopping-place for us, when we have once abandoned pure materialism, short of the admission of a broad idealism — an idealism which is not exclusive, but inclusive, of realism. We must, in other words, — in view, first and immediately, of the phenomena of conscious life, and then of the rational order, the providential government, the beauty of the world, — admit that the world is the expression of ideas, that thought controls the action of matter (or of the forces which may constitute what we call matter); and that, as being must be ascribed to that which causes and directs as much as, and even more than, to that which is only acted upon, the primal reality belongs to thinking, ideal being, rather

¹ Tyndall, Belfast Inaugural Address. 1874.

than to the atoms of a mechanical physics. But such being cannot retain its character, and be impersonal. We come, therefore, as the only alternative, after our rejection of philosophical materialism, to the recognition of an original, supreme, and personal Spirit, i.e. to God, as the One to whom, originally and in the highest sense, true being belongs.

Why have I gone apparently so far out of my way to reach a result, the connection of which with the main topic of this discussion may not be directly obvious? It is because, I repeat, before reasoning about the soul's immortality, we must reach a conviction that the soul can be and is. The physicist who attempts to give you an exhaustive account of the body refers you at last to assumed physical atoms, solid and imperceptible and in motion, and there stops. The psychologist is naturally and rightly expected in like manner to furnish, if possible, a similarly ultimate account of the substantial constitution of the soul. But the average carnal eye, and not only this, but positive science itself, is prone to see in the physicist's atoms the radical and only ultimate form of existence. We must make ourselves realize that such a conclusion is false. We must see that there is another category of existence in which the soul can be classed, before we can admit with intelligence that there is a soul. Hence we must be made to see that in the beginning there not only were atoms, but there was thought, i.e. thinking being, i.e. God. And as the atoms were the fathers of our bodies, so we must see God, or thinking, ideal being, as the Father of our spirits or souls.

Having arrived at the conclusion that what may be termed the wooden or mechanical conception of the universe is incomplete,—that ideal being not only exists as truly as physical being, but that to it belongs the primacy in existence, and that the universe contains, if I may so express it, the material for souls or psychical material, as well as bodily material,—we are in so far prepared to acknowledge the truth of the conclusion to which self-observation has universally pointed, namely, that the human body is the tenement

and instrument of an ideal principle or soul, that the latter expresses itself in the former, and that the history of the body is to a large extent the history of the earthly fortunes of the soul. And from among the great number of definitions of the soul which have been given I choose the following: "The soul is a self-realizing purpose."¹ To which I add, that it realizes itself under providential guidance and tuition. To explain: We have concluded that ideal or thinking being exists. I have termed it "ideal agency, activity" (for such it must be; ideal inactivity is, from the nature of the case, not ideal being at all). But from the idea of such activity the idea of purpose cannot be separated. Aimless ideal activity is not true to itself, to its own definition. God, as the fountain of all ideal or spiritual being is, or has, the thought of the universe, and that thought is the purpose which he is realizing in the infinite realms of space and in the hearts and minds of the children he has created. So the ideal or spiritual nature of man cannot but follow an ideal end or purpose, which is the idea of man, particularized in the case of each individual by the circumstances in which each is placed. The soul of man is therefore ideal (hence in its measure free and independent), active being, the activity of which tends towards the realization of a purpose, or, in language more commonly employed in this connection, an ideal. It is in this sense that the soul of man is, under providential guidance and tuition, a self-realizing purpose.

The greater includes the less; the admission of a two-fold order of being — namely, physical and ideal — provides the way for the recognition of the two-fold — the bodily and the spiritual — nature of man, and, as I trust will appear, of the eternal destiny of the latter; and I need no longer detain those who are following this discussion from reflections upon the question of their souls' immortality, except to remind them that physiology has till now discovered in the material organ of the soul nothing but a complicated apparatus or

¹ The language is that of the late Professor Trendelenburg, of Berlin. The thought is essentially Aristotelian.

instrument, not an agent. The nerve transmits motion, but nowhere is it discovered in the act of perceiving or willing. And the latest psychology finds that the simplest act of conscious perception must be accompanied by the combining, ordering activity of the thinking principle.¹

What, now, from the stand-point here reached, is the outlook for the immortality of the soul? I think we must conclude that the soul is as indestructible as are the eternal ideas of God. And in this conclusion must be included not only the persistence of the soul as an ideal substance, but also the continuance of personal consciousness, without which death would be an eternal sleep, and our immortality in vain.

As a substance, i.e. as belonging to the category of true being, the soul, according to all the principles of phenomenal science, must be imperishable. The indestructibility of matter, or of force (which amounts to the same thing), by natural agencies is an axiom of science, confirmed by all experience. The modern discovery of the convertibility and correlation of forces (or of modes of energy or motion) is but a new confirmation and illustration of the same axiom. But what is true, in this respect, of matter or force or phenomena, the existence of which is in a pre-eminent sense derived, must *a fortiori* be true of the soul,—the being of which, according to our principles, is directly derived from, and is akin to, the being of God. The unending existence of the soul, when its existence as a substance is once admitted, follows, then, from the scientific law of persistence. With less obvious stringency, and yet with infinite probability, does its conscious existence also follow. For a human soul is a self, a person, differing in this from all other beings or things known to us on this planet. It has self-knowledge; it distinguishes consciously between me and thee, mine and thine, itself and the whole universe besides it. In the brute

¹ Compare, for example, I. H. Fichte, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Halle, October, 1874; J. Fiske, *Cosmic Philosophy*; also views of Schopenhauer, in *Schopenhauer als Mensch und als Denker*, by J. B. Meyer, p. 24, and Ueberweg's *Logic*.

which approaches nearest to man, this distinction is, at best, only dimly made; with the reason not at all; at most, and then only incompletely, with the feeling. Its selfhood, or personality, is what constitutes the infinite worth and meaning of the soul. It is involved in the very heart of the conception of the soul as a spiritual or ideal, i.e. a thinking, purposing, willing being. An impersonal human soul were a contradiction in terms, and hence an impossibility in fact. Still, our experience in sleep and in swoons teaches us that our consciousness may be temporarily interrupted; hence the apparently inferior demonstrativeness of the inference from the law of persistence to the conscious immortality of the soul. The whole force of this objection cannot, perhaps, by direct argument, be destroyed. But I will offer one or two observations which may tend to weaken it.

First, the consciousness which we nightly lose in sleep is for the most part phenomenal, transient, and no part of the true ideal selves which we should be, and which our souls are, by the very hypothesis that we have adopted concerning their nature, striving to become. Our daily varying consciousness is mostly the consciousness of changing states, depending on our physical condition and the state of our senses. It is not, and cannot be, mainly occupied with what is eternal in reason and in love, and which is yet the true and only intrinsically worthy object of our conscious attention. The Faust of Goethe is made to say:

“Two souls, alas! reside within my breast,
And each withdraws from and repels its brother.
One with tenacious organ holds in love
And clinging lust the world in its embraces;
The other strongly sweeps, this dust above,
Into the high ancestral spaces.”¹

Who shall say that this distinction made by the poet is not psychologically true, and that when once our variable diurnal consciousness ceases, the inner Psyche does not fly away on the rapid wings of thought to bathe in the bright presence of its divine ancestry—to refresh itself and gain strength

¹ Taylor's Translation, p. 61.

in the realm of eternal truth, goodness, and beauty for the life-long contest with the refractory matter which it has to shape into the symmetrical proportions of the divine form of man, and with this lower consciousness, which it must discipline and refine until it be capable of participating in the higher and true life of the soul? Whence but from such an inner and better personality come the inspirations of genius, the anticipations of presentiment, the warnings of conscience, and the ability, at times, in dream-life to solve problems which the more sluggish activity of our waking mental life found insoluble? Why is intuition often quicker and surer than ratiocination? And how was it that the mathematical and astronomical truths announced by Kepler were, as he was accustomed to say, whispered to him by his protecting genius before he had demonstrated them?

Many of the elements, the data, of our ordinary mental life are results of high complexity, which are furnished, ready and complete, as starting-points for our conscious mental activities. As a consequence of the perception of this fact, the psychology of the last twenty-five years has gone on attributing more and more of that which our phenomenal consciousness contains to the sphere of the so-called "unconscious," until now, in the newest notable system of German philosophy, the "unconscious" plays the supreme role which spirit, or the thing-in-itself, or the absolute idea did in earlier systems. But who shall say that this unconscious element in the psychical life of man is really unconscious, simply because it does not form a part of the extremely limited subjective consciousness of our daily terrestrial life? What relation may it not have to a higher personality within us, clouded, developing, but ready in due time to burst forth in all the brightness of ideal glory, and be recognized by us as our true self? ¹

¹ The reader may recall the sentiment of the ancient philosopher, Heraclitus: "Our life is the death [or burial] of gods in us," and our death brings their release. What is the "active reason," *νοῦς ποιητικός* of Aristotle but the higher Psyche of the text? Read also Wordsworth's Ode on Immortality, Canto v.

Does this sound like mere fancy? It certainly is not the statement of mechanically demonstrable fact; it is not the discovery of a new mode of motion, yet it may lay claim, I think, to a pre-eminent measure of verisimilitude, and is not in known contradiction to fact. I feel warranted in claiming that, on the whole, the psychology of to-day is tending toward the establishment of such a conclusion. It is offered here to show the direction in which we may at least look for considerations to break the force of that argument against immortality which is derived from the interruption of our ordinary conscious life by sleep and comatose conditions. It is but an extension of the same objection to urge that spirit is so dependent on material organism for its manifestation and for its conscious existence that it cannot continue to exist after death shall have destroyed the body. But this is what we do not know, and cannot prove. As long as our experience takes place necessarily through organs adapted only to the perception of sensible existence, it cannot be expected that we should *see* how any existence apart from a sensible basis should be possible. But we are not to make the limits of our present knowing powers, in this respect, the limits of objective fact. This lesson empiricism is always foremost in recommending to our attention.

First, we must remember that we have come to the conviction that ideal or spiritual being really is, and that it is the king in the realm of existence. Can we fittingly or justly deny that the ruler may continue to exist when his subject has perished? But, again, we may also remind ourselves of the great changes in its material environment which the soul has not only survived, but grown upon. The transition from the womb to the light of day, the growth of the body, and the more than yearly renewal of the elements of the body have taken place without prejudice to the life of the spirit. It, on the contrary, remaining personally identical, has continued to live and to advance; while the body, changing in its states and in its elements, has served simply as a kind of stepping-stone by which the spirit could mount

higher, often burning with a clearer light as the body has grown more diseased or infirm.

And from here the argument may take either of two courses. Either we may pass again to the conclusion that the ideal spirit is, in its fundamental nature, not only measurably, but absolutely, independent of the body, and capable of subsisting apart from it; or, returning to physical analogies, and calling in the aid of Christian history and doctrine, we may end with the doctrine of a renewed and transfigured body. Let us follow the latter course. The analogies of the physical world, the facts of the metamorphosis of organisms, show that when an organ has served its purpose as the basis for the development of an ideal function, it is cast aside, and a new one is provided in its place. The evolution of species itself, if the theory be true, is but the illustration, on the widest scale, of the same law. Besides, in the universe as actually and at present constituted, the general law is that matter is the basis and condition of the manifestation of spirit. Aye, this is the very substance of our conception of matter,—that it is simply clay in the hands of an ideal potter, that it is in all its varied forms but the expression of ideas, that all its forces issue from and are controlled by intelligent will. I know not, therefore, what interest we can have, or how we can even rationally be justified, in denying the extreme probability that the spirit, surviving the death of its present body, will be clothed upon with a more glorious body, according to the comforting doctrine of him through whose good tidings “life and immortality are brought to life.” If positive, material science extends its speculations to this point, it is this conclusion that it must demand. Pure speculation reaches the same result as a probable one. Both meet in harmony with the assuring doctrine of our holy Christian faith.

Other, and perhaps more impressive, considerations in support of the hope of immortality are suggested by the definition of the soul as a purpose, a complex ideal which is to be realized, and by the facts which support and illustrate

the definition. That there is a purpose, a "chief end of man," in the realization of which man alone rises to the full measure of his being, is obvious enough from the observed and necessary nature of all life. In all life there is progression; there is a starting-point, which represents the minimum of being, from which an orderly advance is made until the end be reached. The same truth appears, in a different and higher light, when we regard the moral sense and ideas of man, which serve him as a standard by which to measure his progress and to rectify deviations, whether through frailty or ignorance, from the right line of his intended development. But in physical life there is periodicity, orbital movement, waxing and waning. Progression is followed by retrogression, growth by decay. What evidence is there that the soul of man, an exception to this law, is a purpose reaching into eternity? There is the negative evidence, derivable from the circumstance that the soul, being, with God's aid, a self-realizing purpose or idea, belongs to the realm of things to which the notion of destruction has no application. Death is dissolution; it is the resolution of the composite into its elements; it is the cessation of motion. But the ideas of God are not compounded of atoms; they are not simple or complex modes of motion. We are such ideas, if we are spirits; for then God must be our Father. And, although the creature may not set limits to the power of the Creator to destroy his own offspring, it is evident that the process of such destruction, if it take place, must be entirely different from any which experience discloses, or which the unaided imagination can picture to itself. If, therefore, the purpose of the soul seems to imply the necessity or probability of eternal duration, we are not simply permitted, under the government of a just Father above, but are morally and logically bound, to expect it. And that this is implied may appear to us, if we contemplate man's place in the known order of created existence, his capacity, and his moral nature.

The signs of man's unique position of superiority in nature

are sufficiently obvious and familiar to all. We need only call to mind how relatively immense is the brain of man, his upright position, his natural and acquired modes of locomotion and communication, the enormous superiority of his mental endowments, and the power he exerts through his moral nature. Verily, man is *facile princeps* among his fellows of the material realm, and it is not wonderful if he exclaims, in the words of a living atheist, "Man was not born to be ruled," but, we will add, to rule. Nor is the essential superiority of man's position in nature diminished by anything which investigations into his natural history and genesis have rendered probable. Granted, that it were strictly proven that man's body is the lineal descendant of the lowest animal form, and admitting (for the sake of the argument) that the rudiments of his mental and moral qualities are for the most part present in the lower animals, increasing in degree as we ascend in the scale toward man, yet this is not out of harmony with the history of development in other ideal realms.

Thus, the advent of Christianity was preceded in advancing degrees by types and signs, by premonitory longings and expectations among the various pagan nations, which pointed with increasing impressiveness to the coming Redeemer. Yet it cannot therefore be maintained that Christianity was a simple outgrowth from pagan religions, the greater from the less, and that it contained no new ideal and saving content which the others had not. Or, to take another, only less impressive, illustration; the history of German literature, with its early cultivation through the study of foreign models of a form which bound the content captive, and its "storm and pressure period," in which the content broke its bands, introducing an anarchical rule of self-styled genius, prepared the way for the classical epoch, and for him—the wise, the comprehensive Goethe—in whom all its best characteristics were more than resumed, and in whom all its best tendencies culminated. But is the great poet's genius, then, a mere product of its antecedents, and are not its pro-

ductions marked by a quality as much higher and as different in kind, when compared with what went before, as the original inspirations of genius are different from the ineffectual strivings of tame talent?

So then, whatever his historical or natural antecedents, yet man is, all the same, just what he is and is known to be; and the lower animals remain, none the less, mere brutes, separated from their head by an impassable gulf. The former is still a being capable of thinking the immutable and eternal, of appreciating its unfading splendor, of longing for an unending life in its vivifying presence. Man can find the motive of his action in the ideal, is conscious of the distinction between right and wrong, holiness and vileness, as an absolute one, and has an absolutely imperative sense of duty. Darwin's attempted derivation of man's mental and moral attributes from the lower animal kingdom by gradual evolution, and through natural (meaning "mechanical") means, rests on false assumptions. It ignores the element of spontaneity, which is essential to all true existence—to the inferior soul of the brute, as well as to the spirit of man, who was "created a little lower than the angels." It assumes, in common, it is true, with the tendency of much of the psychology of the day, that spirit is a mechanical function of matter, resolvable ultimately into a mode or modes of motion. The idealist, on the contrary,—the man of spiritual faiths,—claiming to view the subject from a stand-point more true to fact, more broad, more fundamental, sees in the advancing types of psychical, as of physical life, only so many successive steps forward in the self-realization (under divine guidance) of that ideal substance of the universe which is the directest emanation from the Divine Being and the most illustrious manifestation of his power and will. He regards everything, down to the lowliest clod of earth, as possessing significance, and endowed with true being, only in so far as it is the expression of the ideal. So far, then, from admitting "natural selection," pure and simple (though not necessarily denying evolution in some form or degree), as

the agent of the genesis of physical and psychical species, he denies *in toto* that anywhere in nature pure mechanism prevails. The phenomenal mode may be determinable by mechanical formulae; but the power and the real operation are spiritual, and guided by comprehensive wisdom.

Man's distinction in nature is therefore grounded not on the fact that ideality first appears in him; for this is not the fact. It is equally present in the whole universe, though in a relatively more elementary form. But in man, of all existences experimentally known to us, it first rises to the form of rational personality. It is this that characterizes him. It is in virtue of this that he is fitted to bear the rule. It is in view of this that the wisest of German poets could exclaim :

“ Only man alone
Can work the impossible ! ”

By it he enters with his thought into relations with the thought of God; nay, more, finds that the possibility, the consistency, the truth of his own thought are only possible and explicable upon the condition that it rest on that primal foundation of rational intuitions whose immutable nature stamps them as the direct children of the ideal realm, of which God must be the light. Does the fact that man is thus founded, in his intellectual relations, on the eternal, signify nothing?

Again, man, through this distinction of his rational nature, first among known created existences discloses not only the capacity for immortality, but the ability to desire it; and he does, in proportion to the perfection of his intellectual and moral being, desire it. Is it a demonstrated rule of the universal order that truly natural capacities and desires are given in vain?

Still further, and finally, man, by virtue of the personality which distinguishes him, is capable of entering into conscious moral relation with him who is from everlasting to everlasting. The whole examination of his capacities is an examination into his purpose or destiny, since the former are not without the latter; and in none of them do we find more

significant evidence that man's nature is, so to express it, planned for immortal existence, that his purpose is eternal, than in those which are to be designated as moral and religious. In common with the beasts which perish man has temperament, natural dispositions ; but he alone can possess character. This, under divine tuition, he must make for himself. The brute is provided with instincts which, being already complete, are not improvable by the voluntary action of the subject which possesses them, but compel their possessor to be relatively perfect in his kind. Man, on the contrary, must learn voluntarily what the beast virtually knows already involuntarily, and by the way in which he does this is forced to lay the first, and what may in some sense be termed the physical, foundation of his personal character. This peculiarity of man is enough of itself to legitimate the suspicion of a radical difference between man and brute beast, not only in nature, but also in destiny. On this foundation the sense of mankind has declared, in an expression which has well-nigh become proverbial, that man must build for eternity. Various circumstances tend to confirm this declaration.

First, character is an expression of the eternal. For true character is fundamentally and alone the living out of the true, which, like the laws of God, is

“ Not of to-day, nor yesterday,
But lives forever.”

Hence our ideal of character includes, above all, absolute invariableness in our highest principles of thought and life, and in our highest loves. Hence, too, we observe that character subordinates the temporal to the eternal, conscious that in so doing it is but giving the preference to the abiding and real over the fleeting and unreal. Character counts not its life dear, but willingly faces every danger for the sake of constancy and truth to the ideal, and that with the more exalted assurance of victory the more extreme the outward peril or the literal cost. Shall a life which commences here to be the conscious, living expression of the eternal, itself perish ? Shall noblest being cease to be ?

Again, true character has eternal worth. Its influence among men is beyond appreciation, and the riches of him who possesses it are felt and admitted by all to be inalienable and absolute. It is the most perfect human expression of the good. The blind law of natural selection, even, provides, according to the admission and allegation of its supporters, for the survival and preservation of the best (and hence is not, after all, so very "blind," or, if so, it is certainly blind to good purpose). Perpetuation of the good — this law of the phenomenal world yields a suggestion by which he will not be slow to profit who not only with Plato, but with all great Christian thinkers, has come to the conviction that the eternal source and substance of being is not only ideal, but good, and that intrinsic goodness is inseparable from intrinsic and imperishable being.

Still further, while the worth of moral character is, as far as the latter extends, absolute in kind, because inspired by ideal and eternal motives, and developed in conscious relation to the absolute; yet in a finite being, in accordance with the universal law of such being, it is a variable and progressing quantity, and to the extent of its progress no limit is imaginable. Examine the case under but one of its numerous aspects. True character involves, among other things, the right distribution of our loves. In particular, it requires the love of self and the vanity of knowledge to be subordinated to the love of goodness. Now, a finite being, continuing indefinitely to exist, cannot conceivably cease to extend the range of his knowledge, when we consider that the range of being, and therefore of possible knowledge, is infinite. Hence it must forever remain a moral problem for the being thus existing to hold knowledge inferior to goodness in his affections. Thus in this one element of perfect character we may see how eternal is that purpose of man which constitutes his true soul, his true being.

Lastly, by his moral and religious qualities man stands in direct relation with the eternal God. By them he is specially constituted a son of God, and in so far co-eternal with him.

And, if this latter consideration does not suffice to furnish him complete assurance of his immortal destiny, yet his conviction that God is literally his Father cannot co-exist in him with the belief that a Parent of infinite goodness, power, and love will ever permit his child to perish out of his hand. If our love to God is so hearty and so supreme that without God we feel that we could not continue to exist, we may be assured — and it is the glory of our Christian faith that it completes this assurance — that God, too, so loves us, and even more.

Such, as I conceive, are some of the more important considerations which may support our hope of immortal life. It can never be amiss to attend to them; for the faith which rests upon them tends to keep us above the dangers and evils of “this naughty world.” The water-spider provides for its respiration and life beneath the surface of the water by spinning around itself an envelope large enough to contain the air it needs. So we have need, while walking through the thick and often polluted moral atmosphere of this lower world, where seeming life is too frequently inward death, to maintain around ourselves the purer atmosphere of a higher faith in things invisible, without which we should morally droop and die. We need to remember, also, that the promise of the scriptures is: “To those who [personally] *seek* for honor and immortality, eternal life.”

To the Mahometan the future life is, amid sensual delights, “Peace, peace.” The Greek proverb declares that “there hands are clasped forever,” thereby intimating the eternity of true affection. For the Christian the future is full of promises not only of peace and undying love, but also of eternally active life. May our assurance and our hope of the Christian’s immortality be complete! They will be so, when we are conscious that, by our clear rational intuitions, our faith, our trust, our love, we are one in our spiritual body with him who saith: “I am he that liveth, and was dead; and behold, I am alive forevermore. Amen.”

ARTICLE V.

AN EXPOSITION OF THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF GENESIS
I. AND II.

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§ 4. COSMOGONIC DAYS.

WE now suspend our critical examination of the Mosaic text. Before taking up our study of the creative day, we wish to present some thoughts about the "cosmogonic day," so-called, which throws itself into conflict with our previous reasonings and conclusions. While doing this, however, we shall ignore those reasonings and conclusions, and shall look at this matter of cosmogonic days, in its relation to our general subject, on independent grounds. We state our present business thus :

Given — the organization of universal matter, by natural processes, from its crude state of torpidity and darkness into the present cosmos ; *To find* — its genesisistic days, and their agreement or disagreement with the Mosaic genesis.

Before taking up our problem, it devolves upon us to show, as definitely as we can, what we are to understand by the vital term, "genesisistic days" ; or, as they are more commonly called, "cosmogonic days" ; or, as we prefer to call them, "aeonic days." As nearly as we can ascertain, a cosmogonic day denotes : 1. The phenomenon — cosmic light ; 2. Some one creative work — cosmogonic ; 3. The time — indefinite — from the initiation to the termination of any one such creative work.¹

¹ "Creative pauses, or successive natures." "First the phenomenon, the appearing itself ; then a period to denote the whole event." "The ante-solar day, marked by no sunrising or sunseting, or any astronomical measurement, and without any computed duration." "The light is still evolving in the second day." — *Lewis*, in *Lange*, pp. 131-134, *passim*. "A great period of development of that world of matter just created, — the immeasurable body of gaseous matter. A day measured not by any definite time, but by the work assigned to it."

These are the best definitions of the word "day" which we can find ; of the word used in a cosmogonic sense. Had they been more concise, probably they would have been more lucid.

I. Our first object is, to find these cosmogonic days, if we can ; that is, to find their development in the *processive construction* of the vast congregation of worlds. The two extremes are : primal matter, astronomic perfection. Cosmogony proper does not include inhabitants of worlds nor furniture of worlds. It terminates with construction and position. It comprehends only the process or processes by which the crude matter of the universe was brought into that beautiful arrangement of individualities which we call the cosmos.

The question now is : In this one grand creative work were there *definable divisions* — one definite creative work, a pause ; another definite creative work, a pause ; and so on, until, by one after another, the grand work, cosmic construction, was completed ? If so, then were there cosmogonic days — successive times, momentary or aconic, in each creative operation.

We will now frankly state — but disclaiming all scientific pretensions — how our thoughts take hold of the question before us. In doing this, we avail ourselves of a few elementary data borrowed from cosmic science.

Primordial matter was dormant. The first divine act towards its cosmic organization was its stimulation — infusing it with activity. At the moment of activity, and by it, light was evolved, and incandescence, and chemical action, and centripetal action (synthesis), and centrifugal action (analysis) or separation, and separation of separations, and cooling, and condensation, astronomic position and functions. Yet all these phenomena were but one — *different names* for that same activity which was the Creator's one creation. When we have activity we have the whole of cosmogony. Light is no more the manifestation of activity than these other phenomena are. Nor are the other phenomena anything else

"The first day's work was the production of light." — *Guyot*, Proceedings of Evangelical Alliance, 1873. p. 290. col. 2. 1.

than matter's activity. This point seems to us very clear. The point is suggestive. We utilize it by following out its suggestions.

All the phenomena of nature — all her forms of life, all her gestations, all her births, all her deaths, all her catastrophes, all her mutations — are resolvable into her one omnipresent phenomenon, *motion*. Her organic units and her inorganic, her solids, her fluids, visible and invisible, tangible and intangible, and all her varieties of light are but her various manifestations of her birthday gift. They have been nothing else; they ever will be nothing else. We may classify her combinations as we please, and analyze her elements as we may be able, and give out for her as many cosmogonic or geogonic names as we can frame. But motion is the substratum and the reality of the whole. It clings to all alike; it makes all alike — atom, molecule, dust, light, planet, comet, nebula, vital organism, death. Whatever we can predicate of one or of all is comprised in motion.

But motion in matter is more than universal; it is perpetual. From the first flash which announced activity to the present moment, that activity has never ceased. It has never intermitted; it has never been suspended; it has never "paused," anywhere. It has always sustained its virgin glory, and worn its vestal robe, and put forth its genial day as a token of its ceaseless, tireless, wakeful, energizing presence. And should it *once* collapse and stop *to be*, darkness would again be the universal shroud, and death the universal doom. It was this one creation which evolved light, which sent off the countless scintillations from the grand incandescent mass. It was this one creative operation which ranged these several fragments into groups, and poised them in space, and sped them on their several ways. It was this one creative operation which did sustain the luminosity of each sun, which did reduce the bulk and exhaust the light of other masses, till each became a planet or a planet's satellite; all doing homage to their central world, which was yet glowing, yet throbbing as at its first impulse

from the creative word. It is this one creative operation which has ever impelled that grand alleluia which is without speech, without language, without voice. This one creation of God is material nature's only force, and she never drops it. She knows no rest; and her everlasting unrest is her everlasting secret, and God's. Nature's motion is nature's operation. It is her dowry from the hand of God — her exhaustless and perpetual dowry, because perpetually sustained; without parts, without periods, without suspensions, without resumptions, without days. And if her operation does not recognize such things, neither can the science of her operation. Activity in decay, as well as in growth. Activity in decay — analytic; activity in formation — synthetic; activity everywhere; activity unpausing.

Cosmic light, cosmic separation, cosmic arrangement, cosmic harmony, cosmic oneness, cosmic symmetry, cosmic beauty were not so many distinct creations. They were only so many "appearings" of that sole and perpetuated creation which woke the first pulsation "under the ribs of death." In the grand creating — the cosmic — there was but one creation — the cosmos. Nor can the keenest eye fix upon a point in the calendar of the universe at which there was any halting in the universe-process. Cosmic creating was one, and knew of no "pause" until the grand result. Nor has the cosmic creation known any "pause" of its activity since the point of its culmination. When God woke up universal matter he charged it with one mission -- to do, and to do, and to do. That was his creative act, and that creation was his creative behest. Universal matter obeyed. No pause after light; no pause after separation; no pause after the individualization of worlds; no pause after their astro-nomic perfection. The mission of universal matter was *to do*, and *not* to pause. Universal matter, we say, has obeyed, and yet obeys. *That is the whole of cosmogony.*

To be sure, the cosmos was made, and the world was made, and each was a distinct and complete "event" of creative power, each a separate and complete "event" of

nature's indefeasible activity. But, if we will have it that each "whole event" creative had its own "great period of development,"—that is, its cosmogonic day in the cosmogonic calendar,—then from the point of primal activity there were as many cosmic days as creative events; not one, or three, or six, but millions of millions. From primal activity to the creative event, this world in its astronomic relations, was a cosmic day, an aeonic day. From the same point to the creative event, Adam, was also an aeonic day. From the same point to the creative event, Eve was also an aeonic day. For, all the while, matter in all its parts was in constant motion, and in some of its parts was in constant motion toward each resultant event (compare Ps. cxxxix. 15, 16). Yet, all the while, there were no days, in the sense of any "divisions," suspensions, "pauses," or *termini* of cosmic toil or divine operation; for the one was without ceasing or completion, and the other (if we will discriminate) was concurrent. As time, the first creative day, like a mathematical point, was below measurement; for there was no point where there was neither light nor darkness, motion and no motion. But as time, the creative day of this world, or the creative day of any other world, or the creative day of Adam, was above measurement.

We think we are not mistaken in all this. We think, too, that we shall have the concurrence of every reflecting mind which takes up the matter manfully and by itself. But if such is the secret of nature,—if there was no suspension of activity during the construction of the universe,—then there were no stages of activity, no distinct "periods of development," no "solemn pauses" in the work of cosmogony, "marking off epochs" creative; that is, marking off that activity into parcels. And if so, then (in reality) there were no such things as *dies ineffabiles*, cosmogonic days. But if this be true, then the biblical interpreter has no authority from natural science for claiming that the "days" of the Mosaic creating denote ages of time.

We are not aware that natural science, free from the bias

of a timorous theology, does recognize any such distinctly marked phases in the process of cosmogony as are signified by the expression "a cosmogonic day," or any pauses between one cosmogonic phenomenon and a succeeding one. Therefore we put the question, and with as much preciseness as we can : In cosmic creation — that is, in the processes by which the worlds were individualized and solidified — can science show us any points where processive and formative motion was suspended upon the completion of any one cosmic phenomenon ? If so, then between the points of that motion begun and that motion stopped, we have found a "cosmogonic day," and if the period be immense, an aeonic day. If science return a negative answer, then does she not only not sanction, but she does explode, the cosmogonic interpretation of the Mosaic narrative. If she return an affirmative answer, on good grounds and honestly, she does not touch *our* interpretation. She only explodes the structure of discursive thought which we have just now interjected ; so that we have only to confess, and to accept the cosmogonic day, and to pursue our problem under the incumbrance.

II. We therefore proceed upon the postulate that there *were* cosmogonic days such as have been defined ; and we now attempt to find their agreement or disagreement with the genesisistic narrative of Moses.

1. When the vast mass of the primitive nebula was first moved, it gave forth light. This mass was separated by natural processes, and while in a state of intense and glowing heat, into innumerable globular masses, ultimately forming the various astronomic systems of the universe. Some of these gradually lost their light and heat ; others still retain them, and now perform the offices of suns. These facts we receive as being well established through the investigations of modern science. Therefore throughout the universe light has never ceased. Even the masses (worlds) which have ceased to be self-luminous are illumined by the light of the suns. This perpetual light, which with reference to its birth and universality we call *cosmic* light, is the same which God

at *some* time called "day." Or, the light primal, which shone during the vast ages of cosmogony, and which still shines, is cosmogonic day. The one day, and the only day, which now pertains to the entire cosmos is no fable; but a perpetual and universe-al reality. The *true* cosmogonic day existed before our sun. It existed before our world was astronomically arranged. It is aeonic in so large a sense that it existed *on the eve* of cosmogony (properly so-called), and during its progress, and now exists. It is independent of all astronomic phenomena. It is ubiquitous.

Although the cosmogonic day, in its academic and theologic sense, contains the other essential elements which we have named in its definition, yet the light which it comprises is light so conditioned as we have just described, whether ante-solar or post-solar.

Now, according to the Mosaic writing, at the very point of time when God did invoke and evolve light, he did *separate* between it and the darkness. Not that he did "*divide*" the light or day, nor that he did *blend* the light and the darkness, but that he did "separate between" *the two*. Each was then. Of course, at the same time, the one was in some one place; the other (no light), in some other place.

If the Hebrew historian is writing about cosmogony,—the genesis of the universe,—then he is here writing of *cosmic* light, or cosmogonic day; and this is necessarily the construction of all his cosmogonic expounders. We therefore transfer the Mosaic words, "God did separate between the light and between the darkness," to the precise point, the birth of cosmic light.

Where was the darkness? The light had dispossessed it, displaced it, dispersed it, annihilated it. It was nowhere; it was *not*. The light had monopolized the grand nebulous mass,—the universe,—and there was no place *for* it. The co-existence of the two was a physical impossibility; for there was no opaque matter to serve as separator (*Ante* § iii. 1), beyond which might be cast a shadow of great darkness. Therefore, at this initial point of cosmic time, any separation between

the light and between the darkness *annihilated* was, in a double sense, a physical impossibility. There was *then* no such separation; and thus there is a stern conflict between the ante-solar universe-light and the textual statement that the light and the darkness, being co-existent, were separated. If both are true, then the language of Moses must refer to some other state of things than that created by *primal* cosmic light.

2. Another matter for comparison. It is really out of place under our present postulate; but we present it *parenthetically*, because no better opportunity may occur. To bring it out clearly, we are obliged to *re-present* the unity of the cosmic day (light), but in a form somewhat modified.

Cosmogonic ante-solar day, so far as its light-element is concerned, does not admit of successions. That light did not shine and go out and shine again. Nor did it admit of successions by shining and expiring and giving place to other created lights. While as yet there was no cosmos, even in incipient outline; while as yet there was no one phenomenon but light's monocratic self; while, through after ages, its offspring spheres were yet self-radiant, like their grand source; and while, through ages yet succeeding, world after world did subside into planets with their satellites, and by their own motion did acquire to themselves successive days—this cosmic light, this cosmic day, was yet, as it had ever been, a unit, without mutation, without loss, perpetuating itself in the princely suns which had kept their princely estate. Thus, from the grand era of the universal morning, notwithstanding the mutations of spheres, there has been but one cosmic day, with never a cosmic evening or a cosmic night. From the morning of primal creation to our historic sunshine, and hence till now, ever the same.

Such is the cosmic light of science. Such is the true cosmogonic day—a stupendous, changeless, *solitary* day. In no sense can it have been duplicated and reduplicated, or numerated, or calendared. Yet if we *will* read cosmogony in the Mosaic creating, we must invent a science of numbers by which one shall be equal to six, by which six shall be shrunken to one.

In other words, the true cosmogonic day (or light) being but one continuous and changeless fact, there could not have been *successive* days or lights, *in any sense whatever*, upon any topos, until after astronomic arrangement and astronomic motion. Therefore, as our writer does enumerate days before his mention of celestial luminaries, he does *thereby* emphatically, although tacitly, represent that cosmogony had been perfected *before* that creating which he narrates.

3. The *evenings* of the Mosaic days must be brought into comparison with cosmogonic days. Each Mosaic day had its evening. If these days were cosmogonic, then we want to find evenings in cosmogonic days.

The word "evening," when not used tropically out of the realm of visible nature, always (in Hebrew as in English) designates the *fading* part of the light of day, just as Moses applies it. Would we apply it to cosmic light, or to cosmogonic, periodic days? But how can we? The primal light may have increased, but it never has decreased. It never has lapsed to a minimum. In respect to their light-element, cosmogonic days have been of uniform volume and uniformly ubiquitous. In the several detachments from the primal nebula which have become planetary worlds, the light has faded and failed and gone out forever. But the grand cosmic light has not failed nor fainted. The universal day has remained in its strength. It has remained corporate and unabated in countless suns. It has remained re-illuminating all bankrupt orbs to the outmost cosmic verge. It has remained without mornings of increase, without evenings of diminution.

With respect to the other elements of cosmogonic days (*ante* p. 716), did *they* diminish? Had *they* their evenings? Did *time* know stages of subsidence? Did each creative *work* diminish? Creative time did always *advance*, and so did each creative work. But if no one of its elementals did glide into diminution,—neither light nor time nor phenomenal event,—neither, of course, did any one cosmogonic day. In other words, there were *no* evenings in the stu-

pendous processes of cosmic creating; and the creative Mosaic days, which *had* them, must have been days in some other sense. And yet cosmogonic scholarship has devised an evening phase even for cosmogonic days! Let us examine these devisings.

“The evening of each day was a diminution of the darkness which went before.”¹ This is certainly unlike our usual way of speaking. We always call the “diminution of darkness,” *morning*, and always call the “diminution” of its *light*, the “evening” of a day. But this is a minor matter.

Looking at the statement from a very different point, we judge it to be a mistake—a mistake, because the cosmic darkness (if we may so express it) was *gone*. Cosmic light had usurped its *place*, had ostracised it absolutely, had abolished it. As we have before stated and illustrated, since the first cosmic illumination there has been *no* cosmic darkness, save those tiny spots of shadow behind lightless worlds. And even that shadow-darkness could not have been until the expiry of photospheres had come to pass, and astronomic perfection also. How, then, could there have been darkness within the universe when, at the birth of light, universal matter was all ablaze? How could there then have been any “diminution of darkness,” when, on the first day, there was no darkness *to be* diminished?

But cosmogonic exposition of this Hebrew text goes a step farther: “The evening of the first day was that dark, chaotic *time* preceding.”² The purport of this is large and peculiar, and being so very definite, we will try and unfold it.

(1) If it mean anything, it means that a preceding “time” was co-present with a succeeding time, and even that the preceding did overlap the succeeding in order to get at five more succeeding “times”! So that the evening which we thus extort from chaos for the first aeonic day cannot serve for the complement of the latter five, without a wrenching more and more amazing, more and more cruel, as each day

¹ Professor Lewis, in Lange, p. 134.

² Professor Guyot, “Evangelical Alliance,” p. 280, col. 2.

is more and more remote from the ante-creative darkness. And then, how about the *reserved* "chaotic darkness," the portion of that seventh and sabbatic aeonic, at whose "evening the last hour of humanity will strike"?¹ Will "the dark chaotic" overleap the vast interim between the day-spring of the universe and the knell of mankind?

(2) This making the first day — God's first cosmic work — to consist in part of ante-creative darkness is only making a part of God's creative work to be in existence before he wrought creatively *at all*.

(3) This is making the first day, and the others too, to be part darkness and part light; although God, as by the record, said that it was *light*.

(4) Moreover, whereas Moses certifies that the first day was *evening* (עֶרֶב) and morning, this exposition says that it was darkness (חֹשֶׁךְ) or night (לַיְלָה) and morning.

But the Mosaic evenings have a *peculiarity* which must be brought into comparison with cosmogonic days. "Evening" always stands in connection with "morning." They are presented uniformly as "the two contrasted states" of that "one completed period"² denominated *a day*. We do not propose to bring them into comparison with cosmogonic days as being periods of time. Every day — whether a solar day, or a lunar day, or a life-day, or a hey-day, or a day of grace, or a six-day day (Gen. ii. 4) — has its beginning and its ending, as has also any event which may pertain to either of such days.

Our eye is not fixed upon the words themselves, — "morning" and "evening," — but upon *the order* in which the sacred writer uniformly places them. It is the reverse of the common order. It is the reverse of the apparent order in which these natural phenomena occur. It is an order to which the writer cleaves persistently throughout the series of creative days; an order which he elects deliberately, purposely, solemnly, emphatically, descriptively, definitively; an order

¹ Professor Guyot, "Evangelical Alliance," p. 286, col. 2.

² Professor Lewis in Lange, p. 133.

which he drops as soon as the creative series is concluded. There is, unquestionably, a meaning in all this, and also a reason for it — a point which we reserve, however, as not within the scope of our present topic. It will come before us in the regular course of our investigations.

By his very peculiar allocation of these words, the writer presents this idea — that the days of which he writes had their evenings *before* their mornings, and their mornings *after* their evenings. Now, how can any day, or any event of any day, have its evening (its ending) first, and its morning (its beginning) last? The problem may, or may not, be solved when we come to examine the Mosaic days. But the question now is simply: Is it solvable in its application to *cosmogonic* days, strictly so-called? Let us make our comparison with the day's several elements — light, time, and phenomenal event, or creative work.

“Evening” in its primary sense could not pertain to cosmic light *at all*, either as its first state or as its last; for, if there were any change in the primal day, it could only have been in the way of its greater intensity. And as for its latter state, it has as yet had *no* evening.

As for “time.” There is no such thing as *a time*, Lilliput or Brobding, having its ending in advance of its beginning, and its beginning in the rear of its ending. The same is true of any “creative event.” No sophistry, no word-craft can fit such a coat upon a cosmogonic day. The impossibility is so clear that it neither admits of proof nor of illustration.

It will be conceded on all hands that the Hebrew writer did not use these descriptive terms to represent either an impossibility or an absurdity. As interpreters, we are not at liberty to reverse his reversion of their common order, that we may make them decently applicable to cosmogonic days; but we *are* at liberty to say, — or, rather, we are under an exegetical necessity of saying, — that the day which he describes in such style, and with the intense emphasis of persistent repetition, could not have been, in his mind's eye,

a cosmogonic day, which *does not* correspond to his peculiar description.

In other words, when we come to test cosmogonic days by this descriptive language of the Mosaic text, we find that the Mosaic wrestle hard and mortally with the aeonic days, which would usurp their royalty in the text. Thus we find, beyond a peradventure, that the aeonic are not applicable there, that they do not belong there, that they are essentially and entirely different from the Mosaic creative days. In short, they do utterly lack, and by no legerdemain can they be made to develop, this unique feature of the Mosaic day. Thus they themselves do prove that the Mosaic days, whose endings *were* first and whose beginnings *were* last, belong to some other creating than that of the cosmos.

4. We suggest another comparison. The seventh day is mentioned without the remarkably descriptive formula which is attached to the others. Yet it is linked to them, and classed with them, by its rhetorical position, by its ordinal number, and by its definite article. Thus it is necessarily taken to be *just such* a day as the others — one of a series. We are not aware that it has ever been regarded otherwise. If the six were solar days, so was the seventh; if the six were aeonic, so was the seventh.

(1) The narrator does not state, in express terms, that morning and evening were (or are) pertainings of the seventh day; but he strongly implies it. And he implies as strongly, and in the same way, that the terms should be supplied, as having here the same meaning and the same relative order as before. But if, in this respect, the seventh day be represented as like the six, then it *has had* its evening before its morning. Now, if one persist that the six days were aeonic, then he must claim (and all cosmogonic interpreters do, of course, claim) that the seventh day, being aeonic, is *now in progress*. Now, it is simply impossible to conceive that an aeonic day in which we live, and which is now in progress, has already had its evening or close, and is also advancing towards its beginning or morning. And if

we do not admit that its close has already past, then, following out the analogy of the six days, we must logically admit that the seventh day has not yet begun! And then, by logical necessity, come the unpleasant corollaries, that the Creator's sabbath has not yet begun, and that the narrator describing it as begun does not tell the truth.

There can be but two ways of avoiding all this nonsense, and of also avoiding the impeachment which it involves, which, in turn, impeaches the whole story. At least, so it seems to us.

The one is, to desert the analogy of the six days (which makes the narrative a confusion), by reversing the order of evening and morning. This method, bold as it is, is now in the ascendant. We find it most distinctly and publicly avowed. Thus: "Each day *begins* with an evening followed by a morning. At the *end* of each of the six working days of creation we find an evening. But the morning of the seventh is not followed by any evening. The day is still open." A very remarkable method of leaping the landmarks of the text to get at an aeonic sabbath with its evening and morning transposed!

The other method of avoiding these absurdities and impeachments is, to make them our expounders of the seventh day,—to see how imperatively they point out to us that this day, like the others, must have been of *such a nature* that its evening could have preceded its morning—a phenomenon utterly impossible for an aeonic day, which has no relation to astronomic facts. By this method we do no wrong to the text. But we find, in so doing, that the seventh day does testify, in a way peculiarly its own, that the days *creative were not aeonic*.

(2) A cosmogonic day, we remind ourselves, includes not only time and light, but some one cosmic creation begun and completed. The one is as essential to the reality as are the others. Besides, it not only includes time, but diuturnal time. Therefore, in every cosmogonic day we must find its several complements—light all along, a cosmic creative

event, and time aeonic. We mean, of course, a creative event in the physical sense, and not in the psychical.

Now the historic and essential feature of the seventh day is simply this — that during that day God did suspend creative work. Both cosmogony and geogony had been completed. Moreover, the *superficies* of our world had been “created, even unto an inhabiting”; and this completeness was attained at the point when God did imbreathe “the glory of the man,” and did bring her to him. God had ended the work which he had made. On the seventh day he had ceased from it; and this day was not marked by any creative event. Surely, then, the seventh day, being a non-creative, a divine sabbatic day, is not cosmogonic; for it lacks an essential characteristic of a cosmogonic day — a creative event.

It may be rejoined: “That a *literal* cosmogonic day was, indeed, impossible; because cosmogony had ceased, and the creative element drops out, of course. But that dropping out of the creative does by no means involve the dropping out of the aeonic.” Very well. But we claim the privilege of taking some exceptions to this adroit change of front.

The aeonic character of cosmogonic days is based upon an aeonic necessity. But if that necessity cease, then it is but an illogical and a false exegesis which claims that the aeonic stage is still to be recognized. Now, from what arises the aeonic necessity in cosmic creation? (We admit the necessity, though not the periodicity.) The necessity of an aeonic duration of a cosmogonic day arises from cosmogony itself — from the acknowledged fact that the cosmos was created by *natural processes*. Perceiving this, we perceive at once that these processes, in the creating of such a structure from such diffused material, must have been of immense duration; and, through the paucity of our data (if for no other reason), the ages which must have been involved are utterly beyond our calculation. Hence it is that we are obliged to say that a cosmic creative day is “without any computed duration.” We cannot compute the measure of time required for any one given creation.

Now, if we postulate definite or indefinite days or stages as belonging to cosmogony, we do logically and necessarily postulate *aeonic* stages or days. It is the *processive creation which creates* the aeonic necessity. If, therefore, there be no processive creation, there is nothing by which or for which to mark out an aeon. In such a case, to speak of aeonic time is a simple and obvious misnomer. The necessity, the propriety, the very possibility of an aeonic day are gone, if aeonic creations have ceased. The moment we have duration (time) passing along without any creative event in progress, we are out of the range of aeonics, and must grope hopelessly to find an aeonic day. No creating, no aeon. It is, therefore, but a delusion to predicate "aeonic" of "day," as an equivalent for "cosmogonic day," when that *very creating* is lacking which only can create aeonic day.

That the seventh Mosaic day stands creationless is conceded by the common voice. Therefore the reasons for assigning aeonic time-periods to cosmogonic days are not true in *this* case. Consequently there is no sense in which the seventh day can consistently or plausibly be denominated a cosmogonic day, or even an aeonic. The aeonic element may not be supposed to exist where the cosmic creative does not.

Therefore we rejoin to the rejoinder which we have extemporized, that "the dropping of the creative" *does* "involve the dropping of the aeonic." What then?

Why, it follows not only that there is no reason why the seventh day should be accounted an aeonic, but that there is every reason, in its non-creativeness, why it should not be so accounted. We are therefore compelled, even on cosmogonic grounds, to write it down a *non-aeonic* day; and we do so. But if it was a non-aeonic day, then it was either akin to the six in respect to time-likeness, or it was not.

If it was *not*, the unlikeness is serious; because it *spoils the textual fabric* before us. That fabric (as we have already illustrated) indicates, almost with the force of a distinct and positive assertion, that the seventh day was *wholly like*

each one of the six, and yet instantly reveals that it was wholly unlike, being *non-creative* and *non-aeonic*. What are we to think of such a narrative? We have been deluded by the very structure of the text! We are all afloat and bewildered!

If we would find harmony, consistency, or even literary respectability in the document, we must find that the seven days are alike in respect to light, in respect to duration, in respect to evening and morning, in respect to evening *before* morning, in respect to *every* particular save that one in which we *are told* that there was a difference.

We have, then, our exegetical choice—either to hold that the seventh day is wholly unlike the six (thus impeaching the entire story); or else to hold that the uncreative seventh was not aeonic, and that, *therefore*, and like it, its fellows were not. But in this latter case we must give up the traditional tenet that Moses is describing cosmogony. Dare we?

(3) Another statement about the seventh day taps us on the shoulder. If the six days were aeonic, then the day which God did “bless and sanctify” was aeonic; and this seventh aeonic was, and is, and is to be, the sabbath of God, “until a new creative aeon arises in the divine counsels.”¹

But where is the Sabbath which was “made for man”? Where, in this outline of the seventh aeonic, is there any reference to that Sabbath-day which man is to “remember and keep holy”? Surely his Sabbath is not the same as God’s! Surely, his Sabbath is not this *aeonic* seventh, which has never been intermitted, and which is perpetually evolving?

Well; was it the seventh nature-day, or astronomic? By no means; for (by the aeonic reading) no such day is brought out in the whole creative discourse, nor even where the seventh day is announced. It may not be said that, as the seventh aeonic opened, the seventh solar opened with it; that while the latter lasted it did coincide with the former,

¹ Professor Lewis, in Lange, p. 196, col. 2.

and was included by it; and that, therefore, the seventh solar was "blessed and sanctified" with it and for man. The assertion of such a *coincidence* is purely hypothetical, and unworthy the name of exegesis. There is no evidence, textual or otherwise, that such was the fact. But even if it was, the seventh solar did not lose its identity under the aegis of the seventh aeonic. Though the greater did include the less, nevertheless, they were *two*; and the naming of the one by our writer is not the naming of the other. Nor were the blessing and sanctifying of the aeonic the blessing and sanctifying of the astronomic. Only *one* was so distinguished — the day (aeonic) of God's rest. Therefore we have no textual right to say that *both* were so distinguished. Nay, more, the text itself *forbids* us to say so — expressly, distinctly, positively, sharply. One is not two. Nor is "*it*" any other than the self-same day on which God did rest. "He did rest on the seventh day, and did bless and sanctify *it*." ¹

It is very easy to *say* that God did bless and sanctify *both* days; but that does not make it true. Besides, here is a bit of grammar, involving a bit of arithmetic, in the text, which says that it is not true — which says that God did bless and sanctify *one* day — one day *only* — the day of his own rest. That simple pronoun "*it*" (peculiarly emphasized in the Hebrew) has the authority, the sanctity, the integrity, and the inviolability of *a unit*. It has, too, the authority of grammatic rigidity, as unyielding as that of the numeral which it expresses. The "*it*" *locks out* the seventh solar day absolutely, *if it be* the pro-noun of the day aeonic.

Now, if our grammatic apprehension of the text be right,

¹ The expression אֵלֶּיךָ is very definite and emphatic. The אֵלֶּיךָ is what Nordheimer calls an *illustrative* particle, "corresponding nearly in its use to the Latin *scilicet*" (§ 676. and § 862). This would give the suffix יך the force of a demonstrative; the two being equal to *self, self-same*. See Gesenius אֵלֶּיךָ 1. 1; who calls it a demonstrative pronoun equivalent to αὐτός, *ipse*. In α) he refers to "the reflexive use of אֵלֶּיךָ as אֵלֶּיךָ לְאֵלֶּיךָ." In the text, equivalent to "blessed the seventh day and sanctified *the very same*." See also references in Noldius's Concordance, p. 134, col. 2. "In אֵלֶּיךָ."

and if we would find here the instituting of the human sabbath, which is a *solar* day, then the aeonic is very much in our way. To escape the annoyance, let us change our position; and we shall speedily come to an exegetical result under which we can breathe easily. It is admitted, even by our aeonic expounders, that the day which God did bless and sanctify as a sabbath *for man*, was the seventh *solar* day. Then, on common ground, we can express our own position; and, to spare words, we state it in syllogistic form:

The day which God did bless and sanctify for man was the seventh
astronomic.

He blessed and sanctified but one — the day on which he rested.

Therefore, the day on which he rested was not aeonic, but astronomic.

If the major and the minor propositions are true, the conclusion, being inevitable, is also true. Well, this leaves us but a step to our final conclusion:

The seventh day, on which God rested, was astronomic.

All the Mosaic days were of the same kind.

Therefore, the six were astronomic, not aeonic — not cosmogonic.

5. We present one more point of comparison. The Hebrew writer states that the creative work which he describes was performed on six days.

While looking at this statement, let us keep in view that a cosmogonic day comprises time “without any computed duration,” and also comprises some one creative event or work produced within that time. An aeonic time to each work, an aeonic work to each time, — solar days only occurring, by the bye, as enlivening episodes, during the last three. In the comparison we now make, the element of time is of no importance. We bring into view only this point: That, in a given series, the cosmogonic days correspond to the number of the phenomenal creations. In the series before us, if the writer uses the word “day” in the cosmogonic sense, then there must be as many creative days as creative products, and as many creative products as creative days. No more and no less of the one, no more and no less of the other.

Let us explain. There might, indeed, have been two or more distinct creative operations—that is, two or more distinct creations—in progress at the same time, or on the same day, whether cosmogonic or solar. But in that case, the one must have been begun when the other was begun, and must have been completed when the other was completed, else their respective times or days would not have coincided. If the day of the one began before the day of the other, or ended before that of the other, or if it began *and* ended before that of the other, then the day of each would have been not the same, but different; although for a while the days would have run along in parallel, that is, each processive fact would have been proceeding over the very same time.

But no two or more of the creative products herein nominated *did* share the same creation-time; for they did neither begin together, nor end together, nor did they begin *and* end together. They are laid before us by the writer, not only as having been *diverse* entities, but as having been *successive* entities—first one, and afterwards another. This is true of every one of the creative facts named. Therefore, as the facts were different and successive, the days of the facts should be different and successive also, provided only that the days were cosmogonic. Or, throwing our meaning into a more condensed and perhaps a more lucid form: While different creative products may have been evolved on the same cosmogonic day, yet successive products must have been evolved on successive cosmogonic days, that is, on different days.

With this unquestionable truth in hand, we now turn to the Mosaic creating. We perceive that no two or more of the creative facts were simultaneous. All were successive—one after another. On one of the days two creative facts occurred—the gathering of the waters into seas and the outgoing of vegetation—facts as entirely distinct as were the light-fact and the expanse-fact. On another day land-animals were brought into being, also the man, also the

woman — three creative facts as entirely distinct as were the light-fact and the expanse-fact and the sea-fact. Indeed, taking up the different creative phenomena here presented as successive creations, we have no less than nine creative facts or “appearings” or “whole events” or “great works” — light, the expanse, the gathering of the seas, vegetable life, sunshine, aquatic life, brute life, Adam, Eve. Thus, according to his own definition, the cosmogonic reader ought to find here *nine* days ; but Moses has given him only *six*.

Corollary. — Unless the sacred writer has made clerical blunders, or unless he could not count nine, it is impossible that he should use the word “day” in a cosmogonic sense. His very numerals are his vouchers for this. His common capacity being conceded, he must have meant such “days” as did admit within their limits different and successive events.

Yet, upon this matter of numbers, our comparison is by no means limited to the creative events specified in the Mosaic text. In each successive phenomenon down to the creation of man, cosmogonic interpretation professes to recognize a cosmic day. But, instead of so reckoning all the phenomena, it coolly elects such six of them as are most convenient for its purpose. But science is not made dumb by being deftly fingered. Even if admitting, for courtesy’s sake, that “day” may stand for creative event, and creative event for day, she rebukes the interpreter who trims the Mosaic account in her name. She tells him openly that he is not honest ; that he has not taken even a moiety of the cosmic phenomena or days which stand on her list ; that for his special purpose he writes down six, and yet, away from this purpose, writes down more.

And he does. As a *secular* writer, he counts off thus : Light, separation of primal matter, condensation of separations into solid globes, mineral incandescence, subsidence of incandescence, geogonic formations, recession of the world’s deluge, invertebral life, fish-life, plant-life, reptile-life, inferior mammals, man.¹ Thirteen distinct and successive creative

¹ Guyot, “Evangelical Alliance,” pp. 240–284, *passim*.

developments which, by the rule, should be counted as so many cosmogonic days. In the rôle of a *religious* writer, however, he counts only six days.

We do not notice the disagreement, under the rule, between the chronological order of certain creations as specified by science and as specified by Moses. But we insist upon the very serious disagreement between the catalogue of creative phenomena furnished by theologic craft and that furnished by *untheologic* science. It is useless to wince under this fact. It is useless to talk Jesuit about it. If a creative event be a day, these thirteen creative events (there may have been *many* more) are death to the cosmogonic interpretation of the Hebrew story.

And yet the story is not touched; because, even if cosmogonic days are not fancies, Moses could not have been so demented as to write of *them*, and yet put two into one and three into another. Because, also, although cosmic creations and geogonic creations are historic facts, Moses does not specify one single development of either kind, not even (as we expect to show) of primal light. Because, also, these creations themselves, not able to find themselves in his story, do thereby bear witness that he has *nothing to do with them*.

Let us now turn back to the proposition which has impelled us to this discussion. It was proposed: To find whether, in the construction of the cosmos by natural processes, there were any proper cosmic days; and whether, if there were, they do or do not correspond to the days of the Mosaic creating.

On the first point, we have failed, rightly or wrongly; and have given reasons, sound or unsound, for our failure.

Upon the second point, we have proceeded upon the supposition that, notwithstanding our opinion to the contrary, there may have been such days; and have therefore brought them into comparison with the Mosaic text.

We have found that the cosmic day, or cosmic light, could not have been the day or light spoken of in the text; because

the latter was co-existing with darkness, which could not have been the case, in any sense or degree, with the primal cosmic light.

We have also found that cosmic light or day has always been one, never admitting of succession or of enumeration in any possible sense; while each was true of the Mosaic light or day.

We have found that cosmic days, so-called, could not have had any evening or waning in regard to their element of light, even though it might be predicable of their respective times and events. More especially have we found that they could not have had, in any sense whatever, any evenings or endings in advance of their mornings or beginnings. Whereas the Mosaic days *did* have their evenings in advance of their mornings.

We have found, also, that to receive *as aeonic* the seventh Mosaic day, with evening first and morning last, involves a gross absurdity, which, in its turn, implicates the integrity and trustworthiness of the whole narrative; that, being avowedly a non-creative day, it could not, like cosmogonic days, have been aeonic, because—no creating, no aeon; and that, being confessedly like the six, it does therefore itself bear witness that they cannot be aeonic, and by consequence are not cosmogonic.

We have found, also, that the seventh day, being the *very same* which was appointed as a sabbath for man, must have been an astronomic day, and that thus it does *again* bear witness that its six fellow days were also astronomic, not aeonic, not cosmogonic.

Finally, we have found that, if a cosmogonic day is coeval and co-extensive with a cosmogonic creative event, then the Mosaic narrative does distinctly disavow such days; because it specifies more such events than its number of days; and also that cosmic history contains a still larger excess of cosmogonic days.

Here, then, we have very many and very serious reasons—all independent of each other, and all evolved by textual

comparisons — for concluding, as we do, that, even if there were proper cosmogonic days in cosmic history, they do not concur with the days of Mosaic history ; and that, therefore, if this history have any claim to credence, it cannot be a history of cosmogony. The creation which it designates must have been some other and some minor creation.

Such are the results of our investigation. If our comparison of cosmogonic days with the Mosaic text is made under mental defect or mental illusion, then is our conclusion defective or illusive. We make no effort to prove our sufficiency of personal parts. At least, we have been honest. We gladly take leave of a course of thought which has necessarily been somewhat polemic — too much so to suit our taste or our habit. And more gladly do we resume our simpler, safer, and more congenial task of trying to unfold the true meaning of the Mosaic text itself. We have digressed to this discussion only that we may be as free as possible from any annoyance which the general subject might occasion us in the more quiet and simple work yet before us. The discussion itself will stand or fall according to its own merits or demerits.

We take leave of this particular theme with a word which may stimulate to reflection, or to investigation, or to both, any whom it may concern. Unless we have greatly slipped in our watchful examination of the entire Hebrew scriptures, there is no one instance out of two thousand (bating this opening chapter) in which the word יום, “day,” stands to express *indefinite* time. On the contrary, it denotes, in every case, some definite and describable time. We are also quite sure that it always points to *astronomic* day as the concrete unit of time, or, more strictly speaking, of light-measure. If we are right, then to assume that the word has an *aeonic* sense in this brief narrative (to say nothing of four other senses) seems to us very bold and very arbitrary.

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE VI.

THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE SOUL OF MAN.

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THE subject which I propose to discuss—the Idea of God in the Soul of Man—belongs at least as much to philosophy as to theology. Every student of philosophy knows that the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche are based upon this idea as their point of departure, and are colored throughout by the interpretation given to it; and nearly as much may be said of Leibnitz and the later German metaphysicians, as well as the most eminent speculatists of our own day; though they often veil his ineffable being and essence under the names of “the Absolute,” “the Universal Will,” “the Unconscious,” and “the Unknowable.” All alike bear testimony to the fact that this idea, in some one of its forms, is primitive in the mind, and upon our conception of it must depend any theory which we may form concerning the nature of pure being, the origin of existence, the source and certainty of knowledge, and the relations of man to the universe. Let us endeavor, then, to bring together and compare with each other the various interpretations which have been given to it, and the manner in which philosophy and theology will be affected by adopting either one of them to the exclusion of the others.

There are, I think, three leading forms of this idea, with which all who have given much thought to the subject are already more or less conversant, and to which all the less prominent varieties of it may easily be reduced. Let me enumerate these briefly at the outset, in order to prepare the way for a subsequent fuller consideration of them.

First, there is the primitive idea of God, which is innate in the human mind, which lies far down and indistinct in

the depths of man's primitive consciousness, which we all at first see, though without looking at it, and which as such is "the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Of course, this is the germ of all the theories which may subsequently be formed upon the subject. Like our other innate ideas, — like those of space and time, for instance, — it may, sooner or later, more or less, or even not at all, be developed by reflection, instruction, or revelation, though these all presuppose it, virtually appeal to it, never entirely efface its original characteristics, and could no more have first imparted it to man than they could have taught geometry to a brute.

Secondly, this germ is often developed (as we have too often seen), by reflective and deductive reasoning, into what may be called the metaphysician's or philosopher's idea of God, as the Infinite and the Absolute, First Cause and *Causa sui*, — as such, necessarily existent, eternal, immutable, and impassive; creating, indeed, because his very being is *actus purus* (action without passion), and therefore necessarily evolving creation from his own essence, though without designing it, as he is without purpose, without affection, and even without consciousness, or any distinctive attribute of personality.

Thirdly, and lastly, experience and inductive reasoning — especially experience of sorrow, weakness, and sin — have evolved from this innate germ what I am content to call the child's idea of God, — for it is also the traditional and the Christian conception of him, — as an All-wise and All-gracious Providence and Moral Governor of the universe, who hears and answers prayer, who rewards justice and punishes iniquity, is offended by sin and propitiated by worship and obedience, and who makes known his will to man by direct and special revelation and by working miracles, as well as by the inward teachings of his Spirit and by the numberless manifestations of artistic and specific design in the visible universe, — a Father in heaven, with a personality as distinct and as conscious as that which he has imparted to you and me and to all our human brethren.

Now, it is obvious that each of these three forms of the idea, if taken entirely by itself, to the exclusion of both the others, is an inadequate and unworthy conception of him whom it partially represents; and is even illusory and deceptive, as leading, either by plain implication or inevitable inference, to consequences which the heart, at least, if not the reason, instinctively rejects. And yet, as I believe may be easily shown, each of them contains some phase or aspect of the truth which is wanting in both the others; and hence, both reason and revelation imperatively require that all three of these representations be combined before we attain any full and worthy conception of the Infinite and Holy One whom we all seek to know and to adore. But no sooner do we attempt such combination than we are beset with difficulties. Many of the attributes which we strive to grasp together, appear, on closer examination, to be inconceivable to thought and irreconcilable with each other. The conclusions to which we are led seem at variance with established facts, or with our most cherished convictions and hopes, or with those necessary laws of thought on which all our reasonings and investigations in other cases depend. We find ourselves either groping in the dark or blinded by excess of light; and in either case we are compelled to echo the sublime exclamation of the Hebrew seer: "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is high as heaven; what canst thou do? Deeper than hell; what canst thou know?"

But here philosophy and revelation alike come to our aid, and assure us that these perplexities and contradictions result from the finiteness of our capacities and the necessary limitations of the human intellect. These difficulties are not inherent in merely this object of thought, or peculiar to a single line of inquiry. They meet and repel us on every hand, whenever we attempt to transcend the sphere of the limited and the finite, to grasp the immeasurable, to descend to the atom, or mount to the absolute beginning of things—to know anything whatever as it really is, or in its inmost

essence. Granted, that we cannot fully comprehend God as he really is ; so neither, if our knowledge be weighed in the same balance, can we understand ourselves. Space and time and causation, pure being and personal being, man and God, must be accepted as ultimate and inexplicable facts. We do not merely believe, we know, that they are, but cannot tell *how* they are. As we cannot go back in an infinite regress, forever deducing one proposition or idea from a preceding one, all that is comprehensible and provable must rest, in the last analysis, on that which is incomprehensible and unprovable. We thus learn, to adopt the language of Sir William Hamilton, that the capacities of our thought are not to be erected into the measure of existence, and that no difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in philosophy. The first principles of mathematical and physical science are as inconceivable and inscrutable as the first principles of theology.

The first or innate form of the idea of God is crude, indistinct, and wavering. If taken by itself, to the exclusion of both the other forms, and without the aid of revelation, it is as likely to become the basis of gross superstition, to be developed into fetichism or polytheism, as to lead to pure monotheism. The second or metaphysical conception of God, as we have learned from Spinoza, only opens the road to pantheism and fatalism. Pushed to its ultimate results by pure reasoning, — unchecked either by the promptings of conscience, the observation of nature, or the word revealed in scripture, — it denies creation and every other form of miracle, rejects the doctrine of a providence or the moral government of the world, annihilates the distinct personality both of man and God, and, by setting up an *immanent*, instead of an *efficient*, cause of the universe, really accounts for nothing, but leaves us precisely where we were at the outset. The third, the childlike and Christian, idea of God satisfies the heart and conscience indeed, and furnishes an adequate guide to life ; but, if unsupported by submissive faith in the teachings of scripture and the church, it does

not answer all the claims of the cultivated intellect. Its tendency is to anthropomorphism. The Infinite and Perfect One, the Author and Finisher of all things, appears too much under the similitude of a glorified human being, with many of the attributes, and even the passions, which we recognize in ourselves. He wills, desires, and purposes, thus apparently laboring to accomplish something not yet within his reach, instead of resting in his infinite perfections. He is mutable, a jealous God, in turn angry and pleased with his people, inflicting punishment and then again repenting him of the evil which he hath caused. We find it hard to reconcile the evil which is in the world, the inequitable distribution of happiness between the righteous and the wicked, with his omnipotence, his perfect wisdom, justice, and goodness.

But what then? Are we to rest satisfied with either of these three forms of the idea, taken separately? or ought we to seek rather to mould them into one, thus eliminating what is crude and unsound, supplying what is imperfect and defective in each, and appealing to the well-known limitations of human thought to account for what might otherwise seem inexplicable, and to lead us to accept different aspects of the same truth, even when they may appear irreconcilable with each other? In order to answer this question, we must examine each of the three forms of the idea more particularly, and show how the second and third are evolved from the elements of the first.

The innate idea of God has, I think, a threefold root in human nature: first, in man's intellect or cognitive faculties; secondly, in his sensibility and affections; and thirdly, in his conscience or moral nature. The first of these has been clearly and fully stated and illustrated by Descartes. Man needs but little reflection and experience, in order to become fully aware that he is a finite, limited, imperfect, and dependent being. In the eloquent language of Pascal: "Man is the feeblest branch of nature; but he is a branch that thinks"; and this thought soon teaches him the feebleness of his powers, the contingency and shortness of his life, and

the limitations of his knowledge. Yet, by that wonderful law of mind which ordains that no one idea can be fully grasped without revealing to us its opposite or contradictory, man cannot know himself without also knowing God; he cannot recognize his own weakness without contrasting it with omnipotence, or the shortness of his life without setting over against it an eternity, or the uncertainty alike of his continuance and his knowledge without having a glimpse of the necessary existence and omniscience of him from whom his own being is derived. In a word, the imperfections of man reveal the perfections of his Creator; and as these perfections cannot be suggested by outward nature,—where also everything is finite, limited, and contingent,—it must be God's own act which thus lights up in the human soul a revelation of himself. It is this first root of the innate idea which, when taken by itself to the exclusion of the other elements, and rigorously developed, by strict *deductive* reasoning, into all its logical consequences, constitutes what I have called the metaphysician's idea of God.

Again, the sensitive or emotional part of our nature is marvellously adapted to the condition in which we are placed, and the relations in which we stand to other beings. The love of society, the affections of kindred, the thirst for knowledge, the stirrings of ambition, emulation, wonder, sympathy, pity, the appetites,—all are desires and needs *which have their appropriate objects*, and incessantly spur us to exertion, that these objects may be attained and these necessities of our nature be gratified. Foremost among these primitive emotions must be placed *the religious sentiment*—that mingled feeling of awe, veneration, trust, and worship, for which, certainly, no finite being can be an adequate object, and which cannot be of artificial or arbitrary growth; since all religious training, all theology appeals to it, is based upon it, and without it would be impossible. In itself considered, and without culture, it is but a blind impulse or craving, is easily perverted, and is the fruitful mother of countless superstitions. But it is as ineradicable as any of the primi-

tive affections ; and the very evils which have grown out of it when unregulated, or ill-regulated, attest alike its fervor and its force. Of course, when acting separately, or even when somewhat modified by the third root, which we have still to consider, it is the germ of what may be called the child's idea of God.

Lastly, conscience or our moral nature reveals to us a law of inherent and imperative obligation, overriding all considerations of prudence or expediency, assuming to bridle our most vehement desires and strongest passions, and asserting its own supreme authority over all other laws and precepts whatsoever. It speaks not to compel ; it has no constraining force, no outward sanction ; it needs none. It recognizes our absolute free-will. We *may* disobey it, if we will. But even in our disobedience we still recognize its majesty, its rightful rule ; and remorse, the stings of conscience, inevitably come to punish the transgression. It seeks no support from extraneous sources. On the contrary, all human and divine law is based upon it, presupposes it, appeals to it, and without it has no binding force whatsoever. It is not infused by education ; it cannot be taught. I do not admit the precept, *Fiat justitia, ruat coelum*, because I find it written in a book, or because my elders and betters have enjoined it upon me, any more than I accept for such reasons the axioms and the theorems of geometry. It is not derived from observation ; for observation can only teach me what is ; while this law proclaims something entirely different—what ought to be. Its demands are very broad ; it simply requires *perfect* honesty, purity, and truth, not only in outward act or speech, but in inward purpose. There is no such thing as half-way justice or qualified veracity ; for what is wrongly so called is not honesty or veracity at all. Now, what is the very nature of a law ? It is a command—the expression of a will ; it presupposes a lawgiver and a government. That is the very meaning of the word. Then the voice of conscience is the voice of God, or rather of a Providence, that is, of a God who governs the world,

and who, by the contents of this law, reveals to man his own nature and attributes, even perfect holiness, justice, and truth.

This might, perhaps, be regarded as a fourth — the moralist's — idea of God. As it seems to me, however, its distinctive function is not so much to furnish an independent conception of Deity as, under its peculiar form of a supreme law and ultimate standard, to modify and regulate the development of the other roots, and to be the tribunal of final appeal in determining their relative pretensions. Exclusive attention to its dictates, — not modified by any consideration of its extreme fallibility, when diverted from its proper office of regulating one's *own* thoughts and actions to that of passing judgment upon the conduct of others, — is the source of that fretful criticism of the ways of God with man, that discontent with the moral government of the world which so frequently constitutes the sceptic's argument, or rather, his excuse.

These are the three germs which constitute the innate idea of God in the human soul, and without which, as well as when without reason or language, man would not be man, but a brute. Left to themselves, without culture or reflection, their joint product is only some crude form of religious faith and observance, which, bad or imperfect as it is, still embraces some belief in a superhuman Power, who directs the conduct and destiny of man, and to whom worship and obedience, sacrifice and prayer, are due. Even in an enlightened country and age, with all the aids of scientific inquiry and philosophical thought, they may receive only a partial and one-sided development. Their obvious meaning may be more or less perverted in order to buttress dogmas or fill out systems of speculation. Such, in truth, has been their history. What I have called the metaphysician's conception of God, as wrought out by Spinoza and Schelling, is drawn exclusively from the first of the roots here mentioned, — from that which has its origin in the intellect alone, — leaving wholly out of view the two others, of at least equal authority, which are supplied by the heart and the conscience. Pure

reasoning about such abstract conceptions as those of the Infinite and the Absolute, neither of which can be comprehended or fully grasped by the mind, might be expected to lead up to consequences as dreary and appalling as fatalism and pantheism combined. On the other hand, the exclusive cultivation of what I have called the second root, the religious sentiment, that vague and awe-struck consciousness of the omnipresence of "him in whom we live and move and have our being," can only end in an irrational, if not immoral, mysticism and quietism, perhaps in a rabid fanaticism. Purest and least perverted is that conception of the Deity which is furnished or regulated by conscience, the third root of the innate idea. Here, at least, we have the unmistakable announcement of a law which is above all other laws, and of a supreme Lawgiver, whose absolute holiness is clearly indicated in the perfect justice, purity, and truth which he ordains. Herein lies the proof of the conscious personality and will of a supreme Governor and Judge of the universe, in that even the Gentiles, who have not the externally written law of God, yet "do by nature the things contained in the law," and thereby "show the work of the law written in their hearts; their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." I am not afraid of the anthropomorphism which is involved in such an idea of God, as I see not how otherwise an Infinite Spirit could reveal himself to a finite consciousness. In some sense or other, God must become man, in order that man may know God. This is the probable meaning of the text which declares that we are "made in his image, after his likeness," and also of that which Paul cites and approves, from an old Greek poet, that "we are also his offspring," and that we should seek after him and find him, "though he be not far from every one of us."

This conception harmonizes perfectly with that which we form of him through the argument from design. For instance, in those two miracles of creative wisdom and adaptive skill, the human eye and the human hand, we find a great number

of parts, agencies, and functions, nicely fitted to each other, and all working together by a complex and intricate, yet orderly process towards the attainment of a definite and highly useful end ; and we argue with confidence that there must exist an intelligent and active Being, who had this end in view, and who made this disposition of the parts as a means for its accomplishment. Of course, the God who is thus revealed to us by his works is an intelligent and conscious Being, having foresight and will, acting with a definite purpose, and thus having a personality as distinct as our own. How he can be at the same time both infinite and absolute we cannot tell, solely because the limitations of human thought do not enable us to cognize either of these attributes. But what then? In like manner, we cannot conceive either the infinity of space or the eternity of duration. In spite of this inability, however, we not only believe, but we know, that space is infinite and duration is eternal — a beginning or an end to either being impossible. As elsewhere, so here we find ourselves situated at the confluence of three immensities and two eternities ; and as this incomprehensibility of our position in the universe does not lead us to doubt our own existence, so the perfectly similar incapacity of human thought must not induce us to question either the existence or the perfections of him who made and placed us here.

We must supplement and correct the imperfect conception of God which is drawn from either of the three germs of the innate idea taken singly, by adding to it each of the others. We must not sublimize him into a mere abstract idea, *aliquid immensum infinitumque*, nor humanize him into a likeness of any of the imperfections of man. We must believe that God is both Infinite and Absolute, at the same time that he is personal ; though we know not how he is so. To believe this, as Mr. Mansel remarks, is simply to believe that God made the world. “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.” *Then*, before

anything was created, he was All in All, Infinite and Absolute, because nothing then existed which could limit his perfections or to which he could be in relation ; One, because the Infinite and Absolute cannot be plural or consist of parts ; Cause of all things, because he existed before all things ; *Causa sui*, or necessarily self-existent, because there was nothing before him whence his being could be derived ; All-holy or perfect, because evil or sin is an imperfection, and therefore cannot co-exist with the Infinite. Hence it is, as Hegel declared, that any philosophy of the Absolute assumes to know God as he is in his eternal essence, before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit. But then creation at any particular moment of time becomes inconceivable to human thought ; for if causation is a possible mode of existence, then that which exists before causing is not infinite ; and that which becomes a cause has passed beyond that which formerly limited its modes of being. But again, I ask : Is this inconceivability of creation a proof that creation is really impossible, or merely that human thought is limited ? If the former, then the doctrine is self-contradictory ; for it asserts that there is something which even Infinite Power cannot do, namely, to create. He who assumes to know what an omniscient and omnipotent God can or cannot do really declares that he is omniscient himself. In like manner, I cannot see *how* suffering and sin can exist in a world governed by an infinitely good and infinitely powerful Being ; but this is only an assertion of what I cannot think, not of what an Infinite God cannot do. I cannot see even how infinite justice can co-exist with infinite mercy, inasmuch as punishment for sin is absolutely required by the one and absolutely forbidden by the other. But their co-existence is surely not prevented by this inability of my thought ; since they must co-exist, or they would not both be infinite.

But the doctrine which we are specially interested to maintain is, that neither of these three forms of the idea of God has any claim to paramount authority, so as to constitute the ultimate standard by which either or both of the others

is to be tried. They stand side by side with equal claims to attention and respect. Each is primitive, innate, having its root in the inmost constitution of our being, and equally corroborated by the teachings of nature and the express declarations of holy writ. Do what we may, we cannot entirely silence either of the three utterances of the divine voice speaking to the soul of man. We cannot eliminate or wholly shut our eyes to any of the aspects under which God is manifested to human consciousness. Each is needed to supplement the others; for either, taken separately, is but a mutilated and unworthy image of the divine essence. Each organ of our spiritual life acts independently, by its own laws, and repudiates encroachments by a foreign power upon its own domain. The intellect, when acting deliberately, refuses its assent to conclusions prompted by the tastes and desires, and, in turn, experiences stout resistance when attempting to eradicate primitive impulses or change the objects of the emotions. Conscience rebels when casuistical reasoning seeks to pervert its dictates, and when appetite or affection lures it to go astray; but the balance of authority shifts to the other side when our matured and well-reasoned convictions declare that the moral nature is acting hastily and impulsively, so as to overleap its natural boundaries and deprive reason of its due. It is mere pedantry to regard man as exclusively a reasoning animal, and logic as the sole guide to truth and right. Frequently our best actions are suddenly prompted by strong affection or by intuitive perceptions of honor and duty, and the highest truths are often spiritually discerned just where the intellect is baffled, or lags behind with a feeble step and an uncertain speech. True, we cannot precisely mark out the boundaries of the provinces within which each of these faculties reigns supreme; but we can still see that these provinces are really distinct, and any decided encroachment upon either of them is both a harm and a wrong.

That conception of Deity which is worked out by the intellect alone has no claim to be considered a fairer likeness of

him than the far different picture presented by the sensibility and the conscience. We are not to throw out the attribute of personality because it is inconsistent with the metaphysician's idea of God, or refuse to believe that he is immutable because he hears and answers prayer, or deny either his omnipotence or his benevolence because there is evil in the world. In either case, the attribute which we vainly seek to eliminate rests upon precisely the same basis of evidence as that which we wrongfully permit to dominate the whole idea. The truth presents itself under a triple aspect; the fact that we cannot reconcile them argues only our ignorance and incompetency, not our power to set bounds to omnipotence.

That the idea of God would be mutilated, and thereby virtually destroyed, by excluding from it either of these attributes, is the doctrine maintained both by Leibnitz and Kant, on the ground of the old scholastic definition of him as *ens realissimum* — the most real of beings. As the unconditioned or absolute First Cause, he is the source and origin of all realities; and since it would be contradictory to suppose that anything should be derived from another which is not already contained in that other, it follows that the sum of all realities, and even of all possibilities, must be comprised within the plenitude of his being. To deny any *positive* attribute of him (all *negative* ones and all imperfections being excluded by the nature of the case) would be to limit, and thereby to deny, his infinite perfection. Nothing is *real* which does not come from him; nothing is *possible* which is not made so by his omnipotence. "If, therefore," argues Kant, "a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of the complete determination of any idea in our mind, — a substratum which is to form the fund from which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied, — this substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a sum total of all reality (*omnitudo realitatis*).” And again he tells us, "All negations — and such are the only predicates by means of which all other and finite things can be dis-

tinguished from the *ens realissimum*—are mere limitations of a greater and higher, and finally of the highest, reality. Consequently they presuppose this reality, and their whole significance and existence are derived from it. The manifoldness, the infinite variety of things is only the infinitely various mode of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their common substratum; just as all figures are possible only as different modes of limiting infinite space.”

But, although the plenitude of his being thus includes all realities, and thereby all predicates, the absolute oneness or simplicity of our idea of him is not thereby negated. A whole, which is a mere aggregate, indeed, presupposes the existence of all its parts, and is conditioned, as it is constituted by them; since without them it would not exist. But just the reverse holds true in respect to our idea of the absolute First Cause. As the source of all things, all realities and attributes presuppose his previous being, instead of constituting it. Unity is no longer incompatible with totality, when the one is the pre-existing source of the all.

Pure ideas, as such, it is admitted, can never have objective reality, as they represent a completeness and perfection to which no phenomenon of experience, existing under all the limitations of time and space, can possibly correspond. Thus, virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity can never be presented in the world of sense, but exist only in contemplation, as aims of effort or guiding stars pointing out directions of progress. But it is otherwise with ideals considered as actually existing not merely in the concrete, but as individual beings or entities, though determinable or determined by the idea alone which shines out through their acts. As the idea provides only a rule in the abstract, so the ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect determination of the copy. But here the Divine must be mingled with the human before there can be an adequate presentation of the great pattern and exemplar. The Saviour of the world is the only actual ideal that has ever appeared to human vision. And it is precisely on account of his divine character and mission,

because he is God manifest in man, that he is at once the perfect Archetype and the most real of beings. Pure ideas are abstractions, formed by throwing out attributes; such exclusion removing them from the world of realities into the world of pure thought. But God, considered as *ens realissimum*, as the source of being, containing in himself not only the sum, but the unity of all attributes, is the most real of all that the human mind can conceive of; he is the farthest removed from an abstraction; no predicate can be denied of him without defacing or breaking his image in the soul of man. He is not merely the Infinite and the Absolute (*aliquid immensum infinitumque*), but he is also the most real of all realities, the most personal of all conscious beings,—a God who hears and answers prayer, who created and governs the universe.

I accept, therefore, the doctrine of Pascal and Hamilton and Mansel. There is an “absolute necessity, under any system of philosophy whatever, of acknowledging the existence of a sphere of belief beyond the limits of the sphere of thought. We must believe as actual much that we cannot positively conceive as even possible. If mere intellectual speculations on the nature and origin of the material universe form a common ground on which the theist, the pantheist, and even the atheist, may alike expatiate, the moral and religious feelings of man—those facts of consciousness which have their direct source in the sense of personality and free-will—plead with overwhelming evidence in behalf of a personal God, and of man’s relation to him as a person to a person. And by our ignorance of the Unconditioned we are led to the further belief that behind that moral and personal manifestation of God there lies concealed a mystery—the mystery of the Absolute and the Infinite; that our intellectual and moral qualities, though indicating the nearest approach to the Divine perfections which we are capable of conceiving, yet indicate them as analogous, not as identical; and that, consequently, we shall be liable to error in judging by human rules of the ways of God, whether manifested in nature or in revelation.”

ARTICLE VII.

DALE ON THE ATONEMENT.¹

BY DR. D. W. SIMON, SPRING HILL COLLEGE, ENGLAND.

THE Congregational Union of England and Wales has established, or as we may say, re-established, an annual lecture, or course of lectures, with a view to the promotion of biblical science and theological and ecclesiastical literature. Of these courses of lectures four have now been published : the one whose title is given above is the third. Most readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* will be already acquainted with Mr. Dale's name.

Like most that Mr. Dale has written, these lectures are very readable. A proof of this is that a fourth and cheap edition has just been published. The style is masculine, and ample use is made of good illustrations. We are inclined, however, to think that readableness has been secured at the expense of some scientific thoroughness, and especially of scientific completeness ; and, after all, what we first look for in a scientific treatise is science. If Mr. Dale had held the reins of his rhetorical impulses tighter he would have left himself more space for the discussion of some branches of the subject which are but inadequately treated. Still the very defect to which we have referred will probably fit the book for awakening a wider interest in the subject, though it may prevent it from being of as much service to the theological student.

There are ten lectures and an appendix of notes. The lectures are headed as follows : Introductory ; The History of our Lord Jesus Christ in relation to the Fact of the Atonement ; the Fact of the Atonement — the Testimony of our Lord ; the Testimony of St. Peter ; the Testimony of St. John and St. James ; the Testimony of St. Paul ; General Considerations confirmatory of the preceding Argument ; the Remission of Sins ; the Theory of the Atonement illustrated by the Relation of our Lord Jesus Christ to the Eternal Law of Righteousness ; the Theory of the Atonement illustrated by the Relation of the Lord Jesus Christ to the Human Race.

The introductory lecture is mainly devoted to a consideration of the necessity under which the Christian mind is laid of endeavoring to construct a theory or doctrine of the atonement. "It is very possible for our theory of the atonement to be crude and incoherent ; but it is hardly

¹ The Atonement. The Congregational Lecture for 1875. By R. W. Dale, M.A., Birmingham. London : Hodder and Stoughton.

possible to have no theory at all. Some conception, however vague, of the relations between human sin and the death of Christ, and between the death of Christ and the divine forgiveness, will take form and substance in the mind of every man who believes that the teachings of Christ and his apostles reveal the thought of God. To speculate is perilous; not to speculate may be more perilous still." It may seem strange that it should be necessary at this day to defend the effort to form an approximately adequate rationale of the fact of the death of Christ and its relation to sin and punishment; but it is due to the religious obscurantism which is being fostered by the Plymouth Brethren, and others of like mind, who literally know not what they are doing; who dream not that they are preparing the way for a new kind of papacy.

Lectures II. to VI. are occupied with ascertaining the teachings of the New Testament as regards the *fact*, in distinction from a doctrine or theory, of the atonement; or, perhaps, rather with showing that the atonement is taught as a matter of fact. In effecting his purpose Mr. Dale appeals rather to the indirect than to the direct evidence. As he observes, the passages directly bearing on the subject have been collected and classified with great completeness, especially by Dr. Crawford in his work on the Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement; he therefore adopts a different method, and, as we think, very wisely. We agree perfectly with the remark that "a mere scattered catalogue of texts in which any great truth is definitely taught can never give a just impression of the place which that truth held in the thought and faith of the apostles. It might even be contended with considerable plausibility that the importance of a doctrine is likely to be in the inverse ratio of the number of passages in which it is directly taught; seeing that the Epistles were occasional writings, suggested by accidental circumstances, and that the central and most characteristic truths of the Christian faith are precisely those which the churches were least likely to abandon. From the very nature of the apostolic writings those truths which belong to the essence of the Christian creed are for the most part implied rather than taught." In fact we do not sufficiently remember that the method of Christ, at all events his primary method, was to evangelize by means of living men; not by books or letters. The latter were designed solely to confirm, encourage, correct, direct, and instruct those who already believed.

The second lecture deals with the evidence from what Christ himself was and did. The difference between him and prophets, apostles, nay all others, is thus described by Mr. Dale: "They were taught of God and they tell us what they have learnt. But the revelation is over when they cease to speak. Their personal character and history; their relations to their friends and to their enemies; their occupations, their sorrows and their joys — all these have only a secondary and human interest. It is not so with our Lord Jesus Christ. Far more of God was revealed in

what he was, in what he did, and in what he suffered, than in what he taught." Replying to a remark of the late Frederick Robertson, to the effect that if the atonement is so essential a part of the gospel, it seems very startling to say that in the most elaborate of all his discourses Christ should omit to mention it, and that it is "absolutely revolting to suppose that the letters of those who spoke of Christ should contain a more perfectly developed Christianity than is to be found in his own words." Mr. Dale well says: "The real truth is, that Christ's chief object in coming was that there might be a gospel to preach." Underlying, perhaps, most attacks on the Bible is the false or, at all events, twisted notion that its chief significance is due to the truths it reveals from God; whereas its chief significance is due to its recording what God has done in, for, and through men for the world's redemption. Primarily it is an historical, not a didactic, book. Mr. Dale brings this out well in relation to the one fact of the atoning death of Christ. To our mind this second lecture is the finest of the whole; concentrated, vigorous, and deeply impressive.

Many readers will be surprised, in reading the third lecture on our Lord's own teachings relatively to his death, to find how much there is in the Gospels bearing on the subject. The manner in which Mr. Dale gathers it up is as appropriate as it is effective. Two points alone can we touch upon. Referring to the notion that his death contributed to our redemption only by producing in us those dispositions which render it right and possible for God to forgive us, he well replies that, if this were so, his death would be no more intimately related to the remission of sins than every part of his public ministry. But how then did it happen that he never even incidentally, not even by implication, affirms that he wrought miracles or revealed truths for the remission of sins; whereas he does affirm that he died for that purpose? "He must have believed that the relation between his death and the remission of sins is different in kind from that which exists between his teaching or his example and the remission of sins." Again, how is the silence of our Lord in relation to such testimony as that of John the Baptist, "the Lamb of God taking away the sin of the world," in view of the idea of the sin-offering which possessed the mind of the Jewish nation, to be explained, if he had not come to obtain by his death the remission of sin?

We must pass over the lectures on the teachings of Peter, John, James, and Paul, though we had noted many points deserving of attention, and, after touching briefly on that headed "General confirmatory Considerations," go on to deal with Mr. Dale's theory. "There are very many persons," says he, "who believe that the idea of an objective atonement was invented in order to satisfy the exigencies of rigid theories concerning the divine justice. . . . This is precisely the reverse of the truth. Theologians did not invent the idea of an objective atonement in order to complete the symmetry of their theological theories. They have invented

theory after theory in order to find a place for the idea. That the death of Christ is the ground on which sin is remitted has been one of their chief difficulties." By way of illustrating this position a few of the chief theories of the atonement, including those of Gregory Nazianzen, Anselm, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, and minor names, are passed in review. Notwithstanding the statement that "it is no part of my intention to sketch, even in outline, the wayward and perplexed movements of speculative thought which [began with Irenaeus and] at the end of sixteen hundred years have not yet arrived at any satisfactory conclusion," we should have been glad if Mr. Dale had spared space elsewhere for this purpose. The course of thought on this subject, especially in Germany since the Reformation, has been deeply interesting; and a review of the chief explanations adopted would have materially aided in the formation of a deeper and truer view of the atonement.

But now to the theoretical portion of the treatise; and let us begin with the lecture on the Remission of Sins. It is mainly devoted to a refutation of the theory of Dr. Young, laid down in his "The Life and Light of Men," which Mr. Dale thinks renders forgiveness impossible; and of that of Dr. Bushnell in his "The Vicarious Sacrifice," which he thinks makes forgiveness unimportant. It seems to us a defect of form that the subject of the forgiveness of sins should be dealt with polemically. Mr. Dale says, indeed, "To attempt a philosophical demonstration of the possibility of the remission of sins is not my purpose. But I propose to examine a theory which, if it were true, would require us to believe that, in the nature of things, sin can never be remitted." Still it seems to us that the efficient refutation of one theory is scarcely possible, save on the basis of another theory; and the lecture would certainly have gained very essentially had the constructive method been pursued.

Two points in Dr. Young's position are assailed, namely: first, that the amount of penalty, visible and invisible, to the veriest jot and tittle, which the violation of law deserves is inflicted; secondly, that spiritual laws, as truly, or even more truly, than natural, being self-acting, these penalties inflict themselves. Against the first point Mr. Dale adduces the apparent inequalities in human experience of the penalties of sin, and apparent escapes from penalty altogether; illustrating his point by reference to cases of intemperance, profligacy, and fraud. Whether Dr. Young would allow these apparent escapes and inequalities to be really such, we know not. He *might* retort by asking: Do the sins you describe, in all cases bear the same proportion to the powers and opportunities of the sinner? If not, the penalty in each case may be exact, and yet not equal or alike. And to urge, as you do, that there is "a confederacy of powers to rescue the guilty from the evils with which these laws menace them" in favor of the possibility of "forgiveness," is to place yourself in another form on my side; for as this confederacy checks some of the penalties by checking some of

the *evil*, so God stops *all* the penalties by rooting out *all* the evil. Besides, even if the inequalities in question be allowed, it depends on the definition of forgiveness whether the fact is relevant or not. We have not been able to make out clearly which of the, at least five or six, different views of the forgiveness of sins Mr. Dale takes. In one place he says (p. 336 f.): "that the *remission of sins, if it stood alone*, would leave us *unsaved*, is one of the common-places of Christian theology; but it does not follow that the remission of sins includes the blessings which are necessary to complete our salvation, or is to be confounded with them. So long as the human heart is conscious of a two-fold misery — the misery of being under the divine condemnation, and the misery of being under the tyranny of evil habits which it cannot throw off, and of evil passions which it cannot subdue — it will passionately cry for a two-fold deliverance. *It is one thing to receive the divine pardon, it is another to recover the divine image.*" Here pardon seems to refer to the divine condemnation alone, and not to include escape from penalty, so far as "the misery of being under the tyranny of evil habits" is a penalty, as which it seems to be regarded by Mr. Dale. But elsewhere (p. 320) we read: "I do not regard the remission of sins as being absolutely identical with escape from the penalties of sin. Sin is sometimes forgiven, although some of the penalties of sin are not recalled. But the remission of sins must be understood to *include the cancelling of at least the severest penalties with which unforgiven sin is justly visited.*" If we take the view expressed in the second quotation, the fact above spoken of is relevant; if the first view, scarcely.

In reference to the second point Mr. Dale says: "Dr. Young's theory ignores the difference between the laws which ought to guide, but which often fail to guide, the conduct of persons and the laws which determine the sequence of phenomena; between ethical laws and those laws which in every sphere of man's individual and social life, from the lowest to the highest, are the same in kind as the laws of the physical universe." We scarcely think Dr. Young would object to this just distinction; but, to our mind, the question depends mainly on whether, as he assumes, there be an eternal law of righteousness, independent of God, to which God and all other beings are alike subject. If there be no such law — as we for our part believe, and if all law, whether natural or ethical, have its seat and root in God, then it is merely a question of terms whether we describe spiritual laws as self-acting, so far as the penalties of their violation are concerned, or as wielded by their author.

In point of fact, the question of penalties arises only in connection with ethical laws; for, as Mr. Dale has vigorously illustrated, natural laws cannot be disobeyed; or, to put the matter in a, to us, preferable form, the only forces that have the option of disobeying their laws are the ethical forces; consequently they are the only ones that can incur penalties. If this be true, Mr. Dale's distinction will only help him, if he can show that

Dr. Young's view of the relation between law and God is false. Judging from the extract from Dr. Young laid before his readers, Mr. Dale seems also to have pressed the word "immediate" rather unfairly; for, as we read him, all he means is that the spiritual laws *begin* to act at once, and go on acting "*as long as the evil remains.*" These last very important words of Dr. Young's have not been allowed their due weight. There is no denying, however, be it said, that Dr. Young has laid himself open to critical attacks, by the exaggerations which mark his style of discussion.

Mr. Dale's treatment of Dr. Bushnell's so-called "moral theory" of the atonement is just; and he deserves the thanks of all who are interested in biblical Christianity for his vigorous reassertion of such "austere" truths as the wrath of God.

As the remaining lectures contain the essential part of Mr. Dale's theory, we must give a somewhat full outline of their argument, and shall reserve our criticisms till the close. After a brief reference to the various New Testament representations of the death of Christ, and to the relation between Christ and the penalties of sin set forth in the words of scripture, we are introduced to the problem in these words: "In these lectures it is assumed that Christ was the eternal Word, who 'was in the beginning with God,' and that 'all things were made by him, and without him nothing was made that was made.' The question we have to determine is, the *relation between God himself and the eternal law of righteousness.*"

Is the will of God the ultimate ground of moral obligation — of the antithesis between right and wrong? No; for then we could not account for the recognition of moral obligation where the existence of God is denied or doubted; for if we impeach the absolute and eternal authority of our moral intuitions, we cannot trust any of our faculties; moreover, no mere command can create a duty unless there is an antecedent obligation to obey the authority from which the command proceeds. "Duty," in a word, "is inconceivable if moral obligation does not exist antecedently to the divine commands."

Nor can the origin of moral distinctions be found in the nature of God. "Conscience does not rest the moral obligation of justice on the fact that God is just, but affirms that justice is of universal and necessary obligation. We reverence God himself because he is righteous; not righteousness merely because by righteousness men become like God."

What, then, is the relation between the two? God's "relation to the law is not a relation of subjection, but of identity. Hence 'he cannot be tempted of evil.' In God the law is alive; it reigns on his throne, sways his sceptre, is crowned with his glory." "God, as a living person, must have the same authority over my will that conscience acknowledges in the eternal law of righteousness, if I am to worship and obey him; in other words, if he is to be my God."

As a part of this general question, the *relation between God and the*

penalties of sin is next investigated. Various views of punishment — the reformatory, the rectoral, the personal — are first examined, and the just conclusion arrived at, that the “only conception which satisfies our strongest and most definite moral convictions, and which corresponds to the place it occupies in the organization of society and in the moral order of the universe, is that which represents it as *pain and loss inflicted for the violation of a law.*”

“Is it necessary that this principle should be asserted, and asserted by God himself?” It is; “or else,” we are told, “the divine will cannot be perfectly identified with the eternal law of righteousness. God would cease to be God if his will were not a complete expression of all the contents of the eternal law of righteousness.”

“It is, then, inevitable that God should inflict the penalties which sin has deserved? Is the moral government of the universe a vast and awful mechanism, dispensing rewards and punishments from eternity to eternity in exact proportion to righteousness and sin?” This is not so; for “whatever moral significance might attach to the punishment of sin if punishment were inflicted by “self-acting” spiritual laws, its moral significance is immeasurably heightened if in every case it is the immediate or remote effect of a divine volition.” “The sufferings which punish sin in this world, and the sufferings which will punish it in the next, are the expression of the irreconcilable antagonism of God to sin and to those who persist in sinning. *It is this which gives them their transcendent significance.*”

But if these things be so, “it would appear that, if in any case the penalties of sin are remitted, some other divine act of at least equal intensity, and in which the ill-desert of sin is expressed with at least equal energy, must take its place. If God does not assert the principle that sin deserves punishment by punishing it, he must assert that principle in some other way.”

“The Christian atonement is the fulfilment of that necessity.” The principle in question would have been “adequately asserted had God inflicted on man the penalties of transgression.” It is asserted in a still grander form in that he to whom it belonged to assert by his own act that suffering is the just result of sin, endured the suffering himself, instead of inflicting it on the sinner.

The next question is: “*On what grounds could the moral Ruler of mankind so identify himself with our race as to assume our nature and endure suffering instead of inflicting it on us?*” Mr. Dale here goes back to the original relation of Christ; first to the universe generally, and secondly to mankind in particular. The former he finds set forth in Col. i. 15–17: “For in him were all things created that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things were created by [or through] him, and for [or unto]

him. And he is before all things, and by him all things consist." The latter is "illustrated in the simplest and most perfect manner by our Lord himself in the words, 'Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches: he that abideth in me and I in him the same bringeth forth much fruit; for apart from me ye can do nothing.' We truly live only as we live in Christ. Our highest life is life derived from him. . . . In a true and deep sense Christ is the 'Firstborn of all creation'; all ranks and orders of created beings, and even the material works of the divine power — through whatever is fair and noble in them — have a relationship to Christ more or less intimate or remote. Between man and Christ, according to God's thought, the relationship was meant to be near and vital." In other words, all creation, humanity especially, has its root, ground, subsistence, in Christ, and is through and unto him what it is.

Such being our relation to Christ, "there is nothing technical, formal, or artificial, in the prerogative of divine sonship which is conferred on all that are in Christ. Our own relation to the Father is determined by the relation of Christ to the Father." Hence "the real and frank consent to the justice of the penalties" of sin, without which there can be no redemption, and which Christ gave for us, becomes really, and not merely technically, ours; and when he submitted on the cross to be forsaken of the Father and die, he endured the "*actual penalty of sin*. . . . He made *our real relation to God his own*"; so that from thenceforth "his relation to the Father is no longer of a kind to render it untrue to our relation to God."

Further, not only do we originally live in Christ, but, as Paul seems to teach, "we died in his death"; "in his death our sin dies, and in his life the very life of God is made our own." This, too, was necessary; for "no assertion on God's part of the ill-desert of sin, no submission on our part to the justice of the penalties of sin, could have made it morally possible for the penalties of sin to be remitted in the absence of a complete security for the disappearance of sin. This moral security has been created by the sufferings of Christ on the cross. The death of Christ is the death of sin."

Mr. Dale's own summary of his theory is as follows:

1. "The death of Christ is the objective ground on which the sins of men are remitted, because it was an act of submission to the righteous authority of the law by which the human race was condemned — a submission by one from whom, on various grounds, the act of submission derived transcendent moral significance, and because in consequence of the relation between him and us, his life being our own, his submission is the expression of ours, and carries ours with it. In a real, and not merely in a technical, sense the act is ours."

2. "The death of Christ is the objective ground on which the sins of

men are remitted, because it rendered possible the retention or the recovery of our original and ideal relation to God through Christ, which sin had dissolved, and the loss of which was the supreme penalty of transgression."

3. "The death of Christ is the objective ground on which the sins of men are remitted, because it involved the actual destruction of sin in all those who through faith recover their union with him."

4. "The death of Christ is the objective ground on which the sins of men are remitted, because in his submission to the awful penalty of sin, in order to preserve or restore our relations to the Father through him, there was a revelation of the righteousness of God which must otherwise have been revealed in the infliction of the penalties of sin on the human race."

The first point to which we wish to direct critical attention is the notion of "the eternal law of righteousness" with which Mr. Dale operates. Our knowledge of this eternal law of righteousness is put on the same footing as our knowledge of the truths of pure mathematics; and we are told "we can trust none of our faculties unless we can trust those by which we apprehend the *universal* and *necessary* obligation of justice and truth, and which affirm the eternal distinction between good and evil." In short, our perception of right and wrong is our perception of "the eternal law of righteousness." But is this so? Right and wrong are surely qualities of relations between actually existent beings; and the relations between beings are surely determined by their nature. If this be the case, right and wrong, as far as men are concerned, can have had no existence till men were created; and right and wrong in the human sense can have no existence even now for beings whose nature is not identical with ours. What we perceive, is the rightness or wrongness of a possible or actual relation between ourselves and other beings; and assuming that wherever the same kinds of beings are similarly related the same things will be right and wrong, we attribute to our notion of right and wrong a sort of universality—a universality, however, which does not apply to beings not possessing our nature. But this is not identical with the perception of an *eternal* law of righteousness. Right and wrong were created for us when we were created what we are. This is evident from the simple fact that what is right and wrong for us is not right and wrong for one of the lower animals. An *eternal* law of *righteousness* can have no existence save in or for an eternal being; and, so far as we can see, even such a being can know nothing of such an eternal law, unless it be in relation; for both the idea of righteousness and the idea of law are unthinkable without relationship. The only senses, so far as we can see, in which our perception of right and wrong can be at all fairly described as the perception of "the eternal law of righteousness"—neither of which is indicated by Mr. Dale—are the following: When God thought in eternity the beings which he created in time, he thought, also, their relations, and thought those relations, of course, as right or wrong. When we

think right and wrong relations, it is because we perceive the divine thought; our perception is not merely a perception of the relations themselves as right or wrong, but of the divine thought of the relations. Hence the eternal and necessary element supposed to be in it. Or eternity is predicated of the quality of righteousness in this connection, because the one factor of the relation, God, is eternal. Whether either of these thoughts lies back of Mr. Dale's position, we know not. For our own part, we see nothing in our notion of right or wrong requiring us to give such an account of its rise.

We next come to Mr. Dale's treatment of the relation between God and "the eternal law of righteousness." When combating the idea that the antithesis between right and wrong originates in the *will* of God, he says that such a notion renders it difficult to account for an atheist's "recognition of moral obligation." We believe it to be impossible to give a scientific or philosophical account of the consciousness of moral obligation apart from the recognition of the existence of God; but we see no more reason why the denial of God should interfere with a man's sense of right and wrong, than with his idea of agreement or disagreement between an intellectual representation and a sensuous impression. God has created us both for the one and the other, and no denial of things outside of us will get rid of things that pertain to our very constitution. We may be unable to explain the origin of the distinction save by referring it to the will of God; but that does not affect the reality to us of the distinction itself. This by the way, for we cannot here enter further into the question of the reason of the so-called universal validity of mathematical and moral truths.

As was mentioned previously, Mr. Dale refuses to find the origin of the antitheses between right and wrong, or of the eternal law of righteousness, either in the will or nature of God, and says that this law is "alive in God," or is "identical with God." We confess that we do not quite understand the difference between his position and one of those which he repudiates. Suppose the eternal law to be alive in God, — either the two were primarily distinct and subsequently blended into unity, which cannot be Mr. Dale's notion, or the two were originally identical. In the latter case the questions recurs: What then is the seat of this law in God? Is it his nature, or is it his will? Mr. Dale's mode of speech logically implies the former; for surely *life*, *identity*, *being*, are expressions relating to the nature and its modes of subsistence. Such objections as "we reverence God himself because he is righteous; not righteousness because by righteousness men become like God," are not met by the identification of the law and God; for one might reply, "in order to know that God is identical with the eternal law of righteousness I must have an independent knowledge both of the law and of God"; indeed, they rather suggest the independence of the law, as maintained by Dr. Young, which we reject as earnestly as Mr. Dale can do.

But, passing by minor points open to criticism, we must now go on to examine the final outcome of Mr. Dale's reasonings, his own rationale or theory of the atonement.

The problem is stated by him as follows: "If God does not assert the principle that sin deserves punishment by punishing it, he must assert it in some other way. Some divine act is required which shall have all the moral worth and significance of the act by which the penalties of sin would have been inflicted on the sinner; the Christian atonement is the fulfilment of that necessity." The alternative divine act thus required was accomplished when Christ submitted to "the awful experience which forced from him the cry 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' and to the death which followed." The question which then arises is, what constituted these sufferings of Christ a sufficient alternative for the infliction of the penalty of sin on the sinner? Mr. Dale's language seems to us at this point to lack its usual clearness and precision. After repeatedly and carefully examining his statements, we have been unable to avoid the impression — though we may be mistaken — that they contain irreconcilable elements. But we will give the reasons of our impression. So far as we can discover, the following are the grounds assigned for the sufficiency of what Christ suffered on the cross:

(a) *Endurance of the actual penalty of sin.* "On the cross he submitted to the *actual penalty* of sin." "He did not merely confess our sin; he did not merely acknowledge that we deserved to suffer. He endured the *penalties* of sin." By the awful experience he endured and his death "he made *our real relation* to God his own, while retaining — and, in the very act of submitting to the penalty of sin, revealing in the highest form — the absolute perfection of his moral life."

(b) "The death of Christ was a propitiation for the sins of men because it was a *revelation* of the righteousness of God, on the ground of which he can *remit the penalties of sin*; because it was an act of *submission* to the *justice* of those penalties on behalf of mankind, an act in which our own submission was really and vitally included; and because it secured the destruction of sin in all who, through faith, are restored to union with Christ." This statement seems to Mr. Dale "the complete truth." The same ideas are elsewhere expressed: "Act of *submission* to the righteous *authority* of the law by which the human race is condemned"; "Surrendered to desertion and to death that the *justice* of the penalties might be *affirmed* before the *penalties were remitted*"; "No assertion on God's part of the ill-desert of sin, no submission on our part to the justice of the penalties of sin, could have made it morally possible for the penalties of sin to be remitted in the absence of a complete security for the disappearance of sin."

(c) "The whole law — the authority of its precepts, the justice of its penalties — must be asserted in the divine acts." It was asserted in that Christ endured suffering himself, instead of inflicting it on the sinner.

He endured "penal suffering" in order that "the penalties of sin" might be remitted.

In these three sets of extracts there seem to us to be traces of the three following views of Christ's death: The *first* set would most naturally suit the doctrine that "what Christ paid when he became obedient unto death was exactly what sinners owed, or neither more nor less than an equivalent for it." The *second* seems to have more affinity, partly with the position of Dr. McLeod Campbell and Mr. Maurice, partly with a declarative, or perhaps a governmental or rectoral, doctrine like that of Dr. Wardlaw and many New England divines. The *third* set, again, reminds us of what Dr. Crawford calls the catholic view, which is, "that God has been pleased to appoint and to accept of the sufferings of Christ as a propitiation for the sins of all who trust in him; or that he has deemed these sufferings a sufficient ground for exempting all such from the penalties they have justly incurred"; in other words, the "Satisfaction view."

Our own explanation of these inconsistencies is this: that whilst Mr. Dale's philosophical premises led naturally to the "Satisfaction view," repelled by the coldness and unreality commonly characteristic of it, he has endeavored, on the basis of the idea of the vital headship of Christ, to deal with the death of Christ as "really, and not merely technically, ours." Hence the use of the strong terms about "penalty." But sensible of the impossibility of such an endurance of "the *actual* penalty of sin," he turned off towards the idea of submission to "*justice*," to "authority of law," to "righteousness"—between which and Campbell's "confession of sin" and the "repentance for sin" advocated by others, there seems to us an essential affinity. We think he would have found a solution of the problem more in harmony with his own instincts, equally, or indeed more, philosophical, far more exactly scriptural, and quite as just to all that is essential in the past thought of the church, in the *direction* indicated by Professor Dr. Schöberlein in a small, little known, but very suggestive, work, entitled, *Die Grundlehren des Heils entwickelt aus dem Principe der Liebe*.

Whilst we have freely hinted at some, and criticised other, defects of Mr. Dale's work, we cannot part from it without expressing our conviction of its value. Taken as a whole it is pre-eminently fitted to be useful. The inductive portion which deals with the scriptural evidence of the fact is admirably done—as fresh as it is thorough; and the theoretical part, though theoretically unsatisfactory, contains so much of important truth, forcibly, eloquently, warmly put, that it will be sure to arrest attention to its grand theme, and suggest to other minds new lines of investigation.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN AND FRENCH WORKS.

ACTS OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.¹—Father Theiner, the editor of the work whose full title is given below, was, in his later years, keeper of the papal archives in Rome. He had previously been Professor at the *Propaganda*. At the outset of his career he sympathized with the movement in Germany which ended in the founding of the sect of the "German Catholics," of whom Ronge was the most noted leader. Midway in his life he sympathized with ultramontane tendencies, though he never went to the lengths to which the Jesuits desired to drag him. He closed his life as a martyr of the opposition to the decree of the Infallibility of the Pope. Ever since he became one of the priests of the oratory, the Jesuits have intrigued against him; and they succeeded at last, during the Vatican Council, in getting him deprived of his archivarial office. The reason of his dismissal was that a copy of the order of procedure adopted by the council of Trent had found its way into the hands of the opposition bishops, and this was laid to his charge. Professor Friedrich, however, proved after his death, that it was not his doing. Amongst his papers was left the work now under notice. It is the official diary of the secretary of the council, Angelo Massarelli, and though, as an official document, marked by reticence, contains and hints at much that was either not known or only guessed. Among other facts of importance are the following: that the most important decrees were enacted by only about sixty bishops; and that the Italian bishops, who were all dependent on the pope, disposed of more than two thirds of the votes. Indeed, as the Emperor Ferdinand was in the habit of saying, "the Holy Ghost came from Rome on the horses of the couriers." From the glimpses here gained, the intellectual culture of many of the bishops must be judged to have been disgracefully low; credible enough, however, after the samples of the exegesis of the present infallible pope given by Mr. Gladstone in one of his recent publications. The passions, too, of the bishops would seem to have been as untamed as their learning was limited; for they repeatedly got to blows, and one of their number had to be locked up for his violence. The value of the present publication lies in its official character; it does not profess to give a complete picture of the entire council.

¹ Acta genuina ss. oecumenici Concilii Tridentini ab Angelo Massarello Episcopo Thelesino ejusdem concilii secretario conscripta edidit Augustinus Theiner. 2 vols. 4to.

HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT.¹—Sickel's work is based on documents contained in the Austrian archives, and is said to bring many actually new facts relating to the council, and thus to give a vivid idea of its character, mode of procedure, and transactions. This and the last-mentioned work are well fitted to supplement each other.

GERMANIA SACRA.²—A kind of theological Murray or Bädeler for Germany and German Austria. "Those who seek for information about places where eminent ecclesiastics and pedagogues were born and died, lived and labored; where princes, scholars, poets, and artists worked for the church; where fanatics, enthusiasts, sectaries, and freemasons have pursued their practices; where there are artistic monuments of importance in relation to the life of the church; and where there are useful Christian institutions, cannot do better than refer to this work."

NATURAL HISTORY OF CULTURE.³—The aim of this work is to apply the principles of the most radical Darwinism to the domain of the history of ethical culture; and it is accordingly dedicated to the German professor, who out-Darwins Darwin, Ernst Häckel. As the title itself indicates, the history of culture is regarded as a natural development. The author recognizes neither the freedom of the human will nor the existence of a soul. As to "concern for the salvation of the soul," it is, says he, concern for a "non-existent thing." "The entire development of culture revolves round the principle 'the end sanctifies the means'; a mighty principle, for which the Jesuits have been wrongly made answerable, whereas it has been taken as a guide in all ages by the great leaders of civilization." In harmony with this view of matters, the writer judges the Jesuits almost more favorably than the Reformers, whose "deeds and sympathies were very little raised above the level of the Romish church." "The faith of the Reformation brought no gain to culture; the edifice of superstition was rather strengthened than overthrown by the biblical faith which it introduced." Christianity is treated as a religion fit only for particular, i.e. the European, nations; and the philanthropic efforts of evangelical Christians to do away with slavery and the like are described as "hypocritical." After these samples our readers will be able to judge for themselves whether the book will suit them.

HISTORY OF PEDAGOGICS.⁴—As Germany has devoted more attention

¹ Zur Geschichte des Concils von Trient. Von. H. Sickel. 1870.

² Germania Sacra. Ein topographischer Führer durch die Kirchen- und Schulgeschichte deutscher Lande. Von Carl Julius Böttcher. Leipzig: Naumann. 2 vols. 1874. 10½ Mark.

³ Culturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart. Von F. von Hellwald. pp. 839. Augsburg: Lampart and Co. 1875. 12 Mark.

⁴ Geschichte der Paedagogik vom Wiederaufblühen klassischer Studien bis auf unsere Zeit. Von Carl von Raumer. 4 vols. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann. 1874. 26 Mark.

to the art of teaching than any other country, so also to the history of all that is connected with teaching. Amongst the various larger and smaller works on the subject of pedagogics that have been published during the last thirty years, none has been able to supplant this of Carl von Raumer. First issued in 1842, it now appears in a fourth edition unchanged, the author having died many years ago. The history commences with the revival of classical studies. The first three volumes consist chiefly of biographies of noted schoolmasters; the third treats of the pedagogical methods of the present day as carried out in schools; the fourth deals with the German universities. The spirit of the whole work is that of a sincere and earnest, but liberal, Christian thinker. Unfortunately the tendency of too many of the pedagogues of Germany at the present time is altogether antagonistic to the Christianity in which the culture is rooted which they aim to further.

KARL ROSENKRANZ.¹—Rosenkranz calls himself the centre of the Hegelian school; if he be not the centre, he is, at all events, one of the chief members of the centre. In the work mentioned below he gives us his autobiography, starting with Magdeburg, his birth-place, and leaving off at Königsberg, where he is now Professor of Philosophy. Rosenkranz is not one of the dry philosophers; he is a man of very large, general, specially aesthetic culture; and this autobiography is a most interesting book. In sketching the course of his personal development he makes us acquainted with most of the chief men of Germany during the last forty or fifty years. Some of his judgments are well worthy of being noted by such as are willing to be taught by the history of human thought; such, for example, as this: "the entire development of moderate Hegelianism tends toward an apostasy from Romanticism to Rationalismus vulgaris." Interesting as the book is, however, it must be read, *cum grano salis*, for the author has, as the Germans say, ein starkes Selbstbewusstsein.

THE RELIGIOUS AND ECCLESIASTICO-POLITICAL QUESTIONS OF THE PRESENT DAY.²—Professor Frohschammer has republished in this volume a number of Essays and Articles which were originally written for the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, and similar first-class German journals. They deal with such questions as—The Papacy and the State; the Dogma of Infallibility and Governments; German Protestantism and Infallibility; the Programme of the Old Catholic Congress at Munich in 1871; the Intellectual Crisis of the Present Day; Catholicism and the Religion of the Future; Italy and the Papacy. Dr. Frohschammer, as some of our readers well know, is Professor of Philosophy at the University

¹ Von Magdeburg bis Königsberg. Berlin: Heimann. 8 Mark.

² Ueber die religiösen und kirchenpolitischen Fragen der Gegenwart. Von Dr. J. Frohschammer. Elberfeld. Ed. Loll. 1875.

of Munich. He was at one time Professor of Roman Catholic Theology, and a priest, but was excommunicated for his liberalism. He has not joined the Old Catholics because he goes further than they do. Some of the Essays here collected have had a wide circulation. They are well fitted to open the eyes of unprejudiced Romanists to the errors and monstrous pretensions of their church leaders. Those who wish to get a good view of the *ins* and *outs* of the great ecclesiastical movement of the present day cannot do better than read this work.

THE RELIGION OF ANCIENT ROME.¹ — The scope of this work cannot be better indicated than in the following words of the author himself in his preface: "A reader passing suddenly from the study of the letters of Cicero to that of the correspondence of Marcus Aurelius would find himself in a new world. In two centuries Roman society underwent a complete change; but of all the changes it underwent, the most remarkable, and the one that could be least anticipated, is its passage from unbelief to devotion. . . . Religion is completely absent from the letters of Cicero. It is everywhere present in those of Marcus Aurelius. . . . What had happened in the interval to account for this change? What events and what influences led Rome into a path from which it seemed at first so far removed? How and by what stages was it converted from incredulity to belief? This is the question which I shall endeavor to answer in the following work."

The author conceives that the history of Roman paganism from the time of Augustus onward falls into two distinct periods, the one extending to Marcus Aurelius, the other from Marcus Antoninus to its downfall; and he has selected the former period for examination, because Christianity was first publicly brought before the notice of the authorities by its apologists in the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

The following is in brief the table of contents: General Character of the Religion of Rome; the Religion of Rome at the close of the Republic; Religious and Moral Reforms of Augustus; the Imperial Apotheosis; the Age of Augustus; Virgil; the Sixth Book of the *Aeneid*; What remained of the Reforms of Augustus after his death; Foreign Religions; Roman Philosophy after Augustus; Seneca; Seneca and St. Paul; the Theology of Rome; the Higher Classes in Rome; Women; the Lower Classes and the Popular Associations; Slaves; the Religion of Rome in the Second Century.

The attitude of the writer towards Christianity is rather favorable than otherwise. He thinks, indeed, that the religious and philosophical movement of the first century prepared the way for Christianity, and rendered its success more easy; but does not regard it as a mere product of causes previously operating, or deny to it anything essentially new, as many are now disposed to do.

¹ *La Religion Romaine d'Auguste à Antoninus.* Par Gaston Boissier. Paris: Hachette et Cie. 1874.

Those who are acquainted with the German works on the general subject will not find here much that is novel ; but, nevertheless, M. Boissier's book is worthy of study. One advantage it has over German treatises,—that of readableness. Its points of view are also different ; in some respects, perhaps, better.

In common with many other writers on the subject, M. Boissier is too much inclined to forget that the really new in Christianity is its *facts*, not its *ideas*, save as its facts involve new ideas. If it be true, its leading ideas ought to have been anticipated, at all events, darkly ; but its facts could not have been anticipated. To the forgetfulness of this very simple distinction is due much of the confusion which characterizes, perhaps, most of the discussions of the question of the relation of Christianity to heathen religions.

THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY.¹—The design of M. Havet's work, of which the two volumes before us are merely the first part, is to trace back Christianity to its true sources ; that is, "not its immediate sources,—namely, the preaching of him who was called the Christ and of his apostles,—but its primary and more profound sources,—namely, those of Greek antiquity from which it entirely proceeded." What he aims to establish is, that "Christianity is far more Hellenic than Jewish. It is necessary to distinguish the essence from the accidents, the Christian spirit from the Christian revolution. The latter came from Judea and Galilee ; it was brought about by Jews. But the former—the Christian idea and the Christian life—contains scarcely anything that could not be found in the philosophy and religion of the Greeks and Romans, or which, at all events, might not naturally have grown out of them under the influence of causes then operating in the world. The Christianity of to-day lives on the same religious and moral stock as the pagans of the classic ages, modified merely by the work of time, by democratic progress, by the approximation of the nations, and the resultant exchange of manners and ideas, and, above all, by the profound sense of suffering and desolation which possessed the human mind during the dominion of the Caesars. It is true, Jewish ideas seemed at first to prevail. There was, however, no God-man and no metaphysics. Faith consisted solely in the expectation of a visible and speedy catastrophe, which would substitute a new, for the existing, order of things. But this Galilean Christianity passed away like a torrent, and the Hellenic ground-work reappeared."

M. Havet's work is evidently based on careful study. His notes—an unusual feature of French works—bear testimony to his learning and labor. The material he has gathered may well be used against his own position. Though his results do not agree with ours, we cannot but

¹ Le Christianisme et ses Origines. Par Ernest Havet. Paris : Levy Frères. 2 vols. 1873.

rejoice that so much attention is being directed to this important question of the relation of Christianity to the religions, morals, and metaphysics which preceded and surrounded its advent. The subjects discussed in these two volumes are as follows: Homer and Pythagoras; Athens in the Sixth Century, Religion, the Mysteries; Pindar and Tragedy; The Science and Morals of the Sophists; Euripides; Incredulity and Superstition; The Bacchantes; Empedocles; Socrates; The Socratics; Xenophon and Isocrates; Egypt; Plato; Aristotle; the Stoics and Epicurus; the Time between Alexander the Great and the Romans; Roman Epoch; Cicero; Religion at the Time of Augustus; Virgil; Astrology and Manilius; Philosophy under Augustus and Tiberius; Horace; the Rhetoricians; Valerius; Judaism; Roman Stoics; Seneca; Lucan, Petronius, Persius; the Pagan World at the Death of Nero. As will be seen, the author covers about the same ground as such works as Nägelsbach on Greek Theology, Zeller's History of Greek Philosophy, Friedländer's Manners of Greeks and Romans, but from a different point of view. Like French works generally, it is, at all events, intelligible.

THE ETHICS OF THE CHURCH AND THE ETHICS OF NATURE.¹ — The motto on the title-page of M. Boutteville's work indicates its general tendency — "*Homme ou Chretien.*" It is divided into eight studies, entitled respectively, — Evil; Man; the Church; Law; the Individual; Society; Free-will; Sanction, with a Prologue and Epilogue. The following passage will show the spirit and tendency of the work: "Man, at his origin, found himself in the presence of a double problem — the world and himself. By way of solution he had recourse to an hypothesis, he invented God. At the present day, reason, enlightened by science and ripened by reflection, refuses to accept an hypothesis as the foundation of the moral law. Reason, in fine, knows nothing of God, nothing of a fall of man, nothing of the mysteries of the incarnation and redemption. It recoils with terror from the dogma of predestination and grace; it trembles with indignation and horror before him who sets up as sanctions of the moral law the eternal rewards and punishments of another life. It maintains that man is a moral being in the same sense in which he is a sentient and intelligent, i.e. by nature and constitution. He finds of himself in the study of his faculties, and of the rights which they confer upon him, the rule of his duties. Morality then, the idea of which is identical with that of justice, and consequently with that of the dignity of our species, is simply the rule of our duties, based on the knowledge of our nature and our rights. This rule is not external to man; it dwells altogether in him. Impersonal and obligatory, *per se*, carrying with it its own sanction, it im-

¹ La Morale de l'Église et la Morale Naturelle. Études Critique par M. — L. Boutteville. Paris: Levy Frères. 1866.

poses itself necessarily on all beings endowed like man with freedom, and like him having the consciousness of their destinies and their ends."

Throughout his discussion M. Boutteville draws contrasts between the moral teachings of nature or philosophy and those of the church, by no means to the advantage of the latter. Nor, indeed, if by the church we understand the Roman Catholic church, can much be urged against his procedure. But we Protestants object to the identification of church and Romish church; still more to the identification of Christianity and Romish church. Works of this character are a sign of the times to which it behoves Christian teachers to take heed. Their danger lies in their being full of half truths which ignorant readers take, as their authors desire them to do, for whole truths. S.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

DARWINIANA: Essays and Reviews pertaining to Darwinism. By Asa Gray, Fisher Professor of Natural History (Botany) in Harvard University. 12mo. pp. 396. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1876.

Some who had private knowledge knew who was the author of the Essays now collected in this volume. A few others, who had made careful study of the literature of the subject, had divined their authorship from internal evidences. For the combination of such fulness of scientific knowledge, skilfulness in literary expression, and loyalty to religious truth is not found outside a very limited circle of contemporary authors. None of these Articles are ephemeral; since even if the theory which they discuss should become obsolete, the philosophy which they embody will be of permanent interest so long as questions of adjustment between scientific investigators and religious interpreters shall arise. The author defines his position as that of "one who is scientifically, and in his own fashion, a Darwinian, philosophically a convinced theist, and religiously an acceptor of the 'creed commonly called the Nicene,' as the exponent of the Christian faith" (p. vi). In ability to expound the principles and discern the limitations of the theory which accepts the derivative origin of species, and accounts for it through natural selection, Dr. Gray stands in the very front rank. There is no American to whom European authorities refer in scientific matters with more confidence and deference than to him.

The present volume is not a systematic treatise either in science or in theology. It is better. It is a collection of Essays by one who both thoroughly understands natural science and the system of orthodox theology. Those struggles for the conciliation of these systems, which are going on in the minds of an increasing multitude, have taken place in his. The results are embodied here, in Essays which have been written at various times during the past sixteen years, and when his mind was under the stimulus which was adapted to secure its best fruits. The reader will hardly find anywhere a more complete or trustworthy exposition of the

argument for the derivative origin of species than is given him in this book, and that combined with literary attractions of a high order. If one wishes to study the subject systematically, a Table of Contents and Index enable him to do so. We think it well that the Essays are republished in their original form. In any attempt to recast them they would doubtless have lost much of their aroma, and gained little in anything else. We are permitted now to go down to the first troubling of the pool. Furthermore, as our author remarks, "to many readers there may be some advantage in going more than once, in different directions, over the same ground."

The desirability of having them collected in one volume may be seen in the list we append of the times and places in which they have appeared. Four of the Articles appeared in *The American Journal of Science and Arts* (of which Dr. Gray has long been an editor); namely, "On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection," March, 1860. "Design *versus* Necessity: a Discussion between two Readers of Darwin's Treatise on the Origin of Species, upon its Natural Theology," September, 1860; "Species as to Variation, Geographical Distribution, and Succession," May, 1863; "Duration and Origination of Race and Species," February, 1875. Three, with the title, "Natural Selection not inconsistent with Natural Theology," were published in the *Atlantic Monthly*, 1860, and were reprinted, with additions, in 1861. It was in these Essays that the following widely-quoted passages first occurred: "We should advise Mr. Darwin to assume, in the philosophy of his hypothesis, that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines. Streams flowing over a sloping plain by gravitation (here the counterpart of natural selection) may have worn their actual channels as they flowed; yet their particular courses may have been assigned; and where we see them forming definite and useful lines of irrigation, after a manner unaccountable on the laws of gravitation and dynamics, we should believe that the distribution was designed. To insist, therefore, that the new hypothesis of the derivative origin of the actual species is incompatible with final causes and design, is to take a position which we must consider philosophically untenable. We must also regard it as highly unwise and dangerous, in the present state and present prospects of physical and physiological science. We should expect the philosophical atheist or sceptic to take this ground; also, until better informed, the unlearned and unphilosophical believer; but we should think that the thoughtful theistic philosopher would take the other side. Not to do so seems to concede that only supernatural events can be shown to be designed, which no theist can admit — seems also to misconceive the scope and meaning of all ordinary arguments for design in nature" (pp. 148, 149).

Article fifth, one of the most interesting of all; on "Squoia and its History: The Relation of North American to North-east Asian and to

Tertiary Vegetation," is the "Presidential Address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, at Dubuque, Iowa," 1872. The Articles on "The Attitude of Working Naturalists towards Darwinism," "Evolution and Theology," "What is Darwinism?" "Insectivorous and Climbing Plants," are from a weekly paper published, during the years, 1873, 1874, 1876. Article ix. is from *Nature*, 1874. The closing chapters of the volume, filling a space of fifty pages are entirely new.

A partial summary of the closing Essay on "Evolutionary Teleology," with some quotations, will reveal the spirit of the book, and, we have no doubt, whet the appetite of many a troubled reader. If any are disposed to banish theism from the realm of thought by means of modern science, they find themselves in this chapter "hoist with their own petard." The war is carried into the enemy's country after a manner that is refreshing. In our author's opinion, Darwin has "brought back teleology to natural history. In Darwinism, usefulness and purpose come to the front again as working principles of the first order" (p. 357). Darwinism does not involve the destruction, but only "the reconstruction of our consecrated ideas of teleology." The old statements of the doctrine of design in nature, are burdened with an accumulating quantity of objections, arising from the seeming wastefulness and imperfections and failures of nature. The burden of these objections, "which our fathers carried comfortably, has become too heavy for our shoulders."

"The error, as we suppose, lies in the combination of the principle of design with the hypothesis of the immutability and isolated creation of species. The latter hypothesis, in its nature unprovable, has, on scientific grounds, become so far improbable that few, even of the anti-Darwinian naturalists, now hold to it; and, whatever may once have been its religious claims, it is at present a hinderance, rather than a help, to any just and consistent teleology.

"By the adoption of the Darwinian hypothesis, or something like it, which we incline to favor, many of the difficulties are obviated, and others diminished. In the comprehensive and far-reaching teleology which may take the place of the former narrow conceptions, organs, and even faculties, useless to the individual find their explanation and reason of being. Either they have done service in the past, or they may do service in the future. They may have been essentially useful in one way in a past species, and, though now functionless, they may be turned to useful account in some very different way hereafter. In botany several cases come to our mind which suggest such interpretation.

"Under this view, moreover, waste of life and material in organic nature ceases to be utterly inexplicable, because it ceases to be objectless. It is seen to be a part of the general 'economy of Nature,' a phrase which has a real meaning. One good illustration of it is furnished by the pollen of flowers. The seeming waste of this in a pine-forest is enormous. It

gives rise to the so-called 'showers of sulphur,' which every one has heard of. Myriads upon myriads of pollen-grains—each an elaborate organic structure—are wastefully dispersed by the winds to one which reaches a female flower and fertilizes a seed. The vast superabundance of pollen would be sheer waste if the intention was to fertilize the seeds of the same tree, or if there were any provision for insect-carriage; but with wide-breeding as the end, and the wind which 'bloweth where it listeth' as the means, no one is entitled to declare that pine-pollen is in wasteful excess. The cheapness of wind-carriage may be set against the over-production of pollen.

"Similar considerations may apply to the mould-fungi and other very low organisms, with spores dispersed through the air in countless myriads, but of which only an infinitesimal portion find opportunity for development. In view of the large and important part they play (as the producers of all fermentation and as the omnipresent scavenger-police of Nature), no good ground appears for arguing either wasteful excess or absence of design from the vast disparity between their potential and their actual numbers. The reserve and the active members of the force should both be counted in, ready, as they always and everywhere are, for service. Considering their ubiquity, persistent vitality, and promptitude of action upon fitting occasion, the suggestion would rather be that, while

'Thousands at his bidding speed,
And post o'er land and ocean without rest,
They also serve [which] only stand and wait.'

"Finally, Darwinian teleology has the special advantage of accounting for the imperfections and failures, as well as for successes. It not only accounts for them, but turns them to practical account. It explains the seeming waste as being part and parcel of a great economical process. Without the competing multitude no struggle for life; and without this no natural selection and survival of the fittest, no continuous adaptation to changing surroundings, no diversification and improvement, leading from lower up to higher and nobler forms. So the most puzzling things of all to the old-school teleologists are the *principia* of the Darwinian. In this system the forms and species, in all their variety, are not mere ends in themselves, but the whole a series of means and ends, in the contemplation of which we may obtain higher and more comprehensive, and perhaps worthier, as well as more consistent, views of design in Nature, than heretofore. At least, it would appear that in Darwinian evolution we may have a theory that accords with, if it does not explain, the principal facts, and a teleology that is free from the common objections" (pp. 375-378).

"Natural selection is not the wind which propels the vessel, but the rudder which, by friction, now on this side and now on that, shapes the course. The rudder acts while the vessel is in motion, effects nothing when it is at rest. Variation answers to the wind; 'Thou hearest the

sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth.' Its course is controlled by natural selection, the action of which, at any given moment, is seemingly small or insensible; but the ultimate results are great. This proceeds mainly through outward influences. But we are more and more convinced that variation, and therefore the ground of adaptation, is not a product of, but a response to, the action of the environment. Variations, [£]—in other words, the differences between individual plants and animals, — however originated, are evidently not from without, but from within — not physical, but physiological" (p. 386).

Weighty as the following paragraph seems by itself, it is far more impressive as one reaches it in its natural order at the close of the book.

"We have been considering this class of questions only as a naturalist might who sought for the proper or reasonable interpretation of the problem before him, unmingled with considerations from any other source. Weightier arguments in the last resort, drawn from the intellectual and moral constitution of man, lie on a higher plane, to which it was unnecessary for our particular purpose to rise, however indispensable this be to a full presentation of the evidence of mind in Nature. To us the evidence, judged as impartially as we are capable of judging, appears convincing. But, whatever view one unconvinced may take, it cannot remain doubtful what position a theist ought to occupy. If he cannot recognize design in Nature because of evolution, he may be ranked with those of whom it was said, 'Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe.' How strange that a convinced theist should be so prone to associate design only with miracle!

"All turns, however, upon what is meant by this Nature, to which it appears more and more probable that the being and becoming — no less than the well-being and succession — of species and genera, as well as of individuals, are committed. To us it means 'the world of force and movement in time and space,' as Aristotle defined it — the system and totality of things in the visible universe.

"What is generally called Nature Prof. Tyndall names matter — a peculiar nomenclature, requiring new definitions (as he avers), inviting misunderstanding, and leaving the questions we are concerned with just where they were. For it is still to ask: Whence this rich endowment of matter? Whence comes that of which all we see and know is the outcome? That to which potency may in the last resort be ascribed, Prof. Tyndall, suspending further judgment, calls 'mystery' — using the word in one of its senses, namely, something hidden from us which we are not to seek to know. But there are also mysteries proper to be inquired into and to be reasoned about; and, although it may not be given unto us to *know* the mystery of causation, there can hardly be a more legitimate subject of philosophical inquiry. Most scientific men have thought themselves intellectually authorized to have an opinion about it. 'For by the primitive

and very ancient men it has been handed down in the form of myths, and thus left to later generations, that the *Divine* it is which holds together all nature.' And this tradition, of which Aristotle (both naturalist and philosopher) thus nobly speaks, continued through succeeding ages and illuminated by the Light which has come into the world, may still express the worthiest thoughts of the modern scientific investigator and reasoner" (pp. 389, 390).

G. F. W.

THE HOLY BIBLE ACCORDING TO THE AUTHORIZED VERSION (A.D. 1611); with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary, and a Revision of the Translation, by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M.A., Canon of Exeter, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. Vol. v. pp. 606. 1875; Vol. vi. 8vo. pp. 750. 1876. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co.

In the fifth volume of this work the Book of Isaiah is explained by W. Kay, D.D., Rector of Great Leghs; Jeremiah, by R. Payne Smith, D.D., Dean of Canterbury; Lamentations, by the same. In the sixth volume the Book of Ezekiel is commented on by G. Currey, D.D., Master of the Charter-house; Daniel, by H. J. Rose, B.D., Archdeacon of Bedford, and J. M. Fuller, M.A., Vicar of Bexley; Hosea and Jonah, by E. Huxtable, M.A., Prebendary of Wells; Joel and Obadiah, by F. Meyrick, M.A., Prebendary of Lincoln; Amos, Nahum, and Zephaniah, by R. Gandell, M.A., Laudian Professor of Arabic, Oxford; Micah, by the late Samuel Clark, Rector of Eaton Bishop; Habakkuk, by F. C. Cook, M.A., Canon of Exeter; Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, by W. Drake, M.A., Hon. Canon of Worcester. It may be said of all these commentators, that they write in good English; and this is no small praise. There is a remarkable degree of harmony in the views of all. The whole work, indeed, including the six volumes, is uncommonly self-consistent. It is easily read, and must be useful not only to clergymen, but to instructed laymen. Its learning is respectable, its taste admirable. Not grappling with the objections of unbelievers in the style of the German exegetes, it yet examines and refutes them in the style best suited to the ordinary scholar. When we think that we detect an error in the commentary, it is apt to be an error on the safer side. Absolutely, however, no error is safe.

LETTERS TO RADULPHUS ON THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE CREATION; together with other Treatises. By John Colet, M.A., afterwards Dean of St. Paul's. Now first published, with a Translation, Introduction, and Notes, by J. H. Lupton, M.A., Sub-master of St. Paul's School and late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. 8vo. pp. 320. London: George Bell and Sons. 1876.

John Colet was born in London, in the year 1466, and died Sept. 16, 1519, in the same city. He was a friend of Budaeus and Erasmus. He

was once Prebendary of York, then Canon of St. Martin's-le-Grand, London, and afterwards Dean of St. Paul's. Twenty-eight works (*libri*) came from his pen. Four of them were successively published in England, under the editorial supervision of Mr. Lupton, in the years 1867, 1869, 1873, and 1874. The present volume contains, in addition to the Letters on the Mosaic Creation, two (one English and one Latin) Expositions of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, supplementing a previous volume of lectures on that Epistle; a Latin treatise on "Christ's Mystical Body, the Church"; and a Latin Commentary on the First Epistle of Peter. Some of these treatises are unfinished. The last is not fully proved to be the work of Dean Colet. The Radulphus to whom the letters on the first of Genesis are addressed is supposed, or rather conjectured, to be Dr. Ralph Collingwood, Dean of Lichfield. Some of these letters are rather remarkable, as anticipating a style of thought which, four hundred years after they were written, has become very common. In various particulars the work is interesting, but is not what the Germans call "epoch-making." The spirit of Englishmen is far more honorable than that of Americans, in the liberality which the English manifest in republishing the writings of their fathers, and thus preserving their national character.

THE DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH, Exhibited and Verified from the Original Sources. By Heinrich Schmid, Doctor and Professor of Theology at Erlangen. Translated from the fifth edition by Charles A. Hay, D.D., Professor in the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, Pa., and Rev. Henry E. Jacobs, A.M., Professor in Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, Pa. 8vo. pp. 696. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. 1876.

This volume aims to exhibit the old theology of the Lutheran church. It corroborates the author's statements by copious citations from Melancthon, Chemnitz, Gerhard, Hafenreffer, Calovius, König, Quenstedt, Baier, and Hollazius. No one can doubt the value of the work. Calvinistic, as well as Lutheran, scholars peruse it with pleasure and profit. Professors Hay and Jacobs have been conscientious and faithful in their translation, and in the apparatus which they have added to the original treatise.

APOLOGETIC LECTURES ON THE MORAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY. Delivered in Leipsic, in the Winter of 1832, by Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Doctor and Professor of Theology. Translated from the German by Sophia Taylor. 12mo. pp. 415. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company. 1873.

These lectures are on (1) The Nature of Christian Morality, in which the connection between morality and religion is developed; (2) Man — a very instructive lecture; (3) the Christian and the Christian Virtues, which is one of the best in the volume, and, indeed, one of the best speci-

mens of Luthardt's general method of reasoning; (4) the Devotional Life of the Christian and his Attitude toward the Church; (5) Christian Marriage; (6) the Christian Home — a very excellent lecture; (7) the State and Christianity; (8) the Life of the Christian in the State; (9) Culture and Christianity; (10) Humanity and Christianity. These lectures are followed by a hundred and forty-six pages of notes, which are as interesting and instructive as the lectures.

A HISTORY OF THE COUNCILS OF THE CHURCH, from the Original Documents. By the Right Rev. Charles Joseph Hefele, D.D., Bishop of Rottenburg, formerly Professor of Theology in the University of Tübingen. Vol. II.: A.D. 326 to A.D. 429. Translated from the German, with the author's approbation, and edited by Henry Nutcombe Oxenham, M.A., late Scholar of Baliol College, Oxford. 8vo. pp. 503. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

A church council has its uses. Often it is the means of strengthening the bonds of Christian brotherhood, of so exciting the mental powers as to result in a decided mental progress, of eliciting the light of truth by the collision of mind with mind as of flint with steel. Often, however, its disputes alienate brother from brother; its excitements and its stratagems injure the tone of the intellect, as well as embitter the heart; its wranglings deepen prejudice, and thus darken rather than illumine the mind, retard rather than accelerate the advancement of sacred science. Dr. Hefele retains much of his faith in these councils. He deserves our gratitude for his faithfulness in detailing their history. His learned work is too well known to need our praise. It is a great work. We are happy to receive the second volume in an English translation. It will do good.

THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF REV. WILLIAM SPARROW, D.D., Late Professor in the Episcopal Theological Seminary of Virginia. By Rev. Cornelius Walker, D.D., Professor of Church History and Canon Law. Philadelphia: James Hammond. 1876.

Dr. Sparrow was of Irish extraction, though with very little of the typical Irishman, either in appearance or character. He was born in 1802, in Massachusetts; but he was taken by his parents, when but three years old, to Ireland, on their return to that country; and in Ireland, under the care of an accomplished teacher, he received his early training in the classics. On the return of his family to the United States, in 1817, they took up their abode in Utica, where he began, in his seventeenth year, his career as a school teacher. In 1819 he entered Columbia College, New York, where he remained until 1822, when he joined his family in Ohio. During his residence in New York, he attended the ministry of Dr. Milnor, then a leader in the evangelical revival in the Episcopal

church, and one of its most distinguished preachers. Bishop Chase was at that time organizing a school in Worthington, Ohio, and in this school Mr. Sparrow was enlisted. In 1826 he was ordained deacon, and, on the organization of Kenyon College, became one of its professors. There he remained during the period of the greatest prosperity, so far as concerns students, of that institution; and reluctantly, though no doubt wisely, consented, in 1834, to take a professorship in the Episcopal seminary near Alexandria, Virginia. For the Episcopal church the change was beneficial. At Kenyon, though he came in contact with a larger number of pupils, his relations with these pupils, from their very number, were more remote, and the topics he dealt with were mainly secular. At Alexandria there were assembled, on an average, forty theological students. Alexandria was the representative seminary of the evangelical school in the Episcopal church. At Alexandria, therefore, he took a leading part in the moulding of that school. For this task he had peculiarities of singular appropriateness.

The structure of his character and mind were such as peculiarly to fascinate those with whom he came in contact. Few men united more harmoniously dignity and humility. To any advancement of personal pretension he would never be a party. He could never be induced to make a speech, or, in the various ecclesiastical bodies of which he was a member, even to make a motion. In conversation, when there was a group around him, he rarely took the lead. His object seemed to be to elicit from others what they might be ready or able to say, never to shine himself; only taking his share when it devolved on him as a matter of courtesy, or when it was proper for the exposition of principles that he cherished. Yet when he talked, how greatly did this instinctive and courteous modesty add to the charm of what he said! A victim of constant headaches, often weary with labor and exhausted by debility, how perennial was the charm that hung about all he said, and how subtle, yet pervasive, the power which he thus exerted! In some intellectual characteristics not unlike Mr. Jefferson,—avoiding, like Mr. Jefferson, the position of a parliamentary leader; influencing the opinions of others by the pen and by conversation, as distinguished from the control exercised by a debater; having in ecclesiastical matters those bold liberal sympathies which marked Mr. Jefferson in political speculations,—Dr. Sparrow, in any orbit, would have exercised a powerful sway. The extent of this sway was only limited by the comparative smallness of the orbit. Yet even where he worked he worked effectively. A single school, in a church by no means the largest in Christendom, may seem not a great field for a man of rare intellectual power. But in this field Dr. Sparrow labored for nearly forty years; and, though his labors were not conspicuous in the public eye, to them what may be called the liberal evangelical school in the Episcopal church owes a large measure of its life.

Dr. Sparrow may be said to have united a horror of heresy with a sympathy for heretics. The result was, that his sympathy with heretics, arising from his love of freedom and the interest he felt in all intellectual movements, caused his horror of heresy to be sometimes misunderstood, and doctrinal laxity to be unfairly imputed to him. So far as concerns himself, his convictions were definitely those of a liberal evangelism,—liberal, in all matters of polity,—evangelical, in holding the doctrines of grace. Butler's Analogy was the book he most delighted to teach. It was to Butler he traced most of his intellectual and religious convictions. It is remarkable that, as from Hegel two distinct schools took origin,—the liberal and the conservative Hegelians,—so from Butler have emanated two schools so widely separated as those represented by Dr. Newman and Dr. Sparrow. Each, following Butler, took probability as a guide; but the one used probability as the guide to determine what is the church by which each action is dictated; while by the other probability is taken as the guide to determine each particular action which in itself controls the church.

In many respects the biography before us is calculated to interest not only those within, but those without, the Episcopal church. Dr. Sparrow's letters, which are numerous, though not always exhibiting the sparkle that made his conversation so delightful, and though necessarily failing to preserve that flavor of exquisite modest delicacy which belonged to his manner, have, nevertheless, great literary, as well as historical value. However much we may question his views with regard to the liberty given by the Episcopal canons, it is impossible not to be struck with the wisdom displayed by him in respect to the practical issues by which the Episcopal church has been from time to time agitated. Eminently is this shown in his letters on the Cummins secession. Dr. Walker's part of the work deserves almost unqualified commendation. It would have been better for the sale of the book had he given us full names, instead of initials, when printing Dr. Sparrow's letters; since even to those who knew Dr. Sparrow best, the initials cast a cloud on much of the text. But this is a trifle; and it remains to be said that Dr. Walker has given us a biography which, for literary finish, for good sense, and for the justice it does to its subject, is unsurpassed in recent religious literature. w.

DOORS OUTWARD. A Tale. By the Author of the "Win and Wear" Series. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 12mo. pp. 404. 1875.

This is a well written and entertaining story. That it is of equal merit with some of the author's other books which we have read we hardly dare affirm; yet we think it altogether superior to the great majority of books for the young.

PRINCIPIA ; OR, BASES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. Being a Survey of the the Subject from the Moral and Theological, yet Liberal and Progressive, Stand-point. By R. J. Wright. 8vo. pp. 524. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company. 1875.

This volume has some features which are agreeable to us. It recognizes theology as an important guide in social science. It is pervaded by a religious spirit. It opposes some of the hurtful tendencies of Herbert Spencer's, Comte's, and Mill's speculations. Some of its theories, however, we cannot sanction. Many of its statements on communism are objectionable. The spirit of the volume is better than the details of it.

RITUALISM DETHRONED AND THE TRUE CHURCH FOUND ; or, The Divine Life in all the Christian Ages most revealed in those Churches and "Martyrs of Jesus" that have witnessed against a Ceremonial and Sacramental Law. (A Plea for Christian Liberty, Christian Union, and the Higher Christian Life.) By Rev. William B. Orvis, Author of "Christ Coming in his Kingdom"; formerly Editor of "People's Preacher and Christian Era," "Western Independent," etc. 12mo. pp. 351. Philadelphia: Henry Longstreth. 1875.

While entirely willing to admit that a disproportionate importance has often been attached to certain outward religious rites, we yet cannot give up our belief that certainly two such rites — baptism by water and the Lord's supper — are prescribed in the scriptures, and ought to be retained. At the same time, should there come into existence a body of Christians whose peculiar characteristic was the disuse of these rites, we do not know that they either would or should be, on that account, excluded from Christian fellowship. Any book whose aim is to do away with ritualism, however, as that term is ordinarily understood, would, if it were well written, meet with our approval.

We do not see how it necessarily follows from the truth, which is most willingly conceded, that Christianity is a system of ethics, a religion of love, a spiritual religion, that, therefore, no external rites can properly be supposed to belong to it. Such rites may have it for their intended effect, and for their real effect, to form the character of Christians to a more perfect harmony with the spirit of their religion. Because the worship of the spirit is indispensable, it by no means follows that the activity of the spirit must never manifest itself in an external form. We hesitate decidedly to accept the unqualified assertion that "it is not possible for a spiritual dispensation to require an external rite" (p. 25).

It does not seem to us quite certain that, if all ritualism should forever cease to exist, sectarianism would wholly disappear. We will not now contend for the position that sectarianism within certain limits is productive of good, and that there must be heresies in the church; but we fear that the church will always be split into sects. Let them contend for what

they conceive honestly to be elements of the faith once delivered to the saints; eschewing, however, with all care, as they may well enough do, all animosity and bitterness.

Baptism, it is insisted upon with much earnestness, originated as far back as the days of Moses; and hence all Christians who observe this rite are in a ritual bondage to Judaism. We have not, however, found in this book any adequate reason given why the rite of baptism — a rite, certainly, of interesting and important significance — ought not to be used by Christians, even though it did originate in the days of Moses.

It is said that "ritualism is unfitted to the millennium, and therefore is unfitted to that (Christianity) which is preparatory to the millennium." This is not conclusive reasoning. Judaism is unfitted for a Christian age; while yet it was preparatory to that age; and Judaical rites were suited to the period of Judaism, and ought to have been observed. The present period is preparatory to that of the millennium; and rites may be suited to it as a preparatory period, which when the millennium comes will be given up.

This book is written in an earnest and apparently conscientious spirit. We should have been a good deal more pleased, if we did not think there was reason to consider the larger part of its quotations from the Fathers and from older writers as being second-hand.

PLATO'S BEST THOUGHTS. Compiled from Professor Jowett's Translation of the Dialogue's of Plato. By C. H. A. Buckley, A.M., Professor in Faith Training College, Boston, Mass. 8vo. pp. 475. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company. 1876.

The fact that the "Thoughts" in this volume are arranged in the alphabetical order (not always exact, however) removes, or at least lessens, the need of an index. The cross-references enable the reader to arrange many of the "Thoughts" in systems by themselves. In order to fully enjoy these "Thoughts," one needs an insight into the spirit and genius of Plato; and with such an insight the volume affords an exquisite pleasure. Prof. Buckley has had a pleasing work to perform, and has performed it well.

THE KING'S HIGHWAY; or, The Catholic Church the Way of Salvation, as Revealed in the Holy Scriptures. By the Rev. Augustine F. Hewitt, of the Congregation of St. Paul. 12mo. pp. 292. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1874.

This book, we are told in the preface, was written expressly for the benefit of that class of Protestants, that is to say, New England Calvinists, among whom the author, who is a son of the late Rev. Dr. Hewitt of Bridgeport, Ct., was brought up. We are afraid that the success of the work will not equal the author's expectations, if these are at all sanguine. The excessive positiveness of many of his statements as to the rapidly

approaching downfall of the Protestant theology is pardonable on the ground of Mr. Hewitt's being a somewhat recent convert to Romanism. When Mr. Hewitt writes another book, he should not forget that there is an important difference between assertion and proof; and that arguments are divisible into two classes, those which are conclusive and those which are not so, and that only the former class are of any worth. We might be accused of Machiavelism if we should express the hope that young converts to the Romish faith will continue to write books against Protestantism, and that they will take pains to put these books, if possible, into the hands of Protestant theologians. They will in this way greatly further the cause of truth.

THE MINISTRY OF THE WORD. By Wm. M. Taylor, D.D., Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City. 12mo. pp. 318. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph and Company. 1876.

Dr. Taylor's style is easy, flowing, familiar, conversational. His thoughts are sound, in the general very pertinent. He brings into view the experience of the recent British pulpit, and thus gives a freshness to our Homiletic literature. In this particular he has a marked advantage over the native American ministers. A Briton as he is, he has an important service to perform for the American pulpit, and his present volume evinces his power to perform it. The fifth, sixth, eighth, and twelfth Lectures in the volume, on the Qualities of Effective Preaching—in the Sermon, and of an Effective Sermon—in the Preacher; on the Use of Illustrations in Preaching, and on the Relation of the Pulpit to Present Questions, are particularly apposite to the wants of an American pastor. We are happy to see that Dr. Taylor has appended to his volume a valuable Index of ten pages; also a list of Biblical passages to which he has made reference.

GOD'S WORD THROUGH PREACHING. The Lyman Beecher Lectures before the Theological Department of Yale College (Fourth Series). By John Hall, D.D. 12mo. pp. 274. New York: Dodd and Mead. 1875.

Soberness of thought, clear views of truth, practical sagacity, and an excellent Christian spirit characterize this volume. We will give a few specimens of Dr. Hall's familiar style.

Pastoral Visitations.—A preacher ought to know his people. "How can he know them? New-Year calls and visits of ceremony are good as far as they go; but they do not go far enough. Men are 'on their manners' at such times. Weddings and social meetings are a little better, for there men relax; but they have their drawbacks. People do not go to evening parties to meet their clergymen, and be 'edified.'

They go to enjoy; and the average clergyman is rather afraid of the imputation of talking 'shop,' and rather ambitious of being seen as the generally well-informed man. I do not blame him for this. A clergyman ought not to be conspicuously behind any whom he meets, as a courteous, intelligent, agreeable gentleman. He may not have time or inclination to go much into society; but it is as well that it should be known that he is a 'pleasant man to meet,' when he can afford it — neither a recluse, nor a boor, nor a Diogenes in his tub, ordering everybody 'out of his sunshine.' To make the acquaintance of his people a clergyman must go to their homes, see the family where the family lives, and converse with them in the freedom of their own homes" (pp. 35, 36). "For many years I pursued, in common with many of my British brethren, the habit of mentioning from the pulpit the streets or localities in which visits would be made on particular days. This secured the presence of most of the family, and, among plain people, a certain preparation. I see no objection to this plan anywhere. I wish we could have it, for the sake of thoroughness, and as a check on desultory 'calling.' One of the best clergymen I ever knew, and one of the noblest of men, the late Dr. Urwick, Congregational minister in Dublin, had his congregation arranged alphabetically, and his announcements ran thus: 'I hope to visit on Monday the families from G. to I.' This plan entails some loss of time, as distinguished from the neighborhood method, as the 'G's' might be widely scattered" (p. 37).

Dogmatic Theology. — "It is the fashion to decry theology in our time. The opponents of that noble science mean no harm. They only do not understand. What they cannot bear is metaphysical or speculative hair-splitting, on the one hand, or on the other, sharp-cut, clear statement and defense of truths they do not like. Let a man put his theology into attractive forms, and they will tolerate it; or let their own views be urged forcibly by a trained dialectician, and they make no objection. We can no more have exact religious thinking without theology, than exact mensuration or astronomy without mathematics, or exact iron-making without chemistry. The puddlers at Pittsburgh would probably think a technical disquisition on the methods of desulphurizing iron ore a tedious business; but some one must master the chemistry of iron and steel making, or it will not go forward. Let there come along an earnest, plain-spoken, clear-brained man, who can put the technical chemistry into their own tongue, and illustrate it by effective experiment before their eyes, and he will interest any body of iron workmen in America. A plain man told Dr. Dabney that the reason John Randolph was so appreciated by the common people was, 'Because Mr. Randolph was so instructive; he taught the people so much which they had not known before.' So it will always be. Men object to what they do not understand or do not like in theology. Be you diligent, patient students of it, that you may put its exact truth in intelligible forms, and teach the people knowledge, Eccl. xii. 9" (pp. 91, 92).

Repetition in Sermons. — “I would almost venture to put among the elements of preparation for preaching some little experience in teaching. A superficial person is apt to suppose that to tell a thing once is sufficient for all purposes. A thoughtful person knows the contrary; knows that in the common affairs of life we often repeat and reiterate the instructions we wish to be remembered and acted upon. So a thoughtful teacher soon finds; and one of the main objects of the preacher is to teach. The teacher varies his phraseology, puts his points variously, asks questions, illustrates, suggests, employs shifts and expedients to insinuate definite ideas into the mind. A brilliant and successful advocate once told me that it was idle to suppose that one simple didactic statement would reach the understanding of the men on a jury. ‘I never assume anything of the sort,’ said he; ‘I go over the same ground again and again, not always in appearance, varying the language and mode of presenting the idea, until no more can be said about it.’ And we must remember that twelve jurymen, on oath to decide justly, may be supposed to have their faculties on a tenser strain, and their intelligence higher than the average of an ordinary mixed congregation. Men find this out practically in teaching; and so not only because a minister is all the better for having some practical knowledge of the teaching — for Sabbath-school and other purposes — but because teaching is so essential an element in good preaching, a little experience in practical instruction is to a candidate for the ministry a substantial advantage” (pp. 100–102).

BANCROFT’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Centenary Edition.

Our readers need not be informed that this edition of Mr. George Bancroft’s celebrated work is published, in six duodecimo volumes, by Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, Massachusetts; that it is thoroughly revised and obviously improved. Mr. Bancroft, while the American minister at the Prussian Court, enjoyed various advantages for augmenting his previously extensive acquaintance with the facts of our Revolutionary history. No previous writer has had access to so many and such valuable documents relating to that history as have fallen under the eye of the author of these volumes. The present edition will not altogether supersede the former; for it does not contain the references and foot-notes which added so much to the value of the larger edition. The larger edition, however, does not contain the results of the author’s more recent investigations, and is not written in a style so chaste, succinct, and animating as the present. Few historians have been so signally favored as Mr. Bancroft in ability to reach the sources of information, to continue one line of research from early manhood until a ripe old age, to communicate a vast wealth of knowledge in a vigorous, lively, and often captivating style. It is remarkable that the stream of his narrative can remain

so clear, while it is often so impetuous. Our former objections to some parts of his work are lessened by the phraseology of the present edition. We trust that he will prosecute still further his researches into the history of our country, since he has many facilities which are possessed by no other man for such a purpose.

THE PROTECTION OF MAJORITIES; or, Considerations relating to Electoral Reform. With other Papers. By Josiah Phillips Quincy. 16mo. pp. 163. Boston: Roberts Brothers.

This finely printed volume contains essays on The Protection of Majorities; Coercion in the Later Stages of Education (this coercion is decidedly and too indiscriminately condemned); The Function of Town Libraries; The Abuse of Reading (many valuable remarks are made here); The Better Samaritan (written in an irreverent style). The first of these essays exhibits the evils of our caucus system, and deserves an extensive circulation.

THE SILENT HOUSE. By Rev. E. P. Tenney. Congregational Publication Society. pp. 156. 16mo. 1876.

Drelincourt's celebrated "Meditations on Death and Eternity" Mr. Tenney's volume often quotes, and often surpasses. Pungency of thoughts and expression, great appositeness of citations, and profound spirituality of tone give to this work a high rank and permanent value. c.

POEMS. By Christina G. Rossetti. 12mo. pp. 300. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1876.

This is the author's edition, revised and enlarged. Many of the poems are exquisitely beautiful. Miss Rossetti has not only a decidedly lyrical talent, but a highly diversified one. Some of her devotional pieces exhibit sound thought, as well as poetic genius.

ARISTOPHANES' APOLOGY: including a Transcript from Euripides; being the Last Adventure of Balaustion. By Robert Browning. 12mo. pp. 324. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1875.

This appears to be intended as a sequel to a poem published several years ago, and entitled "Balaustion's Adventure." We suppose it must have some definite scope and aim; but if so, great pains have been taken to keep them concealed. There may possibly be a class of minds whom it will please and interest. To that class we do not belong.

LITERATURE OF THE METHODISTS.

This great denomination is making rapid progress in literary culture, as well as in numbers. We are compelled to abridge some notices, which we had hoped to insert in a more extended form, of several volumes published by scholars and divines of this powerful sect. First among them all is to be mentioned the

CYCLOPAEDIA OF BIBLICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND ECCLESIASTICAL LITERATURE. Prepared by the Rev. John M'Clintock, D.D., and James Strong, S.T.D. Vol. VI. (ME—MN). 8vo. pp. 997. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1876.

Published by the Methodists, this cyclopaedia may very properly pay special attention to those topics which are peculiarly interesting to that denomination. It may also, without giving any reason for complaint, defend the tenets of the Methodists, and oppose the tenets of other sects. Other denominations may, if they can, publish their own cyclopaedias. We must say, however, that the work now under review is uncommonly liberal and catholic. We seldom read an Article in it which seems to us unfair. The Article on Inability, in the fourth volume, we do not regard as exactly right; and still it is excusable, and is one exception to the general character of the work. Its general character is that of candor and accurate learning. All denominations of Christians may derive much pleasure and profit from the Cyclopaedia. In some respects it is unequalled. Its origin and much of its value may be traced to the enterprise and culture of the man whose memoir is noticed below.

LIFE AND LETTERS OF THE REV. JOHN M'CLINTOCK, D.D., LL.D., Late President of Drew Theological Seminary. By George O. Crooks, D.D. 12mo. pp. 410. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1876.

Dr. M'Clintock was born in Philadelphia, October 27, 1814, and died March 4, 1870, in the fifty-seventh year of his age. He was a man of erudition and public spirit, a theologian and an orator. He was eminently useful, not only to the church, but also to the state; not only at home, but also abroad. This memoir is highly interesting, especially as detailing his labors in connection with the Cyclopaedia, the Methodist Quarterly Review, the pulpit of New York, and also of Paris, France.

A HUNDRED YEARS OF METHODISM. By Matthew Simson, D.D., LL.D., one of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church. 12mo. pp. 369. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1876.

This volume is designed "to give the general reader a glance of what Methodism is, and what it has accomplished during the century." Every distinct class of Christians may learn much from it, as also from the following volume, which is published by the same Houses:

METHODISM AND THE CENTENNIAL OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE; or, The Loyal and Liberal Services of the Methodist Episcopal Church during the First Century of the History of the United States. By Rev. E. M. Wood, Ph.D. 12mo. pp. 414.

In the thirteenth chapter, entitled "Liberality of Doctrine," it is stated that the Formula of Faith presented for the Methodists in England is the same with that of the Episcopal church; but for the American Methodists

Mr. Wesley amended the Thirty-nine Articles. "When the candidate comes forward for full admission he is asked to assent to this general formula of faith, the Articles of Religion, very much as a member of the Evangelical Alliance is asked to subscribe to its general formula. He is not asked whether he believes in any emphasized doctrines of the Wesleyan theology or not, and for even disbelieving these he is not liable to excommunication. True, he can be expelled for 'sowing dissensions in the Society by inveighing against' the doctrines of the church; but this does not refer so much to the kind of opinions held as to the spirit and manner of holding and disseminating them" (p. 301).

Similar in design to the two preceding volumes, but giving more of the details of the Methodist system, and exhibiting great candor, is the following work, from the same press:

METHODISM AND ITS METHODS. By Rev. J. T. Crane, D.D., of the Newark Conference. 12mo. pp. 395.

THE CHINESE PROBLEM. By L. T. Townsend, D.D. 16mo. pp. 86. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1876.

The author of this volume is the Harris Professor of Practical Theology in the Boston University. He published, in 1871, a volume entitled "Credo" (16mo. pp. 444). The four principal chapters of this work are devoted to the Supernatural Book, Supernatural Beings, Supernatural Life, and Supernatural Destiny. In 1873 he published a volume entitled "Lost Forever" (16 mo. pp. 448). This is an able defence of the doctrine of eternal punishment. Other works of Professor Townsend are entitled, "The Arena and the Throne," "The Sword and the Garment," "God-Man," "Real and Pretended Christianity," "Outlines of Theology." The last three of these books we have not seen; the first two are sprightly and interesting. The present work is devoted to the practical question: What shall be done in regard to the immigration of the Chinese into our country? Professor Townsend gives many thrilling descriptions of the barbarity with which the Chinese are treated in California, criticises with deserved severity the action of some American politicians, and gives various reasons for not opposing the advent of the Chinese to our shores. He closes his exciting book with these words: "Let our entire country arise from its immoral and unchristian practices; let California adopt liberal educational measures, and infuse intelligence into her heathen masses; let her instruct them by example and precept in the simple yet eternal truths of Protestant Christianity,—then we shall have heard the last bitter complaint and curse against this donation of one of the oldest civilizations of the world to our own populations; and the peculiar and perplexing Chinese problem will be solved in harmony with the principles of our Christian faith, and, if we mistake not, in accordance also with the sublime purposes of Him who is now preparing to give the light of the gospel to all nations of the earth" (p. 86).

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